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FEDERICO ("FRED") CHEEVER (1957-2017)
BRUCE P. SMITHt
The Denver Law Review's first issue of Volume 95 honors the
memory of Professor Federico ("Fred") Cheever, who served with great
distinction on the faculty of the University of Denver Sturm College of
Law from 1993 until his tragic passing in June 2017. As the following
testimonials reveal, Fred had a colossal and life-changing impact on his
many colleagues, students, and friends throughout the Rocky Mountain
West and further afield. He was also a strong and long-standing supporter
of the Denver Law Review, and it is thus particularly fitting that his legacy
be honored in its pages.
During his twenty-four years on the University of Denver faculty,
Fred contributed his immense talents and energies across the University's
entire enterprise. As a law professor, he was an innovative interdiscipli-
nary scholar, a brilliant and revered teacher, and a treasured colleague and
friend. He was also a respected and influential mentor, particularly to stu-
dents and alumni in the environmental and natural resources area. As the
law school's Associate Dean for Academic Affairs from 2009 to 2013, he
played a vital role in developing Denver Law's pioneering and highly suc-
cessful experiential learning initiative. He also made significant and en-
during contributions at the University level, co-founding (and later chair-
ing) the University's Sustainability Council (in which capacity he pro-
moted campus energy efficiency, environmentally-sound transportation
methods, and waste reduction) and more recently serving as a member of
the Chancellor's Enhancing Sustainability Task Force (which seeks to ad-
vance the University of Denver to a position of national leadership in cam-
pus sustainability). In the broader community, Fred served on the boards
of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation and Transportation So-
lutions, and he represented environmental groups in cases under the En-
dangered Species Act, the National Forest Management Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act, and the Wilderness Act, among other environ-
mental laws.
Having joined the University of Denver in July 2016, I had the priv-
ilege of sharing a faculty with Fred for only one year. But I felt that I had
known him much longer and more deeply. In some respects, I had. At my
prior institution, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Fred was
t Dean and Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. An earlier version
of this essay was delivered at a memorial service at the University of Denver on July 2, 2017.
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the brilliant entry-level cross-disciplinary scholar who "got away"-a
hugely promising job candidate, for whom the charms of the Illinois prai-
rie simply could not trump his beloved Rockies. As a new dean, I relied
disproportionately on Fred-for his wisdom, for his rock-solid institu-
tional values, and for his incredible ability to understand the perspectives
of others. (And I must confess that, on some days, the mere sound of his
voice and laugh outside my office would draw me out, simply to be in the
field of his magnetic presence.)
As a scholar, Fred possessed an uncanny capacity to recognize, un-
derstand, and transcend boundaries-legal boundaries, disciplinary
boundaries, and natural boundaries. With respect to legal boundaries, he
comprehended-perhaps better than any legal scholar of our Age-the
ways that four distinctive bodies of law (public lands law, land use con-
trols, conservation law, and environmental law) have worked together to
shape the history and landscape of the Mountain West. In terms of disci-
plinary expertise, his reach was similarly breathtaking, ranging well be-
yond law into geology, ecology, botany, history, ethics, and literature.
(Fred was as conversant with the Engelmann spruce, Gambel oaks, and
Ponderosa pine as he was with the conservation easements that protected
them.) And Fred possessed an unparalleled understanding of what he
styled our "landscape of borders"-places where the pristine natural world
rubbed up against the lived experience of humans-sites such as his be-
loved Roxborough State Park in Douglas County, Colorado, which he en-
joyed hiking and about which he wrote so eloquently. (As Fred once wrote,
in his marvelously understated way: "There is some quality about a sunny
morning at Roxborough that I value ... more than, say, a morning at a
shopping mall.")1
But unlike many lovers of the natural world, Fred also had the capac-
ity to draw upon both idealism and realism. In some respects, it was this
combination of passion and pragmatism that truly set his vision apart. My
former colleague Eric Freyfogle, Swanlund Emeritus Professor at the Uni-
versity of Illinois, a coauthor with Fred on the inaugural casebook in the
field of wildlife law,2 and, like Fred, one of that field's most distinguished
scholars, described Fred's distinctive vision this way:
As a wildlife scholar, Fred Cheever had few peers, largely because,
better than others, he mixed vision, ethics, and passion with solid sci-
ence [and] with a keen sense of the practical. What he saw and yearned
for, what he labored long to bring about, was a world in which wildlife
and people thrived together, forging and sustaining complex commu-
nities of life that, he hoped, might flourish for generations. We needed
1. Professor Federico Cheever, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law, Toward a Bigger Picture:
Law and Nature on the Wildland-Urban Border, Lecture at Mercer University (Nov. 2005) (transcript
available at http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/cheever.html).
2. DALE D. GOBLE, ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ERIC BIBER, FEDERICO CHEEVER & ANNECOOS
wIERSEMA, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2016).
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humility and restraint to get there, Fred knew well, and he told us so.
We also needed practical guidance for the path ahead, and he offered
it, again and again. His hope and fine character infuse his abundant
scholarship. [And] they will live on together.3
Like many, I have struggled to come to terms with this incredible
loss. Grief takes us down different paths. My journey led me to Henry
David Thoreau-a writer whom Fred admired, whom he quoted, and with
whom he shared much in common. A love of nature, to be sure. But also
a passion for books; a penchant for bread making; a preference for human
locomotion over mechanized transportation; and a conviction that we all
exist on this earth to effect beneficial and enduring change.
In the concluding chapter of Walden, Thoreau reflects on the lessons
learned from his grand "experiment"-his two years at Walden Pond, by
the edge on an extensive New England woods, against the backdrop of the
Green Mountains. He distilled his learning this way:
I learned . . . that if one advances confidently in the direction of his
dreams, and endeavors to live the life which he has imagined, he will
meet with a success unexpected in common hours. He will put some
things behind . . . [but] he will live with the license of a higher order
of beings.4
Like Thoreau, Fred Cheever "lived the life that he imagined"-one
distinguished by conviction, courage, idealism, pragmatism, empathy, and
love. Within the environmental and natural resources community,
throughout the Rocky Mountain West, and for the students, alumni, fac-
ulty, and staff of the University of Denver whose lives he graced, he will
always be remembered amongst the highest order of beings.
3. E-mail from Eric Freyfogle, Swanlund Emeritus Professor, Univ. of Ill., to Bruce Smith,
Dean, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law (July 1,2017,4:35 MDT) (on file with author).
4. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 303 (Beacon Press 1997) (1854).
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LOYAL FRIEND, DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR, AND DEVOTED
CONSERVATIONIST: THE LEGACY OF FRED CHEEVER
SUSAN DAGGETTt & JUSTIN PIDOTtt
When news of Fred Cheever's death spread among his peers in the
legal academy, the outpouring of sentiment was swift and sustained. He
had a broad reach. He offered himself boundlessly. The stories related by
friends and colleagues across the country, both those who had known Fred
for years and those who had met him only once, affirm our own experience
of Fred. He lived an examined, intentional life. His curiosity knew no
limit. He carefully chose the things he valued, and lived those values every
day.
Summing up a life as rich and multifaceted as Fred's is impossible.
Instead, we offer reflections from the two of us on themes that we saw in
our interactions with Fred. These reflections are not all profound; some try
to capture Fred's playfulness. Our friendships with Fred differed in dura-
tion and context. Yet in talking together about Fred, how he affected us,
and how we will try to carry on where he left off, these themes emerged.
We offer them here in hopes that they will kindle recollections and reflec-
tions among others who were graced by Fred's presence.
Physical Place
JUSTIN. Upon meeting Fred, I could sense his palpable love of the
history of the places that were important to him. I first encountered him
when I came to Denver to interview for a teaching job. At the conclusion
of a day's worth of interviews, Fred was tasked with driving me to and
from a dinner with several people who would become my future col-
leagues. The dinner was pleasant, although because it came at the end of a
long day, I don't specifically remember what we talked of. I can't forget,
however, the delight Fred took at touring me through downtown Denver
on his way to drop me off afterwards. The fifteen-minute drive from Lar-
imer Street to the hotel turned into nearly an hour as we meandered by
buildings and public art. I saw the Denver Gas and Electric Building, the
giant blue bear peering into the convention center, the alien-like dancing
figures on Speer Boulevard, the downtown light rail stations, the Tenth
Circuit courthouse, city hall, and the capitol. I'm sure there were more.
After each destination, he would exclaim that there was one more sight I
just had to see. I particularly remember him describing the manner by
which the federal land survey shaped downtown; with development prior
to the survey running parallel to the river, and that occurring subsequently
t Executive Director, Rocky Mountain Land Use Institute.
tt Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
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according to the cardinal directions. I remember Fred commenting that the
resulting forty-five-degree shift in perspective running through the city re-
mains a testament to the relationship between early federal efforts to map
the West and the built environment.
SUSAN. Fred's love of the West was a defining, and carefully culti-
vated, aspect of his being. Raised mostly in New York (with a stint at
boarding school in New England), he struck out for college in California
and never looked back. He adopted the West as his chosen homeland, and
loved this place-and particularly its rivers-with a passion. He spent a
lifetime studying its history and culture, exploring its remote corners,
fighting to protect its precious resources, and teaching others about the
laws that govern it. One of the hallmarks of his early career as a public
interest litigator for Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (SCLDF) (later
Earthjustice) was his work to protect Western rivers and the ancient desert
fish that once thrived there. My earliest memories of him go back almost
thirty years to a rafting trip that he helped lead for young law students
interning at SCLDF, part of his quest to share the enchantments and les-
sons of our Western landscapes with other newcomers to the region. It is
no surprise that, when planning a celebration of family milestones, he was
drawn to the Green River as a place of refuge and inspiration, and that his
preferred family vacation involved rafting into the most remote reaches of
Colorado. I hope he recognized his own role and enduring legacy in help-
ing to protect that particular place for future generations.
Scholarly Commitment
JUSTIN. There is a tradition among law professors that the first foot-
note in an article includes a thanks to those who read your work. Other
academic disciplines have similar traditions. I routinely thank the handful
of people to whom I have sent a working draft. Reflecting upon this prac-
tice, I see how thoroughly it undervalues some vital contributions, includ-
ing those of Fred. Fred received his share of thanks in my footnotes, rep-
resenting the occasions I sent him my prose and asked him to share his
thoughts. But I often didn't avail myself of this opportunity, although I
knew he would never have refused to read my work. For every paper I
wrote, however, and for many ideas that I have not yet written, at some
point I would spring into his office with cluttered thoughts and an inkling
of an academic article I might like to pursue, or a case I might like to bring,
or something I might like to write for the popular press. And in a calm,
supportive, and ever curious fashion, Fred would drop whatever other
work he was doing and help me sort myself out. Invariably, I would leave
with a list of books or articles to read-and more importantly-Fred would
impart to me some of his vast knowledge and wisdom.
SUSAN. Fred's academic scholarship is legendary. He was brilliant.
And prolific. And a real leader in thinking about land conservation. For
me, however, he was a mentor and teacher, helping me to find my way in
6 [Vol. 95:1
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the academic world. We first met when I was a summer intern in the Den-
ver office of SCLDF. A quarter-century later he recruited me to the Uni-
versity of Denver (DU) to run the Rocky Mountain Land Use Institute.
More advocate than academic, I needed a lot of guidance in how to think
about my new role, how to develop a course curriculum, and how to teach
others about land use in the West. He was there for me every step of the
way, offering advice when I asked for it and providing a sounding board
whenever I needed to brainstorm or think out loud about some (potentially
ill-advised) new idea. When I wondered how to handle a particularly vex-
ing problem, I turned to Fred. When I was tempted to dream big about
some new project, I turned to Fred. And when I wanted to complain about
a disappointment, I turned to Fred. Sometimes we went for coffee. More
often than not, he lingered outside my door on his way to or from his of-
fice, sometimes multiple times a day. He always had time to listen, he
asked the perfect questions to help me find the right decisions for myself,
and he offered encouragement and support unconditionally. Although the
quintessential scholar himself, one of his real gifts was in cultivating the
scholar in others.
Living Sustainability
JUSTIN. Fred's biking outfit was, for me, one of the most visible man-
ifestations of his dedication to sustainability. Most mornings, Fred would
arrive at the law school clad in spandex, a biking shirt, and a bit of sweat.
Before heading to his office, he would often take a lap around the fourth
floor, seeing who was about and greeting those he happened upon with a
contagious smile and often an invitation to talk about, well, just about
whatever occupied the mind of his conversant. Sometimes these conver-
sations lasted. All the while law students scurried by a bit perplexed by
Fred's attire. While I hesitate to imbue this almost-daily ritual with an out-
sized importance, it reminded me, and I think others too, that the grand
ideas we have about sustainability have humbler but equally important
counterparts. Fred's view of sustainability was not dogmatic. It allowed
both for vegetarianism as a means of reducing our impact on the planet,
and an occasional burger. He sought to transform the world, and us, his
fellow travelers, through acceptance and compassion, not judgment or
shame.
SUSAN. More than just about anyone I know, Fred lived his values.
His passion for protecting the West translated into personal routines cen-
tered on gardening, cooking, biking, and living lightly on the planet in
countless other ways. That passion drove him to advocate relentlessly
(some would say) for sustainability at DU. He founded the Sustainability
Council a decade ago to serve as a vehicle for students, faculty, and staff
to come together and to push the university to embed sustainability into its
operations, and he was the Sustainability Council's most ardent member,
serving as chair for many years. In that capacity, I watched him use his
72017]
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advocacy skills to great effect, doggedly pushing the DU Trustees and ad-
ministration to step up their commitment to sustainable practices. He was
charmingly persuasive most of the time, using his winning smile and soft
humor to bring others around. However, he didn't hesitate to adopt a sharp
tone in his critique, when necessary, and he famously and frequently
voiced concerns on behalf of others with less power. His final accomplish-
ment-and one that I'm sure meant the world to him-was getting a com-
mitment from the DU Board of Trustees, the day before he died, to step up
DU's efforts on sustainability.
Our lives are richer for knowing Fred. He left us better teachers,
scholars, mentors, friends, and citizens of the world. Fred had an unflag-
ging faith that conversation and connection could lead to change. In dis-
cussing thorny questions about wilderness areas, and what it means to
leave nature untouched in an era where humans have reshaped the natural
world, he once wrote that "[fjor years, I have shied away from discussions
of the meaning of wilderness. I am not alone in doing this. I feared that he
elusiveness of wilderness may lead good-hearted skeptics to conclude that
it was an illusion, a sham, a sanctimonious pretext for depriving federal
land management agencies of discretion. However, . . . I decided that I
have been wrong to avoid the subject. We need to talk about wilderness
far more than we have."' Fred had a way with words. He believed in their
power. We will keep faith with that vision.
1. Federico Cheever, Talking About Wilderness, 76 DENv. U. L. REv. 335, 336-37 (1999).
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GREGORY J. HOBBS, JR.t
SIMPLE TALK
Spilling themselves in the sun bluebirds
wing-mention their names all day. If everything
told is so clear a life, maybe the sky would
come, maybe heaven; maybe appearance and
truth would be the same. Maybe whatever seems
to be so, we should speak so from our souls,
never afraid, "Light" when it comes,
"Dark" when it goes away.
William Stafford, western poet
Simply speaking, Fred Cheever devoted his most observant work to
the creatures, peoples, and landscapes of the West. A problem solver, he
was never afraid to lead from his soul and his intellect in law practice,
teaching, writing, and in helping students navigate into the profession and
the communities they would serve.
It's tragic but fitting he passed before us in the late spring of the year
2017 on the Green River inside Dinosaur National Monument. Earlier in
the year, he'd traveled to Patagonia with his beloved wife, Mary, celebrat-
ing in the hemisphere of the Southern Cross his Sixtieth birth year. With
their daughters, Elizabeth and Laurel, in early June they launched into the
Gates of Lodore running the traces of John Wesley Powell. They were
heading downriver for Echo Park where the Green and Yampa Rivers join
within Dinosaur.
THE CREATURES
As a lawyer with the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Fred helped
with a lawsuit leading to the 1994 critical habitat designation for conser-
9
t Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., a Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court from May 1, 1996, to Au-
gust 31, 2015, served with Professor Cheever as Co-Director of the Environment and Natural Re-
sources Program at University of Denver Sturm College of Law beginning in September of 2015.
I. William Stafford, Simple Talk, in OREGON MESSAGE (1987).
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vation of the endangered Colorado River fishes-the endangered razor-
back sucker, pikeminnow, humpback chub and bonytail chub.2 The Green
and Yampa Rivers are essential components of the fishes' habitat. Two
years later as a University of Denver law professor in a 1996 law review
article centering on its recovery provisions, Fred re-characterized the En-
dangered Species Act as a "problem-solving" statute, instead of the pro-
ject-stopper others criticized the Act for being:
[A] new emphasis on the concept of recovery can help us reconceive
the act in a way that better addresses the dynamics of extinction and
reestablishes its role as a problem-solving law .... The concept of
recovery has provided the courts with an interpretive key, linking the
terms of the Act with its purpose: the conservation of species and the
ecosystems on which they depend.3
His 1996 law review analysis tapped familiarity with the upper Col-
orado River endangered fishes recovery planning process. Commenced
in the mid-1980s, this partnership brought the states of Colorado, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming together with federal agencies and water and
environmental interest groups. Unprecedented in its big river system
reach, this novel alliance focused on means to conserve and recover the
fishes without presuming to rearrange the water allocations preserved to
the states under the 1922 Colorado River Compact and 1948 Upper Basin
Compact. The recovery-plan umbrella covered all existing depletions to
river water plus an increment of additional depletions, subject to an annual
finding of sufficient progress.
Primary measures evolved to include habitat restoration, operation of
reservoirs for instream flows as well as their other uses, control of non-
native fish that prey on the endangered fish, design of water diversion de-
vices for fish passage, and, when indicated, introduction of hatchery-bred
natives to encourage sustainable populations in the wild. Adjustments to
the program continued to occur through monitoring and responsive actions
in consultation with the many interested participants.
In a 2016 statement reflective of Fred's view of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service "remains convinced that the
best chance for success, i.e., recovery, results with this collaborative Re-
covery Program."6
2. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Critical Habitat for the
Colorado River Endangered Fishes: Razorback Sucker, Colorado Squawfish, Humpback Chub, and
Bonytail Chub, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374 (Mar. 21, 1994) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
3. Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endangered
Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 10, 48 (1996).
4. Id. at 70-71.
5. See Noreen E. Walsh, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL 2015-
2016 ASSESSMENT OF SUFFICIENT PROGRESS UNDER THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER ENDANGERED





Not just once in his lifetime did Fred pull on the oars of history. In
the early twenty-first century, he helped San Luis Valley descendants of
Mexican land-grant settlers regain their valuable easements rights in a
large tract of Sangre de Cristo mountain land Jack Taylor bought in 1960
and closed off to access.The descendants ued for rights of entry their an-
cestors exercised for over a hundred years. They lost in Colorado district
court and the court of appeals.
A good argument before the Colorado Supreme Court must resonate
in the facts and law of the case. The court welcomes amicus'briefs,-espe-
cially when they assist with the broader ramifications of the dispute and
bring expertise to bear on the issues appealed. By then a nationally-recog-
nized expert in real property law, Fred worked with the Hispanic Bar As-
sociation to craft influential amicus briefs in the two Lobato decisions the
court issued.
In Lobato I,8 the court had before it the meaning of an 1863 document
written and recorded by Carlos Beaubien, owner of the grant.9 It confirmed
rights of access to common lands of the Sangre de Cristo Grant to settlers
receiving deeds to their farmsteads ("varas") on the grant: "[A]ll the in-
habitants will have enjoyment of benefits of pastures, water, firewood and
timber, always taking care that one does not injure another."'0
A year later, Beaubien sold a large portion of the mountain tract to
William Gilpin (who had just stepped down as Colorado's first Territorial
Governor). The 1864 Beaubien-Gilpin agreement contained a condition
confirming that "settlement rights before then conceded ... to the residents
of the settlements . . . shall be confirmed by said William Gilpin as made
by him."" Finding the 1863 Beaubien document ambiguous about which
lands these rights of access applied to, the court construed the Gilpin
agreement o include the immense mountain tract he was purchasing.12
Chief Justice Mullarkey's opinion singled out the hefty assistance the
amicus briefers brought to the court's work:
It would be the height of arrogance and nothing but a legal fiction for
use to claim that we can interpret this document without putting it in
its historical context . .. We agree with the amici. From the trial court
findings, expert testimony, the documents associated with the grant,
and a review of the settlement system under which Beaubien and the
settlers were operating, we draw two conclusions. First, we conclude
7. Lobato v. Taylor (Lobato 1), 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002); Lobato v. Taylor (Lobato II), 70
P.3d 1152 (Colo. 2003).
8. 71 P.3d 938.
9. Id. at 946-47.
10. Id. at 943.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 947, 949-50.
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that the location for the settlement rights referenced in the Beaubien
Document is the mountainous area of the grant on which the Taylor
Ranch is located. Second, we conclude that Beaubien meant to grant
permanent access rights that run with the land.'3
The court relied on Colorado state law, not Mexican law, in giving
effect to the Beaubien and Gilpin documents, as well as access on the
mountain lands exercised by land grant settlers and their descendants for
over a hundred years.14 Although the Mexican Government made the grant
to Beaubien's predecessors to attract settlers, they moved into the upper
San Luis Valley after the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 15 On April
10, 1852, Hispano settlers on the Sangre de Cristo grant commenced con-
struction bf the San Luis People's Ditch, which predates the 1861 creation
of blorado Territory and remains the oldest irrigation water right in Col-
orado in continuous use.16 The 1863 Beaubien and 1864 Gilpin documents
followed the 1861 creation of Colorado Territory.
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision held in favor of three kinds
of implied rights of access across a 77,000 acre stretch of the Taylor Ranch
under Colorado law: a prescriptive easement, an easement by estoppel, and
an easement from prior use for grazing, firewood, and timber.'7 These are
valuable "dominant" rights in subservient lands otherwise held in fee sim-
ple ownership. Such rights were absolutely essential to settlement of Col-
orado and the West. For example, they included irrigation ditch rights-of-
way necessary for the diversion and conveyance of water from the streams
across intervening public and private lands to its place of use.'8 The San
Luis farmers could not graze their animals on irrigated cropland without
destroying critical food supplies, nor did the San Luis Valley's high alpine
desert environment support forest growth for timber and firewood harvest-
ing. Instead, they depended upon Sangre de Cristo forested mountain lands
just as Beaubien and Gilpin knew they had to.' 9
Lobato II20 ruled that landowners enjoyed these access rights if set-
tlement of their property occurred at least at the time of William Gilpin's
13. Id. at 947-48.
14. See id at 946.
15. See id at 946 n.4, 955.
16. See id. at 952 n.9.
17. See id. at 946.
18. Lobato I cites the court's irrigation ditch right-of-way servitude case Yunker v. Nichols for
the proposition that "water rights are necessary for enjoying land." Id. at 953 (citing Yunker v. Nichols,
I Colo. 551, 554 (1872)). Lobato I goes on to explain that the law will imply grant of an easement for
ditch construction, maintenance and use arising out of "pre-existing and higher authority of laws of
nature, of nations, or of the community to which the parties belong." Id. (quoting Yunker, 1 Colo. at
554).
19. For an excellent in-depth analysis of a San Luis Valley Hispano settlement centered upon
its acequia culture, see Gregory A. Hicks & Devon G. Pefia, Community Acequias in Colorado s Rio
Culebra Watershed: A Customary Commons in the Domain ofPrior Appropriation, 74 U. COLO. L.
REv. 387 (2003).
20. 70 P.3d 1152 (Colo. 2003).
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ownership.21 Fred was an expert in real property servitudes and easements.
His heart must have flown like a bluebird when he read these two supreme
court decisions, for he could see therein the handiwork of generations so
clearly told, upheld.
THE LAND
Fred was an ardent student of the West's public lands-in particular
the 14 million acres of national forest lands existing within the state of
Colorado. His article about the 2002 Hayman wildfire southwest of the
Denver metropolitan area, the worst in Colorado's history, explores its
multiple causations: (1) Terry Barton's liability in starting it, (2) a long
tradition of Forest Service fire-suppression policy, (3) climate change im-
pacts, and (4) local land-use decisions allowing residential construction
22
within the forest interface. This fire took a month to suppress, burned
nearly 138,000 acres, destroying 133 homes, a commercial building, and
466 other structures; it was fortunate that no one died because of it.2 This
article is remarkable in both its content and tone, thoughtful without hurl-
ing invective at individuals and governments
At the outset, Fred gives credit to the expertise of Dr. Stephen Pyne,
"[O]ur greatest chronicler of the historical and social aspects of wild-
fire." 2 4 "Fire," Fred says, "is one of the consistent forces shaping life on
this planet. It is ubiquitous, powerful, frequent, and inevitable ... many
policy makers still desperately want fire to be unforeseeable."2 5
A Forest Service employee, Barton set fire to a letter from her es-
tranged husband, left the scene of the fire ring she had used thinking the
letter was no longer burning, and soon turned back only to find the forest
uncontrollably burning. She reported the fire, made up a story about dis-
covering it, then recanted and admitted her role in igniting it. Convicted in
state and federal court, she incurred six years in federal prison and a $14
million restitution order for re-vegetation of the forest.
Fred questions why Barton stands alone as a foreseeable cause of the
Hayman Fire: "Terry Barton's act was a catalyst that transformed reality,
a summoning of forces. Her burnt letter was a necessary but certainly not
a sufficient condition for what followed." 26 He points to other significant
causal chains: "Climate change increased the probability of ignition out-
side the fire ring and the rapid spread of the fire. Forest Service fire sup-
pression policy increased the fuel available to feed the fire... . Residential
development in the wildland urban interface dramatically increased the
21. Id.at1156.
22. Federico Cheever, The Phantom Menace and the Real Cause: Lessons from Colorado's
Hayman Fire 2002, 18 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 188, 191, 193-94 (2010).
23. Id. at 185-86.
24. Id. at 186.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 196.
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damage the fire could cause."2 7 He calls for balance in our perspective and
actions. Forests must play a significant role in capturing carbon and wild-
fire is a natural part of the life cycle of forests. While the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice "has generally gotten the rap as the great hoarder of forest fire
fuels[J" the transformation of private land from farms and pastures to
wooded subdivisions has added to the fuel load.28
He urges us to rethink "[t]wo uniquely American conditions [that]
distort our view." 29 The federal government is responsible for the forest
and private land-use regulation is a matter of purely local concern.30 In-
stead of invoking jurisdictional boundaries, we should act and work with
each other as part of the same community. We have a responsibility "to
modify human behavior in ways that will create a substantial likelihood of
improving human welfare" and we have to stop "thinking about fire as the
unforeseeable calamity or the curable disease rather than part of the fabric
of life itself."31
We should look to our forested watersheds and interact with federal,
state, and local authorities to cultivate remedial relationships implement-
ing effective measures, instead of depending upon lawsuits for sorting out
issues of damages or invoking sovereign immunity as a shield against their
imposition.
CONCLUSION
This is vintage Fred Cheever, writing-teaching and out in this great
land among us. He's about recovering our ability to problem-solve. We
will miss him greatly, of course we will. But, his compassionate resolute
way of doing his part and urging us on to ours shines in the light.
27. Id. at 201.
28. Id. at 204.
29. Id. at 207.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 210.
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MARTIN J. KATZt
Fred was a mythical figure at Denver Law. Truly. I arrived at the
school in the fall of 2000, while Fred and his family were overseas on
sabbatical. From the first day I arrived, people would say, "You have to
meet Fred. He is the greatest." He was billed as the greatest mentor, the
greatest teacher, the greatest scholar, and the most thoughtful addition to
any endeavor we might be contemplating. As the accolades for Fred-in-
absentia piled up, I became convinced that Fred did not actually exist;
that he was a mythic hero created by my colleagues to describe their ide-
al of the law professor. And I bought into the myth. We should all aspire
to those qualities.
Sure enough, Fred did exist. He returned to the law school one day,
and poked his smiling face into my office to introduce himself. And I
quickly understood why his colleagues loved and respected him so much.
He was all they said he was, and more.
There is so much to say about Fred's contributions to our school.
But I will focus on three.
First, he was an amazing mentor and friend. From the perspective of
an individual faculty member, this was an incredible blessing. But from
the perspective of our community, it is important to understand that Fred
served these roles for so many of us. And by doing so, he set an example
for all of us-a mythic ideal. At times when a colleague was in need,
even if I felt overwhelmed with other obligations, Fred's example would
often cause me to step up and help. It was infectious in the best of ways.
Second, Fred was often the glue that held our faculty together. Fac-
ulty politics can be intense (an understatement). Our law faculty is won-
derful. They are smart and highly dedicated. But they can also occasion-
ally be divided over issues that are extremely important to them and of-
ten to our school. On those occasions, it is sometimes easy to focus on
the division and the rightness of one's cause. To make these debates
healthy and constructive, rather than destructive, it is important to have a
leader who subtly but steadfastly reminds us of our ideals and provides
perspective on what is most important-including our common values
and the bonds of our community. So often, Fred was that leader. I know
that others will step up to play this role in his absence. But they will have
big shoes to fill.
t University of Denver Chief Innovation Officer and Senior Advisor for Academic Innova-
tion and Design, Former Dean of the Snrm College of Law, and Professor of Law.
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Third, Fred was one of the best associate deans that I can imagine.
As dean at the time, I feel amazingly lucky to have had the opportunity
to work with Fred in this role. But Fred's impact went far beyond our
small office. His work in this role had a positive and lasting impact on
our school and on legal education across the nation.
His work as associate dean always began with humility, curiosity,
and love. He continually sought to learn about every person, every job,
and every system at the law school. He had long applied this curiosity in
his scholarly work and in his voracious approach to reading. Yet, when
he turned it to the law school, two great things happened. First, he under-
stood the law school and its workings-its soul-in a way that few oth-
ers have ever done. Second, he made the people who work and study
here feel truly understood and appreciated. We always knew that we had
a champion in Fred. He brought out the best in so many of us.
Fred's deep understanding of our school, combined with his unwa-
vering commitment to fairness and excellence, resulted in some of the
most thoughtful and innovative policies in the nation. For example, he
constructed a workload policy that aligned our most important re-
source-our faculty's time and energy-with our values and our strate-
gic plan. Instead of allocating teaching relief haphazardly, Fred's policy
made sure that teaching relief went to those who had carried the highest
teaching loads in prior semesters, those who were our most productive
scholars and innovative teachers, and those who contributed most to our
school through their service. The policy provided "Credit Hour Equiva-
lents" or "CHEs" to these hard-working faculty members, which could
be accumulated and later used for teaching relief. (We still joke that CHE
stands for "Cheever Credits.")
This workload policy produced great benefits at our school. I be-
lieve that policy (in addition to Fred's enthusiastic support for our faculty
and students) played a significant role in the progress our school made
while he was associate dean. During that time, our faculty's scholarly
productivity doubled, innovative course offerings proliferated, and we
were able to offer a full year of experiential learning to every one of our
students. These things could not have happened without Fred.
Upon seeing the accomplishments at our school, many deans across
the country wanted to know our secrets. So often, the answer was an
initiative that Fred had created. Because Fred believed in the power of
open-source administration, he willingly shared his thoughtful ideas and
policies with deans and associate deans across the country, and many
U.S. law schools have now adopted similar policies. In this way, Fred not
only helped our school; his legacy lives on in legal education in our
country.
In all of these ways, Fred-though very real-lived the life of a
mythical figure. He exemplified compassion, curious humility, excel-
16 [Vol. 95:1
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lence, fairness, and a strong dedication to our community and the people
who work and study in that community. At the personal level and at an
institutional level, he made our lives so much better. I miss him.

PROFESSOR FRED CHEEVER-BELOVED TEACHER AND
TRUSTED ADVISOR
BRITTANY WISERt
I was deeply touched to find out that the Denver Law Review is ded-
icating its first issue to our beloved teacher and trusted advisor, Professor
Federico Cheever, who passed away on June 10, 2017, while vacationing
with his family in his home state of Colorado.
Professor Cheever was universally adored by his students. I am
grateful that I had the opportunity to be one of them. From the moment
Professor Cheever walked into my first-year Property class with a beam-
ing smile on his face and an "I V Property" mug in his hand, the entire
class was drawn to his compassionate demeanor and contagious enthusi-
asm for the law. At that moment, we knew nothing about adverse pos-
session, easements, or the rule against perpetuities, however, we all knew
one thing beyond a shadow of a doubt-by the end of the semester, we
would love Property, too.
Sixteen weeks and one ten-hour take-home exam later, the class was
even more enamored with our funny, brilliant, and humble professor than
before. It was blatantly obvious that one class with Professor Cheever
would not be enough. Some students, even those pursuing careers in
corporate or criminal law, enrolled in his Federal Wildlife and Public
Lands courses, while others followed Professor Cheever to the Denver
Law Review.
It's true, I wrote onto the Denver Law Review largely because of
Professor Cheever's involvement as a faculty advisor. He was an enthu-
siastic supporter during my 2L year as a Staff Editor, and during my 3L
year, he was the guiding light that helped me navigate my role as Editor
in Chief. When the journal secured a prestigious author or met a publica-
tion deadline, Professor Cheever was my go-to cheerleader who celebrat-
ed our success. And when it felt like the weight of the world was on my
shoulders, Professor Cheever was my go-to confidant who helped carry
the burden. When current law review editors ask for advice and guid-
ance, I still find myself thinking "Oh, you should ask Professor Cheever
about that." I truly don't know what I would have done without him.
Professor Cheever profoundly impacted my life, as he did the lives
of all his students. Therefore, I know I speak for all of Professor Cheev-
T Associate attorney at Otten Johnson Robinson Neff + Ragonetti PC. Brittany currently
serves on the Sturm College of Law Alumni Council and the Denver Law Review Advisory Board.
While in law school, she served as the Editor in Chief of the Denver Law Review for Volume 93.
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er's students when I say thank you. Thank you for teaching us, thank you
for inspiring us, and thank you for making the world a better place.




In August 2013, the Syrian government fired roughly fifteen rockets
with a deadly chemical agent onto its streets, killing hundreds and
wounding thousands. After the United States threatened to intervene mil-
itarily in Syria, the Syrian government agreed to sign the Chemical
Weapons Convention and destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles. But
Syria violated the terms of the Convention on April 4, 2017, when it
launched another deadly chemical attack on its people. In response, the
United States fired fifty-nine rockets at a Syrian airbase to warn Syria
that its use of chemical weapons would not be tolerated. When the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council is either deadlocked by a veto or simply
unwilling to intervene, what actions can an individual country take to
halt gross violations of human rights? This Article asserts that under the
emerging "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine, the United States' missile
strike was legal-and morally required-under international law.
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INTRODUCTION
It was April 4, 2017, and the war in Syria raged on. The sleepy,
rubble-ridden streets of the city of Khan Sheikhoun awoke to face anoth-
er, day with the hope that maybe, somehow, today would be different.
And it was. As the sun peaked over the bomb-blasted skyline of her re-
bel-held hometown, a fourteen-year-old girl walked to school and felt her
eyes sting as she saw a "yellow mushroom cloud" erupting from the blast
a few dozen yards away.' She saw people rush out of their cars to help
the wounded, but they collapsed almost immediately.2 They convulsed,
gasped for their last breaths, and died.3 Nearby, a young father clutched
his twin toddlers in his arms and kissed their lifeless bodies goodbye.
It was April 4, 2017-almost four years after the Syrian government
released its first major chemical weapons attack on its people-and
again, accusations of the dropping of a toxic chemical agent spread.5
Shortly after the first rockets hit, a hospital in the region treating the vic-
tims was also bombed.6 The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) began collecting samples and evidence to determine
whether chemical weapons were in fact used, and if so, what specific
agent was utilized.7 The World Health Organization and Doctors Without
Borders,8 two prominent organizations that have been working on the
ground for several years now, stated that the attack likely involved a
.1. Anne Barnard & Michael R. Gordon, Worst Chemical Weapons Attack in Years in Syria;




4. See Sarah El Deeb, A Father Bids Farewell to Twin Toddlers After Syria Attack,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 5,2017), https://www.apnews.com/039901baa62d4486afd2a3054123f7c7.
5. Syria Conflict: 'Chemical Attack' in Idlib Kills 58, BBC (Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter
'Chemical Attack' in Idlib Kills 58], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39488539.
6. Syria 'Chemical Attack' Down to Assad, US Says, BBC (Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Down
to Assad], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39493854.
7. See Press Release, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons [OPCW], OPCW
Press Release on Allegations of Chemical Weapons Use in Southern Idlib, Syria (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-press-release-on-allegations-of-chemical-weapons-use-in-
southern-idlib-syria.
8. Medicins Sans Frontieres, or Doctors Without Borders, is an international medical human-
itarian organization that provides impartial medical assistance in more than sixty countries to people
whose survival is ravaged by natural and manmade disasters. History & Principles, MEDICINS SANS
FRONTIERES, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/about-us/history-principles (last visited Sept.
16, 2017).
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chemical agent, such as sarin,9 based on the symptoms exhibited by the
victims: choking, paralysis, foaming at the mouth, no external injuries,
and pupils as small as a pinpoint.'0 It is estimated that at least 92 people
were killed, including 30 children, while hundreds were injured."
The international community immediately pointed the finger at Syr-
ian President Bashar Al-Assad for the attackl2 and blamed his Russian
ally for protecting him.' 3 British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson stated
that the attack "bears all the hallmarks" of the Assad regime and that
Britain "will continue to lead international efforts to hold perpetrators to
account."'4 Britain appealed to "the Security Council members who have
previously used their vetoes to defend the indefensible" and urged Rubsia
and China not to block any actions sought against the Assad govern-
ment.1s U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that President Assad
operates "with brutal, unabashed barbarism."'6 He also criticized Russia
for being either "complicit" or "incompetent" in ensuring the removal of
chemical weapons from Syria.17
Both Syria and Russia shirked responsibility. Russia blamed an air-
strike on a rebel-held storage facility allegedly housing the chemical
weapons, but rebel leaders maintained that they lacked the capability and
capacity to produce nerve agents.'t At an emergency United Nations
Security Council meeting on April 5, 2017, the Syrian representative to
the United Nations asserted that the Syrian government was not respon-
sible and had complied with all of its obligations under the Chemical
9. Sarin is a nerve agent that blocks the "proper operation of an enzyme that acts as the
body's 'off switch' for glands and muscles. Without an 'off switch,' the glands and muscles are
constantly being stimulated. Exposed people may become tired and no longer be able to keep breath-
ing." Sarin (GB), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/facts.asp (last updated Nov. 18, 2015). It is the "most
volatile" of all nerve agents because it is colorless, odorless, and "can easily and quickly evaporate
from a liquid into a vapor and spread into the environment." Id.
10. Louisa Loveluck & Zakaria Zakaria, World Health Organization: Syria Chemical Attack
Likely Involved Nerve Agent, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-blames-syrian-rebels-for-devastating-chemical-
attack-in-northern-town/2017/04/05/bal73c76-196a-lle7-8598-9a99da559f9estory.html; see also
Barnard & Gordon, supra note I (stating that doctors found victims with "pinpoint pupils" that
"characterize nerve agents and other banned poisons").
11. OLE SOLVANG, DEATH BY CHEMICALS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 21 (May 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/05/01/death-chemicals/syrian-governments-widespread-and-
systematic-use-chemical-weapons.
12. Down to Assad, supra note 6.
13. Syria Chemical 'Attack': Russia Faces Fury at UN Security Council, BBC (Apr. 5, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39500319.
14. The Latest: Russian Says Rebel-Held Town in Syria Exposed, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 5,
2017), https://www.apnews.com/69edel 0b25e542268ebd5fbflfe0fa42.
15. Id.
16. Down to Assad, supra note 6.
17. Abigail Williams, Secretary Tillerson on Russia: 'Complicit or Simply Incompetent' on
Syrian Chemical Weapons, NBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2017, 2:15 AM),
https://www.nbenews.com/news/world/secretary-tillerson-russia-complicit-or-simply-incompetent-
syrian-chemical-weapons-n743686.
18. Loveluck & Zakaria, supra note 10.
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Weapons Convention (CWC).19 Britain, France, and the United States
put forward a resolution condemning the attack and calling for an inves-
tigation, but Russia vetoed the resolution as "unacceptable."20 U.S. Am-
bassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley took a firm stance against
Russia's repeated protection of Syria and issued the following warning:
"When the United Nations consistently fails in its duty to act collective-
ly, there are times in the life of states that we are compelled to take our
own action. For the sake of the victims, I hope that the rest of the Coun-
cil is finally willing to do the same."2 1
Two days after the attack, the United States launched a missile at-
tack that sent fifty-nine rockets to the air base in Syria from which the
United States claimed the chemical weapons were fired.22 Ambassador
Haley justified the strike at the U.N., stating: "The moral stain of the
Assad regime could no longer go unanswered. His crimes against hu-
manity could no longer be met with empty words. It was time to say
'enough'-but not only say it. It was time to act."23 The United States
was praised by its allies, including Germany, Britain, and France,24 but
the Syrian government decried the attack as "reckless, irresponsible be-
havior" and stated that the United States was "naively dragged in by a
false propaganda campaign."2 5 Russia, as well as other non-permanent
members of the Security Council such as Bolivia, sharply criticized the
attack, calling it a violation of Syria's sovereignty, "an act of aggression
against a sovereign state delivered in violation of international law under
a far-fetched pretext" and suspending the "deconfliction channel" that
was created to prevent unintentional encounters between U.S. and Rus-
sian forces operating within Syria.26 Russian and Syrian officials alleged
that nine civilians, including four children, as well as six servicemen
were killed in the U.S. missile strike and that only twenty-three of the
fifty-nine rockets hit their targets and destroyed six planes.27
19. U.N. SCOR, 72nd Sess., 7915th rntg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7915 (Apr. 5, 2017).
20. Russia: Proposed U.N. Syria Resolution Based on "Fake Information," REUTERS (Apr. 5,
2017, 7:18 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-zakharova-idlNKBN1771 OP.
21. U.N. Doc. S/PV.7915, supra note 19.
22. Syria War: US Launches Missile Strikes in Response to 'Chemical Attack,' BBC (Apr. 7,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39523654.
23. Bill Chappell, Russia Says U.S. Broke International Law in Striking Syria, Citing 'Pre-
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/russia-says-u-s-broke-international-law-in-striking-syria-citing-pretext.
24. Chiara Palazzo & Peter Foster, 'Assad Bears Full Responsibility': How the World Reacted
to Donald Trump's Missile Strike on Syria, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 7, 2017, 6:37 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/07/us-air-strike-syria-world-reacted-donald-trumps-
decision-intervene.
25. Harriet Alexander, Danny Boyle & Barney Henderson, US Launches Strike on Syria -
How It Unfolded, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 7, 2017, 5:44 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/07/us-launches-strike-syria-unfolded.
26. Chappell, supra note 23.
27. Alexander, Boyle & Henderson, supra note 25.
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To what extent was this use of force permitted under international
law? When the world fails to act collectively, how far can an individual
state go to fight against such brutality? These same questions were
posed in August 2013, when the Syrian government under President As-
sad released rounds of the chemical agent sarin on its people.28 Hundreds
of civilians, including children, died and thousands were injured.
2 9 The
Syrian government denied responsibility,3 0 and the U.N. Security Coun-
cil was incapable of acting because China and Russia vetoed every reso-
lution. 1 The United States then threatened to act on its own and conduct
a targeted military strike to render Syria incapable of using chemical
weapons, but when Syria agreed to sign the CWC and rid the country of
its chemical stockpiles, it appeared that such a military strike was unnec-
32essary.
In 2013, if Syria had not acceded to the CWC, would the United
States have been able to conduct its military strike legally under interna-
tional law? Four years later, because Syria ostensibly violated multiple
provisions of the CWC, particularly Article I (prohibiting the develop-
ment, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and requiring their de-
struction) and Articles IV and V, and committed a crime against humani-
ty, did the United States act legally when it took military action against
Syria without the approval of the United Nations? The U.N. Charter,
developed in response to the horrors of World War II, enables a state to
use force against another only with the Security Council's approval or if
the attacking nation is acting in self-defense. These requirements up-
hold the ideals of a country's sovereignty. But in the face of gross hu-
manitarian violations, what happens when the Security Council is dead-
locked and fails to act? The U.N. Charter does not provide any other
means by which a country, whether alone or in a group,34 can take mili-
28. Rep. of UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the
Syrian Arab Republic, In 27-29, U.N. Doc. A/67/997-S/2013/553 (Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter U.N.
Mission Report].
29. Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, BBC (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23927399.
30. Id.
31. See Syria Resolution Authorizing Military Force Fails in U.N. Security Council, CBS
NEWS, (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:48 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-resolution-authorizing-
military-force-fails-in-un-security-council [hereinafter CBS NEWS].
32. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Statement by the President on Syria (Aug. 31, 2013)
[hereinafter Statement by the President on Syria] (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria); Barack Obama,
President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria (Sept. 10, 2013)
[hereinafter Remarks by the President] (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria).
33. U.N. Charter art. 42, 51.
34. Article 53 allows regional organizations to take military action, but this still requires
Security Council approval. U.N. Charter art. 53, T 1. There have been instances, however, when ex
post facto authorization has occurred. Inger Osterdahl, Preach What You Practice. The Security




tary action without Security Council approval, and no Article in the
Charter specifically mentions humanitarian intervention.35
In the U.N. report on the investigation of the 2013 alleged chemical
weapons use in Syria, former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated:
"The international community has a moral responsibility to hold ac-
countable those responsible and for ensuring that chemical weapons can
never re-emerge as an instrument of warfare."36 From the lessons learned
through Kosovo, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, is there a "responsibility
to protect" norm that now permits a country or the international commu-
nity, to act unilaterally-without U.N. authorization-to halt human
rights violations? This Article utilizes the United States' attempt to inter-
vene in Syria as an example to demonstrate how, under the emerging
'responsibility to protect" doctrine, the United States, or any individual
state, may be permitted to use military force against Syria in response to
its use of chemical weapons.
Humanitarian intervention is defined simply as the threat or use of
coercive action for the purpose of protecting or assisting people at risk.37
Another classic definition is the "threat or use of armed force by a state,
a belligerent community, or an international organization, with the object
of protecting human rights."3 8
This Article will analyze humanitarian intervention through the
framework developed by the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was created in 2000 in response to
35. T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust Peace-
keeping, 25 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002). The General Assembly, however, passed the
"Uniting for Peace" resolution, stating that when the Security Council fails to fulfill its primary
responsibility of maintaining peace, the General Assembly will take on such a responsibility. See
Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law 3
(2008), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufpe.pdf.
36. Note by the Secretary-General, Report on Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in
the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, U.N. Mission to Investigate Allegations of the
Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/67/997-S/2013/553 (Sept.
16, 2013) [hereinafter Note by the Secretary-General] (emphasis added).
37. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT, at VII (2001) [hereinafter ICISS].
38. Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD 217, 217 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974). "Humanitarian Intervention" has been defined in
similar ways. For example, one definition is "the justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting
the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the
limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice." Ocran, supra note 35,
at 8 (quoting E. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (1931)); Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, The Customary
International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N.
Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 204 (1974). Although this type of intervention is thought of
primarily as military, it may also include material assistance (providing food, medical supplies, etc.)
and economic sanctions. Ocran, supra note 35, at 8. Another, broader definition is limited to the
instances when a state "unilaterally uses military force to intervene in the territory of another state
for the purpose of protecting a sizable group of indigenous people from life-threatening or otherwise
unconscionable infractions of their human rights that the national government inflicts or in which it
acquiesces." David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U.
TOL. L. REV. 253, 264 (1992).
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former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's plea to the international
community to develop responses to grave human rights violations.
39 The
Canadian government initiated the Commission, comprised of represent-
atives from Australia, Algeria, Russia, South Africa, Germany, Philip-
pines, Switzerland, Guatemala, India, and the United States.4 0
Part I of this paper will provide a brief history of the use of chemi-
cal weapons in Syria. Part H will examine the details of the broader Syri-
an conflict and the state's human rights responsibilities under interna-
tional law. Part III will then discuss the United States' inability to act
through collective action under the U.N. Charter. Part IV will analyze the
self-defense claim as another mechanism for attack. Finally, Part V will
explore the United States' responsibility to protect through the three-
prong doctrine laid out by ICISS: responsibility to prevent, responsibility
to react, and responsibility to rebuild. Under this doctrine, the United
States was permitted to launch a limited military strike in Syria without
Security Council approval to halt the gross violations of human rights.
Hindsight is twenty-twenty, but the world can learn from the past to pre-
vent tragedy in the future. When the world has witnessed a blatant recur-
rence of human rights violations, it must act to prevent history from re-
peating itself.
I. HISTORY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN SYRIA
On August 21, 2013, at least fifteen rockets exploded on the streets
of Syria.4 1 Videos showed dozens of bodies with no external injuries
lying lifeless in the streets, in clinics, and in mosques.4 2 Adults and chil-
dren convulsed and gasped for air, choking on their own saliva as their
mouths foamed and fluids ran from their eyes and noses.4
3 Based on the
size and trajectory of the rockets' remnants, the United States and Hu-
man Rights Watch" accused the Syrian government of launching the
*45
attack and using the chemical agent sarin on innocent civilians.
Syrian President Assad denied responsibility: "How is it possible
that any country would use chemical weapons, or any weapons of mass
39. ICISS, supra note 37, app. b at 81.
40. Id. app. a at 77-79.
41. Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, supra note 29.
42. Id.
43. Id.; Barnard & Gordon, supra, note 1.
44. Human Rights Watch is an independent organization that focuses on researching and
advocating against various human rights violations. It monitors conditions in eighty countries and
publishes its findings in numerous reports and news releases. See Frequently Asked Questions, HUM.
RTS. WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/node/75138#3 (last visited Sept. 16, 2017).
45. See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Gov't Assessment of the




1; Syria: Government Likely Culprit in Chemical
Attack, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/10/syria-
government-likely-culprit-chemical-attack.
2017] 27
28 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1
destruction, in an area where its own forces are located? . . . This is pre-
posterous! These accusations are completely politicized .... 46 Tnstead,
the Syrian government, along with its Russian ally, blamed rebel forces
for the attack and for attempting to spur a U.S.-led invasion.4 7 The Unit-
ed Nations led an independent investigation48 on site,49 conducting nu-
merous interviews with survivors5 0 and medical personnel," obtaining
medical52 and environmental3 samples, and documenting ammunitions.54
It then released a report confirming that, chemical weapons, including
sarin, had been used between the parties in Syria.
Britain introduced a draft proposal to the U.N. Security Council
seeking authorization for military action against Syria56 under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, which authorizes collective action measures that
could include military intervention under the Security Council's guid-
ance." The five permanent members held an informal, closed-door meet-
ing, but the parties could not come to an agreement. Russia and China
left the meeting after one hour; France, the United States, and the United
Kingdom remained for another hour.9 The draft resolution went back to
each local government for consultation but never resurfaced, presumably
46. These remarks were translated by Syria's official news agency from an interview Presi-
dent Assad conducted with the Russian newspaper Izvestia. Patrick J. McDonnell, Syria's Assad
Denies Use of Chemical Weapons, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/26/world/la-fg-wn-syria-assad-denies-use-of-chemical-
weapons-20130826.
47. Id.; see also Vladimir V. Putin, Opinion, A Plea for Caution from Russia, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-
on-syria.html.
48. U.N. Mission Report, supra note 28, ¶ 1.
49. The investigation was focused in Moadamiyah in West Ghouta and Ein Tarma and Za-
malka in East Ghouta. Id. ¶ 15.
50. The Mission interviewed thirty-six survivors who displayed severe symptoms. They
underwent a clinical assessment, including a brief health history and a physical examination. The
main symptoms consisted of "loss of consciousness (78%), shortness of breath (61%), blurred vision
(42%), eye irritation/inflammation (22%), excessive salivation (22%), vomiting (22%), and convul-
sions/seizures (19%)." Id. T 25, app. 4.
51. Clinicians who treated people in the field or at the hospital were asked questions regarding
the symptoms they observed, treatments provided, and whether there was secondary contamination.
Id. app. 4.
52. Sarin was present in 91% of 34 blood samples drawn. Out of 15 urine samples taken, 93%
tested positive for sarin. Id.
53. Environmental samples included soil samples acquired near rocket warheads, clothing,
pieces of fabric from beds and carpets, rubble, and rocket fragments. Id app. 6.
54. The munitions research included collecting rocket heads, examining craters and other
damage, obtaining rocket motors, and measuring all warheads. The Mission determined the trajecto-
ries and types of rockets used, some as variants of M14 artillery rockets that launched from a single,
multi-barrel launcher and others as 330 mm caliber artillery rockets. See id. app. 5.
55. Id. at 8. President Assad told the Russian newspaper Izvestia that he feared the U.N.
investigation results would be interpreted unfairly: "We are all aware that instead of being interpret-
ed in an objective manner, these results could easily be interpreted according to the requirements and
agendas of certain major countries." McDonnell, supra note 46.
56. CBS NEWS, supra note 31.
57. U.N. Charter ch. 7.
58. CBS NEWS, supra note 31.
59. Id.
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because China and Russia would block the resolution if it were up for
voting.60 Russia, one of Syria's closest allies,6 1 and China have previous-
62
ly vetoed other proposals regarding action against Syria.
After failed peace talks with Russia and Syria, former President
Barack Obama decided that, if Congress approved, a targeted military
strike aimed at Syria's chemical weapons units, artillery, and aircraft,
would send a message to President Assad and to other dictators that the
international community would not tolerate the use of chemical weap-
ons.63 But the threat of military intervention seemed to be enough, for
Russia agreed to help the United States forge an agreement with Presi-
dent Assad to give up the chemical weapons.64 The plan entailed destroy-
ing all of Syria's stockpiles and chemical weapons facilities by June 30,
65
2014, and Russia would oversee the removal. Syria acceded to the
66
CWC on September 14, 2013, entering into force on October 14, 2013.
The U.N. Security Council then adopted a resolution on September 27,
2013, condemning Syria's use of chemical weapons.67
Since Syria acceded to the CWC, progress had been made in the de-
struction of Syria's chemical weapons production facilities, with twenty-
four of twenty-seven destroyed as of November 2015.68 But the goal of
ridding the country of all of its stockpiles was grossly unmet, with only
eleven percent of the stockpiles removed by the deadline imposed by the
OPCW.69 However, the use of various chemical agents has consistently
60. Id; see also Farnaz Fassihi, Peter Nicholas & Nicholas Winning, U.S., U.K. Face Delays
in Push to Strike Syria, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 28, 2013, 1:43 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/uk-to-request-un-action-to-protect-syrians-from-chemical-weapons-
1377685475; Syria Crisis: UK Puts Forward UN Proposal, BBC (Aug. 28, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23864124.
61. With regards to the potential of a biased interpretation of the U.N. results, President Assad
stated, "Certainly, we expect Russia to block any interpretation that aims to serve American and
western polices." McDonnell, supra note 46.
62. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 77, (Feb. 4, 2012); S.C. Res. 612, (Oct. 4, 2011).
63. Statement by the President on Syria, supra note 32. Former Legal Adviser to President
Obama and Yale Law Professor Harold H. Koh argued that Congressional approval was not required
to take limited military action because it did not rise to the level of "war" such that it would trigger
the Declaration of War clause of the U.S. Constitution. Rather, he argued that President Obama's
appeal to Congress was "politically prudent." See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law ofHuman-
itarian Intervention (Part I Political Miscues and U.S. Law), JUST SECURITY (Sept. 26, 2013, 4:30
AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/l l58/koh-syria.
64. Address to the Nation on the Situation in Syria, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOc. 615, at 3
(Sept. 10, 2013).
65. Org. for Prohibition Chemical Weapons [OPCW], OPCW Adopts Plan for Destruction of
Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme in the First Half of 2014 (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-adopts-plan-for-destruction-of-syrias-chemical-weapons-
programme-in-the-first-half-of-2014.
66. Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons [OPCW], Rep. of the Seventy-Fourth Session
of the Executive Council, EC-74/5 (Oct. 2013).
67. S.C. Res. 2118, (Sept. 27, 2013).
68. Org. for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], Report of the OPCW on the
Implementation of the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2015, ¶¶ 1-2, C21/4 (Nov. 30, 2016).
69. Salma Abdelaziz & Jim Sciutto, OPCW: Only 11% of Chemical Weapons Removed from
Syria, CNN (Feb. 13, 2014, 8:37 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/12/world/meast/syria-civil-war.
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been documented since Syria signed the CWC. 70 The United Nations
concluded from results of an independent investigation that the Syrian
government had dropped chlorine gas bombs on its people on at least
three separate occasions in 2014 and 2015.
In response, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Reso-
lution 2235 to identify those responsible for the use of these weapons,
also stating that it would impose certain measures if violations of the use
of chemical weapons occurred.7 2 The OPCW reported that blood samples
taken from victims of an attack in January 2016 indicated the presence of
the agent sarin or a sarin-like substance.73 Human Rights Watch reported
at, least eight instances of chlorine gas bombs being dropped between
November and December 2016.74 Then, on April 4, 2017, the Syrian
government launched its biggest chemical weapons attack since 2013.75
II. SYRIA'S CRISIS AND ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The overarching conflict in Syria began in 2011 when groups op-
posing President Assad's rule began protesting and demanding his resig-
nation.76 Rallies spread across the country as the people demanded a
functioning democracy, and violence erupted as the government began
using tanks, rockets, and bombs to try quell the opposition.7 7 Since the
uprisings, roughly 400,000 people have been killed, thousands of
whom are children.79 The conflict has led to one of the greatest refugee
crises in modern history, with over five million registered refugees hav-
ing fled the country seeking shelter in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt,
70. See id.
71. Press Release, Security Council Considers Fourth Report by Joint Investigative Mecha-
nism, U.N. Press Release DC/3668 (Oct. 27, 2016).
72. S.C. Res. 2235, TT 1-3, 15 (Aug. 7, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2235 (2015), Establishing Mechanism to Identify Perpetra-
tors Using Chemical Weapons in Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/12001 (Aug. 7, 2015).
73. Down to Assad, supra note 6. For a full timeline and history of the civil war in Syria, see
Syrian Civil War Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-civil-war-
fast-facts (last updated July 8, 2017, 10:12 AM).
74. Syria: Coordinated Chemical Attacks on Aleppo, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 13, 2017,
10:57 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/13/syria-coordinated-chemical-attacks-aleppo.
75. See 'Chemical Attack' in Idlib Kills 58, supra note 5.
76. Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-19331551 (follow "Protests" tab).
77. Id. (follow "Bombardment" tab).
78. Syria Envoy Claims 400,000 Have Died in Syria Conflict, UNITED NATIONS RADIO (Apr.
22, 2016), http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2016/04/syria-envoy-claims-400000-have-
died-in-syria-conflict/#.WOU4svnyuO2.
79. Syria War: 2016 Deadliest Year Yet for Children, Says Unicef BBC (Mar. 23, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39252307.
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and Iraq.80 As of March 2017, another 6.3 million were internally dis-
placed,81 and over 13.5 million were in need of humanitarian aid. 82
The U.N. confirmed that chemical weapons were used in Syria on
August 21, 2013, and the Secretary-General called the act a "war crime"
and "grave violation" of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other customary
international law.8 Syria has been a member of the U.N. since 1945.84
As such, it is obligated to uphold the human rights values set forth in the
Charter of the United Nations and in the subsequent Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR), which is now largely considered to be
binding under customary international law.85 For example, Article 3 of
the UDHR states that everyone has the right to life. 8 6 Article 28 elabo-
rates that people have the right to a social and international order in
which that right to life can be realized.87 Article 30 further prohibits all
states from engaging in any act that would destroy this right.8
8
Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), an optional U.N. treaty to which Syria became a party in 1969,
protects parallel rights.89 Article 6 states that "Every human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily90 deprived of his life." 91 This right to life has been considered
the "supreme human right" because without guarantees to it, all other
rights would lack any real meaning.92 This right has also been considered
jus cogens under international law,93 meaning that it is an overriding,
fundamental principle of international law from which no state may de-
viate.94 In fact, states must take active measures to uphold this right.95
States have a supreme duty to prevent acts of mass violence that cause
80. Syria Regional Refugee Response, UNHCR (last updated Sept. 18, 2017),
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php; see also Syrian Arab Republic, OCHA,
http://www.unocha.org/Syria (last visited Sept 21, 2017).
81. Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 80.
82. Id.
83. Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 36, ¶ 1.
84. Member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml (last
visited Sept. 21, 2017).
85. See ICISS, supra note 37, at 6, 14.
86. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1948).
87. Id. art. 28.
88. Id. art. 30.
89. See G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. I ¶
1, art. 5 ¶ 2, art. 6 11 (Dec. 16, 1966).
90. The use of the term "arbitrarily" was criticized as being too vague. But the Human Rights
Committee justified its use because the word encompasses both intentional and unintentional kill-
ings. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS CCPR
COMMENTARY 127-28 (2d rev. ed. 2005).
91. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, supra note 89, at art. 6 ¶ 1.
92. NOWAK, supra note 90, at 121.
93. Id. at 122.
94. Jus cogens "is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
95. NOWAK, supra note 90, at 122.
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arbitrary loss of life.96 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that
this inherent right 'exists in times of both war and peace and explained
that whether loss of life from specific weaponry violates Article 6 is de-
termined by examining the laws governing the use of that weapon.
The use of chemical weapons violates the right to life as set forth in
the UDHR and ICCPR.9 8 In its General Comment to Article 6 of the
ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee expressed its growing concern
regarding the development and proliferation of "awesome weapons of
mass destruction," citing nuclear weapons as among the greatest threats
to the right to life. 99 Chemical weapons, though not specifically men-
tioned in the comment, create this same threat of mass annihilation. The
U.N. recognized the extreme danger they pose because a single attack
can inflict mass casualties.00 Though the death toll from the chemical
weapons attack was difficult to establish, Doctors Without Borders esti-
mated that 3,600 people had been injured, of which 355 died.' 1 The Syr-
ian Observatory for Human Rights confirmed at least 502 deaths.'02 The
United States government initially reported that 1,429 people had been
killed but could not elaborate on the methods for determining that figure
and why that number was so much higher than other reported esti-
mates.10 3 By killing indiscriminately and in mass, the weapons "arbitrari-
ly deprive" human beings of their inherent right to life and human digni-
ty, as explained by the laws prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and
U.N. resolutions ascribing the importance of the prohibition.
Syria is a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which is the Pro-
tocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.'04 The Protocol
prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war but does not
restrict a country from producing or possessing them.0 5 It states that the
96. Id. at 125.
97. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
240 (July 8).
98. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 14, ¶ 1, HRI/GEN/l/Rev.9 (Vol. 1)
(Nov. 9, 1984).
99. Id. ¶ 3; see also NOWAK, supra note 90, at 126.
100. High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, ¶ 114, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter High Level Panel].
101. Syria: Thousands Suffering Neurotoxic Symptoms Treated in Hospitals Supported by
MSF, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (Aug. 24, 2013), http://www.msf.org/article/syria-thousands-
suffering-neurotoxic-symptoms-treated-hospitals-supported-msf
102. Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, supra note 29.
103. The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 45; see also Ken Dilanian &
Shashank Bengali, U.S. Toll for Syria Higher than Others', L.A. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/04/world/la-fg-syria-casualties-20130904.
104. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS,
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsflStates.xsp?xpviewStates=XPagesNORMStatesParties&xp tr
eatySelected=280 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
105. See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571 [hereinafter Gene-
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use of these weapons in war has been condemned by the civilized world
and that the prohibition shall be universally binding as international
law. 06
In 1993, the OPCW developed the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weap-
ons and on their Destruction, commonly called the CWC.1 07 Article 1
prohibits each state party from developing, producing, acquiring, stock-
piling, retaining, transferring, and using chemical weapons.i 
0
Syria was not a party to the CWC at the time of its chemical weap-
ons use,109 so it was not technically beholden to the Convention's provi-
sions. However, Syria still had an obligation not to use chemical weap-
ons because the nonuse of chemical weapons is almost universally ac-
cepted and is becoming an international norm.'10 As of November 2013,
190 countries were parties to the Convention,"' representing about nine-
ty-eight percent of the global population and landmass.112 As depositary
of the Convention, the Secretary-General has long called for its univer-
sality and stated that "any use of chemical weapons by anyone under any
circumstances is a grave violation of international law," referring to the
Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and customary international
law.1 13
Additionally, both the U.N. General Assembly and the Security
Council have adopted a number of resolutions affirming the importance
of the CWC.114 One General Assembly resolution from 2001, adopted
without a vote, 15 emphasized the necessity of universal adherence to the
Convention and called upon states not party to the Convention to become
parties immediately.16 In a separate section of that same resolution, the
va Protocol]; Marian Nash (Leich), Arms Control and Disarmament, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 324
(1994).
106. Geneva Protocol, supra note 105.
107. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S Treaty Doc. No.
103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317.
108. Id. art. 1.
109. See Member State - Syria, ORG. FOR PROHIBITION CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
https://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/member-states-by-region/asia/member-state-syria
(last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
110. See Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 36, TT 1, 4.
111. Org. for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], Note by the Technical Secretari-
at, Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 14 October 2013, S/1131/2013
(Oct. 14, 2013), https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/S-series/2013/en/s-l 131-2013_e_.pdf.
112. Status of Participation, ORG. FOR PROHIBITION CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
https://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/status-of-participation/ (last visited Sept. 22,
2017).
113. Note by the Secretary General, supra note 36, ¶¶ 1, 3-4.
114. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 55/33, at 13 (Jan. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 2118, at I (Sept. 27, 2013).
115. This resolution has multiple sections, and the General Assembly voted for each section
separately. The section referred to in this Note is Section H, which the First Committee adopted
without a vote and the General Assembly followed suit.
116. G.A. Res. 55/33, at 13 (Jan. 12, 2001).
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Assembly renewed its call to all states to "observe strictly" the principles
of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.'17 This section was adopted by 163 votes
and five abstentions, including the United States." 8 Another resolution
signed in December 2012 expressed the same message of the "long-
standing determination of the international community to achieve the
effective prohibition" of the stockpiling and use of chemical weapons
and to uphold the 1925 Geneva Protocol.19 This resolution was adopted
by 181 votes with four abstentions, including the United States.120 These
aforementioned statements suggest that the non-use of chemical weapons
is considered binding universal law, or if not, increasingly moving to-
wards that direction.
Three months before the 2013 chemical weapons attack, the Gen-
eral Assembly adopted a resolution specific to the ongoing violence in
Syria. 121 The resolution demanded that the Syrian government "strictly
observe their obligations under international law with respect to chemical
and biological weapons," including the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Secu-
rity Council resolution 1540 adopted in 2004.122 This Security Council
resolution affirmed that the proliferation of chemical weapons is a threat
to international peace and security and required that all states "take and
enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means
of delivery." 23 It also expressed concern about the trafficking of these
weapons and the risk that non-state actorsl24 will acquire them.125 Acting
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council decided that
all states must make and enforce domestic measures to prevent the pro-
liferation of such weapons and must promote the universal adoption and
fulfillment of all treaties related to chemical weapons.126
These resolutions demonstrate that the U.N. expected Syria to fol-
low the international norms created by the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the
Convention, even though it was not a party to the latter.127 Article 25 of
the Charter binds all states, by their membership in the United Nations,
to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions, regardless of
117. Id. at 16.
118. U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 69th plen. mtg. at 13-14, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.69 (Nov. 20,
2000).
119. G.A. Res. 67/35, at 1 (Jan. 4, 2013).
120. U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 48th plen. mtg. at 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/67/PV.48 (Dec. 3, 2012).
121. G.A. Res. 67/262 (June 4, 2013).
122. Id. ¶ 11.
123. S.C. Res. 1540, at 1 (Apr. 28, 2004).
124. The resolution defines a "Non-State actor" as an "individual or entity, not acting under the
lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolu-
tion." Id. at 1.
125. Id. at 2.
126. Id. at 2-3.
127. See Member State - Syria, supra note 109.
34 [Vol. 95: 1
US. INTER VENTION IN SYRIA
whether they agree. 12 Syria thus had an obligation under international
law not to make and use chemical weapons in both wartime and in
peacetime. Consequently, it can be argued that Syria violated interna-
tional law and could be held accountable for its actions.
III. COLLECTIVE ACTION
The primary way for a country to attack another is through collec-
tive action and authorization by the U.N. Security Council.129 If that does
not work, a country can ask the General Assembly, which has the sec-
ondary responsibility to maintain international peace after the Security
Council, to vote to put pressure on the Security Council,130 or it can seek
assistance from a regional international organization.'3' The responsibil-
ity to protect doctrine arises when these options have failed and a state
wants to act unilaterally.
The U.N. Charter expressly states that the United Nations is built
upon the idea of sovereignty for all its members.'32 Two Articles specifi-
cally illustrate the foundational principle of nonintervention: Articles
2(4) and 2(7). First, Article 2(4) prohibits U.N. members from threaten-
ing or using force against the "territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations." 3 3 This prohibition is a cornerstone of the Char-
ter.134 Article 2(4) does not define "use of force." But the word "force" is
used to mean "armed force," as evidenced by Paragraph 7 of the Pream-
ble to the Charter, which states that a goal of the United Nations is to
prevent armed force; Article 44 of the Charter, which explains how the
Security Council can use armed forces; and the travaux pr6paratoies of
the Charter, which illustrate that military force is the primary concern of
the prohibition against the use of force.' 35 Moreover, if "force" could
include political and economic force, countries would be left with no
other means to pressure states .that violate international law.1
36 Article
2(4) also applies to the "threat" of force. But threats are often tolerated
and not violative of the Article unless they directly threaten force to
128. U.N. Charter art. 25 ("The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.").
129. See id art. 1, ¶ 1, art. 39.
130. ICISS, supra note 37, 16.29.
131. Ocran, supra note 35, at 48.
132. U.N. Charter art. 2, 11.
133. U.N. Charter art. 2, 14; see Ocran, supra note 35 at 16.
134. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 148 (Dec. 19). The ICJ also reinforced the idea that a state cannot intervene in a
country in order to support an internal opposition within the state. It held that Uganda's interference
was of such great magnitude and duration to gravely violate Article 2(4)'s prohibition against the use
of force. Id. ¶ 165.
135. 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 208-09 (Bruno Simma et al.
eds., 3d ed. 2012).
136. Id. at 209.
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compel a state to give up territory or remove political leadership.1 37 In
the instant situation, the United States threatened force for neither of
those reasons.
This prohibition on the use of force is considered customary lawl 38
and jus cogens and is a core value accepted by the international commu-
nity.' 39 Thus, to use unilateral force against a sovereign state, the inter-
vening country must justify its use on an exception to the general rule.
Two such exceptions are self-defense, discussed below in Part V, and
humanitarian intervention, discussed below in Part VI.
Additionally, Article 2(7) prohibits the United Nations as an organi-
zation from interfering in those matters of a sovereign state that fall with-
in its "domestic jurisdiction," 40 with exceptions for threats and breaches
of peace and acts of aggression.141 Sovereign states have exclusive juris-
diction over their territory, and other states have a duty not to intervene
in another country's internal affairs, or its "domestic jurisdiction." 42 If
that duty is violated, the victim state can retaliate in self-defense.143 But
ideas of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction are evolving as new inter-
national actors and issues emerge, including human rights violations.144
As stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice, "The question
whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a
State is an essentially relative question; it depends on the development of
international relations."4 5 More specifically, it depends on whether the
matter is governed by international law in certain respects.146 Further-
more, as international treaties and organizations become more numerous,
a state's international obligations penetrate into its domestic law all while
affecting other states as well.1 47 For example, ethnic groups striving for
self-determination, displacement of refugees fleeing from war and other
natural and manmade disasters, and multinational organizations working
in and among a host of countries all underscore the idea that certain do-
mestic issues have an international impact.148
137. Id. at 218.
138. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 188 (June 27). Its place in customary international law is further evidenced by
reports of the International Law Commission as well as statements of state representatives who refer
to Article 2(4) as a "cardinal principle" of law. Id. ¶ 190.
139. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 203.
140. U.N. Charter art. 2, 17.
141. Ocran, supra note 35, at 16.
142. ICISS, supra note 37, 1 6.2.
143. Id. ¶ 6.4.
144. Thomas M. Franck, Lessons ofKosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 857, 857-58 (1999).
145. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7).
146. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 292.
147. Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1683, 1697 (2000).
148. Scheffer, supra note 38, at 260.
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There is growing acceptance that matters of life and death are no
longer reserved for the country at issue but are of concern for the greater
international community.149 The Charter itself recognizes respect for
human rights as one of the main purposes of the United Nations: "To
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion . . . ."1so
This language demonstrates that instances of human rights violations that
occur within a sovereign state are of international concern and not only
within the state's domestic jurisdiction.'5 1 For instance, in the 1960s,
South Africa claimed that the U.N. General Assembly's statements
against the apartheid violated Article 2(7) because the apartheid was a
domestic issue.152 But the United Nations determined that anti-
apartheid actions were beyond the scope of domestic jurisdiction, even
though they involved domestic issues,153 and called upon all states to
conform their laws to the Charter's observance of human rights.154 Pro-
fessor Bruno Simma suggests that, although "domestic jurisdiction" is
not obsolete, systematic and widespread violations of human rights do
not need to be alleged to overcome Article 2(7).
Additionally, in response to the atrocities committed in Uganda by
dictator Idi Amin, Ugandan President Museveni attacked the specific
issue with the sovereignty argument:
Over a period of 20 years three quarters of a million Ugandans per-
ished at the hands of governments that should have protected their
lives . . . I must state that Ugandans . . . felt a deep sense of betrayal
that most of Africa kept silent . . . the reason for not condemning
such massive crimes had supposedly been a desire not to interfere in
the internal affairs of a Member State, in accordance with the Char-
ters of the OAU and the United Nations. We do not accept this rea-
soning because in the same organs there are explicit laws that enun-
ciate the sanctity and inviolability of human life.1 56
149. Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The
Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333, 340 (1998);
Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J.
INT'L L. 99, 101 (2007).
150. U.N. Charter art. 1, 1 3 (emphasis added). The U.N. Charter Preamble reiterates this
purpose: "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small . . . ." U.N. Charter
pmbl.; see also id arts. 55-56.
151. Brown, supra note 147, at 1689; see also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 297.
152. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 296.
153. Scheffer, supra note 38, at 261-62.
154. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 296.
155. Id. at 297-98.
156. Yoweri Museveni, Uganda President, Org. of African Unity [OAU], Maiden Speech to the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Twenty-Second Ord. Session (July 1986).
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This statement demonstrates the inherent conflict with the U.N.
Charter in that it professes the fundamentality of human rights and yet
has no express provisions to uphold those human rights. The U.N. Char-
ter still generally requires a country to secure authorization from the Se-
curity Council before taking action within another state."' Article 1(1) of
the Charter states that one purpose of the United Nations is to "maintain
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collec-
tive measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace . .
."158 This collective action refers to the joining of multiple states, in-
cluding the use of regional organizations, to end acts of violence.159
However, obtaining approval for collective action is difficult, if not im-
possible, in certain instances. Failure of the Security Council to authorize
such collective action under circumstances of gross human rights viola-
tions may enable a single state to act unilaterally, provided it has met the
other requirements of the ICISS framework, discussed in Part VI.
Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter confers on the Security Council
the "primary responsibility" for maintaining this international peace and
security.160 The Security Council has the power to authorize collective
action when peaceful measures fail; "In other words, forceful action to
prevent mass atrocity crimes is reserved to the Security Council."1 6 1 Such
responsibility involves a political, moral, and legal requirement to act.162
It also includes the responsibility to protect its member states,163 a resid-
ual responsibility that falls upon the international community when the
state at issue cannot meet its primary responsibility.164 But as Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon stated in 2009, "Within the Security Council, the
five permanent members bear particular responsibility because of the
privileges of tenure and the veto power . . ."165
The veto has become the primary obstacle that prevents the mitiga-
tion or termination of a grave humanitarian crisis.166 ICISS expressed
157. U.N. Charter art. 1, 1 1, art. 24.
158. Id. art. 1, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
159. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶¶ 6.5, 6.31.
160. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.
161. Dapo Akande, The Legality of Military Action in Syria: Humanitarian Intervention and
Responsibility to Protect, EJIL: TALK!, (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/humanitarian-
intervention-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-legality-of-military-action-in-syria.
162. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 766.
This legal responsibility, however, lacks a legal remedy if the Security Council fails to act. "It is
however, perfectly enviseagable that the Council's responsibility will harden into a legal obligation
of conduct which can be violated by the Council's complete passivity or its obviously inadequate
reaction in the face of massive atrocity." Id. at 775.
163. See id at 775-76. Some commentators disagree that the Security Council's responsibility
is to the U.N. members but argue rather that it is to the organization itself. See id.
164. Id. at 767; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,
¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (indicating that the sovereign state has the primary respon-
sibility to protect the human rights of its people).
165. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164, ¶ 61.
166. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 6.20.
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concern that, despite the need to intervene in such a situation, a perma-
nent member would use the veto power to advance its own national in-
terests, not because of a genuine disagreement about the proposal.
167
ICISS offered a solution, a "code of conduct" whereby the permanent
members would agree not to use the veto to obstruct a majority resolu-
tion in matters in which their vital national interests were not involved.168
But this is unlikely to be successful because many issues can be tied to a
vital national interest.
The veto power often deadlocks the Security Council, and ultimate-
ly it renders no assistance.169 Countries that want to take action are then
faced with a dilemma: do nothing and watch the atrocities occur, or take
action without the Security Council's authorization and potentially face
reprimand later or seek ex post facto approval.170 For example, NATO
did not seek prior Security Council permission to enter Kosovo for fear
that Russia would veto the proposal; Russia later, in fact, proposed a
resolution to declare the act unlawful.17 ' But NATO faced the above di-
lemma. Then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, Harold H. Koh, stated that most, if not all, of the
NATO states relied on some form of humanitarian intervention as the
legal justification for action.172 The United States did not claim the
NATO action was legal but rather that it was "justified and necessary to
stop the violence and prevent an even greater humanitarian disas-
ter."1 73 The UK claimed that "as an exceptional measure on grounds of
overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally
justifiable." 74 The Netherlands did not give a clear legal reason for its





170. See id TT 6.35-.36; Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law ofHumanitarian Intervention
(Part II: International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY, (Oct. 2, 2013, 9:00 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria-part2 ("By treating the veto alone as dispositive, the per
se position denies any nation, no matter how well-meaning, any lawful way to use even limited and
multilateral force to prevent Assad from intentionally gassing a million Syrian children tomorrow. In
the name of fidelity to the U.N. and this rigid conception of international law, leaders would either
have to accept civilian slaughter or break the law, because international law offers no lawful altema-
tive to prevent the slaughter.").
171. Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
824, 825 (1999).
172. See Koh, supra note 170; Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment - the Legal Basis
in Favour of a Principle of Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-
humanitarian-intervention.
173. Matthew Waxman, Intervention to Stop Atrocities: Kosovo History as Predictive,






Those opposing NATO action relied on the ideas of sovereignty and the
nonuse of force in Article 2(4).176
Critics, like Professor Simma, maintain that without Security Coun-
cil authorization, any unilateral military action violates the Charter:
[I]f the Security Council determines that massive violations of human
rights occurring within a country constitute a threat to the peace, and
then calls for or authorizes an enforcement action to put an end to
these violations, a "humanitarian intervention" by military means is
permissible. In the absence of such authorization, military coercion . .
. constitutes a breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter. Further, as long
as humanitarian crises do not transcend borders . . . and lead to armed
attacks against other states, recourse to Article 51 [self-defense] is
- not available.177
At least 133 countries agree and oppose alteration of the standard in
the Charter.'7 8
NATO's actions in Kosovo perhaps were illegal, as Professor Sim-
ma suggests, but ultimately, its actions protected human rights and ele-
vated humanitarian law.1 79 "Undoubtedly, the UN Charter has taken a hit,
but perhaps not a very major one. Even an illegal action, if instrumental
in bringing about results widely desired by a community, will not seri-
ously undermine a resilient legal system, one with the elasticity to make
allowances for mitigating circumstances."'80 Interestingly, NATO did not
use humanitarian intervention as the legal justification for bombing Yu-
goslavia.'8 ' Rather, it provided no legal reasoning at all and instead used
humanitarian intervention as the moral and political justification for en-
tering the state.182 This humanitarian intervention is certainly an excep-
tion to the rule, not an attempt to reconfigure or upend the rules.'83
Many small, militarily weak states oppose the idea of humanitarian
intervention because they believe their sovereignty depends on the strict
interpretation of Article 2(4).184 For example, Yugoslavia sued the Unit-
ed States for illegal use of force and violating the state's sovereignty in
Kosovo, but the ICJ never ruled on the issue because it said it lacked
176. Id.
177. See Franck, supra note 144, at 858 (alterations in original) (quoting Bruno Simma, NATO,
the UN and the Use ofForce: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1999)).
178. Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
107, 112 (2006) (citing Movement of the Non-aligned Countries, XIII Ministerial Conference, Final
Document of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries,
¶263, U.N. Doc. A/54/917 (June 6, 2000) ("We reject the so-called 'right' of humanitarian interven-
tion, which has no legal basis in the UN Charter or in the general principles of international law.")).
179. Franck, supra note 144, at 859.
180. Id.
181. Brown, supra note 147, at 1685.
182. Id.
183. Franck, supra note 144, at 859.
184. See Brown, supra note 147, at 1702.
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jurisdiction.' 8 5 The situation is even trickier when the country desiring to
act is a powerful, permanent member of the Security Council claiming to
be entitled to act outside the Charter's framework.186
Such is the case here. In 2013, the United States determined that a
targeted military strike would be the best method to ensure that Syria
could not use chemical weapons again.'87 But despite its attempts to
comply with the U.N. Charter, it could not get authorization from the
Security Council.'88 The United Kingdom introduced a draft proposal to
the Security Council seeking authorization for military action, but Russia
and China blocked it.' 89 Russia in the past has vetoed seven Security
Council resolutions condemning President Assad's government, requir-
ing a cessation of violence, and threatening it with sanctions.'90 Thus, the
United States was faced with the aforementioned dilemma: be a bystand-
er to a human atrocity, or take action without U.N. support.191 In a state-
ment to the American people, President Obama decided: "I'm comforta-
ble going forward without the approval of a United Nations Security
Council that, so far, has been completely paralyzed and unwilling to hold
[President] A[s]sad accountable."19
2
Fast forward to 2017, and the United States under the Trump Ad-
ministration chose the latter.'9 3 President Trump remarked: "There can be
no dispute that Syria used banned chemical weapons, violated its obliga-
tions under the Chemical Weapons Convention and ignored the urging of
the UN Security Council. Years of previous attempts at changing As-
sad's behavior have all failed and failed very dramatically."'94 Russia yet
again vetoed a Security Council Resolution condemning the chemical
attack, bringing Russia's total vetoes of Syria-related Resolutions to
eight.195 U.S. Ambassador Haley remarked that with its veto,
Russia said no to accountability, Russia said no to cooperating with
the UN investigation, Russia said no to helping keep peace in Syria,
Russia chose to side with (Syrian President Bashar al-) Assad, even
185. Yugoslavia found jurisdiction under Article IX of the Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. But the Court stated it has jurisdiction only over consenting
parties, and the United States had a reservation on the Convention that required its consent for juris-
diction. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), Order, 1999 I.C.J. 916, ¶ 29 (June 2).
186. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 6.20.
187. See Remarks on the Situation in Syria, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 596, at 1 (Aug. 31,
2013); Koh, supra note 63.
188. See CBS NEWS, supra note 31.
189. Fassihi, Nicholas & Winning, supra note 60.
190. See Security Council - Veto List, UNITED NATIONS,
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
191. The United States' motives for taking action are discussed in further depth supra Part VI.
192. Remarks on the Situation in Syria, supra note 187, at 2.
193. Barbara Starr & Jeremy Diamond, Trump Launches Military Strike Against Syria, CNN
(Apr. 7, 2017, 4:59 PM), http://cnn.it/2oGmkDQ.
194. Id.
195. See S.C. Res. 315, 11 (Apr. 12, 2017); Security Council - Veto List, supra note 190.
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as rest of the world, even the Arab world, comes together to condemn
the murderous regime.196
Once again, the veto has been used to deadlock the Security Coun-
cil. History serves as a keen indicator that no action will come from the
U.N. Security Council; accordingly, collective action will fail.
IV. SELF-DEFENSE
The second main way a country can justify an armed attack another
is through the self-defense doctrine. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
acknowledges "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,"
though requiring that the measures taken be reported immediately to the
Security Council. 1 9 7 This self-defense can be undertaken only in response
to an armed attack.'9 8 Such attacks include invasions by armed forces,
the sending of armed groups on behalf of the intervening state,199 bom-
bardment, blockades, attacks on military warships and aircraft, and large-
scale, cross-border use of weapons.200 Occupation and annexation typi-
cally are not considered armed attacks, even though they generally in-
clude the use of military force.20 1 Article 51 also allows for collective
self-defense, where the attacked state can request the help of other coun-
tries in its retaliation.20 2
A more contentious justification is that of preemptory self-defense.
No international consensus exists as to when in time a country can
launch a retaliatory attack.20 3 The debate reemerged in 2002 when the
United States proclaimed the "Bush Doctrine"204 and invaded Iraq as a
205
preemptive attack on terrorists. The government argued the United
States was "defending the United States, the American people, and our
interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat
before it reaches our borders."206 As explained by the Secretary-General,
196. Richard Roth, Russia Vetoes UN Resolution on Syria, CNN (Apr. 13, 2017, 12:20 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/12/politics/assad-syria-sarin-gas.
197. U.N. Charter art. 51; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, T 200 (June 27).
198. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 195; see also 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 1403.
199. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 195.
200. 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 1410-11.
201. Id. at 1410.
202. Id. at 1420-21.
203. Id. at 1421.
204. See generally THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(2002).
205. Bush Declares War, CNN (Mar. 19, 2003, 11:05 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/1 9/sprj.irq.int.bush.transcript.
206. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note
204, at 6.
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such a right arises only if the "threatened attack is imminent, no other
means would deflect it and the action is proportionate."2 0 7
In justifying the threat of force or actual use of force in Syria, Presi-
dent Obama did not explicitly use the Bush Doctrine to justify an armed
attack in Syria, but he did focus on the threat of Syria's chemical weap-
ons use to national security.208 Although not a direct threat to U.S. bor-
ders, he argued chemical weapons could be transferred to terrorist groups
that later could harm the American people.209 Moreover, inaction would
cause other tyrants to acquire and use chemical weapons on the battle-
field, potentially harming American soldiers.210 Another danger is. the
risk to U.S. allies nearby, including Turkey, Jordan, and Israel.211
gional stability is threatened when these "internal" events lead to refugee
migrations, armed conflicts that spill over borders, scarcity of regional
resources, and transnational environmental and health problems.2 12 Simi-
larly, President Trump, while stating that the chemical weapons attack
,213
was a "disgrace to humanity," also used national security as a justifica-
tion for the missile attack, stating: "It is in this vital national security of
the United States to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chem-
ical weapons. . . . As a result, the refugee crisis continues to deepen, and
the region continues to destabilize, threatening the United States and its
allies."2 14
The type of self-defense the United States alleged could perhaps be
found valid, but it is not the type of self-defense referred to in the U.N.
Charter that grants a state the right to attack. Article 51 applies to a coun-
try's retaliation from a direct attack, whereas President Trump's use of
self-defense is preemptive.215 Perhaps the United States could have met
the second and third prong required by the Secretary-General (no alterna-
207. High Level Panel, supra note 100, 1 188. The Secretary-General maintained, however,
that if a state has objective evidence of an anticipated attack, it must still seek approval from the
Security Council because allowing one state to conduct a unilateral preemptive attack allows for
more illegal uses of force. See id. IT 190-91. Two criteria-necessity and proportionality-for the
use of preemptive military force arose in the infamous Caroline case. In 1837, when Canada was
under British rule, the British burned a U.S. ship that was providing assistance to anti-British, Cana-
dian rebels, claiming that it was acting in self-defense. See Anthony Clark Arend, International Law
and the Preemptive Use ofMilitary Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89, 90-91 (2003).
208. Remarks on the Situation in Syria, supra note 187, at 1.
209. Id.
210. Address to the Nation on the Situation in Syria, supra note 64, at 2.
211. Id.
212. Scheffer, supra note 38, at 287.
213. Syria War: US Weighs Military Action Following Gas 'Attack', BBC (Apr. 7, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39522312.
214. Michael R. Gordon, Helene Cooper & Michael D. Shear, Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air
Base in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to-weigh-military-responses-to-
syrian-chemical-attack.html; Anthony Capaccio, Illya Arkhipov, & Kambiz Foroohar, Trump's Syria
Missile Strike Ramps Up Tensions with Moscow, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 8, 2017, 2:45 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-07/u-s-launches-missile-strike-on-syria-in-
response-to-gas-attack.
215. See Akande, supra note 160.
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tive means and proportionate action), but it is unlikely that the United
States could justify an anticipatory attack because a threat to U.S. bor-
ders was not imminent. Nor does the Article allow retaliation as self-
defense when an ally is attacked. Thus, to strike Syria, the United States
could not do so legally under Article 51. Accordingly, an attack on Syria
could not be justified under collection action or self-defense. All that
remains then as a legal doctrine is the responsibility to protect.
V. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT
In 2013, President Obama addressed the American people regarding
his proposed military strike and stated:
What message will we send if a dictator can gas hundreds of children
to death in plain sight and pay no price? What's the purpose of the in-
ternational system that we've built if a prohibition on the use of
chemical weapons ... is not enforced? . .. Out of the ashes of world
war, we built an international order and enforced the rules that gave it
meaning. And we did so because we believe that the rights of indi-
viduals to live in peace and dignity depends on the responsibilities of
-216
nations.
This statement reflects the idea behind humanitarian intervention. In
the face of gross human rights violations, the international community
has a responsibility to protect the victims and to prevent further abuses of
power.217 As such, a country may be permitted to act without authoriza-
tion from the Security Council and not in self-defense under the emerg-
ing exception to the nonintervention doctrine from Articles 2(4)218 and
2(7) of the U.N. Charter.219 The exception holds weight in that the inter-
vention is directed neither toward the "territorial integrity" nor "political
independence" of the targeted state,220 the two main reasons why the use
of force is prohibited. The debate centers on whether humanitarian inter-
216. Remarks on the Situation in Syria, supra note 187, at 2.
217. ICISS, supra note 37, at VIII.
218. See Koh, supra note 170. Professor Koh suggests that the "use of the word 'other' leaves
open whether Article 2(4) would permit a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of a
state, in a case where that threat or action was critical or essential to effectuate the U.N.'s purposes."
Id. (citing U.N. Charter art. 2(4) which states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations") (emphasis
added).
219. ICISS, supra note 37, at VIII.
220. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 135, at 222. Pro-
fessor Simma objects to this theory because it contradicts the purpose of Article 2(4): to prevent
armed force. See id. He discusses the prevailing legal view that forcible humanitarian intervention
cannot be justified under the U.N. Charter because the validity of the Articles is not conditioned on
the effectiveness of collective action to protect against humanitarian atrocities. Id. at 222-23.
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vention intrudes on the political independence of the state, or whether
human rights are matters beyond a state's domestic jurisdiction.22 1
ICISS defined the responsibility to protect as "the idea that sover-
eign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoid-
able catastrophe-from mass murder and rape, from starvation-but that
when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be
borne by the broader community of states."2 22 It explained that this re-
sponsibility overrides nonintervention when a population is suffering
serious harm-from civil war, repression, or state failure-and the home
state is either unwilling or unable to end that harm.223 In other words, a
state abrogates its right to sovereignty when it fails to protect its peo-
ple.224 "When a State refuses to accept international prevention and pro-
tection assistance, commits egregious crimes and violations relating to
the responsibility to protect and fails to respond to less coercive
measures, it is, in effect, challenging the international community to live
up to its own responsibilities ... 225 By becoming a signatory of the
United Nations, the state "accepts the responsibilities of membership
flowing from that signature. There is no transfer or dilution of state sov-
ereignty. But there is a necessary re-characterization involved: from sov-
ereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal func-
tions and external duties."226
To be clear, the responsibility to protect is not a catchall doctrine
that permits a state to invade another for no reason. The doctrine may be
invoked only as a last resort where collective action cannot be obtained
and for those types of suffering that are fundamentally against well-
established human rights norms.2 27 The United Nations recognized this
principle, explaining that states do not have a "right to intervene" but
rather a "responsibility to protect" individuals whose state cannot or will
not protect them.228 Furthermore, the doctrine's use is narrowed by the
ICISS framework.
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has early philosophical
roots. Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, one of the founders of international
law, believed the law should include an exception for humanitarian in-
tervention.229 He wrote:
221. Ocran, supra note 35, at 15.
222. ICISS, supra note 37, at VIII.
223. Id. at XI.
224. Rebecca J. Hamilton, The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine-but
What ofImplementation?, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 290 (2006).
225. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164, 156.
226. ICISS, supra note 37, at 13 (emphasis omitted).
227. Ocran, supra note 35, at 25-26.
228. High Level Panel, supra note 100, ¶ 201.
229. Ocran, supra note 35, at 12.
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Certainly it is undoubted that ever since civil societies were formed,
the ruler of each claimed some especial right over his subjects . . . but
if a tyrant . . . practices atrocities towards his subjects which no just
man can approve, the right of human social connection is not cut off
in such case.230
E.R.N. Arntz echoed that idea, stating:
When a government, even acting within the limits of its right of sov-
ereignty, violates the rights of humanity, either by measures contrary
to the interests of other [s]tates, or by excessive injustice or brutality,
which seriously injure our morals or civilization, the right of inter-
vention is legitimate. For, however worthy of respect the rights of
sovereignty and independence of states may be, there is something
even more worthy of respect, namely the law of humanity or of hu-
man society that must not be violated.231
The African Union (AU) is the only regional organization that has
enshrined this doctrine within its founding charter. Article 4(h) of the
Constitutive Act of the African Union specifically provides for "[t]he
right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision
of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity ... ."232 The AU later adopted the
Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act, which amended Article
4(h) by adding to the end of the Article "as well as a serious threat to
legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the
Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council." 233
The AU inserted a right to intervene into its charter after the failures of
the region to respond to various genocides and atrocities in Africa, such
as the genocide under Idi Amin in Uganda in the 1970s and in Rwanda in
1994.2 There was growing criticism that surrounding countries had
watched idly as gross human rights violations occurred and chose not to
intervene based on the principles of sovereignty.23 5
230. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting HUGONIS GROTH, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS LIBRI
TRES 439-40 (William Whewell trans. 1853)).
231. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rorin-Jacquemyms, Note Sur La Theorie du Droit
d'Intervention, 8 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 675 (1876)); see
also DAVIDE RODOGNO, AGAINST MASSACRE: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE, 1815-1914, at 55 (2011).
232. Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 4(h), July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3, 37.
233. Ben Kioko, The Right of Intervention Under the African Union's Constitutive Act: From
Non-Interference to Non-Intervention, 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 807, 807 (2003). Mr. Kioko, a legal
adviser to the African Union, explained in his article that this provision to the Constitutive Act was
added in order to give the AU the "necessary flexibility in deciding on intervention" after many
delegations pointed out that the threshold for intervention was too high and excluded too many
situations that threatened national and regional peace and security. Id. at 812.
234. Id. at 812.
235. Id. at 812-13.
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The AU is technically required to seek permission from the United
Nations to intervene under Article 53 of the U.N. Charter.236 However,
the AU has shown on prior occasions that it is willing to defy the United
Nations and forgo the "legal niceties such as the authorization of the Se-
curity Council."237 Based on this law, the Eastern African Region coun-
tries intervened without Security Council approval in Burundi in 1996
where the AU imposed trade and economic sanctions on the country after
238
a coup d'6tat that assassinated the democratically elected president.
The actions of the AU and explicit adoption of the doctrine indicate a
clear emerging practice of the use of humanitarian intervention, or "non-
indifference,"239 where core international crimes against humanity have
occurred.
The doctrine is perhaps becoming more widely accepted as more in-
stances occur over time that require this type of intervention.240 NATO
invaded Kosovo without Security Council permission to end the conflict
between the Serbian military and Kosovar Albanian forces, usinq human-
itarian necessity to prevent genocide as the primary rationale. 41 Other
examples include Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, which forced out
communist Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime from power in Phnom
242Penh, and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1979 to overthrow dicta-
tor Idi Amin, whose reign led to the deaths of over 300,000 people.243
236. Id. at 820; U.N. Charter art. 53.
237. Kioko, supra note 233, at 821. Kioko adds that the AU will likely have to call upon the
U.N. and request its assistance because it will be unable to meet the massive financial, logistical, and
military demands of an intervention. Id. at 822.
238. Id. at 821, 821 n.38.
239. Id. at 819.
240. Yassin El-Ayouty, International Action on the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention:
The Case of Southern Iraq (1991-1992), N.Y. ST. B.J., Aug. 1996, at 12, 17 (1996); see also THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 134, at 226. Professor Simma
suggests that a rule of customary international law may develop over time as more instances occur
whereby countries intervene in situations of gross humanitarian violations without Security Council
approval. But he argues that if that occurs, the Security Council should extend its Chapter VII prac-
tice to such human rights violations, rather than creating a completely new customary law. Id.
241. ICISS, supra note 34, ¶ 2.25; NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, NATO,
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last updated July 15, 1999); Adam Roberts, NATO's 'Hu-
manitarian War' Over Kosovo, SURVIVAL, Autumn 1999, at 102, 102. At the time, National Security
Advisor Sandy Berger identified three criteria that enabled the U.S. to enter Kosovo: (1) presence of
genocide or ethnic cleansing, (2) U.S. must have the capacity to act, and (3) U.S. must have a na-
tional interest at stake. Brown, supra note 147, at 1692. But professor Jack Goldsmith argues that
Kosovo should not even be used as precedent because the U.S. had not accepted humanitarian inter-
vention as the justification for the invasion. Jack Goldsmith, The Kosovo Precedent for Syria Isn't
Much of a Precedent, LAWFARE (Aug. 24, 2013, 8:02 AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/the-kosovo-precedent-for-syria-isnt-much-of-a-precedent.
242. STEPHEN J. MORRIS, WHY VIETNAM INVADED CAMBODIA 5,219-20 (1999); Ocran, supra
note 35, at 2.
243. Ocran, supra note 35, at 2; Michael T. Kaufman, Idi Amin, Murderous and Erratic Ruler





The United States also used the doctrine to explain its invasion into Iraq
in 1990 in the aftermath of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis.2 44
Additionally, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)2 45 used the doctrine to justify intervention in Liberia and
Sierra Leone.246 The situation in Liberia involved the bloody clash be-
tween six ethnic groups that escalated into a massive civil war causing
200,000 casualties, 800,000 refugees, and about a million internally dis-
247
placed residents. After the United Nations failed to take any action,
ECOWAS decided to intervene without Security Council approval for
the following reasons: (1) the extent of the violence affected Liberians
and other nationals from ECOWAS countries; (2) neighboring states
were bearing the huge burden of taking in the largest group of refugees
in West Africa; and (3) ECOWAS "shared a collective responsibility of
'ensuring that peace and stability is maintained within the sub-region and
in the African Continent as a whole, for ECOWAS believes that the trag-
ic situation in Liberia poses a threat to international peace and securi-
ty."' 248 The United States supported this intervention and drafted Securi-
ty Council Resolution 788 that declared the deteriorating situation in
Liberia "a threat to international peace and security" and welcomed "the
continued commitment of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) to and the efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the
Liberian conflict[.]" 2 4 9 Resolution 788 further recognized the requests
from ECOWAS to dispatch U.N. groups to observe "the encampment
and disarmament of warring parties" and "to verify and monitor the elec-
toral process" and commended and encouraged ECOWAS "to continue
its efforts to assist in the peaceful implementation of this Accord[.]" 250
The Security Council adopted this Resolution, among others, thereby
legitimizing the legality of ECOWAS' actions, including ECOWAS'
petroleum and arms embargoes against Liberia.25 1
Libya is another example in which the responsibility to protect was
used to justify a military invasion and was actually the first use of force
with this rationale endorsed by the Security Council. Inspired by the up-
risings in the Arab Spring, Libyan civilians began protesting the regime
of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who used force and violence against his
244. Ocran, supra note 35, at 2.
245. ECOWAS was established by the Treaty of Lagos in 1975. Treaty of the Economic
Community of West African States, May 28, 1975, 1010 U.N.T.S. 17.
246. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 2.25.
247. Binaifer Nowrojee, Joining Forces. United Nations and Regional Peacekeeping-Lessons
from Liberia, 8 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 129, 133-34 (1995).
248. Id. at 135 (quoting ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Final Communiqud of the
First Session, Doc. 54 (Aug. 7, 1990)).
249. S.C. Res. 788, at 1-2 (Nov. 19, 1992); Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, U.S. Support for Multina-
tional Intervention in Liberia, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 194 (2004).
250. S.C. Res. 788, at 2 (Nov. 19, 1992).
251. Levitt, supra note 149, at 366; see also IKECHI MGBEOJI, COLLECTIVE INSECURITY: THE
LIBERIAN CRISIS, UNILATERALISM, AND GLOBAL ORDER 115 (2003).
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opposition.25 2 The protests, which began in small spurts in February
2011, escalated quickly and led to the deaths of an estimated 30,000 peo-
ple, the wounding of 50,000, and the disappearance of over 4,000.253 The
United States and Russia denounced Gaddafi, but politicians in each
country expressed concern over intervening because of the long-term
stakes in the oil-rich region.254 On February 25, 2011, the United States
froze Libyan assets.255 The next day, with backing from the Arab League,
the Security Council adopted a resolution demanding an end to the vio-
256
lence in Libya and imposing sanctions.26 When Gaddafi failed to heed to
these demands, the Security Council adopted another resolution on
March 17, 2011, imposing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorizing U.N.
members to take "all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians" and
halt violence.257
This was the first time in history the Security Council endorsed mil-
itary action under the "responsibility to protect" doctrine.258 The United
States and NATO used this authorization to launch a bombing campaign
over the country, eventually leading to the assassination of Gaddafi by
rebels and the end of the intervention in October 2011.259 Because Gad-
dafi was ousted, this bombing campaign was highly criticized as a means
to enforce a regime change, a purpose prohibited by ICISS.260 This criti-
cism is discussed further in the "Responsibility to React" Section below,
but the framework ICISS has created should prevent these types of mili-
tary interventions for a regime change and not for a "just cause."
Over time, as the Security Council begins to endorse further actions
under the responsibility to protect doctrine, the doctrine may perhaps
252. Karin Laub, Libyan Estimate: At Least 30,000 Died in the War, CNSNEWS.COM (Sept. 8,
2011, 3:50 AM), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/libyan-estimate-least-30000-died-war.
253. Id.
254. David Usbome, Russia Slams 'No-Fly Zone' Plan as Cracks Appear in Libya Strategy,
INDEPENDENT (March 2, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/russia-slams-
nofly-zone-plan-as-cracks-appear-in-libya-strategy-22296
2
1.html; Arab League Backs Libya No-Fly
Zone, NEWS24, (March 7, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://www.news24.com/World/News/Arab-League-
backs-Libya-no-fly-zone-20110307.
255. 2011 Libya Civil War Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/20/world/libya-
civil-war-fast-facts (last updated Mar. 29, 2017, 4:38 PM).
256. S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 1, 9-17 (Feb. 26, 2011).
257. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011).
258. Upon the unanimous adoption of the Resolution 1970, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon expressed "hope that the message that 'gross violations of basic human rights will not be
tolerated and that those responsible for grave crimes will be held accountable' would be 'heard and
heeded' by the Libyan regime and that it would bring hope and relief to those still at risk." Meetings
Coverage, Security Council, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures
on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters,
SC/10187/REV.1 (Feb. 26, 2011). The representative from France stated that the "resolution recalled
the accountability of each State for the protection of its population and the role of the international
community when that responsibility was not met." Id. The Libyan representative "thanked Council
Members for their unanimous action, which represented moral support for his people, who were
resisting the attacks." Id.
259. See 2011 Libya Civil War Fast Facts, supra note 255.




become part of customary international law. 261 But a few hurdles remain
before it can assume that label, namely that customary law usually does
not override treaty law.262 Accepting the idea that the responsibility to
protect is international customary law necessitates accepting the premise
that it has overridden other established international laws, including Arti-
cle 53 of the Vienna Convention, which states that a rule of jus cogens,
like the nonuse of force, can be modified only by another rule of jus co-
gens, and Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, stating that Charter prevails
263over other treaty obligations. Once the doctrine becomes customary
law, it can more easily navigate around the provisions in the U.N. Char-
ter. But the journey to that point is still far away.
The dilemma surrounding humanitarian intervention is complex. If
an outside state takes no action, then it becomes a complicit bystander.264
But if a state intervenes, it may not be successful in mitigating the of-
265fenses. Furthermore, intervening could mean taking a side in a civil
conflict, which could cause further state fragmentation.266 For example,
Interventions in the Balkans did manage to reduce the civilian death
toll, but it has yet to produce a stable state order in the region. As
both the Kosovo and Bosnian interventions show, even when the goal
of international action is, as it should be, protecting ordinary human
beings from gross and systematic abuse, it can be difficult to avoid
doing rather more harm than good.267
However, the doctrine has been criticized as highly susceptible to
268abuse2. States would, the argument goes, use humanitarianism as a
guise to intervene for nonaltruistic purposes, such as expansionism or
overthrow of government.269 Nothing would prevent states from using
force against another for an easy-to-fabricate reason.270 For example, in
1938, Adolf Hitler justified the use of force in Czechoslovakia as human-
itarian intervention to protect the German nationals living there from
being
261. In order to become a "custom," two elements need to be met: state practice (usus) and a
belief that such practice is required (opinion juris sive necessitatis). Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 27 (June 3) ("It is of course axiomatic that the mate-
rial of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris
of States .... ).
262. See Akande, supra note 161.
263. Id.




268. Ocran, supra note 35, at 13.
269. Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention, 19 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1005, 1020-21 (1998).
270. Id. at 1021 (citing Louis Henkin, Remarks on Biafra, Bengal, and Beyond: International
Responsibility and Genocidal Conflict, 66 PROC. AM. SOCY INT'L L. 95, 96 (1972)).
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maltreated in the unworthiest manner, tortured, . . . [and denied] the
right of nations to self-determination," that "[i]n a few weeks the
number of refugees who have been driven out has risen to over
120,000," that "the security of more than 3,000,000 human beings"
was in jeopardy, and that the German government was "determined
by one means or another to terminate these attempts ... to deny by
dilatory methods the legal claims of oppressed peoples.
But countries trying to do real good should not be prevented from
doing so just because of the possibility that a different country could use
272
the doctrine for an improper purpose. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, the first
female judge and former president of the International Court of Justice,
likens this idea to that of self-defense:
Many writers do argue against the lawfulness of humanitarian inter-
vention today. They make much of the fact that in the past the right
has been abused. It undoubtedly has. But then so have there been
countless abusive claims to the right to self-defense. That does not
lead us to say that there should be no right of self-defense today. We
must face the reality that we live in a decentralized international legal
order, where claims may be made either in good faith or abusively.
We delude ourselves if we think that the role of norms is to remove
the possibility of abusive claims ever being made.273
A balance must be struck between the sovereignty of states and the
imperatives of humanitarianism. Achieving this balance and ensuring the
lack of abuse is not a simple or easy endeavor and will be discussed fur-
ther below in the "Right Intention" Section under the "Responsibility to
React."
Another argument is that intervention will drastically affect the do-
mestic country's political process and organization of the state.274 And
another pits humanitarian intervention against state sovereignty. But as
the former Secretary-General has suggested, sovereignty goes hand-in-
275
hand with the responsibility to protect. 2 In his 2009 report "Implement-
ing the Responsibility to Protect," he explained that respect for human
rights is an essential part of being a responsible sovereign 276 and that
271. Goodman, supra note 178, at 113 (alterations in original) (quoting Letter from Reich
Chancellor Hitler to Prime Minister Chamberlain (Sept. 23,1938), in THE CRISIS IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, APRIL 24-OCTOBER 31, 1938, 19 INT'L CONCILIATION 433 (1938)); Kritsiotis,
supra note 269, at 1021 (citing Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of
Humanitarian Intervention By Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 284 (1973)). However, a
state's use of force to protect its own nationals is often justified under self-defense because the
doctrine is much clearer; for example, Israel used self-defense to explain its raid of the Entebbe
airport in Uganda to rescue Israeli and Jewish hostages. Brown, supra note 147, at 1703-04.
272. Ocran, supra note 35, at 26.
273. Kritsiotis, supra note 269, at 1022 (quoting ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 247 (1994)).
274. Ocran, supra note 35, at 16.




sovereignty itself is a responsibility.277 "By helping States to meet their
core protection responsibilities, the responsibility to protect seeks to
strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it. It seeks to help States to succeed,
not just to react when they fail . . . ."278 The ICJ in Nicaragua v. United
States stated that "[t]he principle of non-intervention involves the right of
every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference;
though examples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent, the
court considers that it is part and parcel of customary international
law."279
The Secretary-General suggested a three-pillar, interrelated analysis
of the responsibility to protect: "[t]he protection responsibilities of the
[s]tate," "[i]nternational assistance and capacity building," and "[t]imely
and decisive response."280 This analysis, however, does not provide spe-
cific guidance for a state wanting to take unilateral action against another
state whose own leadership is responsible for the human rights viola-
281tion. ICISS came up with a framework to analyze the humanitarian
intervention doctrine so that it could be effectively used only for the cor-
rect purposes.282 This framework also includes some of the elements dis-
cussed in the three-pillar analysis. As framed by ICISS, the responsibility
to protect includes the responsibility to prevent, to react, and to re-
build.2 83 Stated differently, the responsibility to protect includes peace-
making, peace enforcement, and postconflict peacebuilding.2 84 The next
Sections of this Article will consider each of these criteria in turn.
A. Responsibility to Prevent
ICISS defined the responsibility to prevent as "address[ing] both the
root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made
crises putting populations at risk."285 This responsibility lies primarily
with the sovereign state and with the organizations within it. 286 Interna-
tional support then serves to bolster this prevention through development
277. Id. I 10(a).
278. Id.
279. Ocran, supra note 35, at 14-15 (alteration in original) (quoting Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 202 (June 27)).
280. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164, ¶ II (a)-(c).
281.
If the political leadership of the State is determined to commit crimes and violations relat-
ing to the responsibility to protect, then assistance measures under pillar two would be of
little use and the international community would be better advised to begin assembling
the capacity and will for a "timely and decisive" response.
Id. 1 29.
282. ICISS, supra note 37, at VIII.
283. Id. ¶2.32.
284. Ocran, supra note 35, at 4.
285. ICISS, supra note 37, at XI.
286. Id. ¶3.2.
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assistance, local initiatives, mediation, and efforts to promote reconcilia-
287tion.
Prevention efforts must be exhausted before contemplating inter-
28vention.288 The main idea is as follows:
[T]he earlier the root causes of a potential conflict are identified and
effectively addressed, the more likely it is that the parties to a conflict
will be ready to engage in a constructive dialogue, address the actual
grievances that lie at the root of the potential conflict and refrain
from the use of force to achieve their aims.
289
These efforts must include both short- and long-term measures in-
volving the political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and institutional spheres
of the sovereign, regional, and international actors.2 90
Conflict prevention is one of the United Nations' primary responsi-
bilities. 29 Article 1(1) of the U.N. Charter specifically mandates that the
United Nations "take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace . . . .,,292 In the 2001 U.N. Report on Pre-
vention of Armed Conflict, the Secretary-General stated, "[C]ollective
security should imply an obligation for all of us to strive to address ten-
sions, grievances, inequality, injustice, intolerance and hostilities at the
earliest stage possible, before peace and security are endangered."293
The United Nations has recognized the importance of prevention
methods. In 2000, it published the Report of the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations, in which it laid out suggestions for better long-term
peace operations that prevent conflicts.294 The report stated that U.N.
peace operations addressed only one-third of the conflicts in the 1990s.2 9 5
Most of the funds were used for intervention and postintervention assis-
tance; according to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict, about $200 billion was spent on conflict interventions in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia
and El Salvador, when the United Nations could have saved $130 billion
if it took effective preventative steps.296
ICISS puts forth three essential conditions that must be met to
achieve effective prevention. First is "early warning," knowledge of a
287. Id. 13.3.
288. Id. 13.4.
289. U.N. Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, at 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/55/985-
S/2001/574 (June 7, 2001).
290. Id. at 2.
291. Id.
292. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
293. U.N. Secretary General, supra note 289, ¶ 19.
294. Rep. of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809
(Aug. 21, 2000).
295. Id. T 29.
296. ICISS, supra note 37, 1 3.7.
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dangerous situation, its fragility, and its risks.297 Investigating these
crimes through on-site missions is just one way of discovering the degree
298of harm or potential harm. Second is the "preventive toolbox," com-
prehensive understanding of all the policy measures that can be taken to
diffuse the situation.299 Finally, the "political will" actually to apply those
measures must be present.3 00
Here, all three elements existed that could have effectuated preven-
tative measures before Syria used chemical weapons. The United Nations
certainly had "early warning" as to the fragile situation developing in
Syria. The Syrian conflict began in 2011, and the amount of violence and
number of deaths continued to increase as time went by. This under-
standing is expressed in the two resolutions the Security Council adopted
in April 2012, condemning the violence and noting that Syria had begun
to implement its commitments to cease fire. 301 Moreover, the United Na-
tions deployed a mission to investigate allegations of the small-scale use
of chemical weapons prior to and after the 2013 chemical weapons at-
tack.302
But as the hostility intensified, those resolutions meant nothing, and
further action needed to be taken to curb the violence. Multiple countries,
including the United States, repeatedly submitted proposals to the Securi-
ty Council to stop the ensuing violence before it escalated even further,
but they were all vetoed.303 These proposals included measures that con-
stituted the "preventive toolbox" and that would be implemented by the
Security Council and various U.N. bodies and regional organizations.
One such proposal from October 2011 led by France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom condemned the violence and urged Syria to halt its
assault on civilians.3 04 The proposal also demanded that Syria comply
with its international law obligations and called for an inclusive political
process that addressed the public's concerns.305 But Russia and China
vetoed the resolution.3 06 Another proposal from the United States in Feb-
ruary 2012 condemned the Syrian government's gross human rights vio-
lations and its use of force against civilians.3 07 It demanded an end to the
violence and called for Syria's cooperation with regional organizations to
promote peace and stability in the region.3 08 But once again, Russia and
297. Id. 13.9.
298. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164, ¶ 53.
299. ICISS, supra note 37, 1 3.9.
300. Id.
301. S.C. Res. 2043 (Apr. 21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2042 (Apr. 14, 2012).
302. See U.N. Mission Report, supra note 28, ¶¶ 6, 15.
303. See Security Council - Veto List, supra note 190.
304. S.C. Res. 612, TT 1, 4 (Oct. 4, 2011).
305. Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
306. Security Council - Veto List, supra note 190.
307. S.C. Res. 77, In 1, 3 (Feb. 4, 2012).
308. Id. ¶¶5, 9.
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China vetoed it.309 In July 2012, the United Kingdom and United States
again proposed a resolution to the Security Council, expressing grave
concern about the escalating violence and death toll and condemning
Syria's use of heavy weaponry, including tanks and helicopters indis-
criminately to shell civilian populations.31 0 The resolution also included a
six-point plan to facilitate the political transition and ease humanitarian
violations.3 11 This proposal was, yet again, vetoed by Russia and Chi-
na.312 These proposals led or cosponsored by the Unites States indicate
that it had the "political will" to carry out measures against Syria.
With the Security Council deadlocked, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution in May 2013, three months before Syria's use of
chemical weapons, encouraging the Security Council to take effective
measures to stop the violence in the Syria. The resolution also de-
manded that Syria strictly observe its international law obligations not to
use or transfer chemical weapons.314 This is the most blatant evidence of
the United Nations' understanding of the possibility of chemical weap-
ons use.
ICISS stated that collective, international preventative measures
must be exhausted before intervention-especially through military
force-may be undertaken. 315 That is exactly what happened here. For-
mer National Security Advisor Susan Rice stated that the overall U.S.
policy for Syria (not the military strike itself) involves this peace-making
agenda: "[T]o end the underlying conflict through a negotiated, political
transition in which Assad leaves power. The best way to achieve this is
to keep the country and its institutions intact, but all parties have to be
willing to negotiate."316 The United States and other states tried to take
preventative action through the Security Council, but their efforts were
blocked.317 President Obama addressed this very point in his statement to
the American people about his plan for Syria: "Over the last two years,
my administration has tried diplomacy and sanctions, warning and nego-
tiations-but chemical weapons were still used by the Assad regime."318
President Trump said that repeated pleas with the United Nations had
failed.3 19
309. Security Council - Veto List, supra note 190.
310. S.C. Res. 538, at 1-3 (July 19, 2012).
311. Id. 1 3; see also S.C. Res. 2042 annex (Apr. 14, 2012).
312. Security Council - Veto List, supra note 190.
313. G.A. Res. 67/262,19 (June 4, 2013).
314. Id. I11.
315. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 3.1.
316. Susan E. Rice, Nat'l Sec. Advisor, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by National Security
Advisor Susan E. Rice (Sept. 9, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/09/09/remarks-prepared-delivery-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice).
317. Fassihi, Nicholas & Winning, supra note 60; CBS NEWS, supra note 31.
318. Remarks by the President, supra note 32.
319. See Starr & Diamond, supra note 193.
2017] 55
DENVER LAW REVIEW
The United States attempted to fulfill its responsibility to prevent.
Because every preventative measure was attempted and blocked, it could
do no more and could enter the "responsibility to react" phase only out-
side of the U.N. framework. The United States, as a world economic
power, has the capacity to enter and fulfill the next phase.320
B. Responsibility to React
ICISS described the responsibility to react as the responsibility "to
respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate
measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and inter-
national prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention."321 The
Commission stated that countries must first seek Security Council au-
thorization prior to carrying out any military intervention.322 This is in
part because nonintervention is always the starting point, for sovereign
states must be allowed the opportunity to resolve the issues within their
323domestic sphere. But, as discussed in Part III above, it is difficult to
get this authorization because of the permanent members' veto power.
Consequently, as Professor David Scheffer suggests, when the Security
Council is deadlocked, a state or group of states must act outside of the
U.N. Charter and be guided by the ICISS framework for humanitarian
intervention.324
When a state is either unable or unwilling to address the harm, and
when international prevention efforts have failed, humanitarian interven-
tion may be required.32 5 The General Assembly reiterated this notion
through its resolution in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, stating that
force may be used "should peaceful means be inadequate and national
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."326 Hu-
manitarian intervention is the exception to nonintervention, an exception
that exists for circumstances where domestic disputes spill over into the
international realm, causing disruption to the region, and also where
327gross human rights violations are occurring.
328Military action is allowed, but only in extreme and grave cases.
These cases of violence must "so genuinely 'shock the conscience of
320. The United States' powerful position in the world alone does not justify a unilateral attack
on another state. Rather, its economic and political stature ensures, or at least makes it more likely,
that it can be successful in carrying out a limited attack and then providing funds to rebuild any
damage it creates, as will be discussed further below.
321. ICISS, supra note 37, at XI.
322. Id. ¶6.15.
323. Id.14.11.
324. Scheffer, supra note 38, at 290-9 1.
325. ICISS, supra note 37, T 4.1.
326. G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 139 (Sept. 16, 2005); see also U.N.
Secretary-General, supra note 164, 149.
327. See ICISS, supra note 37, passim.
328. Id. 14.1.
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mankind"' or present a profoundly "clear and present danger to interna-
tional security" to permit the use of military force. 329 Such cases arise
when broken-down states and civil conflicts become so violent and re-
pressive that citizens are faced with actual or potential large-scale geno-
cide, massacre, or ethnic cleansing.330 ICISS further elaborates on how
this level is measured in the "just cause" analysis below. These types of
interventions have occurred in the past, primarily due to the Security
Council's failure to act where gross humanitarian violations are present
and the need for assistance is overwhelming.331 "[I]n the face of a con-
science shocking situation but inaction by the Council, it is not a stretch
of legal reasoning to say that the responsibility to protect admits of a
narrowly tailored right of ad hoc action for a proper purpose."3 32
To ensure that these military interventions are not abused, ICISS
created a narrow framework that ought to be followed in assessing
whether a country can lawfully use military force against another. There
are six elements for intervention: (1) right authority, (2) just cause, (3)
right intention, (4) last resort, (5) proportional means, and (6) reasonable
prospects.333
1. Right Authority
ICISS stated that Security Council authorization must first be
sought prior to any military intervention.334 It also stated that the perma-
nent members should agree not to use their veto in matters that do not
affect their national interests, but where the intervention would greatly
ease the violations.335 But practically speaking, even if the permanent
members did make this agreement, it is highly unlikely to prevent the
veto from being used. Here, Russia is one of Syria's strongest allies,
336
even providing the country with Russian weaponry. Russia could as-
sert that a resolution taken against Syria would also hurt its own domes-
tic interests and therefore it can rightfully veto the proposal. In an op-ed
to the New York Times, Russian President Vladimir Putin asserted that
any action taken without Security Council approval would plainly violate
the U.N. Charter, stating, "We are not protecting the Syrian government,
but international law. . . . It is alarming that military intervention in in-
329. Id. T 4.13.
330. Id.
331. Scheffer, supra note 38, at 290.
332. Bethlehem, supra note 172.
333. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 4.16.
334. Id.¶6.15.
335. Id. 6.21.





ternal conflicts in foreign countries has become commonplace for the
United States. Is it in America's long-term interest? I doubt it." 33 7
ICISS partly recognized the veto problem and suggested that a
country seeking to intervene should look to the General Assembly and
then to regional organizations for assistance.338 In the case of Libya, the
African Union, Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Organiza-
tion of the Islamic Conference all supported the condemnation of Gadda-
fi. 339 The regional support certainly helps, but it also takes time. These
situations often require immediate action, and acquiring approval from
these other large organizations could waste precious time. ICISS also
warned the Security Council that if it fails to take action, states wishing
to intervene may do so on their own, an action which would affect the
credibility of the United Nations as a peace-keeping organization.3 40 That
is why, as a practical matter, if the Security Council is unwilling to au-
thorize military intervention, a state may do so without its approval if all
the other elements for intervention are present.341
Moreover, instances have occurred in which action has been taken
legally without Chapter VII authorization. For example, the forcible po-
licing of no-fly zones in Iraq in 1999 by the United States, United King-
dom, and France lacked Security Council approval under Chapter VII.3 42
Though the Security Council did pass resolution 688 to condemn the
suffering of Iraqi civilians, the resolution was not passed under Chapter
VH. 343 Thus, the Security Council did not authorize the policing actions
under the Charter but rather under a humanitarian intervention princi-
ple.
Regarding Syria, the United Kingdom proposed a resolution to the
U.N. Security Council in 2013 seeking its authorization for military ac-
345tion, but the members could not agree to its terms. Because the pro-
posal failed, no official record exists of whether the United States co-
sponsored it. But it is reasonable to assume that the United States sup-
ported the U.K.'s proposal based on their allied relationship.34 6 The
337. Putin, supra note 47.
338. ICISS, supra note 37, In 6.29--3 1.
339. Justin Morris, Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum, 89 INT'L
AFF. 1265, 1272 (2013); Ved P. Nanda, From Paralysis in Rwanda to Bold Moves in Libya: Emer-
gence of the "Responsibility to Protect" Norm Under International Law - Is the International Com-
munity Ready for It?, 34 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 39 (2011).
340. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 6.40; see also U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164, T 60
("[T]he international community's failure to stem the mass violence and displacements in Darfur, as
well as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia, has undermined public confidence in
the United Nations and our collective espousal of the principles relating to the responsibility to
protect.").
341. Scheffer, supra note 38, at 290-91.
342. See Bethlehem, supra note 172.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See Fassihi, Nicholas & Winning, supra note 60.
346. See, e.g., CBS NEWS, supra note 31.
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countries then came together again in condemning the attacks in April
2017 and urging Russia not to block any U.N. actions.34 7 Under the
ICISS framework, this is enough to satisfy the element of right authority.
2. Just Cause
Military intervention can be justified only if the circumstances in
the sovereign state so grossly violate human rights and cause "serious
and irreparable harm" to human beings.348 Professor Scheffer identifies a
number of elements as requiring intervention: "(1) [t]o rescue or protect
citizens abroad . . . whose lives are at risk[;] (2) [t]o protect religious or
ethnic minorities from genocide or violent oppression[;] (3) to [stop]
internal . . . human rights atrocities[;] (4) [t]o contain mass migration,"
assist internally displaced people, and to improve life-threatening condi-
tions for refugees; (5) to curtail gross human suffering from "man-made
or natural disasters"; and (6) to aid oppressed rebels in their fight for
self-determination against tyrants who grossly violate human rights.349
ICISS stated that this harm must be either (1) "large scale loss of
life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to
act, or a failed state situation," or (2) "large scale 'ethnic cleansing,' ac-
tual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion,
acts of terror or rape."350 Such loss includes crimes against humanity and
war violations as defined by the Geneva Conventions and other interna-
tional laws.35
1
ICISS did not define "large scale" in numbers but stated that inter-
vention can be anticipatory when clear evidence exists of the likelihood
of mass killing. 3 52 If countries could not act on this likelihood, they
would have to wait until a human rights violation rose to the level of
mass genocide.3 53 Even so, some extreme humanitarian violations to a
smaller population may warrant the same intervention.354
The Commission listed a number of circumstances that would not
meet the "just cause" requirement for military intervention: systematic
racial discrimination, systematic imprisonment, repression of political
opponents, overthrow of government, rescuing own nationals on foreign
347. Down to Assad, supra note 6; The Latest, supra note 14.
348. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 4.18; see also Scheffer, supra note 38, at 291.
349. Scheffer, supra note 38, at 265. But Professor Scheffer notes the problem with this list: all
purposes are difficult to justify under a traditional reading of the U.N. Charter. These purposes, he
argues, can be addressed using non-consensual, non-forcible methods, which include the work of
non-governmental organizations that provide aid, rather than military force. See id. at 266.




354. Ocran, supra note 35, at 45.
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soil (covered by U.N. Charter Article 51), and responding to terrorist
attacks (also covered by Article 5 1).
Syria's use of chemical weapons clearly fits the just cause require-
ment because the attack caused large scale loss of life to adults and chil-
dren. The U.N. Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Chal-
lenges, and Change in 2004 specifically stated that chemical weapons are
similar to nuclear weapons in that they pose a serious threat for their
ability to indiscriminately kill masses with one shot. 356 The Secretary-
General's report on the U.N.'s chemical weapons investigation even stat-
ed that "chemical weapons were used on a relatively large scale, result-
ing in numerous casualties . . . ."35 The Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights confirmed at least 502 deaths and thousands more injured in
2013.358 The April 2017 attacks killed about 100 and left hundreds more
injured.35 9 Furthermore, because Syria had huge stockpiles of the weap-
ons,360 the intervention could be further justified as anticipating more
deaths.
3. Right Intention
"The primary purpose of the intervention," whatever other motives
intervening states may have, "must be to halt or avert human suffer-
ing."361 It cannot be, for example, to help a rebel group overthrow a gov-
ernment or to change international borders.362 It may be difficult to ascer-
tain what the true motivation is, but the intention is better affirmed when
multiple states intend to intervene, or when one state has backing from
regional organizations and support from the victims themselves.363
Realistically, a country is always going to have additional motiva-
tions, like economic interests, political strategies, or even expansion-
ism. 3 64 While ideally this should not be so, a state must be able to justify
to its own people the reason for expending the country's resources and
355. ICISS, supra note 37, TT 4.25-27.
356. High Level Panel, supra note 100, ¶ 114.
357. U.N. Mission Report, supra note 28, 1 1 (emphasis added).
358. Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, supra note 29.
359. Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, Nikki Haley Says U.S. May 'Take Our Own Action'
on Syrian Chemical Attack, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-attack-un.html; Lena Masri,
Death Toll in Syrian Chemical Attack Rises to 72, ABC NEWS, (Apr. 5, 2017, 1:36 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/death-toll-syrian-chemical-attack-rises-72/story?id=46591764.
360. Report of the OPCW, supra note 68.
361. ICISS, supra note 37, 14.33.
362. Id.
363. Id. 14.34; see also Scheffer, supra note 38, at 291.
364. Ocran, supra note 35, at 44; Kioko, supra note 233, at 823 (areas of interest could include
a desire to prevent cross-border refugee flow or strategic and economic interests in establishing order
in the target state); Amy E. Eckert, The Responsibility to Protect in the Anarchical Society: Power,
Interest, and the Protection of Civilians in Libya and Syria, 41 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 87, 91
(2012).
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taxpayers' money and for taking the risk to intervene.36 5 Though domes-
tic approval is separate and apart from international obligations, leader-
ship will be held accountable domestically for its actions abroad. There-
fore, it is natural to have some state interest, other than just a moral one.
These interests, in fact, serve as a check on prolonged interventions and a
compass that keeps the alleged purpose for intervention on the humani-
tarian path because the intervening state is using its own resources to
intervene.366 Moreover, because of international interdependence, "inter-
national citizenship is a matter of national self-interest."367 The question
here is not how many intentions the intervening country has but rather
what the primary reason is.
This prong in the analysis is perhaps the highest hurdle to overcome
because it is the most susceptible to abuse.368 How do we know when a
country is being disingenuous? And how do we prevent countries from
taking advantage of the doctrine and using it as a pretext to wage war?
Many leading scholars reject unilateral humanitarian intervention for just
this reason.369 For example, Richard Bilder argues that "historically,
claims of humanitarian intervention have typically served simply as a
pretext for what are, in fact, selfish assertions of national interest, power,
and greed . . . ."370 Similarly, Jane Stromseth, who believes in a gradual
acceptance of the doctrine, asserts that it should not be codified because
that "would provide another theory under which states determined to use
force can seek to justify their actions."371
Such was the case in Libya. Only France referred to the responsibil-
ity to protect during deliberations about the resolutions, but the doc-
trine's ideals were discussed subsequent o the adoption of the resolu-
372
tions. The AU, while it condemned Gaddafi, actually opposed the
resolutions, arguing that intervention in Libya-particularly without AU
approval-would make the situation worse and was not necessary be-
cause the situation did not involve genocide; further, the AU believed
that if a regime change were to occur, the Libyan people must make that
decision, not external forces.373 After the NATO bombings, Human
365. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 4.35.
366. Kritsiotis, supra note 269, at 1026.
367. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 4.36; see also Franck, supra note 143, at 857.
368. See Brown, supra note 146, at 1727; Goodman, supra note 177, at 113; Kritsiotis, supra
note 268, at 1020-23.
369. See Goodman, supra note 177, at 108-09.
370. Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism": Promise or Peril?, 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 160 (1999).
371. Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental
Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 232, 257 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds.,
2003).
372. See supra, note 258.
373. African Leaders Oppose NATO Over Gaddafi, supra note 260; see also 2011 Libya Civil
War Fast Facts, supra note 255; see supra note 258. The AU's opposition is particularly important
given the fact that Article 4(h) of the AU's founding charter specifically delineates the right to
intervene in "grave circumstances" like war crimes and genocide. Constitutive Act of the African
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Rights Watch called for an investigation of the campaign, asserting that
the act was illegal and caused far too much collateral damage.37 4 Since
then, during the ten publicly recorded meetings regarding the situation in
Libya between February 2011 and May 2013, express references to the
responsibility to protect were made by the United States, France, Germa-
ny, Colombia, France, Lebanon and Rwanda.
President Obama mentioned a number of reasons why he wanted to
strike Syria for its chemical weapons use. He discussed the potential
harm to U.S. allies, the disruption of regional peace from refugee migra-
tions, the spilling of violence across border lines, and national security-
the potential harm that could occur from Syria providing chemical weap-
ons to terrorist groups and other tyrants who could then use the weapons
against U.S. soldiers on the battlefield.376 Clearly, the United States had
many self-interests to intervene. But President Obama also discussed the
attack as "an assault on human dignity" and his primary purpose to "hold
the Assad regime accountable for their use of chemical weapons, deter
this kind of behavior, and degrade their capacity to carry it out." 377 For-
mer President Bill Clinton gave a similar reasoning for the U.S. invasion
of Macedonia in 1999.378 Ms. Rice explained that the strikes on Syria
would not be an attempt to topple President Assad or to effect a change
in regime because that would require a much more extensive military
campaign.379 While the overarching U.S. plan for Syria did include a
peaceful change in government, the narrowness of the strikes indicates
that the action would not likely result in such a change.380 In Libya,
NATO claimed humanitarian intervention as its justification for action.3
Union, supra note 232, art. 4(h). Its opposition to the resolutions thus indicates that the trigger for
humanitarian intervention is extremely high and the right is highly limited, and the AU believed that
the circumstances in Libya did not reach that bar.
374. NATO: Investigate Civilian Deaths in Libya, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (May 14, 2012, 12:00
AM), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/14.
375. See Morris, supra note 339, at 1272-73.
376. Statement by the President on Syria, supra note 32; see also U.N. Secretary-General,
supra note 164, 1 58 (stating that special attention must be paid to the prevention of arms flows to
repressive regimes).
377. Statement by the President on Syria, supra note 32.
378. William J. Clinton, President of the U.S., Remarks to Kosovo International Security Force
Troops in Skopje, (June 22, 1999) (transcript available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57770) ("[P]eople who come from different racial and
ethnic and religious backgrounds can live together and work together and do better together if they
simply respect each other's God-given dignity-and we don't want our children to grow up in a 21st
century world where innocent civilians can be hauled off to the slaughter, where children can die en
masse, where young boys of military age can be burned alive, where young girls can be raped en
masse, just to intimidate their families. We don't want our kids to grow up in a world like that....
But never forget, if we can do this here and if we can then say to the people of the world, whether
you live in Africa or central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians
and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background, or their religion, and
it's within our power to stop it, we will stop it."); see also Brown, supra note 147, at 1691.
379. Susan E. Rice, supra note 316.
380. See Statement by the President on Syria, supra note 32.
381. See NA TO and Libya, NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics 71652.htm (last
updated Nov. 9, 2015).
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The bombing campaign did in fact lead to a regime change, though Gad-
dafi was killed by rebel forces, not NATO forces.3 8 2 But NATO's strike
lasted seven months;3 83 the strike on Syria would be much shorter, mak-
ing it much more difficult to achieve such a change in government had
that been the underlying intention. President Trump also cited national
security as a reason for using military force; however, he emphasized
that Assad's use of chemical weapons was "egregious"384 and had to be
stopped: "It was a slow and brutal death for so many. . . . Even beautiful
babies were cruelly murdered at this very barbaric attack. No child of
God should ever suffer such horror."385
4. Last Resort
A country can use military force to intervene only when every other
preventative option for diplomatic resolution of the crisis has been ex-
386
plored.36 This does not mean that each and every one must have been
tried and failed, but it does mean that each conceivable option would
have likely been unsuccessful.387 Moreover, if the intervention does not
have Security Council approval and it is undertaken by a single state, the
country must have made efforts to create a multinational force. 388
After the first large scale attack in 2013, Ms. Rice reiterated Presi-
dent Obama's plan, explaining the multiple attempts to resolve the Syri-
an crisis before a mass use of chemical weapons.389 She stated that the
United States had consistently supported the U.N. diplomatic process to
talk to Syria and the formation of the United Nations Commission of
Inquiry to document the violence in Syria.390 She asserted that the United
States also publicly admonished Syria when it started using chemical
weapons on a very small scale a few months before the main attack and
provided evidence of the use to Congress and the United Nations.
39 1
Moreover, the United States provided non-lethal assistance to the civil
opposition and pushed for over six months for a U.N. team to visit Syria
to investigate the chemical weapons situation.392
382. See 2011 Libya Civil War Fast Facts, supra note 255.
383. See id.
384. Dana Bash et al., Trump on Syria's Assad: 'Something Should Happen,' CNN (Apr. 6,
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/06/politics/donald-trump-syria-options/index.html.
385. Tony Capaccio, Nicholas Wadhams & Toluse Olorunnipa, U.S. Launches Missile Strike
on Syria After Gas Attack, BLOOMBERG QUINT (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.bloombergquint.com/markets/2017/04/07/u-s-launches-missile-strike-on-syria-in-
response-to-gas-attack.
386. ICISS, supra note 37, 14.37; see also U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164, ¶ 40.
387. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶ 4.37.
388. Scheffer, supra note 38, at 291.






Three times the Security Council took up resolutions to condemn
lesser violence by the Syrian regime. Three times we negotiated for
weeks over the most watered-down language imaginable. And three
times, Russia and China doubled vetoed almost meaningless resolu-
tions. Similarly, in the past two months, Russia has blocked two reso-
lutions condemning the use of chemical weapons that did not even
ascribe blame to any party. Russia opposed two mere press state-
ments expressing concern about heir use. A week after the August
21 [2013] gas attack, the United Kingdom presented a resolution that
included a referral of war crimes in Syria to the International Crimi-
nal Court, but again the Russians opposed it, as they have every form
of accountability in Syria.3 9 3
When Syria acceded to the CWC, Russia assumed the role to over-
see its ally's compliance and destruction or removal of its chemical
weapons stockpiles.3 94 By agreeing to permit Russia to serve as Syria's
supervisor, the United States made an accommodation to Syria as a com-
promise for not using force. When Syria launched its April 2017 attack,
Secretary Tillerson accused Russia of being either "complicit" or "in-
competent" in carrying out its duties to ensure Syria's adherence to the
CWC. 39 5 Before launching a military strike, the United States could have
threatened to sanction Russia for its role in the attack and to pressure
Russia to compel Syria to halt its use of chemical weapons. The United
States also could have used economic sanctions to pressure President
Assad directly to give up the chemical weapons stockpile. The United
States currently maintains sanctions against Syria for its support of ter-
rorism and weapons of mass destruction,396 but neither former President
Obama nor President Trump made any efforts to sanction Syria specifi-
cally for its use of chemical weapons. It can be argued, however, that
such sanctions against Russia or Syria would have had no real effect be-
cause history shows a lack of compliance and because the sanctions
could not literally destroy the stockpiles like a military strike would.
Under the ICISS theory explained above, evidence of the likelihood
of failure would be sufficient to rule out all conceivable options that were
393. Id.
394. See David Filipov & Anne Gearan, Russia Condemns U.S. Missile Strike on Syria, Sus-
pends Key Air Agreement, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-condemns-us-missile-strike-on-
syria/2017/04/07/c8leal2a-lb4e- lle7-8003-f55b4clcfae2_story.html.
395. See Williams, supra note 17.
396. The U.S. has placed sanctions on Syria but not any directly related to its use of chemical
weapons in August 2013. The sanctions include the Syria Accountability Act of 2004, which impos-
es sanctions on Syria for its support of terrorism, weapons of mass destructions programs, and its
role in Iraq. Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-175, §§ 2(4)-(5), (20)22), (26)-(34), 117 Stat. 2482 (2003).
Another sanction is imposed against the Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS) and prohibits U.S. banks
from maintaining accounts with CBS. The final sanction is imposed on Syrian individuals and enti-
ties for their association with al Qaida, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden, involvement in the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction, or receipt of any benefit from public corruption. See SYRIA
SANCTIONS PROGRAM, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL 4 (2013).
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not attempted. As a result, a U.S. military strike would be the last resort.
For years, the Obama Administration tried peace talks with Syria and
attempted to have U.N. resolutions passed. Though Syria ultimately
agreed to give up its chemical weapons stock, it did so only under this
U.S. threat of force. Moreover, the United States attempted to gain sup-
port and create a multinational force, as ICISS requires. British Prime
Minister David Cameron backed President Obama's plan, but the British
Parliament voted not to intervene,397 based not on the legality of humani-
tarian intervention but rather on the wisdom of such a mission.398 Given
this history, Ambassador Haley warned that the United States would take
action given the consistent failure of the United Nations to act.399 Ac-
cordingly, President Trump's strike was a last resort.
5. Proportional Means
Any military intervention undertaken should be the minimum nec-
essary to achieve the desired result of halting violence and protecting
people from suffering.4 0 0 The scale, duration, and intensity should be
commensurate with the original provocation.401 Any effect on the politi-
cal system and structure of the targeted country must be limited to only
that intervention necessary.402 For example, in 1914, two German offic-
ers and one German official were killed at an outpost in Portuguese-
controlled Angola.403 The Germans retaliated by destroying several Por-
tuguese outposts.404 The case's arbitrators found that the German retalia-
405
tion was greatly disproportionate to the instigation.
Another example is the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo.
Scholar John Janzekovic criticized NATO's seventy-eight-day air cam-
paign as disproportionate to fight the decade-long slaughter of Kosovars
by the Serbs because it did not halt the killing.406 In fact, he argued, once
the air attacks began, the Serbs began a massive killing campaign of Ko-
sovars. 407 About 100,000 Kosovars and only 8,000 Serbs were killed as a
result of the air campaign.4 0 8 He asserted that NATO's strikes should
have been aimed at Serb forces instead of command and communications
397. Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action, BBC (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23892783.
398. See Bethlehem, supra note 172.
399. Read Nikki Haley's Remarks About Syria at the U.N., TIME (Apr. 5, 2017),
http://time.com/4727499/nikki-haley-unsc-transcript-syria.
400. ICISS, supra note 37, ¶¶ 4.39-40.
401. Id. 14.39; see also Ocran, supra note 35, at 45.
402. Ocran, supra note 35, at 45.
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systems, water and power supplies, and army and police barracks.409 Ac-
cordingly, the attack was not proportionate to achieve the intended re-
sult.4 10
Here, the Senate bill approving President Obama's plan stipulated
that the strike is for the "limited and specified" use of the armed forces in
Syria only to respond to the use of chemical weapons, deter Syria's use
of the weapons to protect the interests of the United States and its allies,
degrade Syria's capacity to use chemical weapons in the future, and pre-
411vent the transfer of the weapons to terrorist organizations. Section III
of the bill explicitly limited the intervention: "[T]he authority granted ...
does not authorize U. S. Armed Forces ground combat operations in Syr-
,,412ia.
President Obama explained that the military intervention would
have been very narrow.413 No soldiers would have been placed on the
ground, and it would have targeted the chemical weapons stockpiles to
deter their use generally and prevent Syria from using them again.414 The
strike would have been deliberately limited in time and scope,415 and it
would target the chemical weapons in a range of ways that would debili-
tate Syria's ability to manage, deliver, and develop chemical weapons.4 16
President Trump's missile launch was highly limited as it was
aimed at hangars, planes, fuel tank ammunition, storage, and air defense
systems.4 17 The strike was not intended to overthrow the Assad regime.
Secretary Rex Tillerson stated: "The process by which Assad would
leave is something that I think requires an international community ef-
fort." 4 18
6. Reasonable Prospects
A proposed military intervention must have some reasonable chance
of success without inflicting more harm than good.4 19 An intervening
state has a duty not to make the situation worse.420 In the United States,
409. Id. at 54.
410. For further examples of proportionality issues, see id. at 54-55.
411. An Official Joint Resolution to Authorize Limited and Specified Use of the United States
Armed Forces Against Syria, S.J. Res. 21, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).
412. Id. § 3.
413. Statement by the President on Syria, supra note 32.
414. Id.
415. Susan E. Rice, supra note 316.
416. Id.
417. Capaccio, Wadhams & Olorunnipa, supra note 385.
418. Rex W. Tillerson, Sec'y of State, Remarks on China Summit (Apr. 6, 2017) (transcript
available at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/269540.htm).
419. Scheffer, supra note 38, at 291.
420. Brown, supra note 147, at 1735. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia launched a pre-investigation into NATO's intervention in Kosovo after allega-
tions that its bombing campaign caused hundreds of deaths and great damage to the environment.
The Tribunal ultimately found that an in-depth investigation of the bombings was not necessary
because it was unlikely to find enough evidence to substantiate claims of human rights violations.
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domestic law imposes no duty upon a passer-by to intervene and provide
aid to someone in need.42 1 If the bystander chooses to intervene and in-
flicts more harm, however, that person may be held civilly liable. Hu-
422
manitarian intervention imposes a similar burden.42 If a state chooses to
423
intervene and does more damage, it has a duty to fix what it has done.
This type of responsibility acts as a deterrent to providing necessary
aid.424
Here, military action would be used as a deterrent, not to stop cur-
rent fighting, so it would have to have a reasonable chance of success of
destroying the weaponry and deterring further use. President Obama's
plan was to destroy Syria's capacity to use chemical weapons in the fu-
425
ture and deter other dictators from employing them as well. President
Trump specifically fired at artillery and aircraft to destroy Syria's capa-
426
bility to spread these chemical gases.46 Eliminating the stockpile and
their modes of dissemination would have a reasonable chance of success
in achieving the stated goals because it would literally destroy the wea-
ponry and make it impossible for President Assad to use those weapons
again. Of course, the strike would not eliminate the intellectual property
and human resources required to develop the weapons, but it is a start.
And it still sends a message to President Assad and other tyrants that the
international community will not tolerate their attempts to use these
weapons.
A chance exists, however, that a strike could do some harm.427 It
could potentially kill innocent civilians located in the vicinity of the
stockpiles, damage unrelated infrastructure, and perhaps even ignite
some chemical gases.428 These types of harms are not minor, and they
must be prevented or minimized. But the question is not whether the
strike would cause any amount of harm; rather, the question is whether
the act would make the country's situation worse and inflict more harm
than good. While some harm is a possibility, based on the targeted nature
of the military strike, inadvertent damage was not great. Furthermore,
steps were taken to ensure that minimal damage was done.429 Prior to
See INT'L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, COMM. ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW
THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FED. REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT TO
THE PROSECUTOR ¶ 90 (2000), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato06l300.pdf.
421. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(a) (2017).
422. Brown, supra note 147, at 1736.
423. See id. at 1737.
424. Id.
425. Statement by the President on Syria, supra note 32.
426. Capaccio, Arkhipov & Foroohar, supra note 214.
427. See generally David Glazier, Ignorance is Not Bliss: The Law of Belligerent Occupation
and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 121 (2005); Legality of U.S.-Led Invasion of
Iraq, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 269 (2005).
428. In President Trump's airstrike, nine civilians, including four children, as well as six ser-
vicemen were allegedly killed, and six planes were destroyed. Alexander, Boyle & Henderson, supra
note 25.
429. Capaccio, Arkhipov & Foroohar, supra note 214.
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President Trump's launch, the Pentagon informed Russia and also took
various measures to minimize the risk to Russian planes or personnel in
the airfield.43 0 This damage would pale in comparison to the benefit of
ridding the world of a large stockpile of chemical weapons.
C. Responsibility to Rebuild
ICISS defined the responsibility to rebuild as the obligation "to pro-
vide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recov-
ery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm
the intervention was designed to halt or avert."431 Without such assis-
tance, countries are often left to deal with the underlying causes that ini-
tiated the conflict originally.432 Rebuilding involves committing addi-
tional funds and resources and may require the intervening country to
stay much longer than intended or desired.433
The most successful reconciliation processes do not necessarily occur
at high level political dialogue tables, or in judicial-style processes
(though we well understand the positive role that truth and reconcilia-
tion commissions can play in certain post-conflict environments).
True reconciliation is best generated by ground level reconstruction
efforts, when former armed adversaries join hands in rebuilding their
community or creating reasonable living and job conditions at new
settlements. True and lasting reconciliation occurs with sustained dai-
ly efforts at repairing infrastructure, at rebuilding housing, at planting
and harvesting, and cooperating in other productive activities.434
In the 1998 U.N. report on the promotion of peace in Africa, the
Secretary-General described postconflict relief as follows: "Peace-
building may involve the creation or strengthening of national institu-
tions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for rein-
tegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for re-
sumed development.'A35
ICISS lists three major areas during the rebuilding stage that require
attention: (1) security, (2) justice, and (3) economic development.436
First, security involves the protection of all nationals to prevent "reverse
ethnic cleansing" of victims against oppressors.437 Security also involves
430. Jordan Fabian, US Launches Missile Strike Against Syria in Response to Gas Attack, HILL
(Apr. 6, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/327728-us-launches-missile-strike-
against-syria-in-response-to-gas-attack.




435. U.N. Secretary-General, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and
Sustainable Development in Africa, 1 63, U.N. Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318 (Apr. 13, 1998); see also
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164, T 31.
436. ICISS, supra note 37, 15.7.
437. Id.¶5.8.
68 [Vol. 95:1
U.S. INTERVENTION IN SYRIA
the reintegration of local police forces and disarmament of demobilized
soldiers.4 38 Second, measures ought to be taken to install or rehabilitate a
properly functioning justice system so that human rights violators can be
tried and punished.439 These courts are the "first line of defence against
impunity"440 and are necessary to help citizens regain and protect rights,
such as property rights, that may have been unlawfully or physically de-
stroyed.441 Third, the intervening state should try to encourage economic
development and market growth.42 This includes helping eliminate any
economic sanctions that may have been imposed on the state during the
conflict.443
This rebuilding requirement is less of a legally imposed duty but ra-
ther a morally imposed one based on the basic premise of keeping prom-
ises.4 In the case of Kosovo, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair
recognized this responsibility when he stated at a press conference after
the NATO bombings, "[W]e said all the way through that we would help
them to reconstruct the Balkans, to make the Balkans a place of peace
and security. . . . Our job is to make sure that the promises that we made
to them during the course of the conflict we now honor post-conflict."44
5
Further, in Libya, the Security Council adopted a resolution in September
2011 creating a U.N. support mission to help restore public security,
. 446
promote national reconciliation, and initiate economic recovery.
If the United States had intervened in Syria in 2013, it likely would
have provided rebuilding assistance as it has done in the past. Since the
United States invaded Libya, it has committed $170 million in aid and
has provided assistance to strengthen the election systems, justice sec-
tors, and various nongovernmental organizations' efforts." 7 Further, the
United States has provided over $1 billion to Kosovo since 1999448 and
continues to provide assistance to develop the electoral system, agricul-
ture and energy markets, and relationships between the Serbian majority
and the Government of Kosovo.449 In this case, Secretary of State John
438. Id. 1 5.9.
439. Id. 15.13.
440. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 164, ¶ 19.
441. ICISS, supra note 37, 1 5.15.
442. Id. 5.19.
443. Id.
444. Brown, supra note 147, at 1738.
445. Remarks Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom and
an Exchange with Reporters in Cologne, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1132, 1134 (June 18,
1999).
446. S.C. Res. 2009, 1 12 (Sept. 16, 2011).
447. Office of the Special Coordinator for Middle E. Transitions, U.S. Government Assistance





448. US. Assistance to Kosovo, U.S. DEP'T ST., https://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/eur/ci/kv/c26235.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
449. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO EuR. AND EURASIA, FOREIGN
OPERATIONS ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET (2013).
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Kerry announced on January 15, 2014, that the United States would pro-
vide an additional $380 million in humanitarian aid to the Syrian people,
bringing the total U.S. funding for humanitarian assistance to the Syrian
people to nearly $1.7 billion since the crisis began.4 5 0 The aid included
food, clean water, shelter, medical care, and relief supplies to over 4.2
million people inside Syria and to more than 2 million refugees across
the region.4 51 President Obama also stated that the United States will
provide Jordan with $1 billion in loans to alleviate the strain of over
600,000 Syrian refugees.45 2
President Trump has stated that more aid would be provided to
countries like Jordan that are carrying the brunt of the refugees seeking
453escape from Syria. As of this writing, however, he has not made any
statements regarding specific plans for Syria, and thus it is unclear
whether President Trump will maintain the amount of aid President
Obama promised. If history is any indicator, however, it is likely that a
large amount of aid will still be provided, and thus the rebuilding prong
should be met.
CONCLUSION
Syria's use of chemical weapons against its own people is undenia-
bly a violation of international law. As a member of the United Nations,
Syria was bound to uphold the values of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and as a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, Syria
was prohibited from using chemical weapons. Moreover, the Chemical
Weapons Convention is almost universally agreed to, so Syria was bound
to those terms under customary international law.
The principles of nonintervention in the U.N. Charter should be pre-
served to maintain social and political order. But the terms of the Charter
also constrain nations that truly want to make a difference when human
rights atrocities occur. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the
responsibility to protect allow very narrow flexibility from the confines
of the Charter. While still developing, this emerging doctrine is a path-
450. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: U.S. Humanitarian
Assistance in Response to the Syrian Crisis (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
pressoffice/2013/09/24/fact-sheet-us-humanitarian-assistanceresponse-syrian-crisis.
451. Id.
452. Sarah Wheaton & Mark Landler, Obama Promises New Aid to Jordan in Refugee Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/15/us/politics/syria-is-expected-to-
be-main-topic-as-obama-meets-with-king-of-jordan.html.
453. While President Trump has promised monetary support to assist refugees abroad, he has
been clear that he will not permit the entry of thousands of refugees into the United States, arguing
that he seeks to prevent entry of terrorists masquerading as refugees. Such a policy flouts U.S. obli-
gations under international refugee law, but that issue is beyond the scope of this article. President
Trump's overall policy regarding Syria is not clear as of this writing. For example, his administra-
tion has issued conflicting statements regarding his position on the overthrow of Syrian -President
Assad.
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way to help ensure the safety and protection of innocent lives against
tyranny.
The United States, not only as a permanent member of the Security
Council but also as one of the most powerful nations in the world, is
poised to intervene when gross human rights violations occur. Though
the United States has not taken action in every instance of such viola-
tions, Syria provides a unique situation because the gravity of the crime
has massive implications for the security of the entire globe. Thus, the
United States and other nations should be able to intervene and fulfill
their responsibility to protect when acts, like the use of chemical weap-
ons, show extreme disregard for and brutality against the innocent and
may be easily perpetrated across borders. As former President Obama
said:
[T]he moral thing to do is not to stand by and do nothing. I would
much rather spend my time talking about how every 3- and 4-year-
old gets a good education than I would spending time thinking about
how I can prevent 3- and 4-year-olds from being subjected to chemi-
cal weapons and nerve gas. . .. I can't avoid those questions, because
* as much as we are criticized, when bad stuff happens around the
world, the first question is, what is the United States going to do
about it?
454
President Trump called "on all civilized nations to join us in seeking
to end the slaughter and bloodshed in Syria . . .. [W]e hope that as long
as America stands for justice, that peace and harmony will, in the end,
prevail."4 55 Too many times in history, the United Nations has ignored
456
blaring warning signs about human rights violations4. It did so in
Rwanda, Cambodia, and the Balkans because of ambivalence or political
agendas.457 "The United Nations and its Member States remain under-
prepared to meet their most fundamental prevention and protection re-
sponsibilities. We can, and must, do better. Humanity expects it and his-
tory demands it." 458
454. Anne Gearen, Ed O'Keefe & William Branigin, Senate Committee Approves Resolution
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BACK TO THE BASICS: LESSONS FROM U.S. PROPERTY
LAW FOR LAND REFORM
SHELLEY CAVALIERIt
ABSTRACT
Redistributive land reform programs are a central development ap-
proach in nations of the global south. For proponents of land reform, land
redistribution is an obvious strategy, designed to reduce hunger and pov-
erty, to bolster citizens' ability to support themselves and their families,
and to shape the future of burgeoning democracies worldwide. But for
land reform skeptics and opponents, land reform is something of a puz-
zle. While states routinely redistribute money, the choice to distribute
land seems somewhat peculiar. On its face, it is not obvious why land is
worthy of a separate, strange approach, when this is not how nations con-
sider the allocation of many other crucial non-monetary resources. To
invest money in reducing the concentration of land by purchasing from
some in order to give or sell land to others seems far more complex than
simply redistributing financial resources. Yet those who think about
property know that land is different-land is unique and culturally im-
portant. It therefore warrants specific consideration as nations contem-
plate how to create the good society.
Essential theoretical insights about property should form the foun-
dation of land reform efforts, but these too often go unstated, leaving
land reform efforts' theoretical underpinnings unexplored. This Article
serves to fill this gap, grounding market-compatible land reform in prop-
erty's animating principles. The Article considers five different sources
of lessons that property theorists can teach those implementing land re-
form. First, it observes that land is unique and therefore worthy of special
treatment as a social good due to its rivalrous and nonfungible character.
Second, it argues that land reform must recognize the shifting nature of
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land as a contextual, contingent resource that bears separate meanings in
different communities, social classes, and nations. Third, it recognizes
that land reformers must understand the role of land in constituting indi-
vidual identity and personhood. Fourth, the Article examines the histori-
cal role of land in constructing social status and creating wealth. Fifth,
the Article considers how land constitutes citizenship, both by shaping
the individual and the relationship of the individual to the nation. The
Article then makes two key arguments about how these lessons are use-
ful in the context of land reform. First, the Article argues that these prop-
erty lessons can explain why redistributive land reform matters. Second,
the Article leverages these property lessons to make land reform more
effective. The Article concludes by observing that these lessons about
land will fundamentally alter the way land reform is undertaken, contrib-
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INTRODUCTION
Land reform has evolved as a key development strategy for nations
in the developing world. The term "land reform" describes an array of
public policy approaches including formalization of land titles and land
tenure, resolution of land-related conflicts, and the provision of land to
those who are landless. This Article will focus on the latter of these poli-
cies, known broadly as redistributive land reform initiatives. Redistribu-
tion of agrarian land to landless rural people serves central societal pur-
poses including poverty eradication,' food security improvement,2 wealth
accrual, and community development goals.4 I have previously written
on the purposes of land reform, arguing that the key pragmatic and ex-
pressive goals of land reform, which are designed to serve the needs of
poor people in the developing world, are best served by crafting a land
reform approach that does not wildly undermine the existing land mar-
ket.'
1. Krishna B. Ghimire, Land Reform at the End of the Twentieth Century, in LAND REFORM
& PEASANT LIVELIHOODS 1, 1 (Krishna B. Ghimire ed., 2001); Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess,
Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India, 115 Q.J. ECON. 389, 392-94
(2000).
2. Thembela Kepe & Danielle Tessaro, Integrating Food Security with Land Reform: A
More Effective Policy for South Africa, CIGI-AFR. INITIATIVE POL'Y BRIEF SERIES, Aug. 2012, at 1-
2.
3. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 39-40 (2000).
4. See generally Besley & Burgess, supra note 1, at 392-94. The international community
has recognized the role of land reform in addressing development deficits and has dedicated re-
sources to encouraging land access as a way of assisting with development goals. See, e.g.,
SATURNINO M. BORRAS JR. & TERRY MCKINLEY, INT'L POVERTY CTR., THE UNRESOLVED LAND
REFORM DEBATE: BEYOND STATE-LED OR MARKET-LED MODELS 1, 3 (Nov. 2006) (Policy Re-
search Brief No. 3).
5. See Shelley Cavalieri, Grounding Land Reform: Toward a Market-Compatible Approach
to Land Reform, 89 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2015).
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Unfortunately, land reform efforts are often politically divisive and
plagued by an array of problems. Even in the single instance when land
reform was meaningfully undertaken in the United States-in Hawaii in
the 1980s-it was subject to a serious legal challenge from prior owners
that ultimately landed the program in the U.S. Supreme Court, which
validated Hawaii's land redistribution program. In other places, land
reform programs lack an underlying rationale for why they are worth-
while. Such programs face strong opposition not only from landowners
who fear that their land may be taken through eminent domain, but also
from other members of privileged classes. Land reform proponents
struggle to persuasively articulate why land is a unique resource that is
worthy of being treated differently than money or any other social good.
To a property scholar, it might well appear that those implementing
land reform have never learned the essential lessons from property law
when they contemplate how to create programs that broaden access to
the key resource of land. They forget that land is scarce and that its
meaning shifts depending on the culture and community where the land
is situated. They ignore land's relationship to social status. They over-
look its centrality to the stable functioning of a nation's economy. They
disregard its important relationship to citizenship and national identity.
They neglect the role of land ownership in helping to stabilize societies
that have struggled with civil and political unrest. To the extent that land
reform programs are enacted without considering these profound mean-
ings of land, they run the risk of failure. The refusal to properly theorize
land reform and to analyze its roots in property law can prevent land
reform programs from serving their central goal of eradicating poverty.
This Article sets forth to offer property law solutions to some of the
basic problems plaguing land reform initiatives. While land redistribu-
tion might be framed as a repudiation of basic private-property values,
this Article suggests instead that property law and theory are crucial
sources of insights to help land reformers succeed in their efforts to
broaden access to land. In this Article, I prove both how key principles of
property law apply to land reform and how property theory can explain
much of the unstated significance of land reform. In Part I, I describe
five key frameworks that emerge from property law and policy. I then
argue that these property frameworks teach two kinds of lessons. First, in
Part II, I argue that property theory reveals why the effort to redistribute
land through land reform programs is worthwhile. Second, in Part III, I
argue that property law can offer insights into how to make land reform
programs more successful.
6. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (challenging land reform as a
violation of the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
7. AJ VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS 3-4 (2009).
8. I have previously discussed this aspect of redistributive land reform at length. See Cava-
lieri, supra note 5, at 6-8.
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Property principles, therefore, are useful in this context by demon-
strating both the value of redistributive land reform initiatives and how to
make such programs more effective. Without these central theoretical
insights, land reform is rootless and suggests that land is just another
social good that a society might decide to redistribute. But rooted in
property law, the profound import and difficulty of broadening access to
land become clear. Prudentially, knowledge of these theories is essential
to crafting effective land reform programs. This Article proves why land
is different, and as a result, why land reform programs must reflect the
meaning of land to succeed. All of these lessons reveal why property
insights into the nature of land are integral to understanding the profound
value of land reform as a focus of antipoverty, development, and human
rights efforts.9
I. PROPERTY'S BASICS PROVIDE LESSONS FOR LAND REFORM
In this part of the Article I identify and explain five sources of les-
sons within property law. Section L.A describes how property law has
come to address land's nonfungible nature and finite quantity. Section
I.B explains how property scholars understand the shifting nature of land
as a contextual, contingent resource whose meaning communities, social
classes, and nations might comprehend in divergent ways. Section I.C
sets forth the role of land in constituting individual identity and person-
hood. In Section I.D, I first examine the historical role of land in con-
structing social status and creating wealth; I then analyze the evolution of
mechanisms in the Anglo-American legal system to prevent the estab-
lishment of dynastic wealth. Finally, in Section I.E, I consider thse role
land plays in constituting citizenship.
A. Property Rights are Rivalrous and Land Itself is Scarce, so Law
Evolved to Treat Land Differently
Real property is one of a group of resources known as rivalrous
goods-those that "[i]f one person owns and controls them, others do
not."'o Rivalrous goods are characterized by the fact that they are typical-
ly under the control of only one person at a time. When one person owns
the property, it means that another person cannot have the same property
right. In the context of land, rivalrousness requires "recognizing [that] a
property right necessarily has the effect of limiting other property
9. This project specifically undertakes to engage with scholars and policy makers in an effort
to improve land reform. An important but separate project is a deeper engagement with the commu-
nities formed by land reform efforts, to invite those communities to contribute their own perspec-
tives on how land reform might better meet their needs. Despite this Article's focus on using proper-
ty law to speak to scholars and policy makers, my previous fieldwork interviewing recipients of
redistributed land in Guatemala deeply informs the property insights I here invoke. For an incisive
analysis of the importance of subaltern voice in property discourse, see generally Rashmi Dyal-
Chand, Pragmatism and Postcolonialism: Protecting Non-Owners in Property Law, 63 AM. U. L.
REV. 1683, 1727-32 (2014).
10. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (2005).
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rights."" This statement reveals a profound truth about rights to land as
they contrast with many other legal rights.12 Professor Timothy Mul-
vaney observes that recognition of speech rights, for example, probably
will not lead to the denial of others' right to speak.13 But granting a per-
son property rights over a parcel of land usually limits the rights of oth-
ers over the same land.14 Land ownership therefore creates a zero-sum-
game scenario, in which one person's exclusionary property right denies
others rights to that same parcel.'5
While most tangible goods are rivalrous, land's rivalrous nature
poses a particular problem because land is also scarce. Land is arguably
the only visibly finite resource in the modem world. Although the supply
for many resources is elastic, the supply of arable land is finite in practi-
cal terms.16 With most kinds of rivalrous goods, society or the market
11. Timothy M. Mulvaney, Progressive Property Moving Forward, 5 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 349,
360 & n.47 (2014); see also Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional Co-
nundrum, 91 TEX. L. REV. 2015, 2029 (2013) ("Property in physical, finite, nonsharable resources is
inherently rivalrous in nature.").
12. This trait is of course not characteristic of all kinds of property, especially with regard to
intellectual property. The recognition of a property right in intellectual property does not necessarily
limit the rights of others to use it, even though permitted widespread use of the intellectual property
might reduce its economic value. An entire movement of intellectual property law and policy fo-
cused on creating a valuable commons has developed around spreading the value of intellectual
property more broadly in society; it manifests a reluctance to overly protect intellectual property
rights. See, e.g., Molly Schaeffer Van Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed
Commons, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 23 (2007) (analogizing the open access movement to
environmentalism's focus on protecting access to resources for the public good).
13. Mulvaney, supra note 11, at 360 n.47; see also Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A
Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1033, 1038-39 (1996) (characterizing property rights as
distinct because "they allocate rights to particular individuals in finite, non-sharable resources").
14. This claim is true insofar as title is held in the atomistic fashion that typifies Western
models of landownership. However, collective forms of ownership or the creation of usage rights
that are distinct from ownership may create forms of property that are less rivalrous than those that
dominate most discussions of property rights. A group of contemporary property scholars are start-
ing to focus on the burgeoning sharing economy, revealing that exclusivity need not be an inherent
aspect of property regimes. See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Econo-
my as an Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 266-71 (2015); Kellen Zale, Sharing
Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 562 (2016) (observing that "sharing can temper the rivalrous
nature of property to some extent" although "exclusivity of use or possession is necessarily embed-
ded into property-sharing activities").
15. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Lessons from Outlaws, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 262,
267 (2007) ("When we are considering the fate of external, physical, finite resources, such as land
and all that it yields, property is a zero-sum game. If we acknowledge the 'rights' of some individu-
als in these resources, we deny the 'rights' of others. When we decide (and decide we must) who
owns a building, who will farm the land, and whose mouths are fed, we are making distributive
decisions, whether we like it or not. Property law design and enforcement cannot avoid this. It is a
continual process of serious, deliberate, distributional decision making.").
16. Joyo Winoto, Taking Land Policy and Administration in Indonesia to the Next Stage, in
INNOVATIONS IN LAND RIGHTS RECOGNITION, ADMINISTRATION, AND GOVERNANCE 15 (Klaus
Deininger et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INNOVATIONS IN LAND RIGHTS] ("While ... [land supply] is
seldom completely inelastic, the potential to increase its availability at the extensive margin is either
non-existent or involves high costs."). In contrast, many other kinds of social goods that could be
subject to redistribution are not inelastic. For example, nations can increase the availability of health
care or education through policymaking and subsequent investment. Even situations of temporary,
severe deprivations of social goods, such as the unavailability of food during a famine, are due not to
inelasticity but to distribution problems. Douglas C. Long & Donald F. Wood, The Logistics of
Famine Relief 16 J. Bus. LOGISTICS 213, 213 (1995).
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resolves problems associated with rivalrousness by creating more of the
good-in essence, by ensuring that the good will not also be scarce. For
example, that food is rivalrous is not a problem, so long as food is not
scarce. It is only under conditions of scarcity that food's rivalrousness
becomes problematic.
Responding to the fact of land's rivalrousness and scarcity, real
property law evolved to treat land as special by providing an extraordi-
nary remedy for instances where property contracts are breached. The
tradition of specific performance as the remedy for conflicts about land
contracts reflects the reality of land's scarcity.'7 Notions of property have
long reflected this fundamental nature of land as different from other
kinds of property because no two acres, or even lots, are identical; Amer-
ican property law has evolved to embrace this presumption." Likewise,
the truly finite amount of land that is suitable for specific purposes, such
as cultivation, only deepens the collective awareness that land is unusual.
In the legal context, the rivalrousness and scarcity of land make it unique
and therefore worthy of different treatment than other resources.19
B. Land is Contextual and Contingent
Property scholars similarly recognize that land's nature is not mono-
lithic. While land is only one kind of property, real property's situated-
ness20 means that it is distinct because it cannot be removed from a par-
17. Specific performance has long been the traditional remedy for breach of land contracts.
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 521 (3d ed. 2010) (observing that "[a]lthough damages are the
usual remedy for breach of contract, specific performance is routinely awarded in land sale contracts
because land is unique"); see also Tanya D. Marsh, Sometimes Blackacre is a Widget: Rethinking
Commercial Real Estate Contract Remedies, 88 NEB. L. REv. 635, 649-50 (2010) (reviewing
sources to explain why the equitable remedy of specific performance is appropriate for land). This
may be changing as fungible housing has become more common, in some cases subverting the legal
presumption that real property is nonfungible. A minority of American courts has concluded that the
identical nature of condominiums defeats the presumption of the non-fungibility of land. See, e.g.,
Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194, 198 (N.J. Ch. 1974). But see Giannini v. First Nat'l
Bank of Des Plaines, 483 N.E.2d 924, 933-34 (Il. App. Ct. 1985) (rejecting Centex).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1979) ("A specific
tract of land has long been regarded as unique and impossible of duplication by the use of any
amount of money.").
19. SINGER, supra note 17.
20. The concept of situatedness is used by legal scholars to define the concurrent facts of
location and context. For example, in her illuminative reflection on the confirmation hearings of
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Professor Kathryn Abrams employs the concept of situatedness to describe
social location within a community. Her exposition is worth quoting at length:
When Judge Sotomayor, in her writings, lectures, or public statements, acknowledges the
effect of her experience or group affinities on her adjudication, she is identifying judges
as socially-situated beings. They are situated in a community or communities, and they
are shaped by the perspectives and norms that structure life and relations in those com-
munities. This situatedness militates against the notion that judges should be objective -
that is, they should take a God's eye view of any given controversy by holding them-
selves at a distance not only from the case before them, but from any kind of affiliation
that might prevent them from seeing all aspects of the dispute. If a judge is situated, this
argument suggests, she may view a case through a particular kind of lens, thus limiting
her ability to approach it in other ways or to grasp all dimensions of the controversy. Sit-
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ticular location. In this regard, real property differs from other social
goods because it bears unavoidably contextual and contingent character-
istics. 2 1 Understanding land as a purely market commodity disregards the
role of physical, temporal, and cultural location in creating the meaning
of land. Land's situatedness means that it belies simplistic market defini-
tion.
Two implications of this characteristic of property emerge as partic-
ularly relevant for helping policymakers construct effective, publicly
accepted forms of land reform. First, property scholars work under the
knowledge that property rules are not inevitable but rather are value lad-
en and reflective of a particular society at a particular moment.22 Altera-
tions to property systems therefore can reflect an evolution of a society's
23values over time. Second, once society comes to acknowledge that
property systems are infinitely varied, society must likewise recognize
that the meaning of property itself will vary as well; well-ordered proper-
ty systems therefore must not be based on the presumption of shared
meanings. Rather, they must operate with complete recognition of the
potentially multivalent cultural implications of land in a specific context.
1. Land is Value Laden
The most traditional view of property law suggests that property re-
gimes are static, fixed, and inevitable.2 4 This is in part rooted in the na-
ture of property as bearing some characteristics of a market commodity.25
If property is just another good for the economy to distribute, redistribu-
tive intervention is simply disruptive of the current distribution. One
common critique of redistributive policies is that existing distributions of
property are settled and therefore should not be interrupted, largely be-
cause legal systems are most stable when they confirm citizens' expecta-
uatedness also threatens the kind of detachment, or even insularity, which is often valued
in American adjudication.
Kathryn Abrams, Empathy and Experience in the Sotomayor Hearings, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 263,
269 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
My use of the word "situatedness" follows from this strain of thought in critical legal scholarship,
that land, like people, has a social location and context.
21. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Property as Constitutional Myth: Utilities and Dangers, 92
CORNELL L. REv. 1239, 1248 (2007) (arguing that U.S. law mythologizes property as an absolute
individual right, while in reality it is a "socially contingent and obligated right").
22. Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101
CAL. L. REv. 107, 110 (2013) (arguing that progressive property scholars seek to "create more space
to contest values" inherent in property systems).
23. See id. (suggesting that progressive property focuses on "the underlying values that prop-
erty serves and the social relationships it shapes and reflects" (quoting Gregory S. Alexander et al., A
Statement ofProgressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2009))).
24. Laura Underkuffler refers to this as the common conception of property. LAURA S.
UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 37-51 (2003).
25. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 1-2 (1997) (positing that our property
norms are bifurcated by a dual meaning that is based in property's status as a market good and its
role as the basis of social order).
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tions.26 Yet the presumption baked into this view is that the current sys-
tem is just.
In the last twenty years, a robust alternative view of property has
emerged, rooted in the recognition that the market-good characterization
of property is far too simplistic since property bears many separate
meanings and "resists generalization."27 Known under the general
framework of progressive property, this movement has generated a vo-
luminous literature focused on several key aspects of property. Most
notable for purposes of this Article is progressive property's fundamental
intuition that "[p]roperty implicates plural and incommensurable val-
ues."28 Progressive property as a movement attempts to expose the values
imbued in and hidden within a property system, and the social relation-
ships that the property system reflects.29 Implicit in this effort is the goal
to reject the characterization of property distributions as static or fixed.
Instead, progressive property seeks to unearth alternative values hidden
within the existing system, values that might support the possibility of
new property allocations that decentralize the importance of stability and
its resulting commitment to the status quo, and instead foreground con-
siderations of distributive justice.3 0
This movement within property scholarship reflects an operative
conception of property in which property is a site for expressing other
social values and priorities, rather than existing in a separate, value-free
system.31 Under this conception, property is more than a mere market
commodity because it plays roles in humans' economic, social, and phys-
32
ical lives. Once the value-laden nature of the property regime is un-
masked, it becomes obvious that any given system is reflective of the
values of the society in which it operates.
2. Because Land Is Situated, its Meanings Are Multiple and Diver-
gent
Contingency has even greater import when contemplating differ-
ences in the meaning that land bears across societies. Localized property
26. VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 3-4, 17-18 (describing opposition to post-apartheid
redistribution as rooted in respect for existing rights and desires for stability and security, as well as
in "the 'normal' tendency of law to entrench the status quo and protect existing property holdings").
27. Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 828-29 (2009).
28. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
743, 743 (2009).
29. Rosser, supra note 22, at 111.
30. Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 400 (2015) (describing pro-
gressive property as working "with property, showing how doctrine supports expanding property law
to reach those who would otherwise be excluded and highlighting areas in which social values have
created exceptions that deviate from an exclusion-centric understanding of property law" (emphasis
added)).
31. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 24.
32. Pefialver, supra note 27.
33. Rosser, supra note 22.
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regimes exist worldwide, both in formal and informal systems.34 As pro-
gressive property scholars have shown, property itself is socially defined
and open to shifting, evolving meanings even within the same nation.35
These intuitions about land are more than theoretical-they have deeply
practical aspects. Those who study land rights as they evolve in societies
worldwide acknowledge that land is both an asset and "an issue of
'wealth, power, and meaning."'36 Questions of land rights "have to do
with heritage, identity, citizenship, and governance."37 Land therefore
invokes some of the deepest questions facing a state.
Profound variation in the understanding of land's significance is
even more pronounced in developing countries. In such places, there are
two divergent realities about land, with a growing cultural divide be-
tween them.38 Less privileged rural citizens who have spent their lives
working on the land, whether their own property or that of an employer,
occupy one side of this schism.39 For such people, land is crucial to over-
coming problems of poverty and food insecurity40 -land is the source of
income and livelihood.41 Even within a rural community that might share
some fundamental understandings of the social role of land, dramatic
power differences divide traditional leaders, who form their own rural
elite class, from the landless poor, who form the bulk of the same com-
34. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Property Lost in Translation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
515, 517-18 (2013).
35. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE F[ELD: LESSONS ON THE
OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP 22-29 (2000).
36. Philippe Lavigne Delville, Registering and Administering Customary Land Rights: Can
We Deal with Complexity?, in INNOVATIONS IN LAND RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 28, 28 (quoting
Parker Shipton & Mitzi Goheen, Understanding African Landholding: Power, Wealth and Meaning,
62 AFR.: J. INT'L AFR. INST. 307, 307 (1992)).
37. Id.
38. Professor Johanna Bond has made a more global observation about the rural-urban divide
beyond the issue of land, noting in the context of her discussion of the drafting of the Convention on
the Elimination -of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), that urban elites dominate the
drafting of most supranational agreements, and highlighting the fact that the divide between sophis-
ticated, urban elites and poorer rural people is very real. She further observes that even trying to
involve organizations that work with rural populations is often insufficient to overcome this urban,
elite bias. See Johanna E. Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa, 83 S. CAL. L.
REV. 509, 540-41 (2010). Professor Ezra Rosser has made a similar point about the metaphorical and
sometimes physical distance that lies between rich and poor people and the racialized aspects of this
gap. See generally Ezra Rosser, Getting to Know the Poor, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 66, 81-
88 (2014).
39. My own qualitative research during 2006 and 2010, interviewing landless Guatemalan
peasants about their experiences of land reform, demonstrated repeatedly the central role that land
played in their lives. Having spent their lives hoping to gain access to arable land, the opportunity to
own property and build stability for their families was a dream realized. For some who gained that
land through occupation based in their religious beliefs in Catholic Liberation Theology, land sym-
bolized literal and spiritual liberation from poverty. For others who had been guerilla fighters in the
civil war, land meant that the struggle had served a purpose. But the land was paramount for all of
them.
40. Besley & Burgess, supra note 1.
41. See Sam Moyo, Land and Natural Resource Distribution in Zimbabwe: Access, Equity
and Conflict, 4 AFR. & ASIAN STUD. 187, 188-90 (2005).
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munities' populations.4 2 On the other side exist the privileged but largely
landless educated, urban elites who often occupy positions of influence
and power in the government; paragovemmental organizations, such as
the United Nations; or nongovernmental organizations.43 The contempo-
rary reality of different lived experiences in relation to land dwarfs any
historically shared cultural understandings of the meaning of land, as the
lives of individuals in developing countries increasingly differ based on
some individuals' privilege afforded by education and family social sta-
tion." This urban-rural divide exists worldwide45 but is perhaps most
pronounced in the developing world, where access to education and other
46
aspects of modem life remain largely absent from rural communities.
The anthropological literature on land further demonstrates how
variation in meaning of land reaches far deeper than the urban-rural di-
vide. Concrete examples illustrate how the meaning of property is not
monolithic, even within a single nation. A few examples can help eluci-
date this distinction in practice.
In Central American nations, land has traditionally served the role
of the generator of the stuff of life. For example, the Maya, the indige-
nous peoples of Guatemala and parts of Mexico, Belize, and Honduras,
esteem land of adequate quality to grow corn and beans as the wellspring
of their cultural and religious identity.47 Yet as modem economic devel-
opment has come to Central America, more and more people are moving
to urban areas, destroying these traditional attachments to real property
as the source of foodstuffs and cultural identity.48 For urban people, food
42. See Bond, supra note 38, at 568 (noting in the context of writing about CEDAW that this
dynamic has a particular, gendered aspect, as "[t]raditional leaders represent an elite, largely male
group that has benefited from considerable influence at the local level even in the postcolonial peri-
od," while "[r]ural women in many parts of Africa generally do not enjoy the same status within the
community").
43. See id. at 540-41.
44. Professor Lisa Pruitt has observed that an array of differences animates the schism be-
tween urban and rural places: the presence of local sources of authority in rural areas, "relative social
and cultural stasis" in rural communities, and the lack of penetration of law. Lisa R. Pruitt, Migra-
tion, Development, and the Promise of CEDAWfor Rural Women, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 707,751-52
(2009).
45. Martha Nussbaum has observed the relative lack of interest in the rural-urban divide and
how this division reveals inequality in access to power. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF
JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 225 (2006).
46. But see U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Information Economy Report 2010:
ICTs, Enterprises and Poverty Alleviation, 14-21 (observing that the penetration of cellular tele-
phones into communities in rural parts of developing nations has significantly changed how these
communities function). See generally Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law,
32 ANN. REV. OF Soc. 447, 447, 455-56 (2006) (arguing that "global penetration of law will require
at least four elements-actors, mechanisms, power, and structures [or] arenas").
47. EDWARD F. FISHER, CULTURAL LOGICS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES: MAYA IDENTITY IN
THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 143, 147, 256 n.9 (2001) (documenting that mother's milk, semen, and
maize are "animizing substances" to the Maya and describing a Maya creation myth in which the
"world tree" is a maize plant that is at the center of the cosmos but remains grounded in the land);
JIM HANDY, GIFT OF THE DEVIL: A HISTORY OF GUATEMALA 46 (1984).
48. See SHELDON ANNIS, GOD AND PRODUCTION IN A GUATEMALAN TOWN 33-37 (1987)
(describing traditional peasant reliance on the "milpa" as a source of food and how the role of the
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comes from markets, not the land; land and agriculture are the purview
of people perceived as backward, parochial country residents.4 9 As a
result, while there remains the historic cultural definition of the role of
land, modem understandings of land have diverged, with some individu-
als remaining dedicated to a traditional vision of land and others viewing
real property in an urban setting as more or less fungible, detached from
its role in human sustenance.o
In Zimbabwe, substantial racialized differences in the meaning of
land contribute to ongoing land conflicts.5 1 Black Zimbabwean culture
understands land to belong to the ancestors, to be allocated to households
and then returned to community leaders to be reallocated to another
family when the original head of the household dies.52 Within Black
Zimbabwean society, there is no cultural tradition of individual property
rights; individuals cannot own land in a manner cognizable through
Western property norms. Land holds sacred meaning because it comes
from the ancestors.5 4 Even Zimbabwe's war of independence reflected
this meaning, with the fighters referred to as "children of the soil." 55 In
contrast, White Zimbabweans' culture of land derives from European
legal rules, whereby parcels of fenced land are held with titles that
demonstrate the existence of market-alienable individual property
rights.56
This Zimbabwean example reveals a deeper aspect of the problem
with land rules. In many instances, property regimes serve to protect
existing structures of privilege. In Zimbabwe, fencing practices reflect
the importation of European usage of land distribution to establish social
hierarchy.5 7 While the system appears on its face to be neutral, it in fact
"milpa" has changed as the population of towns has increased); cf FISHER, supra note 47, at 4 (doc-
umenting that while rural elders who relocated to cities during the civil war missed their fields,
young people quickly adapted to indoor urban life).
49. See FISHER, supra note 47, at 159-60, 178 (discussing how rural Mayan communities
view non-market food exchange at the hearth as central to identity; urban elites view villages as
backwards).
50. See id at 111, 113 (describing a ceremony celebrating the transfer of rural land within a
family as well as indigenous identity groups working to strengthen connections to land and reestab-
lish communally held land after the civil war).
51. Andre Degeorges & Brian Reilly, Politicization of Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Impacts on
Wildife, Food Production and the Economy, 64 INT'L J. ENVTL. STUD. 571, 573 (2007).
52. Id. This set of norms too frequently renders widows, women whose marriages or relation-
ships have ended, and single, never married women deeply vulnerable as they lack access to the
primary source of income and stability in their rural communities. Rudo Gaidzanwa, Women 's Land
Rights in Zimbabwe, ISSUE: J. OPINION, Summer 1994, at 12, 12. Even outside of this particular
cultural context, the landlessness of women is a pervasive development problem worldwide. See
Sofia Monsalve Suarez, Gender and Land, in PROMISED LAND: COMPETING VISIONS OF AGRARIAN
REFORM 192, 198 (Peter Rosset et al. eds., 2006).
53. Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 51.
54. Id.
55. DAVID LAN, GUNS AND RAIN: GUERILLAS AND SPIRIT MEDIUMS IN ZIMBABWE 171-72
(1985).
56. Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 51.
57. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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reflects the interests and values of the dominant portion of the population
that already owns property. But it overlooks the needs of people with
weaker property claims-what Professor Andre van der Walt called the
people on the margins58 or Professor Mark Roark would call under-
propertied persons.59 The rules are value laden; the property system re-
flects the existing set of social priorities.
C. Land Can Constitute Identity
In her seminal article Property and Personhood, Margaret Jane Ra-
din posited the key insight that property can be central to individual iden-
tity.60 While Radin has her critics, at its core the concept of personhood
and property reveals that property ownership is intimately tied to our
conceptions of ourselves, an argument that is based on a continuum of
property that ranges from personal to fungible.62 Radin defines personal
property as "a class of objects or resources necessary to be a person or
whose absence would hinder the autonomy or liberty attributed to a per-
son."63 In contrast, fungible property is purely instrumental in nature, and
it "is perfectly replaceable with other goods of equal market value."6
This continuum "generates a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement."65 As a result,
while the state owes deference to personal property rights, under appro-
priate circumstances the state may override fungible property rights to
serve other purposes.66
Complicating this continuum is fetish property, which is a relation-
ship to property that "hinder[s] rather than support[s] healthy self-
constitution."6 7 While owners may perceive their fetish property to cap-
ture their personhood, Radin rejects the ascription of personal, protected
status to fetish property.6 8 Instead, though she recognizes that fetish
property is entitled to status as property, she argues that fetish property
should be treated as fungible.69 Implicit in the refusal to defer to fetish
property rights is Radin's adoption of the Marxist analysis of the "fetish-
58. VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 23-24 (2009).
59. See Marc Roark, Under-Propertied Persons, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming
Fall 2017) (manuscript at 6), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2918598.
60. Margaret Jane Radin, Property andPersonhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959-61 (1982).
61. See, e.g., Mary L. Clark, Reconstructing the World Trade Center: An Argument for the
Applicability of Personhood Theory to Commercial Property Ownership and Use, 109 PENN ST. L.
REV. 815, 816, 821-22 (2005); Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's
Imagery of Personal Property as Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55, 110 (1994).
62. See Radin, supra note 60, at 959-60.
63. Id. at 960.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 986.
66. See id
67. Id. at 969.
68. Id. at 970.
69. Id. Distinguishing fetish property is a challenge, however, for Radin, who appears to
suggest that, like insanity, fetishism can be perceived through its deviance. Id at 969.
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ism of commodities," which means that an excessive obsession with the
"control over a vast quantity of things" will "destroy[ ] personhood ra-
ther than foster[ ] it."70
Radin is not without her detractors. Some suggest that she may have
overstated her account of connection to the home,71 or that these attach-
ments have more to do with connections people form with their commu-
nities and social networks than to property itself.72 Most relevant to the
question of land reform, others have critiqued her reluctance to recognize
personal attachment to fungible property73 or to commercial property.74
Despite these critiques, Radin's work helps elucidate the fact that, while
property as a category bears important connections to identity, property
can be further divided into classifications that warrant different levels of
state protection. The result of the distinction between personal and fun-
gible property is that state protection is more appropriate for personal
property but often invalid for fungible property. Because the existence of
fetish property may be harmful to society, a state may actually have to
actively work to disaggregate it.
D. Property Law Reflects the Fact that Land Has a Historical Function
of Creating Wealth and Status
Property law tells us that land serves different functions than money
serves. Throughout history, land has played a substantial role as a prima-
ry source of wealth and social status. In some instances, this had nega-
tive, dynastic aspects, but it also served the function of establishing
households' autonomy. Yet urbanization in many nations has led rural
property to play a much more trivial current role in establishing substan-
tial wealth. But in nations of the Global South today, land's significance
as a source of wealth and stability is a far more substantial contemporary
construct than it is at this point in most communities in developed na-
tions.7 5 While this largely bygone character of property continues to re-
70. Id. at 970.
71. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255,
277-82 (2006).
72. See Mulvaney, supra note 11, at 370-71.
73. See Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of
Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 391 (1993) (criticizing Radin for overlooking the
role of fungible property in self-constitution); Schroeder, supra note 61, at 110 (suggesting that
Radin does not appreciate "the subjective experience of empowerment and satisfaction owners have
in controlling fungible property and the feelings of pain they experience at the loss of control"). But
see Radin, supra note 60, at 1008 ("While I have argued that personal property should be specially
recognized, I do not argue that there is no personhood interest even in fungible property.").
74. See Clark, supra note 61, at 821-22. But see Radin, supra note 60, at 960 n.6 ("The dis-
tinction is not simply between consumer property and commercial property. While it is likely that
most commercial property is not property for personhood but rather held instrumentally, a great deal
of consumers' property is also not property for personhood in the special direct sense I am trying to
bring out.").
75. This is largely due to the fact that only in 2008 did the global population become essen-
tially evenly split between rural and urban communities. See Pruitt, supra note 44, at 709 (citing Lisa
R. Pruitt, Did the World Become More Urban than Rural Yesterday?, LEGAL RURALISM BLOG (Dec.
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verberate even today in rural communities in the developed world,76 its
strongest domestic resonance is in U.S. history.77 Considerations of the
historical role that land ownership has played in the United States and of
the way that the law has served to recognize this role reveal that land can
be an important and distinct form of social support for poor and disen-
franchised persons.
The early English roots of the American property system and the
subsequent evolution of that system demonstrate the initial source of
land's meaning-one of wealth and status-in the United States.7 ' The
entire American system of conveyancing real property is an outgrowth of
the English model, which began with the monarch owning great tracts of
land and individuals having few permanent land rights.79 As the feudal
system evolved into the modem English property system, tenants gained
more substantial control of their property.80 The ownership of large tracts
17, 2008, 7:38 PM), http://legalruralism.blogspot.com/2008/12/yesterday-was-one-of-those-
days.html (discussing listserv report of Professor Ronald C. Wimberley to the Rural Sociological
Society regarding United Nations data on rural and urban populations)). In contrast for example, in
the United States, only one in five citizens today lives in a rural community. See Lisa R. Pruitt, The
Forgotten Fifth: Rural Youth and Substance Abuse, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 359, 361 (2009)
[hereinafter Pruitt, The Forgotten Fifth]. In the United States, the nation has been more urban than
rural since the 1920 Census. See id. at 362 n.9 (citing Ken Deavers, What is Rural?, 20 POL'Y STUD.
J. 184, 184 (1992)). As a result of this divergence, the reality of rurality has disappeared from the
view of policy makers in developed countries like the United States, who are oblivious to the "rural
manifestations of social problems." Id. at 362.
76. Yet it is still the case that land remains an important productive resource and symbol of
economic stability for people who are otherwise cash-poor in contemporary rural U.S. communities.
See JENNIFER SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, THOSE WHO DON'T: POVERTY, MORALITY AND
FAMILY IN RURAL AMERICA 30 (2009) (discussing how one rural community's "economy has al-
ways been mostly land based" and how "[e]lements of their subsistence lifestyle endure there, as the
local culture still highly values hunting, fishing, and gardening for food, building one's own housing,
and gathering one's own wood for heat"). In the popular media, this meaning has most poignantly
been captured in the film Winter's Bone, in which a family's timber lands were to be sold if they
otherwise could not cover a substantial debt to a bail bondsman. The film's protagonist, a teenage
girl, willingly subjected herself to violence and the risk of death, in order to prevent the loss of the
family's timber lands and home; she even participated in the dismemberment of her father's corpse
in order to prove that he was dead and avoid the loss of her land, which she perceived to be the only
way she had to support her young siblings and mentally ill mother. WINTER'S BONE (Roadside
Attractions 2010).
77. But see Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REV. 159, 159 (2006) (observing that
to the extent today's courts discuss rural people and places, it is often with an idealized, nostalgic
image of rurality in mind, including such assumptions that rural areas are safe, that rural people are
neighborly, and that rural communities are largely self-contained, so the law should play less of a
role in rural lives and livelihoods).
78. See NANCY ISENBERG, WHITE TRASH: THE 400-YEAR UNTOLD HISTORY OF CLASS IN
AMERICA 19 (2016) ("Whether barren or empty, uncultivated or rank, the land [in colonial America]
acquired a quintessentially English meaning.").
79. Property rights under such a system were largely illusory; services rendered to the crown
could result in accumulating a tract of land as a response to fealty, but the land was held subject to
royal whim. See THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 3 (2d ed. 1984).
80. Id. at 7-9. This change included the establishment of heritable land rights. The evolution
of the language needed to convey an estate in fee simple absolute demonstrates how this change
occurred. At early common law, a conveyance was presumed to be only for the duration of the
grantee's life. Somewhat later, the right to convey to heirs became part of the fee simple estate so
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of land within this system and in colonial America came to signify
wealth, status, and control of the practical resources necessary to secure-
ly maintain a position of privilege in society.82 As a result, the incentive
for individuals to keep their land and pass it onto their children and other
descendants became a pronounced means of entrenching privilege for
83generations.
In both the American and English contexts, land was even more
useful than money to establish intergenerational wealth because the kinds
of restraints that could be placed on land could prevent spendthrifts of
future generations from squandering the family's accumulated wealth.84
Owners constrained their property in these ways so they could encumber
their descendants' ability to sell, segment, or otherwise disrupt the integ-
rity of the entire assembled parcel.
Evolving democratic norms against dynastic wealth entrenched in
land led to today's American property law rules, which have significant-
ly limited the rights of owners to control property for generations.86 The-
se laws initially evolved as a means of liberating land from family-
imposed constraints, instead shifting power into the hands of the present
owner and away from the preferences of deceased prior owners. These
changes have substantially reduced the role of real property as the basis
of dynastic wealth in the United States.88 They are part of a more general
long as the appropriate language was used. Modem law now presumes, barring other indication, that
heritability is the nature of the default estate.
81. ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 37 (describing the appeal of landed widows as marriage
partners because they permitted men in Jamestown to "increase their acreage"). "Land held power
because of its extent, potential for settlement, and future increase."Id. at 41.
82. Marsh, supra note 17, at 647-48 (explaining that land meant political authority, social
status, and food security in feudal England and colonial America).
83. J.H.C. MORRIS & W. BARTON LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 11-14 (1956)
(explaining the social and legal climate in which the rule against perpetuities evolved).
84. Owners could bind land to the family lineage with some degree of permanence via the fee
tail, whereby ownership of the land could be restricted to lineal heirs for generations into the future,
barring any of those heirs from selling even a portion of the land. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra
note 79, at 30-31. This of course led to its own set of problems, namely the existence of land-poor
gentry, saddled with expensive estates to maintain without the cash resources to cover the related
costs. Alternatively, owners could attach restrictions for future generations to allow only certain
permissible uses and bar impermissible ones. For example, defeasible fees grant fee simple title that
can endure forever, so long as a specified event does not occur. SINGER, supra note 17, at 304. Fail-
ure to obey the conditions would result in the forfeiture of the property.
85. SINGER, supra note 17, at 324 ("If enforced, the fee tail could ensure the perpetuation of a
landed estate and protect the family somewhat against a child who might squander the family for-
tune.").
86. Id. at 325 (explaining the abolition of the fee tail); MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 83, at 11
(defining the purpose of the rule against perpetuities).
87. MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 83, at 3 ("From very early times the common law judges
have shown a strong bias in favour of the free alienability of land."); SINGER, supra note 17, at 324-
25 (noting the ways that modem law furthers alienability and why it does so).
88. SINGER, supra note 17, at 325 (explaining the public policy behind the abolition of the fee
tail); see also MORRIS & LEACH, supra note 83, at 11 ("[T]he Rule Against Perpetuities and its
kindred succeeded in preventing enormous concentrations of land in the hands of a very few and
thereby brought it about that England never suffered unbearably from those conditions which else-
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contemporary shift toward broadening land ownership throughout socie-
ty, in which the law supports freer conveyancing of land and policies that
further the alienability of real property.
89
Beyond these arcane rules regarding estates, U.S. history is replete
with additional examples of the centrality of land ownership, showing
how the law helped people gain access to land as a primary source of
wealth and social status. The U.S. government privileged land ownership
throughout its history, originally associating the rights of citizenship with
the ownership of property and not merely with residence in the nation.
90
Later, the federal government prioritized land ownership as a value un-
derlying many of its central policies. In nineteenth-century American
society, the import of land ownership was a driving force behind much of
the westward population push.9 1 Government recognition of land rights
through homesteading sought to harness Americans' desires to own
92
property as a means of populating the western states.
This trend of government support of real property ownership ex-
tends past the early days of the nation. Into the twentieth century, the
system of tenant farming in the American South was widely recognized
as a site of entrenched inequality, and the federal government responded
by initiating a program of subsistence homesteading.93 This governmen-
tal support of land ownership continues today. Scholars have document-
ed the role of even modest home ownership as the source of most Ameri-
where have produced violent social revolution-land hunger, a class of serfs or peons and wide-
spread destitution.").
89. SINGER, supra note 17, at 281-86, 324-25.
90. See generally Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic,
41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 357-58 (1989).
91. The Homestead Act of 1862 was part of a century-long series of government acts de-
signed "to create a stable society whereby broad-based land ownership would provide individuals
with a stake in the economy." Gary D. Libecap, Bureaucratic Issues and Environmental Concerns:
A Review of the History of Federal Land Ownership and Management, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
467, 470 (1992). Congress initially intended homesteading to raise funds through land sales, but later
focused on small-scale farming by creating 160-acre limits on claims; this policy shift also involved
broadening access by allowing improvements instead of purchase as the basis of title. Id. at 469-70,
473.
92. Id. at 470-71; see also Dana May Christensen, Securing the Momentum. Could a Home-
stead Act Help Sustain Detroit Urban Agriculture?, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 241, 251 (2011) (noting
that homesteading served "to promote development in the Western United States" and also played a
substantial role as a centerpiece of government efforts to extirpate Native American tribes by treat-
ing land historically under native control as if it were unoccupied). But see ISENBERG, supra note 78,
at 90 (documenting how Virginia, during the colonial era, "was content to dump the poor into the
hinterland" by allowing squatters on unclaimed land in western Virginia and Kentucky to gain a
right of priority for purchase, but that this harmed rather than helped the poor families who attempt-
ed to gain property because without the resources to purchase, they became trapped as tenant farm-
ers).
93. ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 214. When this program faced legal challenge, the New Deal
Roosevelt administration issued an executive order to start a new bureau, the Resettlement Admin-
istration, which was charged with helping the rural poor by buying submarginal land, resettling
tenant farmers, helping drought victims, restoring damaged land, and offering camps for migrant
workers, all with a central goal of "help[ing] tenant [farmers] obtain better living conditions and
learn how to become farm owners. Id. at 218.
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can families' accumulated wealth.94 The federal government continues to
prioritize property ownership by subsidizing it through federal first-time
homeowner programs and advantaged tax status.96
Yet as the primary locus of American life has shifted from rural
communities to urban population centers within the last hundred years,97
the land itself has lost much of its meaning as a principal signifier of
wealth and social status in the United States.98 Instead, education is per-
haps the best analog to the prior function of land. Today, education func-
tions as the central social good used to equip one's descendants to be
94. The history of racial redlining demonstrates just how this kind of wealth developed in the
United States. A formal policy of providing federally backed mortgages and mortgage insurance
only for homes in white neighborhoods meant that African American families could not qualify to
purchase homes on the same terms as white families of similar economic means. RICHARD
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF How OUR GOVERNMENT
SEGREGATED AMERICA 63-66 (2017). Worse yet, the federal government would only insure houses
that were subject to racially restrictive covenants, thereby guaranteeing that the neighborhood could
never be integrated, since the covenants barred sales to African Americans. See id. at 77-91; Ta-
Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC, June 2014, at 9-10 (describing African Ameri-
cans as "[1]ocked out of the greatest mass-based opportunity for wealth accumulation in American
history"). Research has clearly documented redlining as a significant historical root of the racial
disparity in wealth between white and African American families in the United States. MELVIN L.
OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH 4-5 (2006); ROTHSTEIN, supra,
at 184-85.
95. See Buying a Home, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/buying a_home (last visited Sept. 12, 2017)
(listing federal programs that encourage homeownership such as FHA loans for first time homebuy-
ers (lower interest rates), the Good Neighbor Next Door program (discounted housing to certain
professions to revitalize areas through homeownership), homeownership for public housing residents
(allowing public housing authorities to sell portions of public housing and convert rent payments
into mortgage payments to create ownership), and Indian Home Loan Guarantee Program (program
to "facilitate home homeownership and increase access to capital in Native American Communi-
ties")).
96. Scholars view federal tax code provisions that allow for the deduction of interest paid on
debt incurred to purchase primary residences, I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2012), and state and local real
property taxes, id § 164(a)(1), as motivated entirely by Congress's desire to promote homeowner-
ship. Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1352 (2000); Mark Andrew Snider, The Sub-
urban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 174
(2005). These deductions are also subject to substantial criticism as tax expenditures targeted to
favor upper-income households while leaving struggling households without meaningful housing
assistance through the tax system. Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Ap-
proaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 352, 396 (1970).
97. Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273, 290 (2003); see also Pruitt, The
Forgotten Fifth, supra note 75, at 359, 361 n.9 (observing that the 1920 Census was the first to
document a more urban than rural nation).
98. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86
MICH. L. REV. 722, 732-33 (1988). But see supra note 76 and accompanying citations (discussing
the continued role of land as a source of wealth in rural American communities). Even if land itself
does not currently signify status as it once did in many communities in the United States, the reality
is that historical patterns of land ownership as the source of wealth and social status have been
reified into a historically stagnant class structure in which whole groups of people are expendable in
service of creating wealth for others. Nancy Isenberg has recently made this argument in a sustained
and compelling fashion, where she notes that colonial America was typified by "waste people [who]
wasted away, fertilizing the soil with their labor while finding it impossible to harvest any social
mobility." ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 42. The remainder of her book offers a damning history of
the maintenance of a poor white class throughout American history.
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self-supporting and privileged individuals who could maintain their so-
cial status into the future.99 In the modem, knowledge-based American
economy, land ownership can seem nearly irrelevant because farming as
a way of life is so far removed from the current economic reality of the
vast majority of Americans.100 But the law continues to reflect this histor-
ical role of land as the source of wealth and power and its role in consti-
tuting social status.
E. Land Creates Citizenship
Property law and theory also reflect the role of land in constituting
citizenship, likewise a strain of popular political theory running through
American history. At the founding of the United States, citizenship large-
ly equated with landownership.10' With few exceptions, suffrage rights
were available solely to those who owned property during the colonial
era.102 Only some decades later would newly founded states enter the
99. Langbein, supra note 98, at 732-34; see also Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten
American Dream, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 417, 428 (2008) ("The modem American Dream is far
more focused on the availability of education, health care, job opportunity, retirement security, and a
general sense of social mobility, rather than on the concrete goal of ownership of productive re-
sources."); Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, How the Other Fifth Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2016, at 1
(marshaling substantial evidence that Americans in the upper socioeconomic quintile have effective-
ly self-segregated from the other 80% of society).
100. Marsh, supra note 17 (land is not about food security, but sentimental attachment in
modem America); see also Jim Chen, OfAgriculture's First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND.
L. REV. 1261, 1282-83, 1315-16 (1996) (documenting how the system of entitlements generated by
agricultural lawmaking continues to exist within a tradition of broad public support that increasingly
has little relationship to most Americans' lived reality, while noting that "[s]tatutes providing price
and income support for farmers epitomize the sort of legislation generated when the potential bene-
fits are concentrated and the potential costs are distributed"). To the extent that farming is embraced
as a political cause through the continued support for farm subsidies, the reality is that a large
amount of these subsidies do not serve to bolster rural communities or family farms, but are provid-
ed to already-wealthy individuals who are usually urbanites. See Ron Nixon, Billionaires Received
U.S. Farm Subsides, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013, at A23 (noting that 50 billionaires
received farm subsidies totaling $11.3 million from 1995 to 2012, including Paul G. Allen, co-
founder of Microsoft, Charles Schwab, investment magnate, and S. Truett Cathy, owner of Chick-fil-
A). The fifteen members of Congress who received $237,921 in farm subsidies in 2012 became
widely publicized during the 2013 battle over the Farm Bill, due to political efforts to substantially
reduce funding levels for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program for needy families. See
Envtl. Working Grp., Members of Congress Received $238K in Farm Subsidies, EWG (June 3, 2013),
http://www.ewg.org/release/members-congress-received-238k-farm-subsidies.
101. ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 14 ("It was the stigma of landlessness that would leave its
mark on white trash from this day forward."). While her use of the pejorative phrase "white trash" is
jarring, Isenberg's book persuasively argues that the American colonies were entirely predicated on
wasteland being occupied by the discarded humanity of English society. See id at 2-3, 22. The
terminology of white trash evolved somewhat later. Id. at 135-36.
102. This requirement had evolved since the seventeenth century, when all freemen and adult
male housekeepers had been eligible to vote. Steinfeld, supra note 90, at 339 n. 13. In the eighteenth
century, twelve of the thirteen colonies denied the franchise to those who lacked property. Id. at 339.
Exceptions were provided in some colonies for residents of certain towns, householders, or trades-
men of long duration. Id. at 339 n.12. These eligibility criteria would not be abolished until far
later-for example, 1834 in Tennessee, 1845 in Louisiana and Connecticut, 1851 in Virginia, and
1857 in North Carolina. ISENBERG, supra note 77, at 130.
92 DENVER LAWREVIEW [Vol. 95:1
Union without property qualifications for voting;' 03 thereafter, existing
states eliminated property restrictions on suffrage.'04
This evolution of land-related citizenship ties directly to the writ-
ings of Thomas Jefferson, which have come to play an outsize role in the
American polity's conversations about land, access to property, and de-
mocracy. Despite an array of serious and damning critiques of Jeffer-
son,10 5 Jeffersonian property is a frequently appearing trope in legal
scholarship,1 0 6 and scholars continue to invoke Jeffersonian notions of
property to represent a variety of positions. Some posit that Jefferson
stood for strong private property rights,0 7 protected against the actions of
a despotic state.108 Others suggest that Jefferson was a populist who
sought to empower a wider range of people with the rights and privileges
of citizenship through access to land.109 As is often the case, the most
103. Peter Onuf, Thomas Jefferson: The American Franchise, MILLER CTR.,
http://millercenter.org/president/jefferson/the-american-franchise (last visited Sept. 2, 2017). Of
course, they replaced property-based restrictions on suffrage with new requirements, usually based
on taxpayer status. Steinfeld, supra note ?0, at 335, 353. In many instances, these were accompanied
by pauper restrictions that denied suffrage to "persons in receipt of poor relief' or who were inmates
of poorhouses. Id. at 335, 353 n.59; see also ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 130. Some other states
granted universal white manhood suffrage, with or without a pauper exclusion. Steinfeld, supra note
90, at 353 n.59.
104. Onuf, supra note 103; see also Steinfeld, supra note 90, at 353.
105. Jefferson's hypocritical and racist actions regarding the ownership of enslaved people cast
substantial doubt on the quality of his judgment as a legal thinker, but Jefferson's property writings
remain an important modem touchstone in theoretical considerations of land and citizenship even
today. See, e.g., Monica Eppinger, Property and Political Community: Democracy, Oligarchy, and
the Case of Ukraine, 47 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 825, 845 (2015) (noting that Jefferson is out of
fashion in part due to "repugnance at the contradiction between his views on property, virtue, and
democracy and his own practices in using enslaved labor to cultivate his agricultural land"); Peter
Onuf, Thomas Jefferson: Impact and Legacy, MILLER CTR., http://millercenter.org-
/president/jefferson/impact-and-legacy (last visited Sept. 2, 2017); see also DARREN STALOFF,
HAMILTON, ADAMS, JEFFERSON: THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
245 (2005) ("Slavery was Jefferson's personal bete noire; it would haunt him throughout his ca-
reer."). Nevertheless, because his thought remains influential in the field of property, Jeffersonian
property warrants exploration.
106. See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Property as a Natural Right and as a Conventional Right in Consti-
tutional Law, 29 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 201, 235-39 (2007) (analyzing the approach of
Jefferson, among other framers, as the basis of constitutional property law); Eppinger, supra note
105, at 843-47 (invoking Jeffersonian property as a coherent account of property and political com-
munity in her consideration of the role of property in the political evolution of Ukraine). Similarly,
Jefferson is also often invoked in the context of intellectual property as an early progenitor of patent
law. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1966) (noting that Thomas
Jefferson "was not only an administrator of the patent system under the 1790 Act, but was also the
author of the 1793 Patent Act"); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About
Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 958-
67 (2007) (explaining "the birth of the Jeffersonian story of patent law in Supreme Court decisions
and how many intellectual property scholars today have adopted Jefferson's views of patents as a
historical axiom").
107. JEAN M. YARBROUGH, AMERICAN VIRTUES: THOMAS JEFFERSON ON THE CHARACTER OF
A FREE PEOPLE 55 (1998).
108. Id. at 99 (observing that some followers of Jefferson advocate adoption of "a libertarian
economic program of low taxes and minimal government"); see also CHARLES A. MILLER,
JEFFERSON AND NATURE 179 (1988) ("On balance, Jefferson chose to protect property.").
109. YARBROUGH, supra note 107, at 99 (noting that others who invoke Jefferson do so to
"urg[e] the expansion of government power to enforce a moral vision of greater social and economic
equality"); Carol Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL.
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accurate view is probably one between these oversimplified and instru-
mentalist perspectives. 10 While Jefferson has come to mean all things to
all people, this Article attempts to articulate a modest, textually support-
ed Jeffersonian conception of property and to consider how that vision
might shape contemporary considerations of land distribution.
The central aspect of Jeffersonian property ideals originates in the
role of land ownership in constituting the virtuous citizen. Jefferson re-
lied heavily on the image of the farmer as the idealized citizen of the
agrarian republic,"' whose status as a cultivator of the landll2 demon-
strated his virtuous character and moral superiority." 3 Jefferson, among
many others of his day, believed human endowments of independence
and freedom resulted from property ownership.114 According to Jeffer-
son, land ownership allowed citizens to develop the kind of industry and
thrift that would be the hallmark of the new American nation,"5 render-
ing men independent and self-sufficient."6 Landownership was so im-
portant to this American vision that without it even free white men were
denied suffrage.17 Jefferson believed that the combination of owning
L. REV. 561, 591 (1984) (arguing that Jefferson viewed agrarian land as fostering "civic character"
and therefore rejecting extreme inequality in land because of the potential for corruption of the
republic); see also MERRILL PETERSON, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND 359 (1960).
110. See YARBROUGH, supra note 107, at 99 ("[I]n so doing, each side simplified and, to some
extent, betrayed the distinctive moral vision that underlay Jefferson's economic program.").
Ill. ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 86-88; see YARBROUGH, supra note 107, at 57; see also
STALOFF, supra note 105, at 283-84 (referencing repeatedly "Jefferson's agrarian idyll").
112. ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 88 (discussing Jefferson's preoccupation with those who
were cultivators: "To cultivate meant to renew, to render fertile, which thus implied extracting real
sustenance from the soil, as well as good traits, superior qualities, and steady habits of mind.").
113. YARBROUGH, supra note 107, at 57-59. Yarbrough notes that Jefferson never meaningful-
ly expounded on these virtues, but he spoke highly of Adam Smith's 18th century tome of political
economy, The Wealth of Nations. There, Smith postulated that industrial labor's repetitiousness
atrophied men, while cultivation of one's own property made men their own independent masters.
ADAM SMITH, 3 THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 160-64 (New York, P.F. Collier & Son 1909).
114. YARBROUGH, supra note 107, at 63-69 (on Jefferson's belief in the virtue-enhancing
power of land ownership); Steinfeld, supra note 90, at 335, 338, 350 (discussing the ubiquity of
belief in the transformative power of property ownership as the source of independence, which
bestowed the right of suffrage and self-governance on individuals). This perspective stood in marked
contrast to the fundamental value of human equality enshrined in the Declaration of Independence
and the U.S. Constitution, both of which were drafted in this era. The evolution of who held the
franchise in the early years of the republic demonstrates the crucial shift from suffrage for those
deemed worthy to suffrage as a universal right.
115. YARBROUGH, supra note 107, at 91-92.
116. STALOFF, supra note 105, at 283; YARBROUGH, supra note 107, at 65-69. Jefferson
assumed that land alone would create self-sufficiency for the newly landed. Of course lost in this
assumption was the reality that in order to cultivate the land, these new landowners would need
adequate capital to afford "slaves, overseers, draft animals, a plough, nearby mills, and waterways to
transport farm produce to market." ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 90. In reality, failed smallholders
would often sell to planters, deepening the concentration of land in the hands of the few. See id.
117. Robert J. Steinfeld has carefully documented how individual independence was central to
the allocation of the right to vote in the early republic. See generally Steinfeld, supra note 90, at 335.
In the early years of the nation, because land was viewed as creating independence, most states
limited suffrage to white males who owned at least fifty acres. Onuf, supra note 103. For example,
as late at 1829, Virginia still required voters to own either twenty-five acres with a house, or fifty
unsettled acres. Steinfeld, supra note 90, at 355. Evolution of suffrage rights was underway in this
era. Most new states eliminated the role of landownership and taxpayer status in granting suffrage.
94 DENVER LAWREVIEW [Vol. 95:1
property and education would allow citizens to cultivate personal virtues
that would lead to the virtuous development of his agrarian republic," 8
advocating in his private correspondence for "as few as possible [to] be
without a little portion of land because [t]he small landholders are the
most precious part of a state."1 l 9 To enact this plan to create the upright,
landowning citizen, Jefferson drafted a new state constitution for Virgin-
ia, in which he advocated "his boldest constitutional proposal [of] gov-
ernment-mandated land reform" through the provision of fifty acres or
enough land to create a fifty-acre estate for all men.120
Despite the failure of these direct efforts to redistribute property,
Jefferson did succeed in other legal reforms designed to broaden access
to land within the new nation.121 Scholars have been quick to emphasize
that the successful reforms "were less about promoting equality or de-
mocracy than moderating extremes" of ownership;122 the reforms were
Yet some revolutionary-era constitutions had included free African Americans in the franchise, and
New Jersey had even granted women the vote, so long as the individual owned property. Changes to
voting rules would universally remove property-related qualifications to vote, but simultaneously
limit the franchise to white men. Onuf, supra note 103.
118. ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 87, 91. Jefferson's effort to codify these rights to education in
even a limited fashion never came to fruition because the landed gentry of Virginia refused to fund
such programs.
119. THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1:133, 8:683 (Julian P. Boyd et al., eds., Princeton
Univ. Press, 1950) (quoted in DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 83 (1994)).
120. STALOFF, supra note 105, at 255; see also ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 89-90 (observing
that this reform would provide the vote to all newly-landed men). Later, in an era of legal reform
within the state, Jefferson again proposed land reform, this time as a seventy-five-acre distribution of
property to all landless citizens, which likewise never came to pass.
121. Some of this work included efforts to abolish the role of hereditary title to land and to
eliminate the role of primogeniture and entail in Virginia, YARBROUGH, supra note 107, at 94,
thereby guaranteeing that all children, not merely firstborn sons, would take property equally from
their fathers. MILLER, supra note 108, at 206. Jefferson perceived these "rules of inheritance as
purely conventional and utilitarian." DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 78 (1994). This and other ways in which Jefferson presented flexible approach-
es to property rights demonstrates that while there is substantial scholarly debate over whether
Jefferson believed property to be a natural right, at a minimum Jefferson did not view property rights
as absolute. See id. at 77-80. These reforms led to more people owning land, but of course the result-
ing conveyances occurred as inheritances from landed parents; they therefore reified the existing
class structure since only the children of landowners would receive property. While Jefferson often
spoke of the new nation as a classless society, ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 98, this kind of effort
should not be viewed as demonstrative of a radical egalitarianism. In fact, he advocated for his
reforms in terminology that belied his egalitarian ideals, referring to those he intended to benefit
from his educational scheme as "raked from the rubbish." Id at 91. He embraced an ideology of
natural differences among people and advocated careful breeding to solve the problems of slavery.
Id. at 99-100. Isenberg has noted that Jefferson arguably personally undertook such a program of
interbreeding, well-documented through the lineage he established with Sally Hemings, who Jeffer-
son owned as an enslaved woman. Id at 100. He further bred enslaved persons as chattels, much as
he focused on breeding his livestock. Id. To pretend that Jefferson believed in human equality is
factually inaccurate.
122. ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 91.
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not suggestive of a broader effort to enact a radical egalitarianism
through widespread property redistribution.123
Yet perhaps the most profound aspect of Jefferson's reforming in-
stinct toward property law had to do with his derision for intergenera-
tional transfers of land. In correspondence with James Madison, Jeffer-
son asked serious questions about whether nations may change land allo-
cations that were established in perpetuity.124 He noted that these arise
from hereditary rights and "perpetual monopolies" and then argted that
reimbursement for such reallocations is "a question of generosity and not
of right."1 25 Professor Ben Barros has argued that Jefferson's words can
be read to suggest that "the state can make [changes to hereditary owner-
ship of property] with or without [compensating] the owners because
there is no right to pass these entitlements from generation to genera-
tion."1 26 But Professor Barros also maintains that in other contexts, Jef-
ferson believed that "property owners were entitled to compensation for
taken property as of right."1 27 Yet in her research on legal protections of
real property from creditors, Professor Claire Priest argues that Jefferson
embraced "the English perspective that land was a natural family en-
dowment and ideally a source of family prosperity through the genera-
tions," interpreting Jefferson's writings on usufruct to "reveal[ ] his as-
sumption that real property, at least according to 'natural right,' involved
not just the fee simple ownership of one person, but also the claims of
family members."1 28 While the precise contours of Jefferson's opinions
are contested, it is abundantly clear that he advocated for some broaden-
ing of land ownership to foster citizenship.
This concern with how the lack of access to property hinders the
lives of impoverished persons animates the work of contemporary prop-
erty theorists and land use scholars, who have more directly addressed
the role of land ownership in constituting citizenship today. While this is
one strain in the progressive property school discussed above, concerns
about the role of property in creating citizens are not limited to scholars
within this school. Professor Jeremy Waldron has posited that property
ownership is central to the development and exercise of liberty.129 His
theory of private property goes even further, however, to argue that it is
123. STALOFF, supra note 105, at 259 ("Much of Jefferson's legal revision was also decidedly
moderate. Primogeniture and entail were rarely invoked in Jefferson's day . ); YARBROUGH,
supra note 107, at 95.
124. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789),
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mtj//mtj1/011/01 1_0912_0958.pdf.
125. Id.
126. Ben Barros, Thomas Jefferson's Property Theory, PROPERTYPROF BLOG (Nov. 9, 2006),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2006/11/thomasjefferso.html.
127. Id.
128. Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and its Limits in Ameri-
can History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 450-51 (2006).
129. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 329 (1990).
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wrong for some individuals to have no private property at all, 1 30 which is
a resounding statement in favor of a radical reconsideration of who gets
to own property and who does not, and of how the state might intervene
to rearrange property allocations. Urban planning scholar Ananya Roy
has likewise considered how property structures modern citizenship,
rendering the propertyless "marginal in the discourses and practices of
citizenship."'3 '
Along these same lines, progressive property scholar Professor Jo-
seph Singer has expansively maintained that property rights must be un-
derstood to encompass not only "the right of owners to exclude others
from their property," but also "rules that protect the liberty of persons to
acquire property and thereby become owners."1 32 Elsewhere, Singer has
compellingly argued that everyone deserves to have the right to private
property because of its role in constituting the self.133 More recently, he
has taken up the relationship between freedom and property, noting the
role of property ownership in providing the freedom that is a precondi-
tion for equality of citizenship.134
II.PROPERTY'S BASICS DEMONSTRATE WHY LAND WARRANTS
REDISTRIBUTION
A. Property Theory Reveals the Nature ofProperty and Property Sys-
tems
One of the key challenges facing those who advocate for broaden-
ing access to land is answering the central question of why this is a valu-
able public policy initiative. Redistribution of any kind is often subject to
critique as an invalid denial of private property rights, while other oppo-
nents who may support redistributive governmental efforts in general
remain skeptical of land as the focus of such programs, as Professor An-
dre van der Walt has compellingly revealed about the post-apartheid re-
distribution in South Africa. 1' A central reason for this skepticism is the
fact that land is harder to redistribute than other goods because land is
scarce and because its scarcity makes redistribution complicated. Yet
property law can help conceptualize the nature of this scarcity, its social
consequences, and possible methods to rectify these problems when con-
ducting land reform.
130. Id.
131. Ananya Roy, Paradigms ofPropertied Citizenship, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 463, 464 (2003).
132. Joseph William Singer, After the Flood: Equality & Humanity in Property Regimes, 52
LOY. L. REV. 243, 272 (2006).
133. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 167-71
(2000) (asserting that everyone deserves the right to private property).
134. Joseph William Singer, Titles of Nobility: Poverty, Immigration, and Property in a Free
and Democratic Society, I J.L. PROP. & SOC'Y 1, 12 (2014) ("[B]ecause we also believe in equality,
we must enable every person to become an owner so every person can be free.").
135. VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 6-9; see also UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 24, at 121
(discussing the social and political issues of redistributive policies).
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1. Existing Maldistributions of Land Reflect Tacit Acceptance of
Injustice Yet Are Unlikely to Be Rectified Without State In-
volvement
Land is the paradigmatic scarce and rivalrous resource, as discussed
in detail above. There is only so much land available, and it cannot be
effectively shared in any meaningful way that resolves the problems of
rivalrousness or scarcity. Even where land can be owned with a collec-
tive title or with a formal mechanism like a cooperative, in which the
same piece of land is owned by a group of people, scarcity and rivalrous-
ness remain. Those holding collective title still have the right to use the
property to the exclusion of others, who may be entirely landless. That
more than one person can collectively hold title to the land does not
mean that all people have simultaneous rights to the land. This fact of
rivalrousness combined with scarcity is one of the primary justifications
for land reform-multiple people or groups cannot own land simultane-
ously and there is not enough to go around so that all have rights to land.
When the market alone does not provide widespread land access, redis-
tributive land reform provides one method to address the consequences
of land's scarcity and rivalrousness by ensuring that more people gain
rights to land. Yet the market alone, without state engagement, is unlike-
ly to generate redistribution; state involvement is necessary to facilitate
and subsidize these transfers.
2. Since Property Systems Are Value Laden and Property Rights
Contingent, Redistribution Demonstrates State Support for Jus-
tice
Land redistribution is an implicit state recognition that existing
property rules are not inevitable but rather are value laden and reflective
of a particular society at a particular moment.1 36 As a result, redistribu-
tive land reform policies both alter a property regime and can signify a
change in underlying values as well.137 One common critique of redis-
tributive land reform policies is that the existing distributions of land are
settled and therefore should not be interrupted, largely because legal sys-
tems are most stable when they confirm citizens' expectations.138 Of
course, to suggest in a postcolonial state that the current status quo
should not be disrupted, while that allocation is reflective of the disrup-
tion caused by colonization, is the height of absurdity. Land reform,
136. Rosser, supra note 22 (arguing that progressive property scholars seek to "create more
space to contest values" inherent in property systems).
137. See id. at 110-11 (suggesting that progressive property focuses on "the underlying values
that property serves and the social relationships it shapes and reflects").
138. See generally Rosser, supra note 30, at 427 (describing the status quo property system as
successful and favored by a "status quo bias observable in celebrations of existing rules without
regard either to how those rules are experienced by those excluded from enjoying property or to the
possibility of improving on the existing structure," while arguing that property systems should be
destabilized to address inequality).
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however, assumes that the current distribution is unjust and seeks a new,
fairer distribution, one that grasps the deeper meaning of land within a
society. Properly conceptualizing the instrumentalist view of property
therefore suggests that law can evolve in the interest of the public.139
Without change to the property system, any preexisting injustice in dis-
tributions will endure through the continuation of the property system
itself.140 Property theorists can help explain the contested meanings of
land and of its distribution, allowing those engaged in land reform to
offer stronger arguments for why land warrants redistribution. Reconfig-
uration of the property system, therefore, is a necessary corrective of the
ways that the property regime reflects misallocations of property. When
land reform opponents suggest that stability should be the primary goal
of a property system, they implicitly argue that continued injustices in
distribution are less important than people's fixed expectations.141 Or, it
is possible that they instead intend to suggest that the current distribution
itself is just, though in the current state of economic inequality, this is not
such a common perception.
Against this backdrop, the justification for land reform is simple:
the current distribution is a maldistribution, and some of the rights cur-
rently held by landowners should justly be extended instead to the land-
less.142 As a result, property law should be used to promulgate govern-
ment actions that rectify these injustices by reallocating property rights.
While this observation may shake our traditional notions of what quali-
fies as a property right,143 insofar as it is not fixed but subject to change,
regulations of land are not unique in this regard. Government actions
often limit the freedoms of some to protect the freedoms of others. Land
reform presumes that the insights of progressive property are true, that
property rights should be allocated to serve social values, not just to reify
existing, fixed distributions that are also value laden.
B. Property Theory Reveals the Importance of Owning Land
1. Land Creates Sites for Self-Constitution
Radin's crucial work helps explain both why land is a much-desired
social good in many poor, rural communities in the developing world and
also why any efforts to disrupt existing property allocations, even by
democratically legitimate means, can evoke suspicion and hostility with-
139. Mulvaney, supra note 11, at 364 n.66.
140. Id. at 364 n.67.
141. VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 7.
142. To state this concept more fully in the language of property theory: "[S]ome of [the] sticks
in the bundle are in fact owned by others and not the person we conventionally think of as the owner
of the property." Singer, supra note 132.
143. That property regimes and land distributions are not valueless, but instead are value laden
with the priorities and inequalities inherent throughout a society is a central tenet of the progressive
property movement. See Alexander et al., supra note 28.
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in the political and social order. Radin's concept of personhood and its
relationship to property help to illuminate the importance of land reform
and its complexity as a matter of social hierarchy and individual identity.
Three different kinds of property owners warrant discussion. First, redis-
tribution affects landless people who lack personhood connections to
property but who could form them if land reform occurred. Second, land
reform may also formalize the personhood connections of tenant farmers
by giving them title to land that they have historically tilled but not
owned. Third, land reform may be perceived as harming the personhood
of those who own the land that is potentially subject to redistribution.
If the goal is for land reform to serve the needs of landless people,
the central insight of Radin's theory is that an impoverished and landless
individual's gaining rights to property under a land reform program
might well represent something more significant than simply the receipt
of a material good. In this way, land differs from other fungible resources
that the state could provide, such as food, health care, or money.1" Land
ownership may more profoundly stand as a poignant symbol of one's
humanity, of improving one's value and demonstrating one's status as a
person in the community. In places where this set of claims rings true,
the creation of a new right to property can bring about a shift in self-
conception from a landless peasant who labors in a short-term fashion on
the land of others, subject to the whims of the landed, to a new identity
as a property-owning individual. Property owners may therefore qualify
as more fully realized, autonomous individuals in a society that connects
personhood to land ownership.145
These insights are similarly applicable to the second category: ten-
ant farmers who labor on a particular parcel of land owned by others,
perhaps over generations, but never establish a legal interest in it. When
land reform provides tenant farmers title to the land that they know and
love, the redistribution of title serves to affirm and enhance the person-
hood connections that existed even without legal title. This was ultimate-
ly what occurred in the only U.S. Supreme Court case that considered
144. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 24, at 121 (observing that redistribution of money and other
fungible property is far less contested than redistribution of land).
145. I have seen this firsthand in Guatemala, where recipients of land through land reform were
eager to tell me about the sense of pride and self-determination they derived from owning land for
the first time. See Radin, supra note 60, at 968. This idea also connects in important ways to the
capabilities approach, which is a model of development economics, as articulated by Amartya Sen,
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 4, 10-11 (1999) and moral philosophy, as developed
by Martha Nussbaum, MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH xiii, 5-6 (2000). The capabilities approach "posits that poverty alleviation
depends on the expansion of the freedoms that people have to use their capacities in ways that satisfy
their personal objectives." Rashmi Dyal-Chand & James V. Rowan, Developing Capabilities, Not
Entrepreneurs: A New Theory for Community Economic Development, 42 HOFSTRA L. REv. 839,
884 (2014). Access to land may well serve as a capability that allows people to shape their own lives




land reform. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,1 46 the Supreme
Court considered the decision by the government of Hawaii to enact a
land reform program that took title from owners and gave it to the resi-
dential tenants of the property to reduce the concentration of land owner-
ship and disrupt oligarchic distributions.14 7 In such an instance, where
landowners have lived on or farmed land for years, land reform supports
the deepening of their personhood identified with specific land.
But the corollary of the relationship between land and personhood
for the first two groups, who gain access to land and therefore person-
hood through a land reform initiative, is that those who lose their proper-
ty might perceive land reform to rob them of a core aspect of their per-
sonhood.14 8 If land is linked to identity for those who are recipients of
land through a land reform program, it is likely even more so the case for
people who have already established identity-based connections to their
land.14 9 The loss of land would cut still closer to identity in instances
where the land qualifies as property that Radin would categorize as per-
sonal, not fungible. But even large-scale agricultural holdings that are
mostly commercial in nature may evoke personhood connections for the
owner, despite qualifying as fungible in Radin's typology.150
The difficulty, of course, is in distinguishing personal land from
fungible land. Problems arise because most landowners would consider
their own land to be personal-to be part of their identity and therefore
worthy of the kind of protection that Radin articulates as proper for prop-
erty that constitutes personhood.'5 1 The owner of a plantation might well
demand deference to plantation-based wealth as personal property in
which the owner's identity is bound.152 But attachment to the social sta-
tus that land provides is not the same thing as attachment to the land it-
self. Allowing the law to privilege this kind of landownership, while
others suffer in poverty, is a grotesque mischaracterization of Radin's
146. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
147. Id. at 231-33.
148. Jeffrey M. Riedinger, Everyday Elite Resistance: Redistributive Agrarian Reform in the
Philippines, in THE VIOLENCE WITHIN: CULTURAL & POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN DIVIDED NATIONS
181, 206 (Kay B. Warren ed., 1993) ("[I]t is an article of faith among landowners that the land is
theirs-not simply in legal terms but in a more metaphysical sense.").
149. Andre Sawchenko, Choosing a Mechanism for Land Redistribution in the Philippines, 9
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 681, 714 (2000) (discussing how landowner attachment o property "trans-
cends [purely] economic concerns").
150. See Clark, supra note 61, at 821-22; see also Schnably, supra note 73, at 350-51, 361-62.
151. See Radin, supra note 60, at 988.
152. That people almost universally look at the resources they control and perceive them to be
insufficient is a well-documented phenomenon. As a result, the notion of giving up even a fraction of
one's wealth or possession is essentially anathema to the human condition. See Kennon M. Sheldon
& Sonja Lyubomirsky, The Challenge of Staying Happier: Testing the Hedonic Adaptation Preven-
tion Model, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 670, 670 (2012). Yet voluminous economics
research demonstrates that "the correlation between income and life satisfaction is evidently negligi-
ble"-income above a certain threshold has a diminishing marginal utility in creating human happi-
ness. Samuel Alexander, The Optimal Material Threshold: Toward an Economics ofSufficiency, 61
REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 2, 5 (2012).
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theory because such property would at a minimum qualify as fungible
and unworthy of special protection from the state. 153 To call large-scale
agricultural holdings fungible is not to denigrate their importance to their
owners. Instead, it is to recognize that fungibility means that those prop-
erty rights warrant less deference to ensure that others can gain sufficient
property in which to constitute themselves as well.
2. Land Creates Opportunities for Individuals to Establish Econom-
ic Stability and Social Status
Land reform skeptics also argue that, even if redistributive efforts
are worthwhile, investing government funds and effort into redistributing
land is inefficient.154 In the last decade, focus within the international-aid
community has shifted toward the redistribution of money in lieu of oth-
er social goods.'55 Monetary redistributive efforts take the form of guar-
anteed basic income, which grants cash to poor individuals with no
strings attachedl56 or as conditional cash transfers that incentivize the
performance of socially desirable conduct. 
5 7
But the historical centrality of land in establishing and supporting
wealth and status manifests a deeper truth about land's meaning in mod-
em developing societies and about the fact that redistributing land has its
own import. For the average citizen of a first-world country today, land
ownership feels almost like a relic of a bygone time. Recalling land's
historical centrality within the United States familiarizes the contempo-
rary reader in the first world with the importance of land in rural com-
munities in the developing world today. Land still maintains this histori-
cal relationship to power in nations of the developing world.'
58 But land
153. See Radin, supra note 60.
154. See, e.g., Tim Hanstad, Roy L. Prosterman & Robert Mitchell, Poverty, Law and Land
Tenure Reform, in ONE BILLION RISING: LAW, LAND AND THE ALLEVIATION OF GLOBAL POVERTY
22 (Roy L. Prosterman, Robert Mitchell & Tim Hanstad eds., 2009) [hereinafter ONE BILLION
RISING].
155. Annie Lowery, The Future of Not Working, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 23, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/magazine/universal-income-global-inequality.html (discussing
guaranteed basic income as an alternative to other kinds of redistributive development programs).
156. See id
157. These models pay cash when heads of household demonstrate, for example, that family
members have received vaccines and other forms of preventative health care or that their children
have regularly attended school with minimal absenteeism. The underlying principle is that paying
cash to encourage otherwise positive conduct pays dividends into the future, since children will grow
into healthy, literate, and numerate adults. Ariel Fiszbein et al., CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS:
REDUCING PRESENT AND FUTURE POVERTY, WORLD BANK [WBG], at 1 (2009),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCCT/Resources/5757608-1234228266004/PRR-
CCTwebnoembargo.pdf.
158. Sawchenko, supra note 149 (observing how in the Philippines, political power is related
to the accumulation of vast tracts of land, and how current landowners are anathema to give up their
land, and with it, their power); see also JAMES PUTZEL, A CAPTIVE LAND: THE POLITICS OF
AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES 60-61 (1992) [hereinafter PUTZEL, CAPTIVE LAND] (docu-
menting the role of land in entrenching political power); James Putzel, The Politics of the Aquino
Agrarian Reform Programme: Influence of Bilateral and Multilateral Donors, in Agrarian Reform
and Official Development Assistance in the Philippines: Four Papers 7, 9 (Ctr. South-East Asian
Studies, Occasional Paper No. 13, 1990) [hereinafter Putzel, Influence ofBilateral and Multilateral
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also serves two deeper functions related to fostering security that can be
conveyed to future generations.159
First, land is symbolically representative of security. Devising land
to children in the developing world can have a meaning much like that of
the family farm in the United States-a symbol of family and roots in a
particular place and context.1 60 Much as American farmers remain intent
on passing their property onto subsequent generations, 16 so too do
smallholders in developing countries attach emotional value to the ability
to pass their land onto their children.1 62
But the perhaps more substantial purpose of land ownership, and the
one of far greater interest when contemplating the function of land re-
form efforts in today's developing countries, is its role in establishing
economic security. The intergenerational transmission of land is a means
of creating socioeconomic stability.1 63 When parents in developing na-
tions have the ability to leave land to their children,1 6 4 it is the analog of
contemporary American parents educating their children. Having the
means to prepare one's children in this way is not about maintaining so-
cial position or demonstrating conspicuous wealth in the same way that
leaving a large amount of land to heirs might have signified status and
privilege in the early American or English context. Rather, land is about
survival; it is a fortification against future social strife and instability. 65
For families with the technical knowledge of how to cultivate subsistence
Donors] (observing that "[g]enuinely redistributive agrarian reform is a complex and painful process
because it involves a challenge to the entrenched power and privilege of landowning and merchant
families").
159. Winoto, supra note 16, at 5 (describing land as a "transfer of wealth across generations").
160. FISCHER, supra note 47, at 111 (documenting the importance of land to families by de-
scribing a ceremony celebrating the transfer of rural land within a family).
161. See generally Hannah Alsgaard, Rural Inheritance: Gender Disparities in Farm Trans-
mission, 88 N.D. L. REv. 347, 347 (2012) (highlighting the importance placed on passing on the
family farm, while noting the role of gender in shaping who receives control of it). To observe the
centrality of this trope in American life, one needs to look no further than the relatively recent dis-
cussions about the inheritance tax, commonly referred to as the death tax, and its rejection because
of fears of disrupting transmission of the family farm. See generally Elizabeth R. Carter, New Life
for the Death Tax Debate, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 189-92 (2012). This role of inherited land has
been part of the American landscape since the colonial era. See ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 34
("What separated rich from poor was that the landless had nothing to pass on.").
162. This function of land as the transmitter of intergenerational, land-based identity strongly
resonates with the personhood and identity strains of property theory. See supra Section II.B. 1.
163. Winoto, supra note 16, at 5 (describing land ownership as "livelihood security").
164. The converse is also true: the inability to provide land for one's family can be perceived
as an absolute failure. In India, male heads of smallholder households often seek out illegal private
moneylenders to obtain loans secured by their land after they have exhausted official avenues for
funds to pay for farming capital, education for children, children's marriage expenses, or health care.
Gowri Janakiramanan, Protecting the Living Victims: Evaluating the Impact of India's Farmer
Suicide Crisis on Its Rural Women, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 491, 493 (2014). The inability
to repay these loans has led to a recent, dramatic wave of suicides; at least 13,754 people in the self-
employed agriculture sector killed themselves in India in 2012. Id. at 492. That such debt often
results from the obligation to pay the dowries that permit their daughters to many only further com-
plicates the image of a parental responsibility to equip children with the resources needed to be self-
supporting into the future. Id at 511-12.
165. Ghimire, supra note 1, at 2.
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crops, having land on which to raise staple grains or legumes provides
reassurance that no matter what happens with the government, barring a
rural scorched-earth campaign, the family should be able to eke out a
survival, even if a very modest one.166 In essence, in a developing coun-
try where unemployment insurance, disaster aid, and other aspects of a
social safety net are absent, ownership of land represents the best insur-
ance policy to which poor people have access.167
Land therefore functions to create social status-not purely in a hi-
erarchical sense of establishing status over others but in a binary sense of
avoiding indigency as well. Land can secure a stable existence for its
owners and their descendants. But land's historical and contemporary,
cross-cultural role in constituting social status is too easily ignored by
both privileged urban citizens of developing societies and outsiders from
other nations, all of whom are squarely situated in a more-or-less
knowledge-driven economy today. That land might bear some greater
import than just being dirt; that it might be valued as a substitute for in-
surance; and that it might have a culturally contingent meaning, based on
one's perspective as a peasant and as a citizen of a developing nation, is
well beyond the apparent surface value of land reform as a development
project. These layered connotations cannot be ignored when the topic of
land reform is under consideration.
This set of observations about the divergent meanings of land for
rural and urban populations can play an important role when it comes to
developing a land reform program. To policy makers in a national capital
or officials in international-aid programs, land likely appears to be just
another fungible resource. From that vantage point, redistribution of land
or money would serve similar ends, so a program to redistribute land
probably does not seem meaningfully more important than a program to
redistribute cash in the minds of even benevolent bureaucrats and legisla-
tors in capital cities. To the extent that land reform may cause social tur-
moil due to the identity-based threat of land redistribution,168 distributing
money might even appear as a more appealing form of redistribution;
policy makers may not grasp land's deeper meanings but recognize land
166. Scholars of land reform have observed that land access plays a central role in addressing
poverty in developing nations. See, e.g., Hanstad, Prosterman & Mitchell, supra note 154, at 19
("[A] decrease in land concentration by one-third leads to a one-half reduction of the poverty level
within 12 to 14 years."); see also Kepe & Tessaro, supra note 2. This trope of land conferring inde-
pendence was an aspect of the Jeffersonian colonial property norms, discussed in detail infra Section
II.B.3, which justified a requirement of property ownership to gain the franchise; without land, a
man was "powerless and dependent." Steinfeld, supra note 90, at 340.
167. See PUTZEL, CAPTIVE LAND, supra note 158, at 20, 22 (noting that "[i]n a predominantly
agricultural society, the 'landless' - or tenants, marginal farmers, farmworkers and other rural poor
groups who enjoy no secure access to land - can never be certain of meeting their basic needs for
survival"); Moyo, supra note 41, at 188 ("[Land and national] resources are the key direct source of
livelihood and wealth for the majority [of Africans]. They are also the means through which the poor
pay for their education, health services, and hence a critical means to attain non-agricultural em-
ployment.").
168. See infra Section II.B.4 (discussing class identity and land reform).
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reform's contentiousness. As a result, money might seem to suffice as a
far lower risk form of poverty reduction. But for the beneficiaries of land
reform programs, land reform is redistribution with a much more pro-
found significance. Receiving land through such a program is not merely
another form of social welfare, such as a food assistance program or a
cash transfer program. Rather, it functions more like a long-term social-
insurance program, one that guarantees a safety net over generations for
its beneficiaries and equips families to care for themselves for an extend-
ed period of time.169 For those charged with initiating land reform pro-
grams, it is important to remember this distinction. Receipt of land
means more than the receipt of other resources, and among an array of
possible poverty eradication programs, it should be prioritized according-
ly.
3. Land Creates Opportunities for Democratic Political Citizenship
Property scholars know that ownership of real property has played a
substantial role in transforming people within a society into actual citi-
zens of that community. Even two hundred years later, Thomas Jeffer-
son's democratizing push toward broadening access to land, and with it,
suffrage and citizenship, remains a compelling vision of the role of land
in constituting an individual's political identity. Today's property schol-
ars have built on these ideas, conceptualizing how land ownership has
become a factor in the contemporary constitution of citizenship.170
Exactly how much direction Jeffersonian property theory provides
regarding contemporary land reform is ambiguous. At a minimum, Jef-
ferson's repeated reforming efforts focused on two broad themes. First,
Jefferson thought it necessary for the government to provide a modest
amount of land to those who were landless, largely due to the importance
of property for good citizenship.17 1 While he did not succeed in enacting
this reform, he clearly and repeatedly advocated for redistribution of
property to the landless because he believed land endowed individuals
with independence that was necessary for citizenship.172 At a fundamen-
tal level, then, Jeffersonian property theory supports some version of
land redistribution. Jefferson's beliefs that land should not lie fallow,173
that the wealthy do not efficiently use their property,174 and yet that for-
169. This kind of social insurance safety net is not especially familiar to those in the U.S.,
though the Supplemental Security Income program, available "to help aged, blind, and disabled
people, who have little or no income . . . ." Supplemental Security Income Home Page-2017 Edi-
tion, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/ssi (last visited Aug. 26, 2017). Tax revenues, not
personal contributions, support this program, so it differs from the more-familiar Social Security
system. Id.
170. See SINGER, supra note 133, at 9; WALDRON, supra note 129.
171. STALOFF, supra note 105, at 255.
172. See Steinfeld, supra note 90, at 338, 350.
173. STALOFF, supra note 105, at 283.
174. Id. at 258-59.
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mal equality of land distribution will never occurl75 suggest some guid-
ing Jeffersonian principles for land redistribution. Fallow lands warrant
redistribution. The usage pattern of vast tracts of ownership should be
scrutinized to ensure that wealthy owners are using them efficiently.
Landless rural laborers have a legitimate claim to a modest parcel of
land. However, formal equality of land distribution is an unrealistic, and
therefore inappropriate, public policy goal.
Second, Jefferson successfully enacted reforms that abolished state-
sanctioned protection of hereditary and familial property privileges.1
7 6
Jeffersonian property theory can therefore be relied on to legitimate legal
reforms that help dismantle dynastic wealth held in real property. Yet
given that Jefferson did not embrace formal equality in the distribution of
real property, the impact of this reforming thrust could be viewed as lim-
ited. It might most accurately be invoked to show that Jefferson sought to
refuse the mobilization of coercive state power to reify existing patterns
of land ownership. What is not entirely clear is how far this can extend.
One circumscribed application might be a historically grounded skepti-
cism about the legitimacy of hereditary titles themselves and the attach-
ment of rights thereto as the means of allocating land.
A broader vision of Jefferson might claim that, while it is true that
Jefferson was not a social radical, his democratizing, anti-aristocratic,
and prorepublican tendencies demonstrate a deeper commitment to open-
ing the political system to more people than were involved at the time.
177
In essence, this argument suggests that what Jefferson proposed was rad-
ical republicanism within the confines of the limited and not yet demo-
cratic Enlightenment vision of the 1700s.178 By analogy then, this kind of
radicalism in the name of investing more people in the republicanism of
the era can serve as an example for today of fostering land reform that
can yield a more decidedly democratic future. If this analogous interpre-
tation is correct, then invoking Jefferson might serve to justify efforts to
democratize access to land even today; now, these democratic efforts
may involve state refusal to support efforts of the wealthy and landed to
maintain their control over vast expanses of property.
Finally, while Jefferson suggested that land redistribution may not
require compensation, it is unclear how far this would extend in practice.
Broader consideration of the themes present in Jeffersonian property
theory suggests that a radical, uncompensated redistribution would be
175. See Steinfeld, supra note 90, at 342.
176. ISENBERG, supra note 78, at 94.
177. This thrust towards more citizenship rights for more people stands in marked contrast to
what Professor Atiba Ellis has observed is a push to circumscribe citizenship today. Atiba R. Ellis, A
Price Too High: Efficiencies, Voter Suppression, and the Redefining of Citizenship, 43 Sw. L. REV.
549, 549 (2015).
178. Many thanks to Professor Atiba Ellis for helpful ongoing conversations that led to the
crystallization of this point.
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inconsistent with the moderation that typified Jefferson's actions in this
realm. It is likely that a compensated redistributive land reform of mod-
est scale, designed to further the citizenship of the landless, and legisla-
tive reforms that remove state support for vested property interests, are
what Jeffersonian property theory would mandate today.
Likewise, contemporary theorists' approach to the role of property
in creating citizenship can offer important insights into the values that
might motivate a nation to engage in redistributive land reform efforts
today. Land reform can improve the status of poor individuals. But
through the lens of citizenship, it can also, and perhaps more importantly,
signify something crucial about the values of a society that rejects the
establishment of monopolistic forms of wealth and their perpetuation
over generations. Allowing extreme concentrations of property owner-
ship in the hands of the few, while the many lack access to a resource
that constitutes citizenship, degrades the democratic functioning of a
nation. A truly engaged democracy is an impossibility in a society that
has terribly unequal land ownership.179
Yet far too often, land reform is viewed as a form of corruption or
cronyism.1so Instead of conceptualizing land reform as playing a signifi-
cant role in building democracy, this kind of cynical viewpoint considers
land redistribution as a simple means of rewarding political allies.8 1 But
if land is reframed as constitutive of citizenship, then programs designed
to democratize land access could instead be viewed as part of a broader
push to build democracy.'82 Land reform thus might be the opposite of
179. See SINGER, supra note 133, at 162; SINGER, supra note 35 at 1-3; VAN DER WALT, supra
note 7.
180. No doubt this is because some of the most notorious modem land reforms have done
precisely this. That Mugabe's land reform efforts in Zimbabwe rewarded political allies and pun-
ished opponents is well-documented. Although this set of traits is not unique to expropriation-based
land redistributions, transfers of expropriated land at times demonstrate gratitude for political pat-
ronage. See, e.g., Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 51, at 574-76 (noting that Zimbabwe's land re-
form programs possessed land but that cronyism meant that "[m]uch of the best land . .. ended in the
hands of [ruling party] leaders and Government officials, military officers and many leading judges"
instead of in the possession of the poor and landless); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ZIMBABWE: FAST
TRACK LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE 2-3 (March 2002) [hereinafter FAST TRACK LAND REFORM]
(documenting "party-political control of access to the forms for applying for land[,] and partisan
discrimination in the allocation of plots," and the role of the same violent political party militias that
intimidate political opponents in implementing land reform); see also Freedom in the World 2017:
Zimbabwe Profile, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2017/zimbabwe (last visited Aug. 26, 2017) ("In the meantime, rampant corruption ... as well
as repercussions of land-reform policies and an unclear indigenization policy, continued to hamper
economic recovery."). But it does not need to be this way. Successful and reform efforts have man-
aged to redistribute massive amounts of land in nations worldwide, creating substantial bulwarks
against poverty and human suffering. Roy L. Prosterman & Jennifer Brown, Tenancy Reform, in
ONE BILLION RISING, supra note 154, at 57, 62-66 (documenting successful redistributive land
reforms in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Kerala State of India, and El Salvador).
181. The Zimbabwean fast-track land reform is the archetype of politically motivated land
distribution. See FAST TRACK LAND REFORM, supra note 180.
182. Joseph Singer and Jack Beermann have moved one step beyond this claim, noting that in
some instances, even uncompensated regulation can enhance democracy, because such regulations
that are adverse in the short-run may in the long-run "be democracy-enhancing because it better
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corruption or cronyism-it could solidify the operation of a newly demo-
cratic nation, rather than undermining it. Land reform might thus create a
more equal and democratic society by improving the lot of the worst off
and by reducing the concentration of wealth.183
Comprehending that land ownership is constitutive of citizenship
can help government officials grasp the stakes of land reform programs.
Efforts to democratize access to land are not just about situating individ-
uals and families who are the beneficiaries in a better economic position
than they occupied prior to receiving land. At a deeper level, land reform
represents the democratic drive for liberty, by giving people a site on
which to live as freely as they can, and equality, through its rejection of
the concentration of land wealth in the hands of the few. Democratizing
access to land can signal a change in the social status of program benefi-
ciaries.1 84 It may also demonstrate a shift in the nature of the government
itself, away from a plutocratic system and towards one that prioritizes a
stronger version of equality. 85
Further supportive of the democratic potential of land redistribution
is the possibility that land reform can reduce unrest. Conflict over land
and the lack of widespread access to agrarian land are central reasons for
civil unrest and social revolution.86 Political theorists have posited that
land reform can play an important role in stabilizing societies, function-
ing as a "substitute for revolution in the countryside."87 In theory, de-
mocratizing land access could appease peasant concerns about economic
inequality and give landless people a stake in the maintenance of the
existing government.'88 In some instances, this has been documented.
189
For example, El Salvador's land tenure reform, which transferred owner-
ship to around thirty percent of tenant farmers, is believed to have con-
tributed to the defeat of the Communist insurgency.1 90
approximates the decisions that would be collectively reached by rational judgment free from the
cognitive distortions caused by excessive focus on short-run costs." Joseph William Singer & Jack
M. Beermann, The Social Origins ofProperty, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 217, 239-40 (1993).
183. See id. at 243-44 (arguing for an "ongoing commitment" to increasing access to produc-
tive resources).
184. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
185. Redistributive land reform can also serve important expressive goals, especially in post-
colonial states. For a longer discussion of the expressive goals of land reform, see Cavalieri, supra
note 5, at 16-21.
186. Riedinger, supra note 148, at 181.
187. T. David Mason, "Take Two Acres and Call Me in the Morning": Is Land Reform a
Prescription for Peasant Unrest?, J. POL., Feb. 1998, at 199, 200.
188. See JEFFERY M. PAIGE, AGRARIAN REVOLUTION 122 (1975) (observing that "the peasant's
enthusiasm for a social movement is likely to dissipate as soon as his immediate hunger for land has
been satisfied"); Mason, supra note 187; see also Michael Albertus & Oliver Kaplan, Land Reform
as a Counterinsurgency Policy. Evidence from Colombia, 57 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 198, 199 (2013)
(identifying land reform as a potential remedy for unrest).
189. Mason, supra note 187.
190. Prosterman & Brown, supra note 180, at 65. However, other examples of successful land-
to-tiller programs, such as those in South Vietnam, Kerala State of India, and China, were not gener-
ated in moments of notable unrest. See id. at 62-65.
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4. Land Redistribution Reorders Social Hierarchies
Beyond the role of land in constituting individuals' personhood and
identities, land reform may have the potential to alter the ordering of
society. Radin's theory of fetishistic property may reveal something far
more insidious about the meaning of land to plantation owners in nations
with deeply unequal access to land. Substantial concentrations of wealth
may create the kinds of unhealthy identity development in which the
wealthy landowner conceptualizes identity solely through acquisition and
not in light of other kinds of community roles. Worse yet, maintenance
of fetish property may exhaust the supply of property entirely-in part
due to the scarcity problems identified previously'9 1-such that an insuf-
ficient amount of property remains for others to use to constitute them-
selves in property.192 As a result, the state may actually need to take af-
firmative steps to dismantle fetish property for the well-being of its citi-
zens, both those who have excess property and those who are unable to
obtain sufficient property to constitute themselves.
Some states have attempted to legally establish the amount of prop-
erty that warrants protection as personal by codifying the amount of land
that an owner can retain following a land reform initiative. The state
thereby indicates as a matter of law the threshold quantity of land that
should be treated as personal.19 3 Such a program can operationalize Ra-
din's central insight: personal property requires deference from the state,
so land that qualifies as personal property is exempted from redistribu-
tion through land reform. In a crude way, this approach is designed to
identify land to which people have deep personal connections. In con-
trast, excess quantities of land are either fungible property that is outside
state deference or it is fetish property, which Radin views as affirmative-
ly harmful to a reasonable constitution of the self. Under a land reform
program that caps the acreage of land an individual may own,1 94 land
reform can transfer fungible property without causing harm to the own-
191. See discussion supra Sections LA, II.A. 1.
192. See Radin, supra note 60, at 990 ("[G]overnment should rearrange property rights so that
fungible property of some people does not overwhelm the opportunities of the rest to constitute
themselves in property.").
193. See Riedinger, supra note 148, at 207-08 (describing the Filipino land reform initiative
that allowed landowners to retain no more than five hectares of land, plus another three for each
child over the age of fifteen). However, this threshold of permissible retention led to over 75% of the
total farm area being exempt from redistribution. See id.
194. A number of countries have adopted what some researchers refer to as ceilings on owner-
ship, that limit either the total amount of land an individual may own, or in some instances, may
control through the rental market. See Prosterman & Brown, supra note 180, at 91. These have at
times been unsuccessful because the ceilings were extremely high, or because landowners would
transfer the property in anticipation of the enactment of the law, using partitions to family members
or fictitious transfers to evade the ceiling. Tim Hanstad & Robin Nielsen, Land Tenure Reform in
India, in ONE BILLION RISING, supra note 154, at 235, 244. Tightening guidelines for the operation
of the ceilings has made them somewhat more effective. See id. At the same time, using aggressively
low ceilings to capture more land is believed to foster opposition and to offer limited success. Roy L.
Prosterman, Redistributing Land to Agricultural Laborers, in ONE BILLION RISING, supra note 154,
at 107, 138-39.
108 [Vol. 95:1
BACK TO THE BASICS
er's essential personhood. Moreover, land reform initiatives might even
intensively focus on redistributing fetish land to reduce the idolatry of
property within the state. Another option would be to increase compensa-
tion to owners based on duration of ownership to recognize personhood
connections to land.'9 5 This approach would make prior owners more
whole, while still permitting the state to identify and purchase sufficient
land to accomplish its land reform goals, even if there was insufficient
fungible or fetish property to seize. Increased compensation would serve
as the protection of personhood interests in this case.
If the concept of personhood and property is broadened by one level
of abstraction to a class-based analysis, Radin's insight into personhood
may capture a far more insidious aspect of the opposition that land re-
form can cause. Radin's theory of personhood and property is primarily
based on the role of property in constituting individual identity, but there
may be a more systemic explanation for why the loss of property through
a land reform program offends fundamental notions of identity.9 6 When,
for example, numerous plantation owners in an agricultural region decide
voluntarily to sell their land and are replaced by groups of smallhold-
ers,19 7 significant social upheaval would predictably result, affecting the
lives of both sellers and their neighbors alike. Such a substantial change
in the constitution of the landowning class in an isolated, rural place may
well feel analogous to a revolution. Despite the absence of violence and
the voluntariness of transfers, such programs alter society in ways that
have identity-based consequences. This sense of social upheaval will be
even more pronounced where the transfers occur involuntarily.
If land's role in constituting identity is both individual and class
based, the creation of land rights for landless rural people-even without
the state exercising its power of eminent domain-could threaten the
identity and station of individuals high within the existing social hierar-
195. This approach has primarily been advocated in the context of eminent domain of homes,
as a method to both fully compensate those whose property is taken and to discourage governments
from taking homes except in cases of necessity. See John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of
Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 791, 804-05 (2006). But see Brian Angelo Lee, Just Under-
compensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 647
(2013) (arguing that fair market value does include a measure of sentimentality). Arguably, this kind
of premium should be less necessary for agricultural land, which is less personal than homes, though
duration of ownership may still increase personhood connections in a fashion that warrants increased
compensation.
196. Radin, supra note 60.
197. The International Fund for Agricultural Development defines "smallholder farms" as
those that cultivate less than two hectares of agricultural land. Conference on New Directions for
Smallholder Agriculture: Introduction and Conference Overview, INT'L FUND AGRIC. DEV., at 1 n.2,
https://www.ifad.org/event/past/tags/2107053#2 (last visited Sept. 27, 2017). The term "smallhold-
ers" is commonly used in development heory in a less technical way to refer to individuals who own
and cultivate small tracts of land; this is typically viewed in contrast to plantation owners or other
kinds of large-scale agricultural production. See, e.g., ROBERT MCC. NETrING, SMALLHOLDERS,




chy.198 By expanding the landed classes of citizens, land reform pro-
grams reveal that the state is concerning itself with the needs and prefer-
ences not merely of the wealthy, but also of the destitute and landless.
The threat to the perceived social order is profound, demonstrating an
elevation in the personhood of previously low-status citizens.199 This is
precisely the central goal of redistributive land reform: to use land to
alter preexisting social conditions. Improving the social status of the
landless poor puts them on an upward trajectory; it therefore risks threat-
ening the class-based status of landed individuals who no longer occupy
reified social space that excludes the poor and marginal.200 To the extent
that social status rooted in property rights has historically been an essen-
tially static and immutable aspect of personhood, land reform causes
dramatic changes in the structure of reforming societies and the identities
of their citizens. If social status is conceptualized as a zero-sum game
that at least partially constitutes the identity of individuals and classes,
then elevating the personhood of those at the bottom of the hierarchy
through land reform threatens the personhood of those at the top.201 Para-
doxically, Radin's theory of personhood might explain why there can be
substantial social backlash to democratically legitimate, market-
compatible land reform programs, even when they occur through a will-
ing-buyer, willing-seller approach. This, of course, is the predictable
response to appropriate levels of redistribution of fetishized property.
198. The ugly history of racially restrictive covenants in the United States evidenced a similar,
hierarchical notion, creating an unmistakable message that land in some places should only be
owned by certain groups of people. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1841, 1848-49 (1994) (describing racially defined
spaces as the hierarchy created by restrictive covenants).
199. See Radin, supra note 60.
200. Winoto, supra note 16 ("Historically, many agrarian reforms have attempted to funda-
mentally change the social relationship of property ownership, wealth, social status, and political
power. These tend to be contested in the political sphere between reformers and those often powerful
interests who expect to lose from it.").
201. This phenomenon is not just about land reform's effect on dismantling existing social
hierarchies. That people derive identity from, and fight to maintain, their position in the social hier-
archy is well-documented. For example, legal scholars have tracked the role of poor whites in main-
taining and enforcing the racial hierarchy in the United States. Trina Jones, Race, Economic Class,
and Employment Opportunity, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 62 (2009) (arguing that "the distinc-
tion between White servitude and Black bondage was sizable. . . and the psychological benefits it
afforded even the poorest Whites, may have impeded the development of cross-racial coalitions that
could have significantly ameliorated the sharp effects of economic and racial dominance in seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century America."). This theme in American racial history is not limited to
scholarly consideration; a recent popular press article examines the contemporary construction of
whiteness as an experience of racialized dispossession. See Hua Hsu, White Plight?, NEW YORKER,
July 25, 2016 (revisiting the photographs documenting the integration of Little Rock High School by
noting that an enraged white student "wanted at least to maintain her status somewhere between the
upper-crust white and largely disadvantaged black worlds") (reviewing ISENBERG, supra note 78),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/25/the-new-meaning-of-whiteness. See generally
MATT WRAY, NOT QUITE WHITE: WHITE TRASH AND THE LIMITS OF WHITENESS 53, 53 n.13 (2006)
(discussing the role of racial hierarchy in preventing poor whites from developing a robust class
consciousness).
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5. Land Redistribution Can Create Political Stability
Land reform may also broaden a form of property ownership that
might increase individuals' sense of investment within their society. Fos-
tering engagement may produce its own positive consequences
2 02 and
might therefore serve as an additional justification for land redistribution
efforts. This kind of investment within a society may not be sufficient to
stop a revolution203 or prevent a revolution from occurring.204 More per-
niciously, property ownership might render people more vulnerable to
less extreme forms of social upheaval, such as recessions or natural dis-
asters, insofar as owning land or a house means people are less able to
205
move to seek work. But gaining access to land might build individuals'
sense of investment within their communities, which may be enough to
change the way that people think about what role they play and how they
conduct themselves within society. Importantly, this possible feature of
land reform contradicts the standard ideological framework of redistribu-
tive programs. While most who advocate for land reform do so for pro-
gressive motives rooted in social justice and concerns with inequality,
land reform's potential as a stabilizing force within a society could sup-
ply a conservative justification for this kind of social investment. Instead
of supporting liberalizing instincts toward social change, land reform
may create a newly established class of people who have a sudden, deep
investment in social stability.
III. PROPERTY'S BASICS OFFER GUIDANCE ON HOW TO MAKE LAND
REFORM EFFECTIVE
Yet even if those implementing land reform understand all of these
reasons why land is worthy of redistribution, this alone does not create
the circumstances for a successful land reform program. Property law
and theory also offer an array of insights into problems that may affect
the implementation of land reform initiatives and explain how land re-
form programs can be made more effective.
202. As alluded to above in Section I.E., Jefferson posited property ownership's role in pro-
moting personal industry and autonomy from others. Jefferson scholars have suggested that encour-
aging home ownership and acquisition of private property may continue to foster these values in
American society. See YARBROUGH, supra note 107, at 98-99.
203. See Mason, supra note 187.
204. See Prosterman & Brown, supra note 180, at 63-65.
205. Property ownership renders the labor force less mobile, creating gluts of labor in some
regions where the economy is stagnant and unemployment is high, and at times shortages of labor in
other regions where the economy is booming and adding jobs. See David G. Blanchflower & An-
drew J. Oswald, Does High Home-Ownership Impair the Labor Market? 1-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 19079, 2013) (finding that rises in the homeownership rate in a U.S.
state are a precursor to eventual sharp rises in unemployment in that state).
2017] 111
DENVER LAWREVIEW
A. Property's Basics Suggest How to Mitigate Popular Opposition to
Land Reform
That land is scarce and rivalrous means that its redistribution
through land reform will almost inevitably lead to a sense that the pro-
206gram has created winners and losers, in two different ways2. First, rival-
rousness means that those who lose a specific, perhaps beloved, parcel of
land through land reform will know that they lost their own property to
someone else. In such a rivalry, the prior owner lost and the new owner
won. Second, scarcity means that, more broadly, land reform uses gov-
ernment intervention to truncate the rights of prior owners as a class in
favor of creating property rights for others. Land reform therefore creates
groups of winners and losers because there is not enough land to go
around.
What is crucial for policy makers to grasp is that opposition to land
reform is a predictable result of shifting the existing property rights re-
gime that governs a resource with a limited supply. The reality is that
land's rivalrous and scarce nature almost inevitably fosters resentment
and distrust when it is redistributed through land reform. Or, at an even
earlier stage, those who anticipate losing through a new land reform pro-
gram may instead attempt to leverage their political power to forestall its
implementation.207 Disapproval are foreseeable responses to land reform
precisely because scarcity and rivalrousness are both reasons that land
reform is needed. As a result, those initiating land reform programs
should anticipate public disapprobation without allowing it to undermine
an otherwise legitimate and effective program.
One way of minimizing negative responses to land reform programs
is to time the launch of a new program to coincide with politically oppor-
tune situations. Legal scholars have developed a robust theory of the role
of moments of crisis and the resulting social upheaval in creating the
conditions in which an existing, static property system can actually
change.20 8 Such moments may offer unusual circumstances in which
those who stand to be the losers of land reform may be willing to break
from the political status quo and support, or at least tolerate, redistribu-
tion to accomplish other shared goals. During such periods, if many peo-
ple across the society are winning and losing in various ways, those who
206. Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rights, I UC IRVINE L.
REV. 1091, 1096 (2011) ("Changes in property regimes create losers as well as winners.").
207. Doremus somewhat cynically observes that those who might lose from a change can use
their political power to prevent it from occurring, even if it would be an efficient change that theories
of evolutionary property rights would predict should occur. Id.
208. See, e.g., VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 9 (end of Apartheid in South Africa); Nestor M.
Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1621-23 (2010)
(United States Great Depression); Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 1, 22 (2003) (climate change).
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lose land may be less likely to feel singled out to suffer a unique form of
publicly imposed loss.
Guatemala's post-civil-war land reform provides an example of
how this strategy worked in practice. While reified concentration of land
in the hands of wealthy people was a reality of Guatemala's colonial and
postcolonial situation, its post-civil-war peace accord provided a clear
route to land ownership for landless peasants after decades of rural vio-
lence.209 Rather than being created in a vacuum, Guatemala's land reform
was part of a broader reconfiguration of many aspects of public life.210
Yes, land was still rivalrous and scarce in Guatemala during this time,
just as it was and always will be. But those who stood to lose because of
land's rivalrousness and scarcity could contextualize their losses in the
midst of widespread social change. Such change rendered many people
winners and losers across an array of axes-political power, criminal
consequences for war crimes, land ownership, and rights to primary so-
cial goods, among others.2 11 That the peace accord negotiations occurred
outside of the standard political process only heightened the sense of
disruption-the land reform was insulated from the usual political forces
that would have prevented its passage in a typical legislative setting.
When peace negotiators acceded to demands from the rural peasants'
union, rendering landless peasants the winners and previously landed
rural people the losers of scarce and rivalrous resources, it was in a
broader setting in which all political factions were simultaneously win-
212
ning and losing. The negotiators could not face electoral recrimination
in subsequent elections and as a result, they were willing to take political
risks that electoral politics would make impossible during another mo-
213
ment. Land's scarcity and rivalrousness will create winners and losers
when land reform happens, but skillful public officials can leverage so-
cial upheaval to accomplish land reform in moments that minimize oppo-
sition.
In theory, direct, market-based transfers from voluntarily selling
owners to beneficiaries of a land reform initiative who have received
subsidies or other government assistance in purchasing property should
minimize the level of opposition because they are less intrusive into per-
sonal property that constitutes identity.2 14 When the state supports and
209. See SUSANNE JONAS, OF CENTAURS AND DOVES: GUATEMALA'S PEACE PROCESS 79
(2000).
210. See id. at 78-79.
211. See id. at 80.
212. See id. at 79-80.
213. Id. at 79-80; cf Susana Gauster & S. Ryan Isakson, Eliminating Market Distortions,
Perpetuating Rural Inequality: An Evaluation of Market-Assisted Land Reform in Guatemala, 28
THIRD WORLD Q. 1519, 1519-20 (2007).
214. Many commentators in the international development field believe the key distinction
between land reform programs is whether they are market-led agrarian reforms or reforms led by the
government, known as state-led agrarian reform. SATURNINO M. BORRAS JR., PRO-POOR LAND
REFORM: A CRITIQUE 54 (2007). However, I have elsewhere observed that the more important legal
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possibly facilitates market-based transfers between willing buyers and
willing sellers,21 the conveyance avoids the taint of involuntariness.
Owners who transfer their property voluntarily cannot legitimately com-
plain that the state is stripping them of a central aspect of their identities
without their agreement; the willing seller in this kind of transaction has
obviously consented.
But the sense of loss of personhood and identity could be especially
profound in instances where an owner relinquishes property involuntari-
ly, such as through uncompensated expropriation or even through com-
pensated eminent domain. In such cases, the situation becomes substan-
tially more complicated because the state takes land in contravention of
the wishes of the private landowner. Where the state elects to take pri-
vately owned land for redistributive purposes but fully reimburses the
private owner for that property216 through compensated eminent do-
217
main, it may pose the threat to personhood that Radin has identified.
The loss of one's land for purposes of state transfer to a landless rural
citizen might well be identity shaking for the former owner, despite it
being a lawful event.2 18 Radin's work exposes the possibility that these
distinction for purposes of poverty reduction or eradication is based on whether or not the land
reform program undermines the value of land in the nation and generates externalities that accrue to
the detriment of the poorest members of the nation. I refer to redistributive land reform programs
based either on voluntary sale or a compensated involuntary sale as market-compatible land reform
programs. I contrast this kind of market-compatible reform to expropriation-based involuntary
takings, in which the state takes private property for redistribution but either entirely refuses to
compensate the prior owner for the taken land or undercompensates the prior owner. These expro-
priation-based programs often set forth with a goal of poverty reduction, but can both devalue the
very resource being redistributed and create other consequences, such as dramatic increases in food
commodity prices that harm the real or intended beneficiaries of these kinds of programs, who
typically control fewer resources that they can use to weather instability. For a broader discussion of
this issue, see Cavalieri, supra note 5, at 21-42.
215. Some land reform programs have adopted a different language, instead referring to mar-
ket-led agrarian reforms as "willing-buyer, willing-seller" programs; commentators and organiza-
tions have embraced this terminology as well. See, e.g., FAST TRACK LAND REFORM, supra note
180, at 6.
216. This kind of process aligns closely with that articulated in the Takings Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Under Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the government may take property for public
use so long as just compensation is paid. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
217. In other cases, the state takes private property but refuses to compensate the private indi-
vidual, or only partially pays compensation, processes that I refer to as uncompensated expropria-
tion. Elsewhere, I have rejected the legitimacy of uncompensated expropriation as the basis of redis-
tributive land reform initiatives because of its likely negative effects on poor people in the develop-
ing world. The distinction is important when considering the democratic legitimacy of the taking,
and importantly, the economic effects of the government's action on the nation in question. See
Cavalieri, supra note 5, at 25-32.
218. The eminent domain power has long been conceptualized as one of the central powers of
the sovereign. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 79 (observing that any act of disloyalty to the
throne could lead to the loss of one's land); see also William R. Vance, The Quest for Tenure in the
United States, 33 YALE L.J. 248, 270 (1924) (describing the powers of the sovereign). The state's
obligation to pay compensation to the owner of taken land is a relatively recent legal phenomenon,
but one that is not unique to the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Spanish Constitution
makes similar provision. CONSTITUCION ESPA&lOLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). France
does likewise. See GREGORY ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY
310 n.160 (2006). Germany does as well. See id. at 115. South Africa also requires compensation,
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kinds of involuntary, legally permissible transfers might threaten the
individual sense of personhood that is rooted in the ownership of land.
As a result, the involuntary loss of property, even if compensated, may
be profoundly difficult for individuals to suffer.2 19 Of course this is not a
reason to avoid such unpopular but democratically necessary and justi-
fied forms of involuntary redistribution. But it can be helpful to under-
stand the roots of opposition to such programs.
Oligarchs' opposition to land reform clearly has substantial fetishis-
tic aspects. No reasonable reading of Radin's theory could permit vast
tracts of property to be protected in order to shelter the wealthiest of a
nation from their own sense of injury when they lose land to which they
are unhealthily attached. Indeed, the central thrust of Radin's theory of
personhood as applied to land reform is that the redistribution of fungible
property is a legitimate state action. Radin therefore can help nations
distinguish legitimate personal attachment to property from attachments
that do not warrant state deference. But these observations about the
structural aspects of personhood and property as related to the wealthy
class of landowners have substantial explanatory value for the depth of
opposition that accompanies even modest versions of land reform. While
nations ought not be solicitous of oligarchs' attachment to their property,
anticipating it may matter for the success of land reform.
Beyond individual opposition, social conflict often accompanies the
implementation of land reform programs.220 Insights into personhood and
its meaning for redistributing land can contribute important knowledge to
those implementing land reform programs. As a result, "designers of land
tenure reforms . .. must make informed and reasonable efforts to take the
interests of existing landowners into account."221 Personhood theory
helps explain how those landowners think of their interests.
B. Property Law Helps Show How to Address Inflationary Effects of
Land Reform
The finite supply of land and the uniqueness of particular parcels
can complicate the initiation of land reform programs by muddying ap-
praisals of property transferred through a land reform initiative. These
features of real property have the potential to artificially inflate the value
though it may be for less than the entire market value of the property if certain criteria are satisfied.
See id. at 171-72.
219. Gauster & Isakson, supra note 213, at 1520 (observing that state-led land redistribution is
"likely to incite protests from powerful landowners").
220. See Gerrit Huizer, Peasant Mobilization for Land Reform: Historical Case Studies and
Theoretical Considerations, in LAND REFORM & PEASANT LIVELIHOODS, supra note 1, at 164, 194
(noting the kinds of conflict that result from efforts to mobilize for reform, including landowner and
elite efforts to undermine organizations).
221. See, e.g., Prosterman, supra note 194, at 127.
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222
of farms, a critique frequently leveled against land reform programs.
Land is, as always, only worth what someone will pay.223 But land re-
form can dramatically alter the market for land, creating a sudden surge
in demand that drives up prices224 at the same time it attempts to provide
poor people with property.2 25 Government action or subsidies with public
funds enable conveyances facilitated by land reform that may create a
greater demand than would have occurred without the involvement of the
226state2. In essence, the finite quantity of land combined with increased
demand for land during implementation of a land reform program means
land reform can cause prices to rise.227 These concerns are particularly
acute in instances of market-assisted land reform, where willing buyers
negotiate with willing sellers.228 In such cases, because the market is
ostensibly supposed to guide the transactions and the role of the state is
relatively minor, the program may permit prices to rise even higher, un-
less the government intervenes.229 Where land reform occurs through
state exercise of some form of eminent domain, the state's more robust
role may mitigate some of the most severe pricing consequences.230
Rising land prices result in the same sum of money purchasing less
land and making it harder for other land reform beneficiaries to access
property, for numerous reasons. Public funds dedicated to subsidy pro-
grams do not extend as far in a rising land market. Any private savings
222. See Medicine Masiiwa, The Fast Track Resettlement Programme in Zimbabwe: Disparity
Between Policy Design and Implementation, 94 ROUND TABLE 218, 224 n. 1 (2005) (observing that
land prices in Zimbabwe increased sixfold between 1980-81, right at the time of independence, and
from 1987-88, during the era of continued compensated land reform); see also Prosterman, supra
note 194, at 128 (detailing reasons why land prices rose as well as the consequences of this in-
crease).
223. See Lee, supra note 195, at 599 (noting that while fair market value is what a buyer would
pay, the property may be worth more as an idiosyncratic matter to the seller).
224. This is especially the case when the compensation for such land is not based on fair mar-
ket value of the land immediately prior to the initiation of a land reform. See Prosterman, supra note
194, at 128. This can be even more severe where expropriation is hampered by land acquisition
processes that increase transaction costs so severely that the government will negotiate an overpay-
ment to avoid extended litigation. See id
225. See Masiiwa, supra note 221, at 224 n.1.
226. See Prosterman, supra note 194, at 128. A similar critique has been leveled against tax
subsidies for homeowners in the United States, arguing that these kinds of subsidies distort behavior,
encouraging housing prices to inflate and beneficiaries of subsidies to purchase more expensive
housing than they otherwise would choose to buy. Cf Snider, supra note 96.
227. Cf Masiiwa, supra note 223, at 224, n.I.
228. See Prosterman, supra note 195, at 128-29.
229. This can be even more severe in instances where the local land market is relatively inac-
tive; large-scale redistribution through voluntary transactions would require a substantial increase in
sale activity, which "is highly unlikely unless the existing 'market' price increases greatly." See id.
at 129.
230. While price controls in many cases outside of the land reform context are documented to
create market distortions that have negative long-term consequences, it is important to note that here,
price controls would be implemented to prevent the market distortions caused by land reform itself.
Rather than viewing the controls as the source of distortion, the controls are instead a response to the
problems that result from land reform. However, in some instances, the state will permit prices to
rise artificially as part of the land reform itself, in order to mitigate the anger of elites at the loss of
their land. See Putzel, Influence ofBilateral and Multilateral Donors, supra note 158, at 8.
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the beneficiaries might have amassed will cover less of the purchase
price of a given parcel of land under these circumstances. Where the
state wishes to obtain property for a land reform program via its eminent
domain power, rising prices mean that compensating prior owners will
cost the state more money. This is exacerbated further by the fact that
land reform programs facing these obstacles may move away from trans-
ferring high-quality cultivated land, instead electing to transfer marginal
public lands.231 Inflationary pressures on land prices can undercut the
ability of a land redistribution initiative to reduce poverty and are there-
fore worthy of mitigation efforts.232
Addressing inflationary effects can also increase the democratic le-
gitimacy of a land reform program. Rising prices accrue to the personal
benefit of the landowners who sell their property as part of a land reform
program.233 Land worth a modest price before the initiation of a land
reform effort can surge in value as the initiative creates greater demand,
while supply stays fixed due to land's nonfungible nature, the relative
inelasticity of the supply of land, and the unwillingness of large-scale
owners to sell property. This can invite the perception that the real bene-
ficiaries of land reform are not the poor who receive the redistributed
land but the wealthy individuals who stand to earn a healthy profit due to
a rapid, dramatic rise in the value of their property just as they prepare to
sell.234
Property law's knowledge of pricing in eminent domain can help
mitigate inflationary effects of land reform. The eminent domain litera-
ture idealizes fair market value as the price that would be reached in an
arm's length transaction.235 Any negotiated price or fair market valuation
reached in the shadow of a land reform program-which is designed to
encourage or facilitate transfer-is therefore generated from a distance
far more intimate than arm's length. Those implementing a land reform
initiative should therefore take care to enlist mechanisms to prevent ne-
gotiations from resulting in runaway land prices, both for the practical
reason of stretching available funds as far as possible and for the mainte-
231. See Prosterman, supra note 194, at 128.
232. Development experts at the Rural Development Institute have identified a number of
strategies to use in attempting to control the price of land. For example, offering to pay a lump sum
immediately instead of allowing beneficiaries to pay over time may incentivize sellers to reduce the
price. Offering benefits such as infrastructure improvements that benefit the owner who retains a
portion of the original parcel may also lead to lower prices. Robert Mitchell, Tim Hanstad & Robin
Nielsen, Micro-plots for the Rural Poor, in ONE BILLION RISING, supra note 154, at 153, 175.
233. See Prosterman, supra note 194, at 128; see also Sawchenko, supra note 149, at 700
(documenting that Filipino landowners of property redistributed through the Comprehensive Agrari-
an Reform Program demanded higher compensation rates than even those provided in the statute,
despite the fact that statutory rates already exceeded market rates).
234. See Sawchenko, supra note 149, at 713 (observing that in the instance of market-led land
reform efforts, characterized by willing-buyer, willing-seller negotiations, the knowledge that land
reform is ongoing can increase demand and raise prices).
235. See Kelianne Chamberlain, Unjust Compensation: Allowing a Revenue-Based Approach
to Pipeline Takings, 14 Wyo. L. REV. 77, 84-85 (2014).
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nance of democratic legitimacy. How to best accomplish this goal will
depend on the mechanism of the land redistribution. If the state is en-
gaged in a low-intervention land reform, attempting to democratize land
access by supporting market transactions between willing buyers and
willing sellers, the state has largely truncated its possible role. However,
articulating specific conditions under which public subsidies will be pro-
vided may help prevent these pricing problems. For example, limiting the
availability of public funds to instances where the negotiated price is
confirmed through an independent appraisal may stem the worst of price
hikes.
The state can more directly limit price increases if it plays a sub-
stantial role in the reform through activities such as identifying privately
owned property for redistribution, exercising its eminent domain powers,
or compensating owners for the deprivation of their property. Using leg-
islation or regulation to set a permissible range for land prices may help
avoid some of the worst price inflation that can result from rising de-
mand for land.236 Careful drafting of land reform legislation to include a
measure for valuing land sold during a land reform program can mitigate
some of these concerns. One possible approach is to legislatively man-
date prices equivalent to a fair market value set prior to initiation of the
237reform. Another option would be to include a schedule or formula for
pricing in legislation creating a land reform program, thereby avoiding
any recourse to the judiciary and creating greater efficiency.238 Alterna-
tively, the legislature may establish a quasi-judicial administrative mech-
anism to determine market value, which may reduce the likelihood of
runaway prices. Likewise, where land reform is part of a broader set of
legal reforms, there may be factors inherent in those reforms that can
limit inflation in the price for agricultural lands. For example, in nations
that are moving away from a state-supported economy towards a freer
market, the abolition of artificial price supports for crops can reduce the
profitability of farming. Depressed crop prices may increase the debt
burden of farmers, as they make less money from the sale of their crops.
Under such circumstances, more farmers may elect to sell their property
voluntarily, and some may be unable to pay on outstanding loans, in-
creasing the odds of lender foreclosure. Either possibility results in more
property being listed for sale, thereby increasing supply.23 9
236. Such a schedule could also include premiums for land held for a long duration, thereby
addressing the personhood compensation concerns at the same time. See Fee, supra note 195, at
791-92. But see Lee, supra note 195, at 648 (observing that where such a schedule is created on a
percentage basis, it ends up treating wealthy people's sentimental attachment as worth more money
than the personhood concerns of people with less expensive homes).
237. Sawchenko, supra note 149, at 713 n.266.
238. See Fee, supra note 195, at 815-16.
239. Klaus Deininger et al., Implementing 'Market-friendly' Land Redistribution in South
Africa: Lessons from the First Five Years 6-7 (1999) (Glob. Dev. Network Working Paper Series),
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Whatever the approach, officials initiating land reform must be
cognizant that the scarcity of land can inflate land prices, resulting in a
host of problems, including undermining the legitimacy of land reform
and eroding the value of public funds invested in land reform. But they
can draw on property law and policy insights to anticipate and respond to
these problems before they undermine the overall success of the land
reform initiative.
C. Recognizing that Land's Meanings Are Divergent Can Render Land
Reform More Effective
For land reform advocates, the recognition that a property regime
captures social values and at the same time represents potentially diver-
gent meanings is crucial to understanding the nature of conflict that land
reform creates. It is not only that property's meaning diverges across
subcultures within a nation. It is that the existing rules embody one set of
values related to land, and any alteration to those rules represents a shift
in the implicitly expressed meaning of land. One might naively presume
that as an outgrowth of a relatively similar set of cultural values, the citi-
zens of a nation might share an understanding of the meaning of land.
Instead, the cultural contextuality and contingency of land's meaning,
and the fact that these divergent meanings relate to allocations of power
and resources, reveal how land reform efforts themselves become sites of
conflict and discord. Even within a single relatively small nation that
might be anticipated to have a more cogent, unitary vision of the mean-
ing of real property, divergent meanings of real property raise the ques-
tion of how a state can realistically attempt to democratize land access
without exacerbating the tensions that result from the conflict-laden
meaning of land in that state. But once it is acknowledged that property
systems are infinitely varied, complete recognition and understanding of
differences in land's meaning can determine whether a land reform ini-
tiative will ultimately succeed or fail. What works in one setting may not
work in another, so those advocating for land reform must have a firm
grasp of the potentially multivalent cultural implications of land in their
context.
When a nation undertakes a land reform initiative, the shifting, con-
tingent meaning of land across populations within the country can be-
come an obstacle to its successful implementation. If land reform pro-
grams are enacted in a place with heterogeneous meanings of property,
social conflict can result.240 Where dissent is widespread, it may preclude
a state from reaching an adequate level of social accord to support a new
https://web.archive.org/web/20010709003040/http:/orion.forumone.com/gdnet/files.fcgi/224_zafpap
v9.PDF.
240. See Sawchenko, supra note 149 (observing how passage of land reform legislation led to
law-breaking by elites who wanted to avoid the loss of their property); see also Albertus & Kaplan,
supra note 188, at 202 (connecting land reform to some increases in social unrest).
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land reform program. Therefore, any discussion of the goals or purposes
of a particular land reform effort realistically can only offer a partial rep-
resentation of the public opinion and belief system about land reform in a
particular setting. But those undertaking land reform programs should
seek to understand the varied meanings of land within their nation before
implementing any such initiative. Those multiple meanings must include
not only historical meanings of land but also the contemporary and po-
tentially shifting significance of land as understood by members of both
dominant and minority groups in rural and urban communities. To the
extent that land reform beneficiaries come from a single cultural group
within a nation, while those who lose their land in a land reform program
come from a distinct cultural group, even more safeguards are needed to
ensure that there is buy in across the full array of subcultures present in
the state.
Progressive property's understanding of land's contextual, contin-
gent nature helps highlight why a monolithic land reform program estab-
lished by members of a ruling social class or racial, ethnic, religious, or
linguistic group will likely fail to engage all members of the society.
Instead, cognizance of this divergent set of possible meanings of land
must lead decision makers to be intentional in their efforts to involve
members of all affected social groups. At a minimum, officials charged
with implementing land reform must be culturally diverse and culturally
competent to communicate clearly with a wide array of citizens. Those
tasked with implementing land reform must establish mechanisms to
engage with and listen to both poor communities of land reform benefi-
ciaries and wealthy landowners, though a third group of citizens com-
prised of those not directly affected are also implicitly important as well.
First, government officers must know the history of land struggles
in their nation and work to avoid invoking painful episodes of the past,
while also attempting to rectify prior injustices. Beneficiaries of land
reform can help decision makers orient a program within the framework
of cultural meanings that land may bear in an agrarian society. They can
ensure that the method of titling used in a redistributive effort aligns with
communities' traditional values about how land should be held and by
whom.24 1 The social meaning of land within the landless community
must be understood, but because land reform implicitly seeks to embody
241. While private landownership by an individual or family is often envisioned as ideal, a
substantial literature exists that extolls the virtues of collective ownership, for reasons of both cultur-
al history and efficiency. See S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case ofAwas Tingni v.
Nicaragua: A New Step in the International Law ofIndigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 1, 12 (2002) (cultural tradition); see also Rick Welsh, Farm and Market Structure, Industrial
Regulation and Rural Community Welfare: Conceptual and Methodological Issues, 26 AGRIC. HUM.
VALUES 21, 22 (2009) (efficiency).
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this meaning, it may be easier to embrace the contingency of land's
meaning to the poor than some other aspects of land reform.242
Second, those who stand to lose their land through a land reform
initiative must be heard to prevent a sense of illegitimacy from permeat-
243
ing the program.24 Where context and contingency create divergent
meanings of land, those who stand to lose theirs must have an opportuni-
ty to engage with the program.
Third, citizens who neither gain nor lose land can be crucial to cre-
ating public support for the initiative. As taxpayers whose contributions
underwrite a land reform program, seeking their input from their own
meanings of property can foster the program's legitimacy. Because they
are not directly affected by the program, it is easy to pretend that their
interests do not matter. But if only those directly affected are engaged,
often the beneficiaries will support a program and those who lose land
will oppose it. This group of uninvolved citizens can shape the percep-
tions of a program, however, and therefore warrant engagement.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS EXCHANGED BETWEEN LAND REFORM AND U.S.
PROPERTY LAW
This Article has highlighted five key lessons from American proper-
ty law and theory and has argued that these lessons can help improve
land reform programs in the future. First, land reform is necessary be-
cause land is different than other kinds of property since it is rivalrous
and scarce, creating a need for state intervention to ensure a just distribu-
tion. Second, property is contextual and contingent, so its distribution is
not fixed but rather can be changed to reflect the evolving values of a
nation. Third, land reform is a site for deeply felt conflict because people
construct their identities in their property. Fourth, land reform can be
socially disruptive because land itself signifies social status, but reform
matters as a means of ensuring status for marginalized people. Fifth, land
reform offers conditions that can foster democracy because land access
allows people to become citizens and to have a stake in their society.
These lessons expose the theoretical roots of land reform, which can
then be leveraged to shape future land reform programs. Property law
reveals why land reform is a valuable public policy intervention. Proper-
ty law also offers interventions to make land reform more effective. Land
reform that is developed cognizant of these lessons will reflect an under-
standing of the importance of the program, the reasons landless people
242. Still, these voices cannot be pressured into conformity with policy makers' goals and
expectations. See Dyal-Chand, supra note 9, at 1687-88 (discussing processes for engaging subal-
tern voices in property discourse and ensuring that their potentially fragmentary perspectives are
incorporated).




are desperate for land, and the reasons that the majority of society is re-
luctant to alter extant land distributions.
At its heart, the goal of this Article is to help address global poverty
by offering support to land reform programs in their effort to reduce ine-
quality in land distribution. But to accomplish these ends, land reform
programs must address widespread opposition to this particular form of
redistribution. Grasping how land forms a web of social status relation-
ships and is entrenched within the established hierarchy of social class in
a nation can explain why even those who do not stand to lose their land
may still perceive land reform as a personal threat. Effective, widespread
land reform signals deep change within the values that animate a nation.
Awareness of this meaning is crucial for decision makers.
Looking forward, perhaps the most interesting question is what les-
sons American property law can learn from the experience of land re-
form. In particular, land reform offers one site for exploring the possibili-
ties of applying progressive property scholarship. Land reform's lessons
for property theory in the United States today include insights about both
the need for more equal property distributions to ensure a functioning
democracy and the possibility that current unequal property arrange-
ments make it impossible for some citizens to constitute themselves in
property. That the existing distribution of property is reified to confirm
the status of already privileged citizens may be an insight that the United
States can more fully absorb by looking to the Global South.
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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN LAW PRACTICE: A LENS
FOR ADDRESSING ALL LEGAL PROBLEMS
JOmN C. DERNBACHt
ABSTRACT
Sustainable development is a normative conceptual framework for
integrating economic development, social well-being, and environmental
protection in decision making. While it is widely recognized that lawyers
have an important role to play in advancing sustainable development, and
while a growing number of lawyers describe themselves as doing sustain-
ability work, it is less clear what they actually do. This is an impediment
not only to achieving sustainability but also to law students and lawyers
who want to direct or redirect their legal careers toward sustainability.
This Article, which is based on structured interviews with twenty-six
lawyers who practice or have practiced law related to sustainability, pro-
vides a first assessment of what this work entails. It describes what these
lawyers understand sustainability or sustainable development to mean,
both as defined and as applied. These lawyers tend to see sustainability as
a lens for productively addressing all legal problems and for helping cli-
ents make better decisions. The Article explains who their clients are and
what they do for them, and provides insight into the dynamics of attorney-
client conversations related to sustainability. It describes key personal and
professional qualities of these lawyers, such as how they became inter-
ested, and what they like and do not like about doing work related to sus-
tainability. Finally, by exploring what these lawyers see as obstacles to
sustainability and where the jobs are in sustainability-related law, it sheds
light on the future of sustainability in law practice.
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Sustainable development is becoming increasingly important to law-
yers.I A small but growing number of lawyers describe themselves as do-
ing work related to sustainability or sustainable development. Many law-
yers or law firms engaged in the private practice of law identify their prac-
tice area using sustainability language.2 Sustainable development is a
growing part of law practice in nearly every practice area and involves
many different skills.3 As the final report of American Bar Association
(ABA) Task Force on Sustainable Development concluded in 2015, "[t]he
transition to sustainability in both governmental and private sector deci-
1. See TASK FORCE ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., AM. BAR Ass'N, FINAL REPORT 2 (2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/environment-energyresources/re-
sources/finalsdtf abaannual_08-2015.authcheckdam.pdf. According to the Task Force: "Sustaina-
bility is affecting, or will affect, tax law, insurance, banking, finance, real estate development, envi-
ronmental and energy law, among other fields. It also involves a wide range of knowledge and skills,
including litigation, commercial transactions, client counseling, advocacy before governmental agen-
cies and other bodies, and legislative drafting." Id. at 2-3. For an overview of this activity, see John
C. Dembach et al., The Growing Importance ofSustainability to Lawyers and the ABA, ABA TRENDS,
July/Aug. 2013, at 21, 24.
2. See infra Part I.
3. TASK FORCE ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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sion making is inevitable, and will profoundly affect the legal profes-
sion."4 The transition toward sustainability in the legal profession is also
both reflected in and encouraged by a wide variety of activities involving
sustainability in law schools, including but not limited to courses, schol-
arship, facilities, and community service.5
Sustainable development is a normative, conceptual framework for
integrating development (which includes not only economic development
but also social development, and is based on peace and security) with en-
vironmental protection in decision making.6 "It is premised on principles
of basic equity-that each human being is entitled to a certain quality of
life and that the minimum conditions for human quality of life should be
maintained from generation to generation."7 Sustainability is intended to
address two significant and related problems: widespread environmental
degradation, including climate disruption; and large-scale extreme pov-
erty.8 The framework applies to a wide variety of decisions, including but
not limited to those involving climate change.9
Sustainable development is reflected, but only partially, in U.S. con-
servation, environmental, and land use laws.o In fact, the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) declared sustainable development
to be national policy even before the term "sustainable development" was
coined." NEPA declares a national policy "to create and maintain condi-
tions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans."12 Environmental, conservation, and land use
laws provide a baseline of environmental protection and employ many of
the tools and much of the vocabulary of sustainable development (e.g.,
integrated decision making, precaution, planning, public information, and
4. Id at 4.
5. John C. Dembach, The Essential and Growing Role ofLegal Education in Achieving Sus-
tainability, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 489, 504-17 (2011).
6. John C. Dernbach & Federico Cheever, Sustainable Development and Its Discontents, 4
TRANSNAT'L ENVTL. L. 247, 256-61 (2015); John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Frame-
work for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 32 (1998). Peace and security provide a
foundation for development; without peace and security, development is difficult or impossible. Id. at
19.
7. Dembach & Cheever, supra note 6, at 252.
8. See World Comm'n on Env't & Dev., Our Common Future, From One Earth to One World,
IM 3, 7-9, 11, 13-14, 20, 23-24, 26-28, 34, 39-44, U.N. Doe. A/42/427, annex (Mar. 20, 1987) [here-
inafter Our Common Future].
9. See John C. Dernbach, Achieving Sustainable Development. The Centrality and Multiple
Facets ofIntegrated Decisionmaking, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 247 (2003).
10. JOHN C. DERNBACH ET AL., ACTING AS IF TOMORROW MATTERS: ACCELERATING THE
TRANSITION TO SUSTAINABILITY 15 (2012).
11. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). The first
use of the term appears to be in 1980, when the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources (IUCN) published a conservation strategy for living resources that explicitly
linked conservation and development in the term sustainable development. INT'L UNION FOR
CONSERVATION OF NATURE & NAT. RES., WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY: LIVING RESOURCE
CONSERVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, at sec. 1, paras. 2, 10 (1980).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(a).
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public participation).3 But, these laws do not directly address the large
ecological footprint (energy, water, resources, and land) of the United
States.14 They do not directly address a great many laws historically used
to foster economic development-laws that have the effect of encourag-
ing, supporting, and even rewarding environmental degradation and un-
sustainable development.15 Nor do these laws fully address existing
threats, particularly climate change.16 Finally, environmental and conser-
vation laws do not directly or fully address the social dimensions of sus-
tainable development, which include but are not limited to poverty, food
security, public health, and human rights.17
Sustainable development has nonetheless influenced the develop-
ment and implementation of law in various ways and contexts, including
13. See, e.g., RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 4-10 (2d ed. 2006); see also
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, at xii-xvi (2004) (describing the de-
velopment of environmental law and policy and explaining the use of these principles and ideas in its
development).
14. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SYS., UNIV. OF MICH., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL FOOTPRINT (2016),
http://css.umich.edu/sites/default/files/U.S._Environmental_Footprint FactsheetCSSO8-
08_e2017.pdf (describing in detail U.S. consumption of resources and explaining that it would take
five earths to supply the resources needed for the entire world's population if it consumed resources
at the same level as the average American).
15. See, e.g., Justin Gillis, Flooding of Coast, Caused by Global Warming, Has Already Begun,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/science/flooding-of-coast-caused-
by-global-warming-has-already-begun.html ("The federal government spends billions of taxpayer
dollars in ways that add to the risks [of sea level rise], by subsidizing local governments and home-
owners who build in imperiled locations along the coast."); Michael Lewyn, How Government Regu-
lation Forces Americans into Their Cars: A Case Study, 16 WIDENER L.J. 839, 839 (2007) (providing
a case study of land use and zoning in Jacksonville, Florida); Dernbach, supra note 6, at 67-68 (sum-
marizing different types of legal obstacles). See also infra Sections V.D., VI.A., in which lawyers
describe various legal obstacles to sustainable development.
16. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1531, 1531 n.2 (2009) (explaining the strong case for U.S. action based only
on U.S. self-interest).
17. See G.A. Res. 70/1, ¶¶ 14-15, 17, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development (Oct. 21, 2015). Among the sustainable development goals contained in this agenda
are Goal I ("End poverty in all its forms everywhere"), Goal 2 ("End hunger, achieve food security
and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture"), Goal 3 ("Ensure healthy lives and pro-
mote well-being for all at all ages"), and Goal 4 ("Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education
and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all"). Id. at 14.
2017] SUSTAINABLE DE VELOPMENT IN LAW PRACTICE 127
brownfields redevelopment, smart growth,1 9 public access to infor-
20 2 22 2mation, recycling,2 1 biodiversity conservation, and green building.23 In-
deed, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has increasingly
integrated sustainability into the implementation of the laws it adminis-
24
ters. These changes are not limited to traditional environmental law. For
example, energy law is being transformed by a great many federal, state,
and local laws that foster greenhouse gas reductions; renewable energy;
energy efficiency and conservation in buildings, transportation, and indus-
try; and distributed energy.25 Many longstanding business reporting and
disclosure requirements, including those administered by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), are now being applied to greenhouse
gas emissions, working conditions, and the environmental and social im-
pacts of activities in a company's supply chain (because investors and the
public now deem these things material to the company's profitability).2 6
The investigation by state attorneys general and the SEC into whether
Exxon misled the public and investors about climate change raises signif-
icant economic, environmental, and social questions.27 To a growing de-
gree, the private sector employs many forms of private law or governance
18. See Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Development: From Individual Sites to Smart Growth, in
AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 57, 57 (John C. Dembach ed., 2009).
19. See Patricia Salkin, Land Use: Blending Smart Growth with Social Equity and Climate
Change Mitigation, in AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 18, at 349, 349-51.
20. See Carl Bruch et al., Public Access to Information, Participation, and Justice: Forward
and Backward Steps Toward an Informed and Engaged Citizenry, in AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE
AMERICA, supra note 18, at 459, 460.
21. See Marian Chertow, Municipal Solid Waste: Building Stronger Connections to Jobs and
the Economy, in AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 18, at 335, 344.
22. See A. Dan Tarlock & Andrew Zabel, Biodiversity Conservation: An Unrealized Aspira-
tion, in AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 18, at 269, 270.
23. See Stuart Kaplow, Can Green Building Law Save the Planet?, 3 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV.
131, 133-34 (2014).
24. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FISCAL YEAR 2014-2018 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN 4 (2014)
(identifying "Cleaning Up Communities and Advancing Sustainable Development" as one of EPA's
five goals and "Working Toward a Sustainable Future" as one of four cross-agency strategies); COMM.
ON INCORPORATING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUSTAINABILITY AND THE
U.S. EPA 1 (2011) (recommending that the EPA adopt a sustainability strategy and take other actions
to incorporate sustainability into its programs).
25. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW (Michael B. Gerrard & Jody Freeman eds.,
2d ed. 2014) (providing a comprehensive description of federal and state energy laws); see also Steven
Ferrey, Solving the Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle Surrounding State "Sustainable" En-
ergy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 122 (2014) (describing five different types of state energy
laws that are "the primary pillars of sustainable energy policy in the United States"-net metering,
renewable portfolio standards, renewable system benefit charges, carbon/greenhouse gas regulation,
and feed-in tariffs).
26. See Jeffrey A. Smith & Matthew Morreale, Disclosure Issues, in GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE AND U.S. LAW, supra note 25, at 453, 453-54; Nancy S. Cleveland et al., Sustainability
Reporting: The Lawyer's Response, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan. 2015, at 2-4 (explaining what corporate
clients can and should report publicly about their sustainability activities).
27. Paul Barrett & Matthew Philips, Can ExxonMobil Be FoundLiable for Misleading the Pub-
lic on Climate Change?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 7, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2016-09-07/will-exxonmobil-have-to-pay-for-misleading-the-public-on-cli-
mate-change; Bradley Olson & Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Probes Exxon Over Accounting for Climate
Change, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 20, 2016, 7:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-investigating-
exxon-on-valuing-of-assets-accounting-practices-1474393593.
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to foster sustainability, in lieu of public law, including certification, audit-
ing, labeling, and reporting programs, and tends to enforce them through
a variety of contractual and related arrangements.2 8
Three assessments of U.S. sustainability activity track the real but
limited progress that this country has made. The first, published in 2002,
concluded that there had been little progress, but that "[i]n virtually every
area of American life, a few people and organizations are exercising lead-
ership for sustainability."2 9 This assessment, based on the contributions of
more than three dozen experts, represents a wide range of perspectives and
disciplines from universities, nongovernmental organizations, and the pri-
vate sector. The second, published in 2009 and based on the work of es-
sentially the same set of contributors, found that the United States "has
made significant progress since 2002 in at least six areas: local govern-
ance, brownfields redevelopment, business and industry, higher education,
kindergarten through 12th-grade education, and religious organizations."3
The third and most recent review, published in 2012, and based on the
contributions of fifty-one people from a variety of fields 3 1 found that while
the United States had made "some progress" over the past two decades,
"the sustainability destination is now farther away than it was" two dec-
ades ago, largely because of climate change.32 The report emphasized that
the basic challenge is "accelerating the transition to sustainability."3 3 The
review continued:
Yet there is nonetheless an emerging sustainability movement in the
United States. It includes dedicated practitioners in a wide variety of
fields who have thought deeply about what sustainability means in dif-
ferent contexts and why it is attractive, and whose day-to-day job is to
make it happen, fix what doesn't work, and improve results. They are
engaged in a wide variety of fields, including agriculture, energy, man-
ufacturing, technology, community planning and development, busi-
ness and industry, government, education, building construction, engi-
neering, and law.34
Within the field of law, attorneys are making their offices run more
sustainably, most obviously by reducing their environmental footprint, and
also by using sustainable development concepts and ideas to help clients
28. See Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. Environmental
Law: Closer Than You May Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10162, 10162 (2001); Michael P. Vandenbergh,
Private Environmental Governance, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 129, 134 (2013).
29. John C. Dernbach, Synthesis, in STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 1, 2 (John C. Dern-
bach ed., 2002).
30. John C. Dernbach et al., Progress Toward Sustainability: A Report Card, in AGENDA FOR
A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 18, at 16.
31. DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 10, at iii-iv.
32. See id at 9.
33. Id. at i.
34. Id. at 9-10.
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solve or address specific issues.35 More than three hundred law organiza-
tions participate in the ABA-EPA Law Office Climate Challenge, under
which they do one or more of the following: reduce paper use, use renew-
able energy, or become more energy efficient. Bar associations in Cali-
fornia,3 7 Pennsylvania,8 and MassachusettS39 adopted and encourage the
use of similar guidelines. Lawyers for a Sustainable Future-a nonprofit
organization with roots in Oregon that is now becoming a national network
of lawyers-developed a set of tools to improve the sustainability activi-
ties within a law office.4 0 The Law Firm Sustainability Network-a non-
profit organization made up of law firms as well as legal departments of
major corporations4 1-launched the American Legal Industry Sustainabil-
ity Standard (ALISS), a "self-assessment tool . . . designed to help law
firms measure the success of their environmental sustainability programs
and discover opportunities to improve their sustainability programs."42
The ABA Section on Environment, Energy, and Resources developed the
Sustainability Framework for Law Organizations, which many leading
firms endorsed and are implementing.43 The framework provides a struc-
ture for progressively greater law firm commitment to economic, social,
and environmental responsibility.44
Still, the existing literature on sustainable development does not tell
us exactly what these lawyers actually do when they are assisting clients.
While there are many stories in magazines, newspapers, and online about
35. Lawyers can also play other roles. These include: 1) working through bar associations and
other organizations to encourage sustainable development in other sectors of the economy, and 2)
working to change legal frameworks to encourage or enable sustainable development. Although these
latter two roles may help clients address specific problems, they are not the primary focus of this
article.
36. ABA-EPA Law Office Climate Challenge, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/envi-
ronmentenergy resources/publicservice/aba epa lawofficeclimate challenge.html (last visited
Sept. 19, 2017) (explaining and describing the program); Partners and Leaders, ABA (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment energy resources/publicservice/aba epalaw of-
ficeclimate challenge/partners_leaders.html (listing more than 300 firms and other law organizations
as "partners and leaders").
37. See STATE BAR OF CAL., VOLUNTARY STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA LAWYERS ECO-PLEDGE
AND VOLUNTARY LAW OFFICE SUSTAINABILITY POLICY 1 (2008).
38. See Pennsylvania Lawyers United for Sustainability (PLUS) Program, PA. BAR Ass'N,
http://www.pabar.org/public/sections/envco/plusprogram.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
39. See Green Guidelines, MASS. BAR ASS'N, http://www.massbar.org/for-attomeys/law-
yers-eco-challenge/green-guidelines (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
40. Welcome, LAWYERS FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, http://www.sustainablelawyers.org (last
visited Sept. 19, 2017) (providing links to tools on sustainability policy, sustainable practices, building
management, tenant improvements, events and retreats, and green lunches).
41. Who We Are, LAW FIRM SUSTAINABILITY NETWORK, http://www.lfsnet-
work.org/about/who-we-are/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2017).
42. About ALISS, LAW FIRM SUSTAINABILITY NETWORK, http://www.lfsnetwork.org/al-
iss/overview (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
43. See Law Firm Sustainability Framework, ABA (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/groups/environment energyresources/publicservice/modellaw.html.
44. See id For an excellent summary of what some of the leading law firms are doing on sus-
tainability under this framework see William R. (Bill) Blackburn, The Sustainability Strategy, ENVTL.
F., Mar./Apr. 2011, at 34, 34.
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lawyers who do work related to sustainability,45 there has thus far been no
effort to systematically assess what they do. That is the basic question this
Article attempts to answer. The answer matters because accelerating the
transition to sustainability requires more and better sustainability choices,
including legal choices, the use of law on behalf of sustainability, and vi-
sionary and supportive governance.46 Accelerating the transition also re-
quires the participation of all significant parts of society, including law-
yers.47 If the lawyers doing work related to sustainability are actually help-
ing accelerate the transition, then it would be of real value to know what
they do, how they do it, and why. Because these lawyers are a distinct
minority of all practicing lawyers, and because there is growing under-
standing of the importance of sustainable development, it is highly likely
that a great many other lawyers and lawyers-to-be would consider doing
this kind of work if they knew how to do it or better understood what this
work entails, both personally and professionally. At the same time, many
lawyers who are doing sustainability work on behalf of their clients may
recognize some of their own experiences and approaches in the stories of
other lawyers who are working on sustainability. They may thus appreci-
ate that more lawyers are doing this kind of work than they may have be-
lieved.
As a growing number of law schools provide sustainability training
for law students,48 moreover, it behooves them to know what lawyers en-
gaged in sustainability work actually do. Greater understanding of what
sustainable development in law practice means will improve the ability of
students to do this work in the real world. It is also consistent with growing
recognition of the need to provide students with the skills and knowledge
they will need in the practice of law, including the importance of training
lawyers to practice law in new and challenging contexts.49 In a 2013 reso-
45. See, e.g., Richard J. Sobelsohn, Law Firms Adopt Sustainability to Stay Sustainable, N.Y.
L.J. (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id= 1202745732909; Stuart Kaplow, Law-
yers'Opinion Matters in Green Building Transactions, GREEN BUILDING L. UPDATE (July 12, 2015),
http://www.greenbuildinglawupdate.com/2015/07/articles/leed/lawyers-opinion-mat-
ters-in-green-building-transactions; Christine Bader, Corporate Lawyers Can Be More Than Naysay-
ers-in-Chief ATLANTIC (May 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/05/corpo-
rate-lawyers-social-responsibility/392474; Bob Langert, Are Lawyers the Enemy ofSustainability Ex-
ecs?, GREEN Biz (Apr. 6, 2015, 1:45 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/are-lawyers-enemy-sus-
tainability-execs; Thomas Bourne, Why Lawyers Have a Part to Play in Sustainable Development,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2012, 9:53 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/sus-
tainable-business-development-law.
46. DERN BACH ET AL., supra note 10, at 229.
47. See id. at 285.
48. Dembach, supra note 5, at 495-96.
49. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 202 (2007) ("The calling of legal educators is a high one: to prepare future pro-
fessionals with enough understanding, skill, and judgment to support the vast and complicated system
of the law needed to sustain the United States as a free society worthy of its citizen's loyalty; that is,
to uphold the vital values of freedom with equity and extend these values into situations as yet un-
known but continuous with the best aspirations of our past.").
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lution, the ABA House of Delegates-the policy-making body for the or-
ganization-urged "all governments, lawyers, and ABA entities to act in
ways that accelerate progress toward sustainability," and called on "law
schools, legal education providers, and others concerned with professional
development to foster sustainability in their facilities and operations and
to help promote a better understanding of the principles of sustainable de-
velopment in relevant fields of law."50
The answer also matters for a more basic reason: although it has been
more than twenty years since the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development first endorsed sustainable development, and
adopted an international strategy and set of principles to realize it,
51 the
term is still subject to misunderstanding and skepticism.
52 This is true in
spite of-and also perhaps because of-the adoption by the United Na-
tions General Assembly in 2015 of Sustainable Development Goals for the
world.53 Understanding what practicing lawyers say and do about sustain-
able development in the context of specific client situations sheds light on
what the term means in practice, and the extent to which it actually adds
value.
This Article examines systematically what lawyers in the sustainabil-
ity arena actually do. It is based on qualitative research, a form of social-
science research that provides insight into how particular people under-
stand what they do.54
Part I of this Article describes the methodology used in the research.
Essentially, the research involved structured telephone interviews based
on thirteen questions. The twenty-six lawyers interviewed have all spent a
considerable part of their professional ives doing work related to sustain-
ability. I chose the interviewees from a much larger pool of lawyers who
do this work. The rest of this Article-Parts II through VI-describes and
analyzes their answers, explanations, and stories.
Part II explains the interviewees' understanding of sustainable devel-
opment and sustainability (unless the context indicates otherwise, the two
terms are used interchangeably in this Article). Most understood one or
more widely applied shorthand definitions of sustainable development.
Many focused on its long-term time horizon or the importance of reducing
overall negative impacts. At the same time, they tended to be more inter-
ested in how those concepts and principles apply to their clients. They also
50. AM. BAR Ass'N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 105, 13 (2013).
51. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, In 1.1, 1.3, 1.6 (Apr. 23,
1993), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf; U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principles 3-4,
8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
52. Dembach & Cheever, supra note 6, at 272.
53. See G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 17; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Progress towards the
Sustainable Development Goals, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/2016/75 (June 3, 2016) (one-year report on progress
toward these goals).
54. See infra Part I.
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tended to emphasize the environmental aspects of sustainability more than
the social aspects.
Part III provides an overview of what these lawyers do. The primary
subject matter of the work performed by these lawyers varies considerably
and includes environmental law, climate change and clean energy law,
corporate law, land use and development law, sustainable infrastructure
finance, and corporate social responsibility and human rights. Their clients
are also diverse, including developers, banks, multinational corporations,
start-up businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and federal, state,
and local governments. These lawyers also perform a wide variety of types
of legal work-not only counseling clients but also performing transac-
tional work, litigating, advocating, and drafting.
Part IV explores the dynamics of the attorney-client conversation on
sustainability. Many said that their clients come to them for sustainability-
related legal work precisely because they specialize in the kind of legal
work that is being sought. This Part then addresses the converse ques-
tion-the circumstances under which attorneys raise sustainability issues
with their clients. Some believe they have a fiduciary duty to explain risks
and opportunities related to sustainability when a sustainability approach
would benefit the client. Some lawyers raise sustainability-related ques-
tions and suggestions based on what the client seems to care about, and to
the extent that the client is interested. Others have developed standard
questions, programs, and tools related to sustainability, and share those
with clients when relevant. Part IV also examines what attorneys say in
those conversations. The essential starting point, of course, is whatever
law may be applicable to the client's situation; sustainable development is
sometimes required or encouraged by law, but often it is not. Beyond that,
many said, the next requirement is understanding what the particular client
needs and wants, rather than preaching to the client about sustainability.
Other attorneys described the importance of framing a conversation with
clients in terms of risks and opportunities related to sustainable develop-
ment, even when clients are not focused on those risks and opportunities.
Part V explores the personal and professional qualities of the attor-
neys who are doing this work. It begins by examining how these lawyers
became interested in sustainability. A few were always interested or de-
veloped an interest prior to law school. Work in environmental law led to
an interest in sustainability for some. Exposure to sustainable development
concepts through specific workplace or community experiences was the
catalyst for others. Still others concluded, based on these experiences, that
they were not doing the work they wanted to do. They moved their careers
in the direction of sustainable development because it offered a more sat-
isfying framework to solve problems. This Part then examines the most
essential personal and professional characteristics for sustainability work.
While many of the most essential skills of a lawyer practicing law relating
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to sustainability are the same as those of a good lawyer, these lawyers em-
phasized six characteristics that overlap with, and extend beyond, basic
legal skills. These characteristics are expertise in, and even passion for,
sustainability; ability to listen well; open-mindedness, curiosity, and crea-
tivity; good problem-solving skills; patience; and an ability to think big
picture and long term.
Part V then discusses what these lawyers find most enjoyable about
their work and what they find least enjoyable or most frustrating. In ex-
plaining what they most enjoy, they identified the achievement of specific
and positive results, success in explaining a sustainability project or pro-
posal to a skeptical or uninformed client, the intellectual challenge of the
work, and their ability to work with likeable and talented people. In ex-
plaining what they find least enjoyable, they identified clients that did not
understand or support sustainability; public opposition based on ideology,
misrepresentation, or ignorance; the slow pace of progress, particularly on
energy and climate change; and legal barriers to sustainability.
Part VI addresses two questions about the future of sustainability in
law practice. The first is about the greatest obstacles to sustainability.
These lawyers identified public opinion as a major obstacle, including fail-
ure to understand both the underlying problems and what sustainable de-
velopment means. The other major obstacle they identified is legal-not
only laws that obstruct progress but also the absence of an effective legal
structure that guides and supports sustainable development. Part VI also
explores present and future employment in law related to sustainability.
Many said that legal jobs related to sustainability are everywhere, but they
are not ordinarily labeled as such. Rather, these lawyers said, sustainability
is or should be a critical part of all legal work. Many identified specific
workplaces or subjects that are particularly amenable to sustainability-re-
lated legal work. These lawyers provided a common piece of advice for
those who want to enter the field: find some particular subject matter or
legal field that is of interest, master both that subject matter or field as well
as its sustainability aspects, and create a sustainability job based on that.
At the same time, some lawyers said there is little or no sustainability-
related work.
The sustainability-related legal work described in this Article varies
considerably in its scope and ambitiousness. Some of it is about more sus-
tainable ways to comply with existing laws; some of it may simply be a
new label for the kind of work they have always done; and some of it is
about helping companies, businesses, and governments achieve more am-
bitious environmental, social, and economic goals. But for all of these law-
yers, sustainable development provides a perspective and framework for
making better decisions. Understanding how this perspective and frame-
work is applied in the real-world practice of law provides insight into the




This Article is based on interviews with twenty-six practicing law-
yers who identify themselves as having spent a substantial part of their
career doing sustainability-related work or who bring a sustainability per-
spective to their legal work. This specific form of research is known as
qualitative research. Unlike quantitative research, which "uses numbers
as data," qualitative research "uses words as data."56 More specifically,
"qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning peo-
ple have constructed; that is, how people make sense of their world and
the experiences they have in the world."57
As explained in the Introduction, the purpose of this research is to
understand what practicing lawyers engaged in legal work related to sus-
tainable development actually do. Although no one appears to have sur-
veyed the number of lawyers in the United States who do work related to
sustainability, a conservative estimate is that several thousand lawyers de-
vote at least part of their practice to such work. A basic source of infor-
mation on this topic is the Martindale-Hubbell online directory of lawyers
and their listed areas of practice.58 In that directory, 615 U.S. lawyers iden-
tified sustainability as a practice area, and an additional 144 lawyers iden-
tified sustainable development.59 The number becomes considerably
larger if lawyers that identify climate change and renewable energy as part
of their practice are included: an additional 749 attorneys include climate
change as part of their practice area.60 Another 826 attorneys-who do not
identify climate change, sustainable development, or sustainability as a
practice area-identify renewable energy as a practice area.61 The number
gets even larger when various aspects of social sustainability are included.
For instance, 590 attorneys identify human rights as a practice area. 62 That
totals 2,624 attorneys. Because the directory is focused on lawyers in pri-
vate practice,63 it is less likely to include government attorneys, academic
55. See generally SHARAN B. MERRIAM & ELIZABETH J. TISDELL, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: A
GUIDE TO DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 5-6 (4th ed. 2016) (explaining how to conduct qualitative
research and write findings).
56. Id. at 6 (citing VICTORIA CLARKE & VIRGINIA BRAUN, SUCCESSFUL QUALITATIVE
RESEARCH: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR BEGINNERS 3-4 (2013) (emphasis removed).
57. Id. at 15 (emphasis removed).
58. See Attorney and Law Firm Search, MARTINDALE.COM, https://www.martindale.com/find-
attorneys (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
Membership in the ABA's Climate Change, Sustainable Development and Ecosystems Committee
provides another data point. The Committee has 837 members. E-mail from Dana Jonusaitis, Dir.,
American Bar Association Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources, to John C. Dembach
(Sept. 7, 2016, 13:50 EST) (on file with author). Of course, many lawyers likely do this work who are
not members of this Committee.
59. E-mail from Brent Johnson, Co-Director & Reference/State Documents Librarian, Law Li-
brary, Widener Univ. Commonwealth Law Sch., to John C. Dernbach (Mar. 3, 2017, 10:37 EST) (on
file with author).
60. Id.
61. Id. Smaller numbers of attorneys identify other aspects of sustainable development, such as
energy efficiency (30) and mixed-use development (77) as practice areas. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Attorney and Law Firm Search, supra note 58.
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attorneys, and attorneys employed by nongovernmental organizations,
businesses, and corporations. Thus, the figures provided here probably un-
derstate the number of attorneys doing legal work related to sustainable
development.
The lawyers interviewed for this Article represent a subset of this
larger group. All of them spent a substantial part of their career doing sus-
tainability-related work for their clients (although not all of them were
working for legal clients at the time of the interview). I interviewed
twenty-six lawyers who are mostly in private practice with law firms.
Some in-house counsel were included because they also work for a client.
And some work for local, state, or federal government. Others now work
for nongovernmental organizations, consulting firms, or law schools, alt-
hough all of these have substantial, previous governmental or private ex-
perience in practicing law. The great majority have more than twenty years
of experience-often in different jobs or with different law firms-over
the course of their career, although some have been practicing only a few
years. All of those interviewed self-identify as doing legal work related to
sustainability.
The results of the interviews are not presented as a representative
sample of the 1.3 million licensed lawyers in the United States.M They
nonetheless constitute a reasonable sample of the total population of law-
yers who do work related to sustainable development. I selected twelve of
the lawyers interviewed because I know or previously worked with them
on sustainable development and climate change issues through the ABA
or in other professional contexts. I selected ten from suggestions by col-
leagues or other interviewees and four based on their law firm's website
descriptions.65
I conducted the research through telephone interviews based on thir-
teen questions that are set out in the Appendix. Telephone interviews both
encouraged participation and permitted follow-up questions when appro-
priate. To encourage those participating to speak frankly about their views
and experiences, the identities of those interviewed are confidential.6 6
Most interviews lasted about an hour, with a few considerably longer. I
conducted the interviews between June 2014 and August 2016.67 After-
wards, I sent my interview notes to those interviewed and asked for any
changes or corrections they thought appropriate; many returned my notes
64. AM. BAR ASS'N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS: YEAR 2016 (2016).
65. Several interviews were subsequently excluded from this list, or were terminated quickly,
because the attorney is not actually doing work related to sustainability. Interviews with three lawyers
who have never practiced law, or who are long retired, were also excluded. At least five unstructured
interviews with other lawyers were also excluded.
66. This Article sometimes makes details vague to protect the identity of these attorneys. For
the same reason, it does not use gender-based pronouns to refer to the interviewees (e.g, he/she,
his/hers).
67. Interviews were not recorded; I typed while people spoke.
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with revisions. I used an online database program to consolidate all of the
interviews into a single master report hat organized the answers by ques-
tion, which facilitated comparison and analysis.68 Except as otherwise
stated, any quantitative indications (e.g., some, many) apply only to the
lawyers who were interviewed.
II. How THESE LAWYERS UNDERSTAND SUSTAINABILITY
How do the lawyers who do sustainability work understand the mean-
ing of sustainable development and sustainability? How does that under-
standing square with the way that other sustainability practitioners use the
term?69 These lawyers have a good understanding of sustainable develop-
ment and sustainability. Most were conversant with several widely applied
shorthand definitions of the term, but tended to be more interested in how
sustainable development concepts and principles are applied in practice.
Many emphasized key aspects of sustainable development-its long-term
time horizon, the importance of reducing overall negative impacts and cre-
ating positive impacts, and limits on resource use. In the context of the
specific work they do, they reflected a sophisticated understanding of not
only the term, but also what it means for their clients. That said, they
tended as a group to be more focused on the environmental dimension of
sustainability than on the social dimension.
A brief history of the term sustainable development may be helpful
here.70 Although many use the term sustainability as a substitute for sus-
tainable development, the original term is sustainable development,7 1 and
the original term provides several keys to understanding. Development is
understood internationally in terms of both economic and social develop-
ment, and requires a foundation of peace and security.72 In other words,
development is not economic development alone; it is more helpfully un-
derstood in terms of human development.73 The objectives of development
are "human freedom, opportunity, and quality of life." 7 4 This model of im-
proving the human condition, which dates at least back to the end of World
War II, has nothing to say about the environment. In consequence, de-
velopment tends to work by furthering economic and social progress to
some degree; however, it does so at the expense of the environment, as
68. Sustainability in Law Practice Interviews with 26 Attorneys (2016) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Master Report of Interviews] (unpublished report generated by author for this Article).
The data base program was developed by Qualitrics.
69. See id. Most of the interview material in this Part is taken from answers to Question 4
("What is your understanding of sustainability?"). See infra Appendix.
70. This paragraph summarizes a history that is explained and documented in much greater
detail in Dembach & Cheever, supra note 6, at 252-61.
71. See supra note 69.
72. Dernbach, supra note 6, at 9-14.
73. Id. at 14.
74. Dernbach & Cheever, supra note 6, at 257.
75. See Dembach, supra note 6, at 14-21.
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well as living and future people who depend on that environment.7 6 Dis-
cussions that treat development and environment as inherently opposi-
tional forces-e.g., development versus environment, or having to choose
between development and environment-are based on that weakness or
limitation in the development model. Human population and economic de-
velopment grew rapidly after World War II.77 Widespread environmental
degradation as well as deep and growing poverty-both understood as
caused or not addressed by development-grew to the extent that they
threatened to overcome, undermine, or weaken the progress of develop-
ment.78
As a result, nations of the world concluded that the development
model needed to be modified. Instead of development, countries would
strive for sustainable development. They first committed to that change at
the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit)
in 199279 and most recently reaffirmed that commitment with the U.N.
General Assembly's 2015 adoption of Sustainable Development Goals
(SDG).80 As the official name of the Earth Summit indicates ("Conference
on Environment and Development"), sustainable development is a way of
reconciling development and environment. In fact, the key action principle
for sustainable development is integrated decision making.8 ' Essentially,
decisions involving the environment or development must take the envi-
ronment and development into consideration and further both in more or
less equivalent ways.82 Sustainable development also requires a long-term
perspective; intergenerational equity is a key principle to be applied in in-
tegrated decision making.8 3 The goals of sustainable development are es-
sentially the same as those of development-human freedom, opportunity,
and quality of life-except that sustainable development focuses on those
goals for both present and future generations.84
Conceptually, this has two consequences. First, because conventional
development can damage not only the environment but also humans de-
pending on that environment, conventional development can be criticized
as unjust, particularly when the adverse effects are visible or obvious.8
76. See id. at 14-21; see also Dernbach & Cheever, supra note 6, at 257-58.
77. See Our Common Future supra note 8, at ch. 5, ¶f 3-4.
78. See id. at ch. 1, 11.
79. See Rio Declaration, supra note 51, at annex I.
80. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 17, 11.
81. See Dembach, supra note 9, at 249 (analyzing and comparing various provisions of the Rio
Declaration); see also MARIE-CLAIRE, CORDONIER SEGGER & ASHFAQ KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PROSPECTS 103 (2005) (defining "sustainable de-
velopment law" as a "set of legal instruments and provisions where environment, social and economic
considerations are integrated to varying degrees in different circumstances").
82. Dernbach, supra note 9, at 260-61.
83. See Claire Molinari, Principle 3: From a Right to Development to Intergenerational Equity,
in THE RIo DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMMENTARY 139 (Jorge E.
Vifluales ed., 2015).




Because sustainable development does not do these things, it follows that
sustainable development is a way of fostering environmental and social
justice86 as well as protecting human rights.8 7 Second, the social dimension
of sustainability is often considered of equal importance to the environ-
mental dimension. Because damage to the environment also tends to hurt
humans who depend on the environment, the social dimension also rein-
forces the point that sustainable development is a way to foster social jus-
tice and human rights.
Many writers have used sustainable development and sustainability
synonymously.8 9 But it is important to recognize that sustainability is often
used to describe a future state of affairs-a sustainable society-where
basic environmental challenges, social challenges, and threats no longer
exist, and where human well-being is fostered for present and future gen-
erations.90 Because no individual, corporation, or country can move from
unsustainable development to sustainable development overnight, the
transition to a sustainable society is often described in terms of a journey
rather than a destination.9 1 A great many of the steps in this journey move
from less-sustainable activities and projects to more-sustainable activities
92and projects. A critical question is whether any given project or activity
should be directed at reducing adverse environmental and social impacts,
or instead directed at creating positive environmental and social impacts
(along with its presumed positive economic impacts).93 Because of grow-
ing population and economic development, and the substantial cumulative
effects of numerous negative impacts, achieving sustainable development
would seem to require that we move toward the latter.
Several shorthand formulas used to explain sustainable development
are more widely understood than the history. The iconic and most often
cited definition of sustainable development is contained in the 1987 report
86. See John C. Dembach, Patricia E. Salkin & Donald A. Brown, Sustainability as a Means of
Improving Environmental Justice, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 1, 12-13 (2012).
87. CLIMATE CHANGE JUST. & HUM. RTS. TASK FORCE, INT'L BAR ASS'N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF CLIMATE DISRUPTION 9 (2014) (recommending that "states con-
sider recognizing freestanding human rights to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment")
(emphasis removed).
88. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. BLACKBURN, THE SUSTAINABILITY HANDBOOK: THE COMPLETE
MANAGEMENT GUIDE TO ACHIEVING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
(2d ed. 2015) (explaining wide variety of best corporate sustainability practices giving equal attention
to environmental and social sustainability).
89. See Dembach & Cheever, supra note 6, at 248 n.2.
90. See PAMELA MATSON ET AL., PURSUING SUSTAINABILITY: A GUIDE TO THE SCIENCE AND
PRACTICE 20-21 (2016).
91. See, e.g., BD. ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OUR COMMON
JOURNEY: A TRANSITION TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 3 (1999).
92. See DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 10, at 6-7.
93. Dernbach & Cheever, supra note 6, at 271.
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of the World Commission on Environment and Development,
94 Our Com-
mon Future. (The Commission is also called the Brundtland Commission,
after then-Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, its chair.)
According to the report, sustainable development is "development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs."95 Others describe sustainable devel-
opment in terms of three overlapping circles or pillars-social, economic,
and environmental.9 6 The idea is that progress on sustainable development
occurs when a particular action furthers all three.9 7 In the corporate setting,
the use of independent metrics to measure each of the three is described in
terms of a "triple bottom line," where the social, economic, and environ-
mental goals are often referred to as "people, profit, and planet."
98
It is also important to recognize what sustainable development is not.
Sustainable development is not a discrete subject or area of law like energy
law, insurance law, or even environmental law; it is a way of viewing,
analyzing, and making decisions about a wide range of human activities.
In addition, sustainable development is not another term for environmen-
talism or environmental protection, and it is not about protecting the envi-
ronment for its own sake. Rather, it is about advancing human well-being
in the context of a quality environment.99 Nor is sustainable development
simply about "balancing" the environmental, economic, and social aspects
of a proposal; the ultimate test of a decision, as the Brundtland Commis-
sion recognized, is whether it ensures the ability of future generations to
meet their needs.00 Conversely, sustainable development is not another
term for sustained economic growth.'0 Economic development is part of
sustainable development, but sustainable development is a framework for
integrated decision making, not simply realizing profits or growth.102 Fi-
nally, sustainable development is not another way of describing environ-
mental regulation; it is based on recognition of the need for a great variety
94. Kaj Blrlund, Sustainable Development - Concept and Action, UNITED NATIONS ECON.
COMMISSION FOR EUR., http://www.unece.org/oes/nutshell/2004-2005/focus-sustainable develop-
ment.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
95. Our Common Future, supra note 8, at ch. 2, 1 1.
96. See, e.g., DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 10, at 3.
97. See id
98. See Carolina Miranda, The Breakthrough Thinking of the Triple Bottom Line, SUNPOWER
(Dec. 17, 2016), http://businessfeed.sunpower.com/business-feed/written-breakthrough-thinking-of-
the-triple-bottom-line; see also ANDREW W. SAVITZ & KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE:
How TODAY'S BEST-RUN COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING EcoNOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SUCCESS-AND How YOU CAN TOO 156 (2d ed. 2013) (explaining how businesses can design and
implement sustainability strategies).
99. Rio Declaration, supra note 51, Principle 1 ("Human beings are at the centre of concerns
for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with na-
ture.").
100. See supra Part II.




of legal tools, including those fostering sustainable economic develop-
ment.1 03
Many of the lawyers interviewed for this Article explained their un-
derstanding of sustainable development in terms of the Brundtland Com-
mission definition, three circles, three pillars, or the triple bottom line. One
lawyer captured the definition this way: "The simultaneous pursuit of eco-
nomic prosperity, environmental stewardship, and social responsibil-
ity."l 04 Another thought that the Sustainable Development Goals are a
helpful touch point, partly because of their breadth: "It is having a society,
including a business model, where you are advancing environmental, so-
cial, and economic goals."10 As the following discussion indicates, how-
ever, their operational understanding tended to focus more on environ-
ment, energy, and land use rather than on the social dimensions of sustain-
ability. In that respect, they mirror the reality that environmental sustaina-
bility is now more accepted among practicing attorneys than social sus-
tainability.'06
Some were uncomfortable with the question about the meaning of
sustainable development, or highlighted the limits of one-sentence defini-
tions. They tended to see these definitions as incomplete. As one attorney
explained:
I understand sustainability to have stewardship at its core-using re-
sources today in a manner so that resources are still available for the
future. But it is more complicated than that simple definition. There
are a lot of nuances involved when you start peeling the onion, with
issues including energy efficiency, water usage, sustainable harvesting
practices for replenishable resources, and carbon footprints. 107
Another highlighted the limits of the Brundtland Commission defini-
tion by saying that it "isn't wrong."'08 A different attorney explained: "To
be more technical, we have to have an energy budget that comes from the
sun and other finite resources and cycles on planet. If we don't succeed in
arranging civilization within those processes, we're toast."109 A third at-
103. See John C. Dernbach, Creating the Law ofEnvironmentally Sustainable Economic Devel-
opment, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 614, 614-15, 630 (2011) (setting out a typology of laws that protect
the environment, create jobs, and foster economic development).
104. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 17.
105. Id. at 16 (for this attorney, the social dimensions of sustainability are particularly im-
portant).
106. E-mail from William Blackburn, William Blackburn Consulting, Ltd., to John C. Dembach
(Oct. 3, 2016, 23:03 EDT) (on file with author).
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torney made a similar point from a different perspective: "Unless sustain-
ability is translated into tangible parameters, it is hard for businesses to get
their minds around it."' 10
The decision making and advocacy aspect of the sustainable devel-
opment frame was much more important to one attorney than a short def-
inition:
I'm not confident that I would put as much meaning into a short defi-
nition. The big question is how much we reduce the environmental
cost of what we are doing. Part of that requires more holistic thinking
than the limits in my air permit. The sustainability frame is good for
options, alternatives, and advocacy. It is particularly good for advo-
111
cacy with government agencies and environmental groups.
Some lawyers emphasized the long-term aspect of sustainable devel-
opment. One emphasized the need to harmonize environmental protection
and economic development so "we can survive for more than the next sev-
eral decades."'1 12 Another stated the importance for long-term sustainabil-
ity of being "fossil fuel free."1 13 And another said, "If I were going to re-
define sustainability, it would be creating a system that has the compo-
nents and structure to maintain itself long term and the flexibility to adjust
to changing circumstances."'1 4
Others emphasized the importance of reducing impacts and creating
healthier places:
Sustainable development law focuses on shaping land use and eco-
nomic development to have a lighter impact on the environment, in-
cluding but not limited to climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Sustainable development uses less material; avoids consuming wet-
lands or eroding watersheds; consumes less energy; emits less carbon
dioxide; lessens storm water runoff; reduces ground and surface water
pollution; and creates healthier places for living, working, and recre-
ating. 115
Several attorneys emphasized the importance of limiting resource
use. Of sustainable development, one said:
It boils down to conserving and best utilizing available resources-not
using more water than you need to, turning food waste into energy,
using an LED (light-emitting diode) bulb instead of an incandescent
110. Id.
111. Id. at 16-17.






bulb,11161 smart ways of doing what we do every day that don't affect
what you do every day. We are not asking people to sit in the dark. A
lot of people I talk to make the assumption I am a left-wing environ-
mentalist. I am a registered Republican, and a capitalist at heart. We
don't have to live in teepees or destroy the environment to enjoy what
the American lifestyle has to offer. This is being smart about how you
117use your resources.
Many other attorneys were more comfortable defining and applying
sustainable development concepts and principles from the perspective of
their own work, rather than abstract definitions. One of these lawyers ex-
plained it in terms of its application to the corporate world: "How can we
help corporations live into an aspirational goal of creating and encouraging
human flourishing?"'" A lawyer who works with agricultural and indus-
trial chemicals explained:
I use it very generally as a surrogate for doing things from inception to
end of life in a more environmental and human health-sensitive way,
including smarter selection of feedstocks and improved manufacturing
processes. It can be summarized as smarter, cheaper, and greener. It is
about designing technologies so that they are fundamentally more
green through their whole life cycle, and the product is sustainable
from a business, environmental, and health and safety perspective.119
An attorney working as in-house counsel for a large city with an ex-
press sustainability commitment explained the term in ways that are some-
what similar to the explanation given above but also quite different in de-
tail:
The city sees it as addressing a wide variety of issues at the same time,
including receiving waters and carbon footprint. A lot of this is revers-
ing the trend toward greater and greater degradation. We have reversed
flow and now we are trying to push back and make the city a greener
space, a better storm-water-managed space, and reduce energy con-
sumption or switch to other forms of energy. This is not being driven
by economic development or job creation; these things are a benefit,
but not a driver.120
Another attorney, who works with businesses and investors, ex-
plained that the transition to sustainability is being driven by economics:
I see that sustainability is critical to long term-success in business and
investment. If you manage your environmental, social, and governance
issues and impacts well, you will be more successful in business and
116. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Lighting Choices to Save You Money, ENERGY.GOv, https://en-
ergy.gov/energysaver/lighting-choices-save-you-money (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (LEDs use 20%
to 25% of the energy of regular incandescent light bulbs and last up to twenty-five times longer).
117. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 17.
118. Id. at 16.
119. Id. at 17.
120. Id at 18.
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investment. There is a lot of data showing that sustainable companies
outperform sustainability laggards in their industry significantly, and
that investment strategies that incorporate environmental, social, and
governance metrics tend to do better. Sustainability investment beats
unsustainable investment. There are megatrends in terms of social li-
cense and laws pushing sustainability (at least in the European Union),
as well as transparency and disclosure, and competitive pressure for
companies to be sustainable. Sustainability is starting to win, but it is
121
not because of law. It is more about economics.
An attorney who works with many businesses that seek to do sustain-
ability work explained these developments in terms of the economic at-
tractiveness of the triple bottom line. This attorney used Walmart's Sus-
tainability 360 program, a comprehensive program for integrating sustain-
ability into all aspects of its business,122 as an example:
A lot of companies these days understand an opportunity to be aspira-
tional, and they are finding business models to do that. This provides
opportunity to scale sustainability, because the programs they imple-
ment are providing profitability. Walmart did not start its Sustainabil-
ity 360 program to make money. There was leadership at the top that
was interested, and then they found all kinds of waste in their supply
chain. So, they developed a questionnaire for suppliers that makes it
clear to suppliers that you better use less plastic, ship less air in your
packages, and have lower greenhouse gas emissions. Once you do that
123
for Walmart, you will do that for other companies.
Finally, several attorneys explained that their view of sustainable de-
velopment is evolving with experience. Several years ago, one attorney
came to the conclusion that simply reducing adverse impacts was not an
adequate way to approach sustainable development. "My clients and I con-
cluded that anything other than a regenerative approach is inappropriate.
Simply sustaining is not enough."l2 4 At "Building to Save the Earth," a
green building event at Ball State University, this attorney remembered
someone asking if "building to save the earth was like logging to save the
owls."1 25 This attorney often wonders "if sustainable development has the
same challenge." 26
III. WHAT SUSTAINABILITY LAWYERS Do
The question of what sustainability lawyers actually do in their work
with clients addresses two distinct aspects of their work: One is subject
121. Id. at 49.
122. Sustainability, WALMART, http://www.corporatereport.com/walmart/2014/grr/environ-
mentsustainability 360.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
123. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 48.





matter and clients, which are most helpfully discussed together. The other
is the type of legal work they do. 12 7
A. Subject Matter and Clients
The primary subject matter of the work performed by these lawyers
varies considerably and includes environmental law, climate change and
clean energy law, corporate law, land use and development law, sustaina-
ble infrastructure finance, corporate social responsibility, and human
rights. The lawyers interviewed also differ in their explicit identification
with sustainability: some identify themselves not as sustainability lawyers
but rather with the primary subject matter of their work. Their clients are
also diverse. What follows illustrates the wide range of activities and cli-
ents they described in the practice of law related to sustainability.
Many are environmental lawyers who see issues through a sustaina-
bility lens. Taken together, these lawyers have a broad range of clients,
including municipal governments, financial institutions, investors, utili-
ties, industry, state and local governments, property owners, and nongov-
ernmental organizations.128 Many of their corporate clients have interna-
tional operations. As one explained: "I do not have a sustainability prac-
tice. I have a sustainability prism that informs, or through which I view,
my cases, and how my cases should be managed, litigated, or pursued."1 2 9
Another said: "I don't sell myself as a sustainability lawyer. I am an envi-
ronmental lawyer who believes in sustainability, and I counsel clients who
are willing to go toward that path. I believe this is an option I need to make
the client aware of." 1 3 0
Within environmental law, the subject matter of their work is also
varied. Many do the full range of environmental law work, including air
and water pollution, wetlands, endangered species, waste, among other
subjects. Others are more specialized. Some focus on the environmental
aspects of transactions and on brownfields redevelopment. One works in
the industrial chemical and agro-chemical area, representing chemical pro-
ducers, formulators, and end-users of these chemicals.' Another, work-
ing for a regulatory agency, is helping to "identify strategies that can be
used to strengthen compliance other than the traditional inspection and en-
forcement route." These strategies, the attorney said, include "greater
transparency about facility compliance and performance."l32
127. Most of the material in this Part is taken from answers to Question I ("How long have you
been in this position?"), Question 2 ("What kind of work do you do, and who are clients?"), and
Question 8 ("Apart from client counseling, what type of other legal work do you do on sustainabil-
ity?") in the Appendix. See infra Appendix.
128. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 9-10.
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 5.
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Other lawyers work primarily or exclusively on climate change, re-
newable energy, and energy efficiency. These lawyers work in a wide va-
riety of private practice, governmental, business, academic, and nongov-
ernmental settings. One with a long career in a variety of governmental
and consulting positions has focused on "developing and teaching an
awareness of energy policy in a carbon-constrained world." 133 Continuing
the theme of identification with the primary subject matter of their work,
rather than sustainable development, another explained: "I'm a climate
change lawyer; I don't call myself a sustainability lawyer."1 3 4
Other lawyers are anchored in corporate law, but again, their work
involves a sustainability lens. One lawyer describes his clients as "renew-
able energy, energy storage, energy efficiency companies, and companies
with strong sustainability platforms, products, or services."1 35 "Other cli-
ents are social enterprises and impact investors." 36 Several do work for
start-up companies that want to focus on sustainability, including green
technology companies.
Some work primarily in land use and development law. The clients
for that work can be buyers or sellers, as well as tenants or lenders. The
types of projects on which they work indicate their orientation toward sus-
tainability. One attorney worked for many years as in-house counsel for a
publicly traded real estate investment trust that began to pursue energy
efficiency, air and water quality, materials consumption, and other issues
in its existing real estate holdings and in new construction.13
7 Another in
private practice has done considerable work in "New Urbanism"- an ap-
proach to planning and designing communities that emphasizes walkabil-
ity, mixed uses, a diversity of people, traditional neighborhood structure,
and quality of life. 13 8 Until somewhat recently, a considerable part of this
attorney's work involved "large-scale, New Urban projects that identified
as pursuing sustainable development-energy and water efficiency, plant-
ing programs, and a wide range of environmentally themed projects."139
More recently, this attorney has being doing work for smaller-scale devel-
opments, including urban infill projects.140 In addition to developers, this
133. Id. at 8.
134. Id. at 5.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 16.
138. Principles of New Urbanism, NEW URBANISM, http://www.newurbanism.org/newurban-
ism/principles.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2017); see also DANIEL K. SLONE & DORIS S. GOLDSTEIN,
A LEGAL GUIDE TO URBAN AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FOR PLANNERS, DEVELOPERS, AND
ARCHITECTS (2008) (explaining how to apply New Urbanist principles).
139. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 7.
140. "Infill development is the process of developing vacant or under-used parcels within exist-
ing urban areas that are already largely developed." Infill Development: Completing the Community
Fabric, MUN. RES. & SERVS. CTR., http://mrsc.org/Home/Explore-Topics/Planning/Development-
Types-and-Land-Uses/Infill-Development-Completing-the-Community-Fabric.aspx (last modified
Dec. 22, 2016). Infill development is preferable to greenfield development-development in areas that
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attorney's client base includes green building and resilient design organi-
zations, eco-districts,141 and companies that are trying to bring "energy ef-
ficiency, green energy, and social equity projects into the marketplace."1 42
Another lawyer combines traditional real estate development with so-
lar energy and sustainable development. This lawyer's law firm has a
longstanding client base comprised of "property owners, whether that is
hotels, shopping centers, office buildings, apartments, or industrial build-
ings." 43 The lawyer said: "We were able to take that client base and put
solar panels on their roofs and encourage them to enter the green sustain-
ability movement and say, this is good for your business."4 4 Another
drafts best-practice-in-sustainability ordinances for the consideration of
municipalities (e.g., transit-oriented development,145 green building, and
water conservation), and trains local officials on these issues.146
Some of the lawyers focus on sustainable infrastructure finance. One
does legal work for "development and financing of projects that are mostly
for sustainable infrastructure of one kind or another, including renewable
energy, energy efficiency, micro grids,[147) water, and wastewater."l48
Others are engaged in various aspects of social sustainability, includ-
ing corporate social responsibility and human rights. One attorney ex-
plained: "We don't do a lot of environmentally oriented work. Our practice
is primarily in the human rights space." 4 9 The attorney further said that
the client base for this kind of work tends to involve multinational corpo-
rations operating in developing countries where they or their suppliers in-
cur risks of violating human rights. This client base has expanded over
time:
When I started, our client base was primarily, but not exclusively, oil,
gas, and mining companies, who were worried about tort cases and
were worried about litigation based on acts of security guards at their
facilities. Our practice has grown. We have seen diversification of the
are currently used for agriculture, forestry, or similar purposes-because it tends to save energy and
resources and helps build and restore existing communities. See id.
141. An ecodistrict is a "neighborhood that combines livability, green infrastructure and com-
munity decision-making." PORTLAND SUSTAINABILITY INST., THE EcoDISTRICTS INITIATIVE:
GETTING TO NEXT GENERATION NEIGHBORHOODS (2010), https://www.mayorsinnovation.org/im-
ages/uploads/pdfl22ecodistricts_10-22-10.pdf.
142. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 7.
143. Id. at 10.
144. Id. at 8.
145. Transit-oriented development is walkable and mixed-use development around transit nodes
such as rail or mass transit stations. See TRANSP. RESEARCH BD. OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,
TRANSIT-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPERIENCES, CHALLENGES, AND
PROSPECTS S-1 (2004).
146. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 5.
147. "A microgrid is a local energy grid with control capability, which means it can disconnect
from the traditional grid and operate autonomously." U.S. Dep't of Energy, How Microgrids Work,
ENERGY.GOV (June 17, 2014), https://www.energy.gov/articles/how-microgrids-work.
148. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 7.
149. Id. at 9.
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client base, including now big banks, apparel companies, private eq-
uity firms that are looking at potential investments, and technology
-150
companies.
Finally, some lawyers who once practiced law related to sustainabil-
ity have now moved into consulting or nonlegal positions on sustainable
development. One explained, "I am helping a green building organization
with some of its programs. I am doing sustainability consulting for corpo-
rations and not-for-profit clients. I also work with professionals who are
traditional environmental lawyers, and also many, many lawyers who have
transitioned from law to sustainability consulting."5 1 Another runs a busi-
ness that sells "software to create, implement, and manage strategic sus-
tainability plans."'52 Still another works for a nongovernmental organiza-
tion that is devoted to addressing climate change and sustainable develop-
ment.15
3
B. Types ofLegal Work
These lawyers perform a wide variety of legal work. This includes
counseling, transactional work, litigation, advocacy, and drafting. Perhaps
the most common type of legal work in this context is client counseling.
Much of it, of course, is traditional client counseling about compliance
with statutes, regulations, and other legal requirements, including assis-
tance in complying with those requirements.15 4 These regulatory require-
ments include California's cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas
emissions.15 5 Much of this work is counseling related to litigation or po-
tential litigation, including enforcement actions.15 6 For some lawyers,
counseling does not just occur in an office setting; at least one speaks to
corporate boards of directors about SEC reporting and disclosure require-
ments related to sustainability.15 7
In addition to traditional counseling about compliance with applica-
ble laws, lawyers that do sustainability-related work also counsel clients
on how to move toward or achieve sustainability. Lawyers are required to
address legal issues related to sustainability, of course.'5 8 But the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct also provide: "In rendering advice,
a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
150. Id.
151. Id. at 5.
152. Id. at 7.
153. Seeid.at7.
154. See id. at 5-9.
155. Id. at 6.
156. See id. at 5-9.
157. Id. at 30.
158. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2014). ("A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
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client's situation."1 59 As a result, lawyers may raise sustainability issues
even when they are not grounded in specific legal rules. At the same time,
a lawyer is generally required to abide by a client's decision about how to
proceed in any matter. 160 As described in greater detail below, many law-
yers specifically counsel their clients on a variety of sustainability mat-
ters-explaining the desirability of particular options based on reduced
cost, greater efficiency, improved reputation, enhanced likelihood of com-
pliance, and other factors. As will also be seen, clients may or may not
follow that advice.
In addition to counseling, sustainability-related work in law practice
also involves a great deal of transactional work. Brownfields redevelop-
ment is a good example of this type of work. As one lawyer explained:
With transactional work, I assist with negotiating the contractual pro-
visions that allocate environmental liability and risk between the par-
ties to a deal. The clients for that work can be buyers or sellers as well
as tenants or lenders. With brownfields redevelopment work, I assist
in putting together teams to execute remediation strategies for a site.
In that role, I serve as an environmental oncologist, excising the envi-
ronmental cancer impacting a site so redevelopment can occur. The
clients for that work are typically developers. In both roles, the ulti-
mate goal is to make sure properties are positioned so they are market-
able, lendable, and developable.161
Much transactional work involves sustainability projects other than
brownfields redevelopment, and the legal aspects of these projects can be
complex. An attorney who works for a large city described the legal effort
required to design, construct, and operate a bio-gas recovery project at a
sewage treatment plant.162 "How do you do a complex project in a city
framework, dealing with millions of rules on procurement and other is-
sues? It is like running an obstacle course to do a project." 63 For financial
reasons, a bank owns the facility-which was largely designed by the city
and built by a city-selected contractor-and the bank has leased the facility
back to the city.1 64 This attorney said, "In order to do a project like that,
you have to be a transactional attorney; you can't just be a regulatory law-
yer. This is about writing, negotiating, managing, and selling contracts."'
65
Other transactional work for these lawyers involves solar energy, in-
cluding negotiation of power purchase agreements, site agreements, con-
struction agreements, finance agreements, and tax-related counseling.166
159. Id. r. 2.1.
160. Id. r. 1.2(a).
161. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 7-8.
162. See id. at 8.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 8-9.
166. See id. at 32.
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For green leasing, the transactional issues tend to be about setting up a
structure whereby the owner can get certification under the U.S. Green
Building Council's Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(LEED) program.16 7 In addition, the leasing arrangements need to be struc-
tured "to make sure tenants do what needs to be done to keep LEED cer-
tification." 8 For other lawyers, transactional work in an environmental
setting involves mergers and acquisitions; private equity deals; and "all
sorts of offerings on the public market, including both issuers and under-
writers, and strategic litigation counseling." 69 One attorney negotiates
contracts between smaller start-up companies with a sustainability orien-
tation "and larger companies who are interested in them and their line of
business. An example is a set of agreements between a ride sharing com-
pany and major airlines that have an interest in that capability."
Many of these lawyers are active in litigation. While litigation is a
traditional part of legal practice, some lawyers are using it to advance sus-
tainability.17 1 A lawyer who does a lot of transactional work related to so-
lar energy explained that sometimes "deals go bad." 72 This lawyer said in
one case, the solar collectors installed as canopies over a parking lot col-
lapsed, resulting in litigation.173 Another lawyer who does enforcement
defense work sees this work in a sustainability context:
The first step in achieving a resolution with government enforcement
is correcting the violation. But compliance programs have sustainabil-
ity components. Almost always, the system does not work because of
sustainability concerns, such as inappropriate consumption of re-
sources or discharge of pollutants. When you fix a system, you fix a
process. A lot of sustainability is avoidance-pollution prevention,
material substitution, upfront design issues. On a wastewater treatment
plan with compliance issues, for example, we are counseling the client
to re-evaluate the design to incorporate energy sustainability (energy
recovery to provide heat and reduce energy usage costs), which can
avoid multiple problems, such as noncompliance, permitting, and op-
erational costs.174
Advocacy on behalf of sustainability is another important skill for
these lawyers. They comment on proposed regulations and proposed gov-
167. Geoffrey M. White et al., Green Building Rating Systems and Leases, in THE LAW OF
GREEN BUILDINGS 15, 22 (J. Cullen Howe, Michael B. Gerrard & Frederick R. Rucci eds., 2010).
168. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 32.
169. Id. at 5.
170. Id.
171. On the other hand, one lawyer who does not do much litigation expressed skepticism about
the value of litigation to foster sustainability, saying that litigation does not address the required be-
havioral changes. Id. at 32.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 33-34.
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ernment agency actions; testify before congressional and legislative com-
mittees, lobby legislators, and government agencies; and present argu-
ments before city councils, zoning hearing boards, and corporate boards.17 1
One lawyer who left law practice for a period said: "I came back to being
involved with the law because I saw that there is an enormous amount of
work to do on advocacy."1 7 6 This includes "helping people understand
how things are connected, and how some things that seem okay are really
bad in the long run." 77 Two lawyers identified advocacy involving brown-
fields remediation as demonstrating how sustainability arguments can
broaden the range of issues being considered as well as potential solutions.
One explained: "In negotiations with environmental agencies about con-
taminated site remediation, I raised sustainability arguments about impacts
of the remedy on other environmental media and on the community."
Another worked on a remediation case where the property owner, a refin-
ery, was in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee asked this lawyer to see if
it was possible to turn the site into a solar farm. The overall objective, this
lawyer explained, was to "actually make money for the estate."1 79
Drafting is another frequently employed type of work for lawyers en-
gaged in sustainability. Drafting is a powerful tool for advancing sustain-
ability because it involves writing the public and private laws that govern
the behavior of individuals, businesses, and organizations in specific con-
texts.180 Drafting on behalf of sustainability includes drafting proposed
statutes, regulations, and municipal ordinances representing best practices
in sustainability; drafting private governance agreements for land devel-
opment (including homeowner associations, commercial associations,
codes, covenants, and restrictions); and editing various disclosure docu-
ments.'8' One lawyer helped revise a smarter municipal regulation involv-
ing water use and conservation.182 In my city, we were charging less on a
per-unit basis the more water that was used; we turned it upside down,
charging more for greater per-unit water use."'83 Another lawyer who
works in human rights and corporate social responsibility explained the
range of her firm's drafting activities: "We do everything from policy and
standard development o developing contract language and vendor guide-
lines."18 4
Drafting is more than scrivener's work and it is not merely legal; it
requires an attorney to conceptualize how particular actions on behalf of
sustainability will actually work in the real world, and to make sure that
175. See id. at 30-32.




180. See Dernbach & Cheever, supra note 6, at 265-66.
181. See Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 30-32.
182. Id. at 31.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 9.
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the legal rules as drafted will work in practice. This in turn requires a solid
understanding of the subject matter, which frequently involves matters that
are not strictly legal in nature. A lawyer who works on sustainable land
use and community planning explained:
A lot of document drafting is a formality, and a lot of lawyers throw
that in for free. They don't realize how much damage can be done with
a bad document, because it is so hard to change; once you start subdi-
viding a property, it is possible to destroy a lot of value of property
with bad documents. A lot of bad legal writing masks fuzzy thinking.
A lot of my work involves looking at a master plan and visualizing it
at each stage of development, and figuring out what needs to be done
at each stage.185
Other types of legal work or skills were also identified. One lawyer's
firm serves as a facilitator for multi-stakeholder dialogues-a form of col-
laborative decision making that engages all actors that have a stake in the
decision.'86 This lawyer facilitates dialogues on a variety of issues, includ-
ing voluntary principles for security and human rights.'87 Other lawyers
need to have the ability to collaborate effectively with scientists on specific
projects because their firm includes scientists as well as lawyers.'88 Many
mentioned pro bono, community service, or public education work on sus-
tainability.' 89
Finally, one lawyer emphasized that many people trained as lawyers
can successfully use their skills in nonlegal settings:
I see so many lawyers who are in the consulting space. The skills that
lawyers bring to the table are an ability to communicate orally and in
writing better than almost every other professional sector, and to criti-
cally analyze a situation. I see that over and over again. Some lawyers
also have the ability to convene all players, get them to the table to
achieve a particular result, and deliver it. 190
IV. DYNAMICS OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONVERSATIONS ON
SUSTAINABILITY
Understanding the dynamics of conversations that lawyers have with
their clients on sustainability involves at least three issues: the circum-
stances under which clients raise sustainability issues with their attorneys,
185. Id. at 30.
186. Id. at 32.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 31.
189. See, e.g., id at 23, 30, 45.
190. Id. at 30.
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the circumstances under which attorneys raise sustainability issues with
their clients, and what attorneys say in those conversations.'91
A. When Clients Raise Sustainability Issues with Attorneys
A great many lawyers interviewed for this Article said that their cli-
ents come to them for sustainability-related legal work precisely because
these lawyers, their firms, or both, specialize in the kind of legal work
sought. Others said clients come to them with questions about business
risks and opportunities, questions that they can answer using a sustainabil-
ity lens. By contrast, very few said their clients rarely or never come to
them for legal help on sustainability-related matters. One who does a lot
of work for real estate developers said that clients "are driven by the bot-
tom line, including lender concerns about project costs." 92 This attorney
added that clients "don't want to spend on green if they are not going to
realize a financial benefit."'93
Many attorneys said that their clients choose them because of their
overall work on legal aspects of sustainable development. One who works
on a broad range of sustainability-related issues said, "Clients come to us
for this."' 9 4 Another, whose client base includes "social enterprise clients,"
says it is easier to attract other similar clients "because they are seeking an
integral approach to their business; sustainability is part of their DNA.
How the business treats the planet and people is just as important to them
as profits."' 9 5 A lawyer with a broad range of clients explained it this way:
Clients consult me with respect to environmental health and safety pro-
grams. In that context, they consider sustainability. I help and advise
them on methods and approaches to be more sustainable. Development
clients approach us on wanting to include sustainable design into their
projects, for a variety of reasons. We help them with that. Energy-user
clients approach us about concerns relating to greenhouse gas issues,
and we counsel them on that.196
Similarly, attorneys who work in-house for a governmental or non-
governmental client committed to sustainable development described a
high level of interaction with people at all levels of the organization who
are interested in advancing sustainability. Sometimes the client's move-
ment toward sustainability occurs with a noticeable shift. In 2011, the Na-
tional Research Council (NRC) published a report called Sustainability
191. The interview material in this Part is primarily drawn from answers to Question 5 ("Under
what circumstances do your clients raise sustainability issues with you?"), Question 6 ("Under what
circumstances do you raise sustainability issues with your clients?"), and Question 7 ("When you talk
to clients about sustainability, what do you say?") in the Appendix. See infra Appendix.
192. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 22.
193. Id. at 22.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 19.
196. Id. at 20.
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and the U.S. EPA, which recommended that EPA adopt a comprehensive
approach for integrating sustainability into its decision-making processes
and strategic objectives.1 97 A lawyer working for the EPA before and after
the NRC issued the report said that, before the report, the EPA did not ask
for much legal help on sustainability matters. However, the "report really
changed that. We got asked to turn that into a path forward for EPA, and
that has now been incorporated into EPA governance structure because it
is in EPA's strategic plan." 98
Many clients come to attorneys because of their expertise in specific
sustainability-related issues. A lawyer with considerable national experi-
ence in financing renewable energy and energy efficiency projects and
programs said: "I'm lucky enough to have a number of clients for whom
these issues are very important. This is a self-selecting process."
199 The
clients of another lawyer-who has deep expertise in community planning
and mixed-use development- "are starting from the position that mixed-
use developments are inherently more sustainable."
200
Some clients in the chemical industry are especially interested in ob-
taining legal help to assist them in moving toward sustainability. A lawyer
who works for many of these companies explained:
Sustainability is embedded in their entire construct. For some clients,
sustainability is a motivator for creation of new technologies. If we are
deploying a particular technology for a particular use, we are looking
to diminish its effects in particular applications, both because it is the
right thing to do and because it won't otherwise pass EPA screening.
Sustainability is always there. It is very rarely the case when we ask if
they are concerned about tort liability, worker health and safety, or the
like.
20 1
Clients come to other lawyers because of their expertise with public
disclosure. A lawyer who does this work explained: "At the end of the day,
what a publicly traded company has done and what it is going to do must
be disclosed in SEC-regulated documents, and through other media and
reports, and to the public on websites."202 This lawyer's role is to help
publicly traded companies "sharpen their disclosure" to the SEC, as well
as in other disclosure documents; to make sure the disclosure documents
are accurate and consistent; and to help companies tell their story.
203 The
lawyer continued:
197. COMM. ON INCORPORATING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra
note 24, at 49-50.
198. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 19.
199. Id. at 21.
200. Id. at 20.
201. Id. at 21.
202. Id. at 19.
203. Id.
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There is also a strategic corporate direction part to this for con-
sumer-facing clients, which means most companies. A global food
company may have concerns about what is in its food, which may have
a social, environmental, or other component. A company may want to
change the perception of its profile to be more sustainable in order to
recover market share.204
In some cases, lawyers are sought when a law or regulation makes it
hard or impossible to do what the client believes is sustainable. Many said
laws that foster or encourage unsustainable development are a recurring
and substantial problem. One attorney who works with industrial clients
explained her challenge:
Typically, the issues we are battling now involve EPA's regulation of
recyclable materials and secondary hazardous materials. Because of
the sham recycling history and EPA's policy on this,[205] clients that
are exercising attempts to be sustainable by adopting really efficient
processes-such as closed loop recycling and putting chemical inter-
mediates back into manufacturing-are leading EPA to say these are
sham recycling. If EPA is trying to hammer people who are doing
green chemistry and more sustainable practices, then where are we go-
ing to go?206
A land use and development attorney told a similar story:
Many times, because of the reputation I've developed over many years
of this kind of work, clients come to me wanting to do a sustainable
project but there are all kinds of legal or regulatory obstacles. When
my projects include components of New Urbanism-things we want
to do to increase pedestrianism-they typically violate local laws, and
we have to get these laws changed. We want to harvest water but we
are not allowed to harvest water. We want to introduce a new non-toxic
wood product, but the treated lumber industry blocks it.2 0 7
In other cases, clients come to lawyers on sustainability issues be-
cause of sustainability-related concerns about risk, opportunity, or both.
Clients come to one attorney because they "perceive a sustainability risk,
whatever that may be. It might be the manufacture of a hazardous chemical
or something in the workplace."208 Clients also come to this attorney be-
cause sustainability provides a "business opportunity to operate more ef-
ficiently (use less energy, less water) or obtain a reputational ad-
vantage."209 "Companies are getting smarter about the upside to this, as
204. Id.
205. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Rethinking Recycling, 38 ENVTL. L. 1053, 1072-73 (2008) (explaining
the history and policy of sham recycling in the EPA).
206. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 21.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 19.
209. Id.
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opposed to merely managing risk." 2 10 In a somewhat similar vein, clients
come to another lawyer under two circumstances (both of which involve
opportunity): In one, the client is told that it needs to be green (sustaina-
ble), and it does not know how.211 In the other, a client wants to build a
project in a more sustainable manner, and needs legal help getting it
done.212
B. When Attorneys Raise Sustainability Issues with Clients
In raising sustainability-related issues with clients, there is a spec-
trum of approaches. On one end of the spectrum are lawyers who do not
need to raise sustainability issues because their clients already embrace
sustainable development. One lawyer said: "If sustainability is not con-
sistent with their core philosophy, we tend not to work with them."213 On
the other end of the spectrum are lawyers reluctant to raise sustainability
issues at all if their clients do not raise them. These lawyers assume that if
clients have not already raised them, then these clients are not interested.
A lawyer who specializes in brownfields cleanup said: "When I raise these
issues, they say 'we are hiring you as our environmental oncologist, and
we only want your input on the remedial aspects of the project."'
214
The center of the spectrum is much larger than either end. At the cen-
ter are lawyers who believe they have a fiduciary duty to explain risks and
opportunities related to sustainability, when these would benefit the client.
Some lawyers raise sustainability-related questions and suggestions based
on what the client cares about and the level of the client's interest in sus-
tainability. Some lawyers have standard questions, programs, and tools re-
lated to sustainability that they routinely share with clients.
Many lawyers frame the decision to raise sustainability issues with
clients in terms of their professional responsibility. As a matter of profes-
sional responsibility, Stephen Gillers wrote that lawyers have a fiduciary
duty toward the client that is based on "trust and confidence."215 This duty
requires the lawyer to act with "solicitude for, candor toward, and tenacity
on behalf of the client within the scope of the work the lawyer has been
hired (or appointed) to do."216 While the fiduciary status of lawyers does
not add to their other duties to clients (including competence and dili-
gence), "it is instead meant to drive home the point that we expect lawyers
to observe their obligations fully and without reservation."2 17
210. Id.
211. Id. at 22.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 25.
214. Id.
215. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE ESSENTIALS 18 (2009).
216. Id. (emphasis omitted).
217. Id. at 76.
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Thus, when sustainability-related issues provide opportunities to ben-
efit clients or raise risks of which the client may be unaware, some of these
lawyers believe they need to raise those issues. As one explained: "All of
us as fiduciaries are honor-bound to maximize opportunities for our cli-
ents. You have to educate your client on anything that would enhance your
client's opportunity for success-to get what the client wants with as few
commercial hurdles and legal obstacles as possible."2 18 A straightforward
way this works, another explained, occurs when "they have not yet per-
ceived a risk that we have seen in the history of other companies in the
same sector, or they don't have programs that their competitors do. This is
also true for business opportunities."2 19
Lawyers often raise sustainability questions with their clients when,
and to the extent that, the lawyer believes their clients are interested. A
lawyer who does considerable corporate work explained:
There are two kinds of lawyers: One believes in sustainability, sees all
these risks related to it, and encourages clients to understand and mit-
igate or manage the risks. When a lawyer does that, management re-
sponds by asking what they should do or by blowing it off as "BS" and
deciding they will deal with it when someone raises it. The other kind
of lawyer says, "the client will tell me when they have a risk they want
help with." 220
To be the first kind of lawyer-the one that believes in sustainabil-
ity-the lawyer must have a good understanding of the client's goals and
orientation. One said, "The issue here is: Where is my client on the sus-
tainability journey?"22' Another explained how understanding the issues
the client is sensitive to-reputational risk, litigation risk, or social respon-
sibility-affects how that lawyer will approach explaining sustainabil-
ity-related issues to that client.22 2 An energy lawyer simply points out to
clients that "there are other ways and places they can go that serve them at
other levels. It is just part of conversation, not where I am preaching."223
Often, these lawyers are in the position of explaining sustainabil-
ity-related options that are either cost-saving or revenue-producing. Ac-
cording to a longtime environmental lawyer, the economic bottom line is
a powerful driver for providing sustainability-related legal advice:
I raise it when there are opportunities for tax credits and other eco-
nomic benefits, when it can assist them in marketing or preserving
their market. You can't really raise issues just because it is a good thing
218. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 25.
219. Id. at 23.
220. Id. at 24.
221. Id. at 24. Another put it more bluntly: "This is for people I know; I don't do this for every-
body." Id. at 23.
222. Id. at 25.
223. Id. at 24.
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to do; you have to raise it because it is of economic benefit to share-
holders.224
Sometimes these lawyers advocate for what they believe is a more
sustainable remediation (at a contaminated site) that would also be less
expensive to the client.2 25 A clean energy finance lawyer provided a simi-
lar explanation:
Lots of times you can help them along at margins. Energy efficiency
saves money. If you do electricity storage with a solar system, you
improve operation of the grid and get paid for doing so. Lots of times
the sustainable thing to do is also the right thing to do from a
money-saving point of view.226
Sometimes, one lawyer explained, clients do not mention sustainabil-
ity but "sustainability issues are embedded or implicit in their request for
legal advice."22 7 This lawyer used these questions as examples: "What is
the cheapest way to clean up this Superfund site? How do I get this en-
forcement case over with? What are the risks of this strategy?"228 Other
lawyers "counsel clients on how they incorporate sustainable measures
into their projects if they don't raise it with us." 229 Another encourages
clients to include sustainability as part of their project or product if it "is
going to need public or regulatory support."230 A lawyer who works on
hazardous waste issues raises sustainability "whenever we are looking at
a waste stream. I ask: 'Why are you generating this? Do you want to have
to deal with these rules?"
2 31
A land use and development attorney said at other times clients come
to lawyers when something the clients want has simply "gone wrong or is
not happening."23 2 This lawyer explained:
They may not identify the issue as a sustainable development issue,
but it is clear to us that it is. Why do people have so little disposable
income in downtown? Part of the answer is that they are spending too
much money on transportation and not enough on housing. So, we
work on transit-oriented development.233
224. Id. at 23.
225. See id. at 24.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 20.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 24.
230. Id. at 25.
231. Id.




A lawyer who does extensive work on corporate public disclosures
described another context where the client does not raise sustainability is-
sues, but where legal advice related to sustainability is needed:
Today, reporting material sustainability issues is gaining prominence.
Clients ask: "What is legally required and what are the legal ramifica-
tions of reporting based on what stakeholders are asking?" The law-
yer's job is to ask: "Do you understand that there are issues under the
umbrella of sustainability that present risks?" For example, there are
climate change risk factors for all of a business's investments. If the
company is in the insurance business, how are they taking account of
risks of increased disease, migration, and other public health ef-
fects?234
A lawyer who works with many multinational corporations does not
broadly raise sustainability-related issues with clients, but rather sees the
sustainability framework as akin to medicine, "looking at the patient ho-
listically." 2 3 5
When a client comes to me with a problem that opens a portal to sus-
tainability analysis, I will look at it through that portal. Then we don't
have twelve discussions about the same symptom-for example,
worker dust-inhalation-claims at different facilities over time. That
may be indicative that the company is using materials that are not sus-
tainable or sourced sustainably, and alternatives may exist that will
eliminate the entire issue.236
Sometimes this legal advice is directed at those within an organiza-
tion who can use it to advocate a particular outcome to more senior man-
agement. One environmental lawyer in private practice gives sustainabil-
ity-related legal advice when "I am trying to give broader strategic advice
about what approach would likely produce the best long-term outcome for
the company or institution."237 The lawyer explained:
A bunch of in-house environmental counsel and environmental health
and safety managers also care about the environment, and you can
work with internal champions. You can give them advice they can
share with their business people. There is often an opportunity to ap-
peal to the broader interests of environmental counsel or chief sustain-
ability officers who do care about it, and who think sustainability is in
the interests of the company.238
When the opportunity to raise sustainability issues with clients arises,
many lawyers have "menus" of issues, tools, and options to share with
234. Id at 24.
235. Id. at 23.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 24.
238. Id.
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them. Options include various tax incentives, rebates, and grant pro-
grams.239 Tools often include specific methods or areas of expertise that
lawyers have developed to address particular problems. One lawyer pre-
sents "social entrepreneur clients" with a "menu of sustainability choices,"
including rules of corporate citizenship, writing into the company's by-
laws how the company treats people and the planet, and getting needed
sustainability certifications.240 A real estate development lawyer who has
developed expertise in solar energy and other aspects of sustainable real
estate development said that "[i]f I start the conversation, it generally
needs to be an economic conversation."2 4' This lawyer has a standard ap-
proach:
The client may buy an industrial building with a big roof. I say you
can put solar panels on the roof, and you can make money. That starts
the conversation, and the client gets an eight percent return on its in-
vestment. Then the client comes back and says: "What else is in your
bag of tricks?" And then I talk about LEDs. And that is how you make
242
converts. This is how you get their attention.
Many of these lawyers acknowledged that clients do not always ac-
243
cept these suggestions.
Another indication of client responsiveness is seen in answers to a
follow-up question that many of the lawyers were asked about the amount
of time they spend doing sustainability-related work. While most an-
swered that all, or nearly all, of their time is devoted to sustainability-re-
lated work, others answered that only half of their time is devoted, and two
answered that below twenty-five percent of their time is devoted to sus-
tainability-related work.244
C. What Attorneys Say in Sustainability Conversations
This Part of the Article has thus far discussed the circumstances under
which clients raise sustainability issues with lawyers, and the circum-
stances under which lawyers raise these issues with clients. Either way the
conversation begins, what do lawyers say? Of course, if there are relevant
public or private laws, those laws would need to be discussed. As previ-
ously explained, some aspects of sustainable development are required or
supported by law, but many are not.245 Beyond that, many attorneys be-
lieve that a critical starting point is understanding what the particular client
needs and wants. Other attorneys described the importance of framing a
239. Id. at 8, 23-25, 33.
240. Id. at 23.
241. Id. at 25.
242. Id
243. Id. at 38-40.
244. Id. at 50.
245. See supra Introduction.
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conversation with clients in terms of risks and opportunities. These two
points of emphasis, of course, are not mutually exclusive.
Many explained that what they say during these conversations de-
pends upon the client. One attorney, who does a lot of work with sustain-
ability-oriented start-up companies, underscored this point by focusing on
the listening aspect of an attorney-client conversation: "I mostly just ask
questions: How important is sustainability to you? Do you simply want to
comply with the law or do you want to be aspirational?"246 In addition to
a client's commitment to sustainability, other values or issues are often
part of this conversation. One lawyer's experience is that the conversation
tends to depend on the client's mix of "conservation values (water, energy,
natural resources) and economic values (things that can be done more cost
effectively or are more affordable)."2 47 Another explained his approach in
this way:
For clients who don't care about climate change, I talk to them about
reducing cost through using less energy, buying cheaper, and using
less. Why wouldn't one be interested in that? If there is ancillary ben-
efit to environment, that doubles the bang for the buck. Much of it is
about return on investment, and is pitched as efficient.248
In addition, one lawyer explained the importance of comparing a cli-
ent's performance to its peers: "Clients try to benchmark themselves, ask-
ing where they fit in terms of their peers. Sustainability may come into that
discussion: Are they consistent with best practices?"249
An attorney with a long career in private practice (who now runs a
sustainability company) framed the key issues in terms of understanding
what the client needs and wants:
When you talk to a client about sustainability, it is in many ways like
being a therapist talking to a patient, and you are trying to figure out
whether the patient is willing and ready to do the work or is in denial.
It would be easy if we could deal with sustainability as a compliance
matter and tell the client, "you must do A, B, C, and D on sustainabil-
ity." And there is a legal framework like that for some sustainability
matters (pollution, labor standards, etc.). But really there is no law or
regulation for all issues, and certainly none at the sustainability
best-practices level. So the conversation is instead about efficiencies,
and evaluating and managing sustainability-related risks and opportu-
nities, like generating revenue with new products and services or en-
tering new markets.250
246. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 26.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 28.
250. Id. at 27.
160 [Vol. 95:1
2017] SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INLAWPRACTICE
The risks and opportunities of sustainable development, of course,
depend on what goods or services the client is producing, or where the
client is planning to locate. An environmental attorney thus tailors a stand-
ard approach, based on assessment of risks and opportunities, to a specific
discussion about risks and opportunities for a particular client:
I put sustainability issues into the context of risk within their industry
if they do not address these issues, and opportunities they could realize
if they addressed these issues. Perhaps for some industries, if one mar-
kets a product that has green components, such as household cleaners
251
that are greener, they can capture greater market share.
Another attorney, who does considerable work in the land use and
zoning area, sees and communicates sustainable development issues in
terms of risk:
Today we are telling people not to build in high-hazard areas so you
don't get flooded. There are risks of climate change that are being
picked up by conservative markets-banks, lenders, secondary mort-
gage markets. If a client is not assessing these risks-and our job is
due diligence as lawyers-then I'm seeing an opportunity that perhaps
others have not opened their eyes to.252
Others make a broader argument that a sustainability approach will
benefit the client and relevant stakeholders. One environmental attorney
habitually asks clients: "Can't we make this look better for everybody by
doing (fill-in-the-blank)?"253 Another tells clients: "I say, 'this is a matter
that will be important to some of the people you work with, and will be
important to more people over the next decade, and if you want to deal
with this issue, you should do it now."'254 An attorney with extensive cor-
porate experience said:
There is no way to summarize it. The simplest thing to say is that to
the extent sustainability principles represent good holistic manage-
ment-whether from a governance, or process, or business perspec-
tive-then I encourage that approach. I believe they are best served by
looking at an issue as part of a larger suite of related concerns and
opportunities, all of which are embraced by sustainability-related prin-
ciples.255
Another attorney summarized his approach in this way: "To make
this work long-term, and minimize your long-term liabilities and transac-
tion costs, you may want to consider the broader environmental and social
251. Id. at 26.
252. Id. at 48.
253. Id. at 27.
254. Id at 28.
255. Id. at 26.
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context."256 For contaminated sites, that means doing "a good cleanup so
it doesn't come back to bite you later."257 For another attorney, that means
"getting stakeholder feedback or input from the community in designing"
a development project.258 It might be better to "spend more time and
money now, to save a lot more time and money later by achieving a sus-
tainable result."259 Depending on the situation, this attorney makes a busi-
ness case, a case based on reputational risk, a case based on demonstrating
"you care about the community and the environment," or a case based on
what competitors are doing related to sustainability.260
Interestingly, many lawyers make these arguments without mention-
ing sustainability, sustainable development, or climate change. Several of
the lawyers said that many clients will not listen to an explanation based
on climate change.26 1 One attorney uses "efficiency" as a substitute for
sustainability: "Efficiency is as big a term as you want it to be. They can't
hear the S-word [sustainability] in the middle of the country."2 62 Another
uses "sustainability principles and concepts" as a substitute for the term
itself:
I have lots of sustainability conversations in which the word sustaina-
bility never comes up-such as about governance, supply chains-but
which are based on sustainability as it is properly understood. People
hire lawyers, not preachers, and no one wants to be preached at. You
can make a lot of good medicine that will go down with the right
amount of sugar.263
A green building and community development lawyer explained the
dynamics of such conversations:
A lot of times I tell them how to save money, how it will give them an
economic advantage in the marketplace. We talk about almost every-
thing, except "that is the right thing to do and will save the world."
That doesn't mean I don't have clients that believe that. If I have to
persuade them though, these other aspects get emphasized. In my state,
many clients have engineers who tell you that a more sustainable
model will cost you more. I tell them they have the wrong engineer. If
you had an engineer who knew more, that engineer would tell you how
to do this in a way that would cost you less and create more community
benefits. The challenge here is to convince a client of both intrinsic
benefits (lower cost, increase in tenants, lower operating costs, higher
retention rate for tenants) and extrinsic benefits (that might benefit the





261. See id at 26.
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community or the environment and would mean that the community is
more likely to support your project).
264
This lawyer added that there are often limits in how far an attorney
can go in arguing for the intrinsic benefits of sustainable development:
Some clients are wary of attorneys who pitch intrinsic benefits. The
clients see the attorneys as engaging in advocacy. They worry that you
are advocating something and if they say no, your heart won't be in
advocating for their position. I had one client who hired me because I
pushed back against what he proposed, but I would move his project
forward whether I won or lost our internal arguments. He didn't buy
all of the things I suggested as sustainable but he bought a lot of
them.265
When a client is fully engaged in an effort to achieve environmental
and social sustainability, on the other hand, the conversation can be more
fruitful. Another attorney is working with benefit corporations and B Cor-
porations, two closely related types of for-profit corporations formed not
only to make profits but also to produce social and environmental bene-
fits.266 This attorney explained:
Lawyers are creative people who can make positive change. At the end
of the day, the question is whether we are able to have a conversation
about how to have all three things at the same time: economic prosper-
ity, environmental stewardship, and social responsibility. Companies
are not able to stop being bad overnight. We are working with a B
Corporation that has been willing to lay bare everything, and their goal
is to stop contributing bad stuff. They know where they want to go, but
have no idea how to get there yet. When you engage an entire company
in that way, people get extraordinarily creative; the challenge is thrown
down and a solution emerges over time.267
264. Id at 28.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 31; see also Jay Love, Benefit Corporation vs. Certified B Corp in Plain English,
BLOOMERANG (Aug. 17, 2015), https://bloomerang.co/blog/benefit-corporation-vs-certified-b-corp-
in-plain-english. Both are alternatives to nonprofit status for a company. Id. A benefit corporation
exists by virtue of state law; a B Corporation is a benefit corporation that has also been certified by a
third party for measurable social and environmental performance, accountability, and transparency.
Id; see also Matthew J. Dulac, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation: Benefit Corporations and the
Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 173-79 (2015) (providing a primer on benefit corpora-
tions, including the 2013 Delaware statute authorizing benefit corporations).
267. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 31.
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V. PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL QUALITIES OF LAWYERS DOING
SUSTAINABILITY WORK
Understanding the personal and professional qualities of these law-
yers is important for two reasons:268 First, for someone considering sus-
tainability in law practice-whether a student entering law school or an
experienced practitioner looking to change direction-it is useful to know
what people in this field think and believe because that information may
be helpful in making a decision. Second, for legal educators, this infor-
mation may be helpful in designing curricula and programs, as well as in
teaching classes.
A. How They Became Interested in Sustainability
A few of these lawyers say they have a lifelong interest in sustaina-
bility and sustainability concepts, and some developed their interest during
college or jobs prior to law school. For many, an interest in sustainability
grew out of their work in environmental law. But some were led to sus-
tainability by specific workplace or community experiences involving pro-
jects, perspectives, clients, or colleagues, which exposed them to sustain-
able development concepts. These experiences fed a sense of dissonance
between what they were then doing and what they wanted to do, which led
them to move their career more in the direction of sustainable develop-
ment.
Many lawyers reported a lifelong interest in sustainable development
concepts. A clean energy finance lawyer explained:
I was a charter subscriber to an energy efficient home magazine, New
Shelter, which started in the 1970s or 1980s. It was all about how to
build a passive solar-house, and collect rainwater, and have compost-
ing toilets-real practical advice. I grew up with a grandfather who
taught botany and started arboretums, and my mother knew the names
of all the trees and was an organic gardener. I read The Sand County
E2693270
Almanac[269] fairly early on.
Others developed an interest during college.271 One participated in
the first Earth Day (a national teach-in on the environment in 1970) as a
268. This Part draws primarily on interview answers to Question 3 ("How did you get interested
in sustainability?), Question 9 ("What personal or professional characteristics are most essential to
your sustainability work?), Question 10 ("What do you find most rewarding about your sustainability
work?"), and Question II ("What do you find least enjoyable or most frustrating?") in the Appendix.
See infra Appendix.
269. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE (1949)
(classic work in conservation and environmental protection).
270. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 13-14;
271. See id. at 11, 14-15. Interestingly, one attorney became interested in sustainability when he
stepped out of law practice for several years to do teaching and research at a major university:
In my university position, the big areas were climate change, biodiversity, and sustainabil-
ity. I also was working with forestry, and sustainability has been an important part of for-
estry for a long time. This is an emerging area, and you can't get into an emerging area as
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272 273
college student.272 Several had science-related majors. Another devel-
oped a particular sustainability-related interest in college that led to a job
274
in that area after law school.27 This attorney studied the duties of multi-
national corporations in college.27 5 That led to work after college at a cor-
porate social responsibility company that performed screenings of a com-
pany's performance for investors.27 6 When this attorney was in law school,
the field of corporate social responsibility did not exist.277 The attorney
worked as an intern during law school at a "group that was filing a lot of
litigation against companies," but was "more interested in facilitating dia-
logue with companies," and saw that nongovernmental organizations and
"companies were not particularly good at talking to each other."
2 78 After
law school, this attorney found a law firm interested in this type of work.
279
One lawyer became interested in toxic metals after dropping out of
college and taking a job at a residential training institute for people with
severe mental disabilities.280 At that job, the lawyer learned that nine of
the residents traced the origin of their disability to heavy metal poisoning
experienced while working at coal-fired power plants.281 This lawyer sub-
sequently did considerable work on energy efficiency and renewable en-
ergy:
I worked for the state's only residential training institute for people
who were severely retarded. I was picked to work with the twelve most
difficult men, and most were in their mid-fifties. I got interested in why
they were mentally retarded. One was trauma, two were genetic, and
the other nine were heavy metal poisoning, mostly mercury and lead.
Many of these men were kids when they were exposed to these heavy
metals. So I went to law school to get lead and mercury out of kids'
.282
brains.
Another's interest in sustainability grew out of training and work ex-
perience prior to law school as a chemical engineer. "We don't make waste
and don't like to waste. Chemical engineering requires mass balance; my
easily when you have to have billable hours, etc. When I returned to private practice, how-
ever, I saw that my clients were interested in sustainability.
Id. at 11.
272. Id. at 14.
273. Id. at 11, 14.











brain is not organized to accept waste. When I worked as an on-scene co-
ordinator for the Superfund cleanup program, I saw the result of operations
,,283that saw no downside to generating waste.
Some lawyers have spent their entire careers working with clients to
advance sustainable development. The attorney discussed earlier who does
corporate social responsibility work provides one example.284 Another ex-
ample is provided by an attorney who does considerable work with start-
up companies interested in sustainability:
I started working with shade-grown organic fair-trade coffee, with a
give-back model. They provide some of their proceeds to help educate
kids in that part of the world. After that, I became more and more in-
terested in those business models, and never gave up. Then the firm
said, "You ought to be our firm's guy."285
For many, practicing law led them to sustainability. Some are envi-
ronmental lawyers who became knowledgeable about sustainability as part
of their overall practice, often because they thought broadly about how the
companies and businesses they represent affect the environment and the
communities in which they operate. For at least one lawyer, this interest
intensified over time: "As you age, and you become a grandfather, you
think about what kind of legacy you and others leave behind for your
grandkids."286
To no small degree, as previously explained, many key concepts of
sustainable development are embedded, albeit imperfectly, in environ-
mental laws and their implementation.287 An attorney with a lot of experi-
ence working for the EPA explained:
The common thread of my work in the agency has been achieving en-
vironmental goals in ways that are in harmony with social and eco-
nomic goals. I assume that they are not automatically in conflict. This
began in the Clinton Administration "Reinvention" era. We didn't call
it sustainability then. When we discussed reinvention, we used terms
like "cleaner, cheaper, smarter." We found it wasn't just cheaper; it
could also advance environmental goals. Then we found that this
aligned with what others were calling sustainability.288
A good number of lawyers became interested in sustainability when
they saw the limits of simple compliance with environmental laws. One
283. Id. at 14.
284. See id. at 11.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 14.
287. See supra Introduction.
288. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 11; see also Sheila M. Cavanagh, Robert W.
Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, National Environmental Policy During the Clinton Years 9-10 (Res. for
the Future, Discussion Paper No. 01-38, 2001) (discussing the history of the "Reinvention" era and
summarizing the history of the Clinton Administration's environmental policy).
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dates his interest in sustainability to his experience in granting and denying
permits for storm water discharges.289 The conventional approach is to use
pipes to move storm water to treatment plants, but this approach is expen-
sive.290 By contrast, green infrastructure-the use of permeable areas,
green roofs, rain gardens, and other features that allow water to be ab-
sorbed into the ground-is less expensive and generates environmental
and social benefits.29'
The idea that we were physically and chemically impairing waterways
with relatively benign discharges got me very interested. The issue is
not what is in water; the issue is volume. How do you avoid over-
whelming urban creeks? We began to look at green infrastructure to
address the issues we had. We have looked at reducing volume and
also at the redesign of urban waterways to help manage runoff.292
Taking a management position at a major pharmaceutical company
led another attorney to sustainable development:
My job was about managing risk and looking for opportunities. It was
more preventative. That is what moved me toward sustainability.
Many of the larger companies have the luxury of being more progres-
sive and forward looking, and they look out ahead of environmental
regulation. They have to manage risks that are not yet regulated. There
are business opportunities from managing risk better, being greener,
operating more efficiently, and utilizing fewer natural resources. And
so many times companies are out ahead of regulation in order to grab
opportunities.293
Many lawyers became interested in sustainable development through
real estate work. For one lawyer, it began with the realization that most of
the real estate transactions that the lawyer worked on were in "greenfields,
which are previously undeveloped areas that may have been used for ag-
riculture or forestry."294 Around the same time, this lawyer became very
interested in LEED and began exploring many of the legal ramifications
29
of LEED for developers, landlords, tenants, and contractors.29 Amother
lawyer, who has done considerable work in walkable communities and
New Urbanism, was introduced to sustainability shortly after law school,
when two real estate law firm jobs did not work out.296 With a baby, this
lawyer decided to work from home.2 97 An attorney from the second firm
289. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 15.
290. See U.S. Env't Prot. Agency, What is Green Infrastructure?, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/green-infrastructure/what-green-infrastructure (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
291. See id
292. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 15.
293. Id. at 11.
294. Id. at 13
295. Id.




this lawyer worked at introduced this lawyer to a prospective client plan-
ning a new community.2 98 This lawyer has been doing that kind of work,
for this and other clients, ever since.299
The recession that began in 2008 brought at least one lawyer, who
had spent the bulk of his career doing "all things real estate," to practice
in the sustainability arena.300 In 2009, this lawyer's firm started a sustain-
ability department:
The biggest reason for starting the department was the real estate
crash; real estate work dried up, and I was looking for another area of
practice. Also in 2008 the state legislature adopted a law creating one
of the largest incentives for renewable energy. We started getting a
client base with a lot of millennials and professionals who weren't in-
terested in living in the suburbs, and who were willing to entertain
paying more to be in a green building. And there were retailers and
other businesses who recognized that this would be a good business
model, and would give them a marketing advantage.301
Another lawyer's career went through several phases before starting
to work on sustainable development. This lawyer started at a firm as a real
estate attorney, but soon began "establishing a practice that could be called
'environmental aspects of real estate transactions."'302 The firm then began
asking this lawyer to do more land use projects:
Because of my environmental reputation, I got big, nefarious pro-
jects-landfills, coal co-generation projects, medical waste, mining
projects, and exploratory oil wells. I developed a practice working on
projects where people filled auditoriums opposing my projects. At one
point, a woman asked me how I could sleep at night. I said, "Unless
you are walking home, to a home that uses no power and you eat all of
your garbage, you expect all of these facilities to be in someone's back
yard; you just didn't want it to be yours. I sleep just fine." My under-
graduate degree was in philosophy, and I went home and did a "gut
check," and I was not where I wanted to be. But it was not for the
reason she thought. My landfills were many times better than those the
state had been using. The co-gens [combined heat and power, or co-
generation plants 303] were more efficient than the conventional plants.
My oil well was safer. It wasn't those projects that kept me awake-it
was the shopping centers and subdivisions that chewed through irre-
placeable habitat. Those kept me awake. In 1988, 1 began doing New
298. Id.
299. See id.
300. Id. at 15.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 14.
303. Cogeneration/Combined Heat and Power (CHP), CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONs, https://www.c2es.org/technology/factsheet/CogenerationCHP (last visited Sept. 19,
2017) (co-gens are combined heat and power, or co-generation plants).
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Urbanist projects. I met the "green mafia"-leading voices of sustain-
able development-in a green development project. I decided that was
what I wanted to do-focus on sustainable development and New Ur-
-304bamism.30
Community work introduced sustainable development o yet another
group of lawyers. One helped to start up a regional green building council.
"I have never been in an organization where people are more committed,
where the environment was more stimulating," this lawyer said.305 "It was
infectious. I was the founding director and I am really proud of that."
306
Another lawyer started learning about sustainable development through
friends and local organizations. At the same time, the firm this lawyer
worked at became interested in sustainability.
307
B. Most Essential Personal and Professional Characteristics for Sustain-
ability Work
Many of the most essential characteristics of a lawyer practicing law
related to sustainability are the same as those of a good lawyer: good ana-
lytical, speaking, writing, research, and advocacy skills; an ability to work
effectively with clients and others; and an appetite for hard work. The per-
sonal and professional characteristics identified by these lawyers as most
essential to their sustainability-related work begin with these characteris-
tics.30s But these lawyers emphasized six basic characteristics central to
practicing law related to sustainability: (1) expertise in, and even passion
for, sustainability; (2) an ability to listen well; (3) open-mindedness, curi-
osity, and creativity; (4) good analytical and problem-solving skills; (5)
patience; and (6) an ability to think big picture and long term. As a whole,
they overlap with but extend beyond the skills of most lawyers.3
0 9
What follows are the personal and professional characteristics that
these lawyers identified as most essential to their work:
1. Expertise in, and even passion for, sustainability.
These twenty-six lawyers, of course, all have this characteristic. One
said that expertise in sustainability includes "what it means, relevant legal
frameworks, best practices, what other companies in the industry are doing
304. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 14.
305. Id. at 12.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 26.
308. See id at 33-35.
309. A word of caution about this list is appropriate. These lawyers typically did not identify
more than three or four characteristics; many identified only one or two; and many identified as the
most important characteristic something that most or all of the others did not identify at all. Thus, it is
inappropriate to conclude that these lawyers or any lawyer doing work related to sustainability pos-
sesses all of the characteristics identified here in equal measure. As one attorney explained in answer-
ing this question, "There is not one model of a typical lawyer in this space." Id. at 35.
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in sustainability, and what government policies are relevant."3 0 Another
explained the importance of mastering the wide variety of issues that arise
in this "quickly trending and developing area."3 11 At least one is LEED
Accredited Professional (AP) certified, which means that this lawyer has
significant expertise in green building.312
For many, mere expertise is not enough. One explained that "you
have to have a genuine interest in it" to understand the environmental, eco-
nomic, and social facets of any given issue and "all of the different parties
that will be impacted."313 Another said passion for the concept is necessary
to "articulate issues in an industry-friendly fashion."314 Another empha-
sized: "Enthusiasm helps. You have to convince people."315
2. Ability to listen well.
One lawyer said, "the key thing is hearing what people really want so
you can find a solution for everyone."316 Another spends "a lot of time
listening to clients, trying 'to figure out various approaches to address a
particular problem."317 Still another stressed the importance of understand-
ing whether the "client is asking a sustainability question or if sustainabil-
ity is relevant even if it is not explicitly asked about."318
3. Open-mindedness, curiosity, and creativity.
These qualities are grouped here because they overlap and because
many attorneys explained themselves in this way. A lawyer who works
with developers said: "I am constantly questioning why architects, engi-
neers, or planners do something in a certain way, so we can unlock creative
ways of meeting their goals while accomplishing those goals in a more
sustainable fashion."319 Another described intellectual flexibility, imagi-
nation, and creativity as essential:
That's why I like the work. We need to develop new answers to ques-
tions. It is not a field for lawyers who are comfortable doing the same
thing year after year with the same forms. It is a field for people who
are prepared to invent or be creative. Yet as a counterpoint, you can't
be operating in the ionosphere. You have to be realistic and prag-
-320matic.
310. Id. at 34.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 12.
313. Id. at 33.
314. Id. at 34.
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In the realm of environmental law, several lawyers said sustainability
means thinking creatively about how to solve problems, and suggesting
solutions that are different from what would ordinarily be considered:
You can't be focused on what not to do or how to stay in compliance.
This is the big challenge I see for lawyers in sustainability. As a law-
yer, you need to have the personality to go beyond compliance to help
the client find ways to get things done, to find legal levers to help the
client accomplish what they want. You can't simply say no. If you are
working on obtaining a permit, you need to find a way to help the client
meet the requirements in a more sustainable way.321
A good example of this creativity is provided by a lawyer in private
practice with a municipal client.3 22 The lawyer proposed a public-private
partnership to enable the city to combine ground source geothermal energy
323
recovery with subsurface storm water recharge basins. Because the pro-
ject would be privately owned but operated on behalf of the city, the owner
would be able to take advantage of tax credits, and the city would be able
to take advantage of private capital.324
One lawyer who counsels many small companies said it was not just
necessary for the attorney to be creative.325 The attorney must also have "a
love of working with creative people. Some of the people I work with are
the coolest people ever. Most of my developers are 'mom and pops.' They
want to make money but they see themselves as stewards of the land and
they want to create something enduring."326
4. Patience.
Several emphasized the importance of being patient with clients, par-
ticularly when they are resistant or do not understand.327 They emphasized
the importance of explaining, translating, and clarifying issues related to
sustainability. One said: "You have to keep winnowing down the negative
conversation about why we would do that, and what are the benefits to
,,328
us.
5. Good analytical and problem-solving skills.
One lawyer with significant experience working with major corpora-
tions said sustainable development is "multi-disciplinary and multi-fo-
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are defined by its environmental, social, and economic dimensions. 330 This
attorney emphasized the importance of "being able to take all sorts of in-
formation and synthesize it and critically evaluate it toward the end of
solving a problem."331
6. Ability to think big picture and long term.
The multiple focal points noted above and the intergenerational as-
pect of sustainable development require lawyers who work in this area to
approach problems from a broad perspective. The three pillars, one said,
require "a much broader lens"-the ability to "connect seemingly dispar-
ate ideas and work areas"-and to break down silos.332 From this perspec-
tive, for example, legal advice on forest protection is not just about the
forest itself but also about economic development and community protec-
333tion. Another described "an ability to think about things at a meta or
systemic level, and then drill down to components of that to more granular
levels, and move back and forth between systemic and granular levels."334
Others emphasized the need to care about "long-term outcomes; you can't
just be focused on billable hours or the cheapest short-term outcome for
your client."335 An attorney has to think about "what the world is going to
be like in fifty or sixty years," said another who worked with Native Amer-
336icans. This attorney explained that Native Americans "introduced me to
the idea of thinking seven generations ahead."33 7 One said that some
lawyers can do big picture thinking and some cannot:
A certain kind of lawyer does project finance and public-private part-
nerships. Some people are natural project managers. It involves keep-
ing a number of large complex documents in mind and how they fit
together. Some people do this well and some do not. Lawyers tend to
be detail oriented and not big picture. To do project management, it
helps to be a big picture person. It is not so different for sustainabil-
- 338
Ity.
C. Most Rewarding Aspects of Sustainability Work
A great many of these lawyers identified the achievement of specific
and positive results as the most rewarding aspect of their work related to
sustainability. Many said they found it satisfying to explain sustainability
projects to clients and particularly satisfying to convince clients who are
either uninformed or skeptical. Others identified the work itself, saying it
330. See supra Introduction.
331. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 33.
332. Id. at 49.
333. Id. at 33.






is enjoyable and intellectually engaging. And some said the most reward-
ing aspect is working with likeable and talented people.
Many described the most rewarding aspect of their work in terms of
specific projects or laws to which they contributed, where they made some
positive difference. One said: "I am always flabbergasted by the incredible
opportunities to do things that are more effective, save money, create local
and lifelong jobs, and beautify neighborhoods."3 39 Another lawyer said the
work is "always about the good I'm doing. Understanding that there is
actual good and bad that can be done is an important divining rod in what
we do."340
Another attorney explained the potential for sustainability to accom-
plish good outside of the United States, particularly in developing coun-
tries where many of this attorney's clients operate:
On a global geopolitical level, it is the opportunity to create extraordi-
nary good in places that should not have to experience primitive and
benighted approaches, or walk the same resource-intensive pathways
to prosperity for their people, as developed countries did. There are
generation-skipping technologies and theories. If an advanced solid
waste sorting technology could be implemented in Nairobi, for exam-
ple, you could remanufacture or up-manufacture up to ninety-five per-
cent of what is currently being disposed of.34 1
They expressed this in terms of "helping the community,"342 ,con-
tributing toward nudging the world in the direction it should be going,"
343
or making the state "a better place to live." 344 One explained sustainability-
related legal work in terms of "making a positive difference in the world
for mankind and the environment, beyond solving a narrow legal prob-
lem."345 Another likes "the idea that by helping clients reuse existing prop-
erty and infrastructure, I am not contributing to metastasizing urban sprawl
that chews up greenfields."3 46
Many attributed this ability to do this kind of work to their clients.
"You collect enough clients that want to do the right thing," said an energy
finance lawyer, "then you get to do the right thing most of the time."34 7
This lawyer added that it is "getting better all the time." 3
48
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While many find satisfaction in getting specific projects done, others
expressed satisfaction in drafting laws that are subsequently enacted, or in
helping to get those ordinances or laws adopted. One attorney who helped
write the regulations for a five-cent tax for plastic bags for a major city
said that "seeing this in operation is amazing."349 Another-whose work
in drafting and implementing laws at the state level has led to significant
reductions in that state's greenhouse gas emissions-has found such
"structural reform" especially satisfying.35 o
Some were nonetheless bluntly cautious or circumspect about the
limits of what they are helping to achieve. Many cast their work in terms
of reducing negative impacts rather than in terms of achieving positive
impacts. One lawyer actually makes a difference "on some days."3 5 An
other sometimes influences a client "to do something that has decreased
their footprint." 352 Still another found it satisfying when "you can make
progress. It is all a drop in the bucket. But it is progress."3 53 A lawyer who
specializes in sustainable community-development projects said:
The thing I find most rewarding is when we get to create a project that
truly makes the community better than it would have been without the
project. This is a really high standard. So much development dimin-
ishes the community. It is so hard to deliver development hat not just
sustains but makes things better. That is the standard I strive for when
working for sustainable development.354
Others find satisfaction in explaining to clients why more sustainable
approaches are better and how they will work. One enjoys "persuading
companies to invest in a new technology that is truly better, safer, and
more efficacious than something that has been used for years."355 Another
who specializes in legal work related to sustainable communities said,
"The part I love the best is rolling out that master plan with the client, and
spending hours talking about the possible things that could happen with
this property."356 Many find particular satisfaction in convincing skeptical
clients. This explanation is illustrative: "I love it when people who are so
certain that what they want to do is right for the world realize that a lower
cost, less intrusive solution is in fact better for the environment."357
Some attorneys emphasized that they find the work enjoyable and
intellectually engaging. "It is fun," one attorney said.3 5 8 Another described
349. Id. at 36.
350. See id. at 37.
351. Id. at 36.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 37.
354. Id.
355. Id.




it as "an endless horizon. That's the most exciting thing. It is just begin-
ning, and you can't see where it will go."359 Another, with a long and di-
verse career in the public and private sector, said:
What is wonderful about this field is that it so diverse. It never ceases
to engage me intellectually. My career has been very multidimen-
sional-it has been sustaining and nurturing. I can't think of another
career that has been as sustaining and challenging. By contrast, I know
a lawyer who has been a bankruptcy lawyer for thirty-five years, and
this has been a very static area of law. Sustainability is a very dynamic
area of law, policy, and thought leadership.360
Another explained the work in terms of tracking social expectations
concerning business performance on sustainability:
Something I particularly enjoy is being a trend spotter-where societal
expectations are trending. Companies need to comply with mandatory
standards but also with developing and evolving standards. I am a cu-
rious person and find the work intellectually stimulating. I also feel I
am playing a part in defining and refining the core performance expec-
tations for companies-not just law and policy but also what they ex-
pect they should do. Playing a role in that conversation is very reward-
ing. 
361
Some expressed their greatest satisfaction in terms of the people with
whom they get to work. One explained this as "having a community of
people in your office who I can work with to realize the vision of sustain-
ability."3 62 Another said: "People who work in sustainability tend to be
very nice. This is not a joke; it is true. They are interested in cooperation,
working across department lines, and encouraging departments to look at
alternatives and options to be more sustainable."3 63 Several commented on
the great talent of the people with whom they work. One enjoys mentoring
"young millennials who are 'wicked smart' to assist in getting things
done."364 One lawyer responded to the question of what is most rewarding
or satisfying by saying:
Everything. It does not get any better than this. I get out of bed at six
thirty in the morning and think about how fast I can get to the office.
When I started this work, I got completely overwhelmed and a bit de-
pressed. At a certain point, we made a conscious decision to stop fo-
cusing on the negatives. We explain issues factually, and then we dive
into the solutions. We don't talk about whether a company is good or
not. I prefer not to talk to people who aren't interested in working on
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 37.
362. Id at 36.
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solutions. We work with great people and all of the great ideas that can
get a business to the triple bottom line.365
D. Least Enjoyable or Most Frustrating Aspects of Sustainability Work
Many lawyers reported that they found little or nothing unpleasant or
frustrating about their sustainability work.366 Others answered by talking
about work-life balance, time sheets and billing, the administrative as-
pects of big-law-firm practice, or their organization's lack of resources-
none of which are directly related to sustainability work.36 7
But the great majority of these lawyers did not feel this way, and there
was a great range in the aspects of their practice they find least enjoyable
or most frustrating. Some were frustrated with clients that did not under-
stand or support sustainability. Others identified public opposition based
on ideology or misrepresentation, or simply public ignorance of basic sci-
ence and environmental policy, as the least enjoyable part of their practice.
Some are frustrated with the slow pace of progress, particularly on energy
and climate change. And some find legal barriers to sustainability the most
frustrating aspect of their practice, and the time and difficulty of accom-
plishing sustainability activities and projects. As will be seen below, there
is some overlap between these aspects of legal practice and what these
lawyers see as the greatest obstacles to sustainability.
Many complained about some of their clients, often distinguishing
between clients they enjoy working with and clients they do not enjoy
working with: "I meet clients who want to be best in the field and clients
who are dragged into the field kicking and screaming," one attorney ex-
plained. 368 A common complaint from these lawyers is about clients en-
gaged in "narrow, short-term thinking." 369 One attorney described such
clients as "focused purely on minimizing short-term cost-how much you
pay to settle the case or close the deal, and how much you pay your lawyer
to do it." 370 Another common complaint is clients who lack a basic "un-
derstanding of science and policy behind sustainability and environmental
protection" (e.g., climate change, chemical loading),' or who resist attor-
ney suggestions "based not on facts but on politics." 372 The attorneys said
that these and other factors often mean that those clients are not interested
in analyzing a problem from a sustainability perspective, or looking at the
additional options that a sustainability analysis would provide.373
365. Id. at 37.
366. See id. at 38-39. One responded, "I really can't say." Id. at 38.
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An attorney who has worked extensively on cleaning up contami-
nated sites explained these problems in terms of the "limited role of the
attorney in big picture decision making."3 74 This attorney said:
When I talk to clients about what they are going to do next, after the
property is cleaned up, about whether they are going to do a green
building, etc., that falls on deaf ears. There is a perception that energy
efficiency and green building are more expensive than they really are.
My overall frustration is not getting a place at the table in the overall
conversation.37 5
Another attorney explained that the least enjoyable aspect of working
with clients is the patience it requires. Yet, this attorney said that some-
times patience pays off:
I have had to be patient with individuals within companies and with
companies themselves. All are at different stages of their sustainability
journey. There is often dissonance between what needs to be done and
what companies and individuals are able to do. But when people un-
derstand what they can do, and what they can encourage other people
to do, they move pretty quickly. It is waiting for the "aha" moment that
is the hardest thing to do. When that happens, it is extraordinarily won-
derful; the best thing ever. We spend a lot of time thinking about how
to get people to the "aha" moment faster.376
Another group of these lawyers said that the most frustrating aspect
of their sustainability work is public opposition, based on ideology or out-
right misrepresentation, to specific proposals or projects. A lawyer who
does considerable legal work for solar industry clients complained about
the "blowback that the industry gets from people who are not knowledge-
able."3 77 In one case, this lawyer's client proposed a solar energy project
for a school system that had demonstrable economic advantages, but one
school board member was simply opposed to solar energy.378 Another ech-
oed that point in describing the least enjoyable aspect of sustainability
work:
Ideological intransigence; that's number one, head and shoulders
above everything else. It is a whole cluster of things. If I have an Amer-
ican value, it is that we recognize problems soberly and solve them
intelligently. When people talk about socialism, conspiracy, property
rights-this requires an entirely differently skill set, and it impedes
problem solving.
379
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One complained about the "Not In My Back Yard" (NIMBY) phe-
nomenon that occurs on some of the land use projects on which this attor-
ney works:
The most frustrating thing is when individuals or communities use le-
gitimate sustainability issues to mask raw NIMBY-ism. Say a commu-
nity really does not want adjoining development to happen. So, they
raise issues about trees or endangered species that they have not cared
about historically; they simply don't want development on the adjoin-
ing property. We can't work out a compromise on that issue because
they are using it as a blocking issue. This gives a bad name to legiti-
mate issues, because developers and engineers then see these simply
380as things to stop the project.
Another framed the least enjoyable aspect of the work in terms of
polarized national politics, particularly the people who are "utterly cyni-
cal"3 8 1 in their opposition to specific EPA proposals:
It is hard enough to do this without fighting people who are lying. It's
not just climate change. It is the assertion that a new EPA rule will
bring the economy to a halt, when the reality is that the new rule will
make us better off and not worse off. It is not only bad earth science;
it is bad economics.382
Another group of lawyers said that what they liked least was not pub-
lic opposition but rather the lack of public understanding. For some, this
is based on the same concerns-about the lack of basic science and envi-
ronmental-policy knowledge-as their clients. For others, there is a dis-
tinct regional dimension to this ignorance. One attorney who frequently
travels to California says sustainability "is in the dark ages in my home
,,383state". In this attorney's view, that ignorance translates into having
fewer clients available for sustainability-related legal work.384 Another at-
torney does not enjoy the "need to win the same battles over and over
again."3 85 This attorney explained: "You can go to the state legislature and
argue that energy efficiency would save money and reduce emissions.
Then five years later you have to go back and defend the same program
because it is threatened with budget cuts."386
For many attorneys, limited progress and the slow pace in moving
toward sustainability are the most frustrating or least enjoyable aspects of
their sustainability work, particularly work on energy and climate change.
One found it frustrating that sustainability "is viewed as secondary and
380. Id. at 39.
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384. See id.




superfluous, or an afterthought, as opposed to ingrained in everything we
are doing."387 Another who "learned about global warming in college in
1977" said, "we have been talking about the world of closed systems since
the 1970s, and I wish we were farther ahead."3
88
One group of lawyers identified legal barriers, and the time and dif-
ficulty of getting sustainability projects and actions done, as the part of
their work that they liked least. Within this group, a common complaint
heard is that the laws themselves get in the way. One criticized a township
code that requires LEED projects to get a variance for energy-efficient
lighting and waterless urinals, rather than simply allowing them.38 9 The
need to get a variance, of course, adds time and expense to these projects
because of the need to prove that a variance is warranted.390 A land use
lawyer frequently butts against "wrongheaded legislation that won't let us
do the best possible plan," such as requirements for more parking spaces
than are needed for a particular place.391
For others, the difficulty of navigating existing laws and policies to
get more sustainable projects and activities approved is what they like
least. One complained how it is difficult to satisfy all stakeholders for a
proposed project or activity, saying that "ninety-nine percent of the time
not everyone is going to be happy."392 Another complained how bureau-
cracy and lengthy review processes for complex projects (in a municipal
setting) can "wear you down." 393 This lawyer said it can also wear clients
down.3 94 Hopefully, the lawyer added, they "stay the course, and stay en-
thusiastic."395
One attorney's work towards more sustainable outcomes repeatedly
puts that attorney in the position of doing something for the first time, and
not only for clients.396 The attorney installed six geothermal wells at home
for heating and cooling, and subsequently received six water bills from the
city. Then the attorney then had to work to get a city ordinance changed to
fix the problem.397 The attorney said that this takes a personal toll; trying
to be sustainable is unnecessarily difficult. 39 8
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VI. FUTURE OF SUSTAINABILITY IN LAW PRACTICE
The future of sustainability in law practice depends on answers to two
questions: What are the major obstacles? Where are the jobs?3 99
A. Roadblocks to Sustainability
The question about the major obstacles to sustainability elicited many
of the same answers as the question about the aspects of sustainability
work that lawyers find least enjoyable or most frustrating. But the question
about greatest obstacles to sustainability is less subjective and invited a
broader perspective than a lawyer's own practice. Perhaps for that reason,
the range of answers focused primarily on two points: public opinion and
the limits of existing law.
Many said that public opinion is an obstacle because of public igno-
rance, providing many of the same explanations described above (e.g., ide-
ology, lack of basic understanding about science and the environment).400
This, others said, contributes to the slow pace of change, which was also
discussed above.4 0 1 But many attorneys see the biggest obstacle to sustain-
ability in terms of a personal unwillingness on the part of the public to
make changes in their lives. People "have a hard time changing habits.A02
Another attorney said: "We have a consumer mindset. I grew up with par-
ents of the Great Depression, and we were encouraged to save and reuse.
How do you inculcate a philosophy of the light footprint? People talk the
sustainability talk, but they don't walk the talk." 403 One described "per-
sonal avarice and selfishness" as obstacles to sustainability.404
Other lawyers pointed not to ignorance or unwillingness to change
but to numerous incorrect mental models or understandings of sustainable
development. They said that a major source of misunderstanding is rooted
in the perceived economy versus environment aspect of environmental
regulation. One attorney said people see environmental regulation "as just
environmental, without looking at social and economic benefits. Some
people simply do not see connections. They might do better with environ-
mental regulation if they saw social and economic benefits."40 5
399. This Part is thus comprised primarily of answers to Question 12 ("What do you see as the
greatest roadblocks to sustainability?") and Question 13 ("Where are the jobs in sustainability and
law?" (current and future)) in the Appendix. See infra Appendix.
400. One attorney added that "people are too busy doing what they are doing to sit back and
think about what they are doing." Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 41. Another said the
basic obstacle is the "lack of ability to show in one to five minutes what people can do to effect positive
change at home, church, synagogue, school, or work. How do you get person, organization, commu-
nity, or business involved? Everyone looks at each other, and no one moves." Id.
401. See supra Section V.D.
402. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 42.
403. Id. at 43. Another attorney explained that it is "hard to persuade the average person they
should lead a sustainable lifestyle." Id. at 41.
404. Id at 42.
405. Id at 41.
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A lawyer who works with many businesses aid people often believe
that "profitability and sustainability are at opposite ends of the spectrum.
That is wrong but that is absolutely how it works, and it grows out of en-
vironmental regulatory experience."40 6 Instead of putting profitability and
sustainability at opposite ends of a line, whereby one grows as the other
diminishes, this lawyer uses a coordinate grid with a horizontal X-axis
representing profitability, and a vertical Y-axis representing sustainability.
The grid shows how high-values for both profitability and sustainability
are possible.4 0 7 "I draw pictures like that because it helps people under-
stand it."A0
Another obstacle is based on the view that sustainability should be
supplanted by resilience, particularly as the climate changes and the need
to protect structures and systems from disruption becomes more evident.40 9
But one lawyer explained how both views are necessary:
Sustainability and resilience are different. I can take an industrial user
and put them completely off the grid on a more sustainable platform,
say biomass. Then I do resilience analysis and determine that a system
with only one source of power is less resilient than the grid with many
generation sources. Greywater reuse[410] is much more resilient than
rainwater capture. We have to pay attention to when we are charting
for resilience and when we are charting for sustainability.411
Still another obstacle to sustainability is based on the incorrect un-
derstanding that sustainability is unnecessary, more expensive, or both.
One lawyer has had "clients, who are not qualified to do LEED building,
say it is too expensive or cannot be done."412 Many of these clients have
constructed buildings in a conventional way for decades, and do not see
the need for change.4 13 This attorney could not convince the environmental
section of his state bar association to support changes in the state's build-
ing code to support LEED certification.414 In a somewhat similar vein, an-
other attorney explained the greatest obstacle as short-term thinking about
sustainability and energy-efficiency investments.4 15 While the benefits of
such investments last for decades and create cost savings far in excess of




409. Dernbach & Cheever, supra note 6, at 279.
410. "Greywater is gently used water from your bathroom sinks, showers, tubs, and washing
machines. It is not water that has come into contact with feces, either from the toilet or from washing
diapers." About Greywater Reuse, GREYWATER ACTION, https://greywateraction.org/greywater-reuse
(last visited Sept. 19, 2017). Greywater can be reused for watering or irrigation, among other things.
See id
411. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 42-43.
412. Id. at 41.
413. See id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 43.
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undertake energy efficiency unless their savings repay the initial invest-
ment within eighteen months.4 16
The biggest challenge, a finance attorney said, is "changing various
cultural attitudes."4 17 This attorney explained: "If you go to a hotel and tell
them you will save them five million dollars in their energy bill" with en-
ergy-efficient retrofits, "there is no one whose job it is to think about
this."4 18 The attorney said that many universities are thinking about this,
but they are the exception.4 19 "At high levels at many corporations, they
get it but they do not get it several levels down" in the organization.420 In
energy-efficiency finance, it is more important "to get customers to feel
safe doing this new thing than to get finance itself. Financing is more me-
chanical; you don't have to fight entrenched skepticism."421 The attorney
further said that changing these attitudes will require not only a new gen-
eration of environmental professionals but also "a new generation of cli-
ents" and "customers of clients."422
The other basic obstacle to sustainability, cited by these lawyers, is
limits in existing law. One type of obstacle that some recounted, which
was described above, occurs when the law itself prevents or impedes a
423desired project or activity. But many lawyers see the limits of existing
law in broader terms. For many environmental lawyers, environmental law
is a necessary but insufficient condition for sustainable development. "Our
environmental laws were written in the 1970s and early 1980s," one attor-
ney said.42 4 "They don't incorporate sustainability. They are narrow, si-
loed, media specific, and don't take into account net environmental and
social impact. We have an outdated environmental legal system and a po-
litical system that is too polarized to fix it."425 Another explained the limits
of environmental law in terms of the underpricing of resources, such as
water, which means that "people are not incentivized to save or protect"
those resources.426
The missing ingredient, many said, is legal rules providing a structure
that guides and encourages sustainable behaviors and projects. According
to one lawyer, this includes specific standards "against which we can cal-
ibrate our actions to that which we should be achieving.'A27 For this law-
yer, the specific problem is the way in which the EPA implements certain
laws, including the lack of measurable standards relating to sustainability:
416. Id.






423. See supra Section V.D.
424. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 42.
425. Id
426. Id. at 43.
427. Id. at 42.
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Without question, the rigid adherence to the way we've always done it
at EPA staff level is frustrating. I adore all of the people we work with,
but some in the federal agencies are not as aware of new technologies
as they could be. There is an information gap, a lack of scientific
awareness. Beyond that, there is sometimes a resistance to doing things
differently than they have always been done. When you put in an ap-
plication for a new chemical, there is an optional field question about
pollution prevention. Even when you do fill in that field, there is no
standard against which EPA program people measure the value of that
information. Our chemical could be ten out of ten here, and the incum-
bent technology awful. But from an advocacy perspective, there is no
demonstrable, measurable standard against which to advocate for the
preferability of that chemical.
428
Interestingly, an EPA attorney made a similar point but in a different
context. The least enjoyable thing for this attorney is people who cannot
get past the broad definition of sustainability stated by the Brundtland
Commission.42 9 We need to "get past 'kumbaya,"' the attorney said, ex-
plaining that the Brundtland Commission's definition is "too abstract to
be meaningful to a lawyer."430 The challenge, this attorney added, is to
figure out what sustainable development should mean in specific con-
texts.43 1
A lawyer with substantial corporate experience said the biggest prob-
lem in achieving sustainability is
the absence of universally applied standards or metrics so that sustain-
able behavior is properly rewarded, and capital can be appropriately
allocated in the global market. There is a lot of work ongoing in that
area, but that is the issue that needs to be solved. Once that is solved,
that is your ultimate top-down answer to sustainability. Everybody
would aspire to be in that choir.
4 32
B. Jobs in Sustainability and Law
The importance of knowing where to find sustainability-related legal
employment is obviously important to law students and lawyers who are
seeking such work. It provides many insights into how many jobs there
are, what kinds of jobs there are, how to break into the field, and what to
expect in the future. And yet it also sheds considerable light on what it
means to practice law related to sustainability.
Among the lawyers interviewed for this Article, many said that legal
jobs related to sustainability are everywhere, but they are not ordinarily
labeled as such. Rather, these lawyers said sustainability is or should be a
critical part of all legal work. Many identified specific workplaces (e.g.,
428. Id. at 39.
429. See id. at 38.
430. Id.
431. See id
432. Id. at 41.
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in-house counsel) or subjects (e.g., climate change) that are particularly
amenable to sustainability-related legal work. At the other end of the spec-
trum, however, are lawyers who say there is little or no work, in part be-
cause of competition from consultants and other nonlawyers.
Many of these lawyers believe that sustainability-related legal jobs
truly are everywhere, but that sustainability is not a subject like environ-
mental law or energy law. Echoing the point frequently made when they
described their own work, they said that they see sustainable development
as a tool,433 lens,43 4 or prism43 5 that can be applied to all areas of law. To
no small degree, these jobs are created by the lawyers who fill them based
on the sustainability expertise they develop, as well as their ability to gen-
erate and maintain client interest in sustainability.436 As one attorney ex-
plained:
There is not a sustainability niche as its own niche. Sustainability can,
however, be embedded in lots of areas of legal practice. It may come
in on a remediation issue or permitting issue. Sustainability can be a
significant part of the practice of a real estate lawyer; brownfields law
is a perfect example of sustainability. Corporate lawyers have to think
about the supply chain. It is not stand-alone; it is a skill or competency
that people ought to have in a lot of different areas of legal practice. A
lawyer who can use knowledge of sustainability effectively-not just
spotting issues and telling a client what they can't do-but also finding
opportunities and being forward looking-that's the skill. But that is
just being a good lawyer. Can you help the client get toward what they
want?4 3 7
A lawyer with substantial experience in corporate law said there will
be more such jobs in the future:
As the world changes to embrace sustainability principles, the legal
jobs will change everywhere. It will be infused in so many elements of
corporate behavior that it will become a language you need to be fa-
miliar with, to speak, to do the job you are doing, just as you need to
understand math to do the things you do. That flavor will be in every
legal job. That will be the evolution of sustainability-related entities
and objectives, percolating into societal behavior, corporate behavior,
and interpersonal behavior.438
An energy finance attorney explained the availability of legal jobs in
terms of the necessary and inevitable transition toward sustainability:
There is a huge amount of work. Over the next twenty years, if we do
it right, we are going to remake the entire economy. The grid will work
433. Id. at 45.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 7.
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differently. There will be a lot more behind-the-meter energy genera-
tion. There will be a whole new level of communications connectivity
that goes along with energy connectivity. People are rebuilding the
food chain, and lots of other things are going on. It is doing all of the
things that lawyers do but with a certain consciousness about what you
are doing. If that is what your client's goals are, you can help them
achieve their goals.439
"This is a great time to be a lawyer," one said.440 Another explained:
"Sustainability aspects of all projects will require lawyers to negotiate, to
draft, to counsel, to implement, and to do all those things. You will also
need lawyers to deal with problems that occur."441
These jobs involve a wide variety of different areas of law.
4 42 Of
these, climate change, renewable energy, energy efficiency, and environ-
mental law were frequently mentioned.43 Other lawyers mentioned fi-
nance, business and human rights, SEC disclosure, development of new
companies, real estate and land use, green-leasing, and sustainable com-
munities.444 A land use lawyer explained: "They are all over the place-
real estate, land use, energy, environment, international, and combinations
of the above. They are in business counseling, business acquisitions, in-
surance, and finance, including mortgages and general due diligence work.
I'm just getting started."
445
The specific places where sustainability-related legal work is more
likely to occur also vary considerably, according to the combined answers
of these lawyers. Some law firms are doing more of this work than others;
as indicated earlier, many lawyers publicly characterize themselves as do-
ing sustainability-related legal work.446 Several attorneys suggested
in-house positions with either corporations or governments.
447 A corporate
social responsibility lawyer explained:
The expansion of social equity within sustainability has resulted in
new types of positions. If you put social equity in sustainability, there
is an expansion of roles for lawyers. Most of the expansion I've seen
in sustainability positions has been inside corporations. Since 2008,
there are a lot more sustainability positions that lawyers can fill that
exist in large-scale corporations.4 48
439. Id at 46.
440. Id
441. Id at 45.
442. See id at 44-49.
443. See id
444. See id
445. Id. at 44.
446. See supra Part I.
447. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 45-46.
448. Id at 46.
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Among government opportunities, several attorneys mentioned in-
house positions for municipalities. An attorney for a major city that is com-
mitted to sustainable development said the city received seventy resumes
when it posted a water and storm water legal job with a major sustainabil-
ity component.449 Another lawyer said that there are many sustainabil-
ity-related legal tasks at the local level, but cautioned that "local govern-
ment attorneys may be doing standard subdivision work eighty percent of
the time, and sustainability work twenty percent of the time." 450
Several attorneys mentioned working for nongovernmental organiza-
tions oriented toward sustainable development, and one works at such an
organization.451 These organizations may or may not involve the actual
practice of law, including litigation. This attorney's organization "employs
a bunch of lawyers in our policy program and disclosure work."452 Another
option that several mentioned is using legal and advocacy skills in contexts
where one is not strictly practicing law.453 "These jobs and few and far
between," one lawyer said, "but you are advantaged if you have a legal
background, because some of what you touch is regulatory in nature."454
In answering the question about where sustainability-related jobs are,
many of these lawyers offered advice to would-be lawyers in sustainability
work. Much of this advice mirrored what others said about the nature of
legal work related to sustainability-that it is a lens or prism through
which to analyze problems in any field.4 5 5 "Young people tell me they
want to be a sustainability lawyer," an attorney with many corporate cli-
ents said.456 "And I tell them to become a corporate lawyer, and then look
for ways to affect every business in a more sustainability-related way."457
One said the same point can be made for other fields: "Take what is oth-
erwise a traditional environmental or real estate, land use, or insurance job,
and figure out a way to bring these ideas into your work, and push the
envelope."45 8 Another explained this challenge to young lawyers against
the background of a substantial increase in corporate sustainability report-
ing that has occurred in recent years, thanks in part to the standardization
of reporting and auditing.4 59 This lawyer said:
A young lawyer wanted to work on sustainable corporate reporting,
but she wouldn't have been hired by a Fortune 500 corporation be-
449. Id. at 47.
450. Id. at 46.
451. See id. at 45.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 45, 47.
454. Id at 44.
455. See supra Section VI.B.
456. Master Report of Interviews, supra note 68, at 44.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 44-45.
459. See id at 47.
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cause she didn't have enough expertise in conventional corporate re-
porting. So, her choice was to work on conventional corporate report-
ing and work toward sustainable corporate reporting, or do niche work
as part of a larger team. The question is: How much time do you want
to spend doing things you don't want to do in order to do things you
do want to do? There are a few pure positions but they are hard to come
by.460
As several lawyers acknowledged, they or others have essentially cre-
ated their own jobs in this way. A corporate social responsibility lawyer
said, "A lot of people who are in this space created their own jobs. It re-
quires a lot of persistence and resilience.' 46 If you want to work on cli-
mate change, another said, "jobs are where you create them."A
62
At the other end of the spectrum, a smaller number of those inter-
viewed said that there are few, if any, jobs in law related to sustainability.
"There is more traction in sustainability in engineering or science," an en-
vironmental attorney said.463 "It seems very soft in law right now. 464An-
other environmental lawyer said: "I've been trying to broaden my practice
into the sustainability arena, and I really haven't found anything out
there."A65 One lawyer has tried and failed to convince colleagues at that
lawyer's firm, as well as other firms, to embrace sustainability:
Most law firms have not figured out how to monetize sustainability.
Until they do, they are not going to pay attention. I've had those con-
versations, and advocated that every firm should have a sustainability
practice group, but it is hard for them to make money doing that. If
they can't make money or commit to pro bono, how can you convince
people to do it?46 6
As several attorneys see it, the lack of legal jobs is due in no small
part to competition from consultants or nonlawyers. This lawyer's expla-
nation is illustrative:
When this all started, a sustainability lawyer might be the only sustain-
ability person in the room. Now, there are consultants and internal sus-
tainability staff and officers at corporations who have their own sus-
tainability expertise at less cost. That has lowered the number of op-
portunities for sustainability lawyers.467
460. Id. at 46.
461. Id. at 47.
462. Id. at 44.
463. Id. at 46.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 45.




In a fundamental sense, this Article is about the role of law and law-
yers in achieving the transition to a sustainable future. The lawyers who
do sustainability-related legal work tend to have a solid operational under-
standing of what sustainable development means and requires. They do a
wide variety of legal work in many legal fields for a diverse range of cli-
ents. Their clients often come to them precisely because of their sustaina-
bility expertise, and they have developed savvy ways of raising sustaina-
bility issues and options when their clients come to them for other reasons.
They fimd ways of reducing the adverse environmental and social impacts
of their clients' actions, and find ways to create positive impacts. They are
also maximizing environmental, social, and economic opportunities for
their clients, and identifying better choices (if the client is open to those
opportunities and choices). They have come to sustainability by a variety
of routes, but they are passionate and knowledgeable in what they do. And
they tend to recognize that sustainability can be part of every legal prac-
tice.
But it should also be clear from the variety of views expressed in this
Article that they do not all think exactly the same way about sustainable
development or the role of sustainability in law practice. And readers with
experience in the practice of law, particularly environmental law, will have
almost certainly recognized that some of what these lawyers describe in
sustainability terms is the same kind of work that was described decades
ago, in terms of cost savings or protection of the client's legal position by
going beyond compliance.468 A lawyer who works with business start-ups
described the role of attorneys in this transition by contrasting attorneys
who see sustainability as a form of compliance with existing laws, and
those who (like this lawyer) see the need for laws and lawyers that support
and encourage sustainable development at the necessary scale:
When I started this, I looked at law firms and consultancies and bank-
ing firms, to see what they were doing. Sustainability covers it all. My
working hypothesis is that most lawyers are adopting that brand to pri-
marily describe an environmental regulatory practice rather than a cor-
porate innovation or client-focused sustainability perspective. From
the client's perspective, they are interested in sustainability as a regu-
latory compliance matter, trying to minimize the regulatory burden on
their clients. There is a big disconnect in capitalism that requires a least
common denominator-environmental law. But these regulations are
not aspirational; they are a bare minimum.469
Some of what these lawyers describe in sustainability terms is almost
certainly a relabeling of work that was previously described in other terms.
468. BRUCE SMART, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: A NEW INDUSTRY VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENT
(1992).
469. Id. at 48.
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And some of the work described here is more modest-the use of sustain-
ability to achieve compliance with environmental laws by cheaper and
more efficient methods. But much of it is more far reaching-helping
companies, businesses, and governments to achieve their ambitious sus-
tainability goals, or nudging them to understand how a sustainability per-
spective can reduce the environmental and social harms they would other-
wise create and even create economic, environmental, and social benefits.
Given the magnitude of the climate change challenge and other sustaina-
bility issues, the aspirational part of sustainability almost certainly repre-
sents the future direction of laws and lawyers.
For all of these lawyers, however, sustainable development provides
a common perspective and set of principles to guide decision making. All
of them see how it leads to better decisions, however much they or others
might wish to see even better decisions or see better decision making em-
ployed at a vastly greater scale. By understanding what they all do, we












1. How long have you been in this position?
2. What kind of work do you do, and who are clients?
3. How did you get interested in sustainability?
4. What is your understanding of sustainability?
5. Under what circumstances do your clients raise sustainability
issues with you?
6. Under what circumstances do you raise sustainability issues
with your clients?
7. When you talk to clients about sustainability, what do you say?
8. Apart from client counseling, what type of other legal work do
you do on sustainability?
9. What personal or professional characteristics are most essential
to your sustainability work?
10. What do you find most rewarding about your sustainability
work?
11. What do you find least enjoyable or most frustrating?
12. What do you see as the greatest roadblocks to sustainability?
13. Where are the jobs in sustainability and law? (current and
future)
190 [Vol. 95:1
DEFINING AND CLOSING THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
GOVERNANCE GAP
GRACE HEUSNER, ALLISON SLOTO & JOSHUA ULAN GALPERINt
ABSTRACT
This Article makes the case for the importance of, and authority for,
local leadership on fracking governance. We do this by first surveying
the public governance structure related to hydraulic fracturing at the fed-
eral level, by reviewing the traditional scope of local land use authority,
and through a close examination of four states. Specifically, we describe
the fracking statutes and regulations in Colorado, North Dakota, Penn-
sylvania, and Texas, and take a close look at how municipalities in those
states have attempted to deal with fracking within their borders. We also
present a list of the most salient local impacts of hydraulic fracturing,
including a description of the methods we employed to catalogue these
local impacts. Finally, we make explicit how local governments might
use that authority to address fracking by presenting a series of case stud-
ies that demonstrate different local governance mechanisms.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODSUCTION .................................................. 193
I. FEDERAL HYDRAULIC FRACTURING GOVERNANCE ....... ........ 195
A. Clean Air Act ............................ .... ........ 196
B. Clean Water Act.................................... 198
C. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act .................................. ...... 202
D. Endangered Species Act...................... ........ 203
E. National Environmental Policy Act ............. ......... 204
F. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act........ .......... 205
G. Safe Drinking Water Act .............................. 206
t Grace Heusner is an associate attorney at Covington & Burling LLP, served as a law clerk
on the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, and is a 2016 graduate of Yale Law
School. Allison Sloto is an associate attorney at Cuddy & Feder LLP and is a 2016 graduate of the
Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies and the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace
University. Joshua Galperin is on the faculty at Yale Law School and the Yale School of Forestry
and Environmental Studies. The authors would like to thank John Nolon and Jessica Bacher for their
support, leadership, direction, and substantive input over the past several years as this paper devel-
oped. We would also like to thank Avana Andrade, Rebecca Gallagher, and Chris Halfnight for their
incredible research assistance at the early stages of this work. Finally, the authors thank the Oscar M.
Ruebhausen Fund at Yale Law School and former Dean Peter Crane at the Yale School of Forestry
and Environmental Studies for financially supporting the research that underpins this Article.
191
192 DENVER LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 95:1
H. Toxic Substances Control Act and Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act........................ 208
I. Gaps in Federal Regulations ........................ 211
II. STATE REGULATIONS ....................................... 212
A. Colorado ...................................... 213
1. Overview .................................... 213
2. Permitting & Reporting Requirements ........ .......... 215
3. Casing & Cementing Standards ................ .... 216
4. Air ......................................... 216
5. Water: Surface, Ground, and Wastewater ..... ........ 216
6. Recent Updates........................... 217
B. North Dakota. ................................... 218
1. Overview .................................... 218
2. Permitting & Reporting Requirements........... ..... 218
3. Casing & Cementing Standards .................... 219
4. Air ............................... .......... 219
5. Water: Surface, Ground, and Wastewater ..... ........ 220
6. Recent Updates.. ........................ ........ 220
C. Pennsylvania ............................... ..... 221
1. Overview ............................... ..... 221
2. Permitting & Reporting Requirements........... ..... 222
3. Casing & Cementing Standards ..................... 223
4. Water: Surface, Ground, and Wastewater ........ ........ 223
5. Air ......................................... 224
6. Recent Updates. ........................ ........ 224
D. Texas ............... .................... ..... 226
1. Overview ........................................ 226
2. Permitting & Reporting Requirements........... ..... 226
3. Casing & Cementing Standards ............. ........ 227
4. Air ......................................... 228
5. Water: Surface, Ground, and Wastewater... .............. 228
6. Recent Updates. ................................ 229
E. Gaps in State Regulation........................... 229
III. LOCAL LAND USE AUTHORITY ............................... 230
A. Home Rule Powers .......................... ..... 232
B. Police Powers .............................. ..... 233
C. Preemption ........................................... 234
1. Legal Nature .................................. 234
2. Politics and the Local Governance of Fracking .... ...... 236
D. Nonregulatory Governmental Approaches ............... 236
IV. IDENTIFYING THE LOCAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 237
A. Methods ................................ ....... 238
1. Project Origins ......................... ....... 238
2. Meeting with Stakeholders .................. ...... 238
3. Building the Impacts List........... .................. 240
B. The Local Impacts ofHydraulic Fracturing ......... ......... 241
20171 THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING GOVERNANCE GAP
V. OVERLAP BETWEEN LOCAL CONCERNS AND LOCAL AUTHORITY. 246
A. What Local Governments Can Do ............................ 248
B. What Local Governments Are Doing: Case Studies .... ..... 249
1. Erie, Colorado: A Novel Nonregulatory Approach ............... 249
2. McKenzie County, North Dakota: A Rural Hybrid
Approach ............................ ............ 252
3. Peters Township, Pennsylvania: A Regulatory Approach..... 254
4. Arlington, Texas: An Urban Hybrid Approach..... ..... 257
CONCLUSION ................................................. 260




How many articles over the past half-decade have begun by describ-
ing the dramatic growth and impacts of fracking? A lot-over 1,200, to
be precise.' We therefore leave that description to others. The purpose of
this Article, instead, is to catalogue the full public governance structure
around hydraulic fracturing, to identify expressed community concerns
around fracking that are uniquely local in nature, and to provide guidance
to local governments on how to manage these local impacts.
Beyond questions about broad issues of climate change and Ameri-
ca's energy mix, much of the debate around hydraulic fracturing has cen-
tered on tensions between local communities, state governments, and
industry.2 These tensions can arise because local communities object to
fracking, and local governments respond by banning the practice. Con-
versely, conflicts may arise when local communities express concerns
but local governments are unprepared to act in line with their citizens'
interests.3
As recent examples in Texas and Colorado have shown, if local
governments ban fracking, they risk pushback from state governments,
1. A November 2017 Westlaw search for "fracking" in law reviews and journals returns
1,243 results since January 2010.
2. See, e.g., All Four Colorado Oil, Gas Ballot Measures Withdrawn as Promised, DENV.
POST (Aug. 5, 2014, 11:14 AM) [hereinafter Ballot Measures Withdrawn],
http://www.denverpost.com/2014/08/05/all-four-colorado-oil-gas-ballot-measures-withdrawn-as-
promised; Molly Hennessy-Fiske, In Denton, Texas, Voters Approve 'Unprecedented' Fracking Ban,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014, 7:19 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nationa/la-na-texas-fracking-
20141108-story.html; Anna Driver & Terry Wade, Texas Governor Signs Law To Prohibit Local Oil
Well Fracking Bans, REUTERS (May 18, 2015, 3:07 PM), http:/www.reuters.com/article/fracking-
texas/texas-govemor-signs-law-to-prohibit-local-oil-well-fracking-bans-
idUSLINOY922Q20150518.
3. E.g., Interview by Allison Sloto with John Smith, Partner, Smith Butz, LLC (Jan. 25,
2016) (noting that local officials in several Pennsylvania towns are struggling with the proper meth-
ods for addressing fracking because of their concern about technical and legal questions).
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and this pushback can result in express preemption of local authority.4
Preemption occurs when there is conflict between state and local laws or
actions, as described in more detail in Part III. 5 If states support hydraulic
fracturing but local governments institute local bans, states have re-
6sponded by undermining the local action. Where a conflict already ex-
ists between state law and the local ban, states will institute legal actions
to undo the local ban. In spring 2016, the Colorado Supreme Court, for
example, addressed this exact issue. If state law does not already prevent
bans, states can legislate, post hoc, to unravel the ban. In 2015, this pre-
8cise scenario occurred in Texas. In either case, an outright local ban on
fracking may be self-defeating, because it could ultimately result in less
local control over the negative (and positive) impacts of hydraulic frac-
turing.
There are, of course, different perspectives on the impacts of frack-
ing, and the appropriate nature of regulation,9 but there is scientific un-
derstanding about the types of impacts that hydraulic fracturing may
cause.'0 The process of hydraulic fracturing itself can impact
water availability, spills of chemicals at the surface, and induced
seismicity that very rarely can be felt. Issues associated with the more
complete process of oil and gas drilling and production . . . include
all of the above as well as groundwater quality degradation, reduced
air quality, noise, night sky light pollution, impacts of sand mining
for use in hydraulic fracturing process, landscape changes such as
forest fragmentation, surface water quality degradation from waste
fluid disposal, and induced seismicity from the injection of waste flu-
ids deep into disposal wells.11
As discussed further in Part IV, there are also community and eco-
nomic impacts-both positive and negative-from hydraulic fracturing
and its attendant activities. While the severity of these issues vary, the
breadth and diversity creates a need for some degree of safeguards.
4. See id.
5. See PATRICIA E. SALKIN, I AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 6:28 (5th ed. 2017).
6. See, e.g., Jacy Marmaduke, High Court Strikes Down Fort Collins' Halt to Fracking,




8. See Driver & Wade, supra note 2.
9. See, e.g., Michael Burger, Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
150, 158-59 (2013).
10. See, e.g., U.S. Geological Survey, What Environmental Issues are Associated with Hy-
draulic Fracturing?, USGS, https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/what-environmental-issues-are-associated-
hydraulic-fracturing?qt-newsscienceproducts=7#qt-newsscienceproducts (last visited Sept. 17,
2017).
11. U.S. Geological Survey, Hydraulic Fracturing ("Fracking") FAQ, USGS,
https://web.archive.org/web/20161210142723/https://www2.usgs.gov/faq/categories/1 0132/3821
(last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
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Given the potential impacts of hydraulic fracturing, and the poten-
tially self-defeating nature of local fracking bans, local governments
should address the impacts of fracking through more traditional local
governance mechanisms that do not pose as great a risk to local authori-
ty. Ultimately, fracking is a land use not entirely different from other
industrial land uses with which local governments have long histories of
governing through zoning and planning tools as well as nonregulatory
techniques. The election of President Donald Trump and Republican
control in Congress suggests that oil and gas exploration will continue to
be an issue attracting attention at all levels of governance, and therefore,
the issues surrounding fracking remain relevant.12
On this premise, this Article seeks to make the case for the im-
portance of, and authority for, local leadership on fracking governance.
Parts I and II give an overview of the federal and state laws that address
fracking and identify gaps in both regimes. In Part III, we describe the
traditional scope of local land use authority. In Part IV, we present a list
of the most salient local impacts of hydraulic fracturing, including a de-
scription of the methods we employed to catalogue these local impacts.
Finally, in Part V, we make explicit how local governments might use
that authority to address fracking by presenting a series of case studies
that demonstrate different local governance mechanisms.
I. FEDERAL HYDRAULIC FRACTURING GOVERNANCE
The current federal hydraulic fracturing regulatory system is both
fragmented and incomplete. This Part identifies aspects of fracking that
are covered by federal regulations and highlights many of the gaps and
shortcomings in that coverage. Major federal environmental legislation-
the Clean Air Act (CAA), 13 the Clean Water Act (CWA),1 4 the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA)," the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA),1 7 the Resource Conservation and Recov-
119
ery Act (RCRA), 8 the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),19 and Toxic
Substance Control Act (TSCA)20-all nominally cover aspects of the
fracking lifecycle. However, these statutes essentially all contain exemp-
12. See, e.g., Gaurav Sharma, Making America 'Crude' Again: U.S. Oil and Gas Industry
Feels the Trump Effect, FoRBES (Jan. 27, 2017, 4:36 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gauravsharma/2017/01/27/making-america-crude-again-us-oil-and-gas-
industry-feels-the-trump-effect/#436b14632213.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2012).
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281a, 1294-1287 (2012).
15. Pub.L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C & 42
U.S.C.).
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2012).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (2012).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (2012).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (2012).
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tions, limitations, or nuances that limit their effectiveness in protecting
the environment from negative impacts of fracking.
Overall, the federal government has not enacted a comprehensive
fracking regulatory regime, instead leaving the majority of regulation to
"a patchwork of state policies."2 1 There are few federal approvals re-
quired as part of a fracking operation; for example, there is no require-
ment to seek federal licensing approvals before beginning fracking activ-
ity.2 2 Yet federal regulations may apply "if the fracking operation risks
harm to an endangered species, will result in a discharge to surface wa-
ters or a pretreatment facility," or involves the transport of hazardous
chemicals.23 Moreover, federal regulations may also apply when the op-
eration includes methane or hazardous air pollutant emissions.24 Still,
fracking operations may avoid regulation under some of these regulatory
25frameworks because of explicit exemptions.
As a result, if a fracking operation and its ancillary activities do not
fall into one of these federal regulatory systems, then no federal approval
is needed under any environmental law. 26 For example, if a fracking pro-
ject does not trigger requirements to obtain federal approvals under any
of the federal environmental laws, there will not be a corresponding re-
quirement to undertake an environmental review under NEPA or obtain a
state permitting certification under the CWA.27
The following Sections will provide an overview of the major fed-
eral environmental laws and analyze the degree to which these statutes
address hydraulic fracturing.
A. Clean Air Act
The CAA seeks to decrease air pollution, but until recently, the
CAA and accompanying administrative regulations did not address
fracking directly. In 2012, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
instituted a new rule integrating fracking into the ambit of CAA regula-
tion. 2 8 That rule encompassed several aspects of fracking. First, EPA set
"[N]ew [S]ource [P]erformance [S]tandards (NSPS) for industrial cate-
gories that cause, or significantly contribute to, air pollution that may
21. Emily C. Powers, Fracking and Federalism: Support for an Adaptive Approach That
Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L. & POL'Y 913, 940-41 (2011).
22. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 477 (2013).
23. Id. at 477-78.
24. See id. at 484.
25. Id. at 478.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490, 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, 63).
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endanger public health or welfare." 29 The NSPS rules regulate volatile
organic compound (VOC) emissions from gas wells, storage tanks, and
other equipment, as well as "leaking components at onshore natural gas
processing plants."30 Among other things, oil and gas wells must now
have equipment ("green completions") able to capture escaping volatile
organic compound emission.31 EPA also promulgated "green comple-
tion" rules regulating the release of hazardous air pollutants.32 The final
rule took effect on October 15, 2012.33
More recent action demonstrates EPA's intent to expand air pollu-
tion regulation. In November 2015, EPA issued a request for additional
data and information on hazardous air pollutants that was not available in
2012.34 In May 2016, EPA finalized climate-change-related updates to its
2012 green completion rule to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.35 The
updates add methane to the pollutants covered by the 2012 rule, as well
as requirements for detecting and repairing leaks, and requirements to
limit emissions from pneumatic pumps used at well sites.36 The agency
explains that all of these actions will reduce methane emissions and re-
duce air pollution, help combat climate change, and provide more guid-
ance about CAA permitting requirements for the oil and natural gas in-
dustry.
37
The cumulative impact of these rules has been to mandate many on-
shore natural gas fracking operations take action under the CAA to ad-
dress VOCs and methane emissions.
29. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF FINAL AMENDMENTS TO AIR REGULATIONS
FOR THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 4 (2012),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
09/documents/naturalgas transmission fact sheet_2012.pdf.
30. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490, 49,492 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, 63).
31. Id.
32. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 29; see also Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New
Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Re-
views, 77 Fed. Reg. at 49,492; What Are Hazardous Air Pollutants?, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/haps/what-are-hazardous-air-pollutants (la t visited Sept. 28, 2017) ("Hazard-
ous air pollutants . . . [include 187 pollutants classified by EPA as those] known or suspected to
cause cancer or other serious health effects, such as reproductive effects or birth defects, or adverse
environmental effects.").
33. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. at 49,490.
34. Actions and Notices about Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/controlling-air-pollution-oil-and-natural-gas-industry/actions-and-notices-
about-oil-and-natural-gas (last updated July 12, 2017).
35. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified
Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824, 35,824 (Jun. 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
36. Id. at 35,830, 35,844, 35,846.
37. EPA Releases First-Ever Standards to Cut Methane Emissions from the Oil and Gas
Sector, EPA (May 12, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-releases-first-ever-standards-
cut-methane-emissions-oil-and-gas-sector.
38. See id; see also Actions and Notices about Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards,
supra note 34.
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B. Clean Water Act
The CWA is the primary federal regulatory tool to manage surface
water pollution.39 Passed in 1972, the CWA set "effluent limitations and
standards governing the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the
United States."40 The CWA ensures that these standards are met by re-
quiring that point sources that discharge into waters of the United
States-including both private facilities and publicly owned treatment
works-obtain a permit pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES).4 ' Either EPA, or states and Indian tribes
that have adopted an EPA-approved water program may issue these per-
mits.42 Most of the states in the United States operate under EPA-
approved programs.43
NPDES permits implement EPA standards by setting "effluent limi-
tations," which "impose restrictions on the quantity or concentration of
pollutants that may be discharged."44 These limitations are set to a floor
which is based on available control technology: either the "best available
technology [] for toxic [or] non-conventional pollutants [or the] 'best
conventional technology []' for a limited number of 'conventional pollu-
tants' (including "pH, biological oxygen demand, total suspended sol-
ids, fecal coliform, and oil and grease").45 Sources whose construction
began after EPA promulgated national standards, called "new sources,"
must comply with "new source performance standards" for all pollutants
representing "best available demonstrated control technology" at the time
of construction.46
Theoretically, there are two ways in which EPA could regulate wa-
ter. First, the agency could regulate the direct discharge of wastewater
from fracking sites. Second, EPA could regulate subsurface injection of
produced wastewater. The CWA does only the former: it regulates the
39. Kevin J. Garber et al., Water Sourcing and Wastewater Disposal: Two of the Least Worri-
some Aspects of Marcellus Shale Development in Pennsylvannia, 13 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 169, 183 (2011).
40. Jason Obold, Leading by Example: The Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of
Chemicals Act of 2011 as a Catalyst for International Drilling Reform, 23 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 473, 486, 486 n.77 (2012); see also Garber et al., supra note 39 (stating effluent limits are
generally either technology-based or water quality-based).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012) (proscribing discharge unless provided otherwise); id. § 1342
(outlining rules governing permits for discharge); see also Obold, supra note 40, at 486.
42. 40 C.F.R. § 123.1 (2017); see also Obold, supra note 40, at 486.
43. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Flowback: Federal Regulation of Wastewater f om Hydraulic Frac-
turing, 39 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 251, 283 (2014); see also NPDES State Program Information, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-information (last updated Feb. 6, 2017) (outlining
EPA process of delegating permitting authority).
44. Gaba, supra note 43; see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 435.30-34 (2017).
45. Gaba, supra note 43, at 284; see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1311(b)(2)(E),
1314(a)(4), 1314(b)(4)(A).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1)(B).
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direct surface discharge of wastewater from fracking, but does not regu-
late the underground activities.47
The CWA provides EPA with the authority to regulate the direct
48discharge of wastewater. However, there are no categorical standards
for the disposal of wastewater discharged from natural gas activities.4 9
As a result, shale gas wastewater is generally transported to publicly
owned treatment works, or private centralized waste treatment facili-
ties50-which may not always be properly equipped to treat hydraulic
fracturing wastewater.
EPA has established a national effluent limitation for oil and gas ex-
traction point source categories, and the applicable regulation states that
"there shall be no [on-site direct] discharge of waste water pollutants into
navigable waters from any source associated with production, field ex-
ploration, drilling, well completion, or well treatment."5 1 However, there
is an exception for "wastewater that is of good enough quality for use in
agricultural and wildlife propagation."52 For fracking specifically, EPA
has interpreted its national effluent limitation for oil and gas extraction to
apply to wastewater emitted from fracking in shale formations as well as
sandstone gas facilities. However, EPA has concluded that fracking in
coalbeds to produce coalbed methane is not subject to these same re-
quirements.
As to the underground injection of discharged wastewater, the
CWA has not been a successful tool for restricting the underground
emission of fracking wastewater because only the actual surface dis-
charge of fracking wastewater is subject to regulation.54 Although one
could argue that a subsurface discharge could trigger CWA if it had a
link to surface pollution-for example, groundwater flowing into surface
water-EPA has not enforced underground operations under the CWA.
Further, although some commentators argue that the CWA should not
regulate groundwater,56 the majority of hydraulic fracturing's risk to wa-
47. See Obold, supra note 40, at 486.
48. 40 C.F.R. §§ 435.30, 435.32 (2017).
49. Natural Gas Extraction - Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing (last updated Dec. 30, 2016) (noting that there are "differ-
ent management methods employed by industry" and describing the ways that EPA is working with
industry to consider different policy frameworks for different disposal techniques).
50. Id.
51. 40 C.F.R. § 435.32.
52. Natural Gas Extraction - Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 49.
53. Unconventional Oil and Gas Extraction Effluent Guidelines, EPA,
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/oilandgas/unconv.cfm (last updated Aug. 7, 2014).
54. Obold, supra note 40, at 486.
55. Cf Obold, supra note 40, at 486 ("The CWA has been successful at regulating the surface





ter is underground through injection.57 Underground injection can occur
at two parts of the fracking process. First, there is injection of fracking
fluid to stimulate the well.5 Second, there is often underground injection
at the end of the process to dispose of produced wastewater back into the
well.5 9 Further, some of the most salient concerns about fracking stem
from the injection of chemicals underground as part of the extraction
process and into the wells themselves.60 Thus, because the CWA does
not regulate underground releases of polluted water, the Act is limited in
its ability to regulate fracking.
In some respects, fracking regulations under the CWA have been
eroded since 1987. In that year, Congress passed CWA amendments to
exempt oil and gas exploration, production, and processing operations
from permitting requirements.61 Then, in 2005, Congress further exempt-
ed onshore oil and gas facilities from stormwater permitting require-
ments under the CWA. 62 Although this exemption only applies to storm-
water that does not come in contact with any on-site waste it still demon-
strates intent to chip away at the CWA power.63
However, there has been some strengthening of fracking regulations
after the 2008 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. EPA .64 In that case, environmental groups
challenged EPA's rule that exempted oil and gas construction stormwater
from the CWA.65 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
environmental challengers, finding that the language of the CWA did not
66allow for a stormwater exemption. The Ninth Circuit thus vacated
EPA's rule that had exempted stormwater runoff from the CWA.67 As a
result of that decision, oil and gas construction activities discharging
stormwater, even when contaminated only by sediment, must obtain an
57. John Craven, Fracking Secrets: The Limitations of Trade Secret Protection in Hydraulic
Fracturing, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 395, 408-09 (2014).
58. Id. at 399-400.
59. Inessa Abayev, Hydraulic Fracturing Wastewater: Making the Case for Treating the
Environmentally Condemned, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 300 (2013).
60. Id. at 305.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (excluding from the SDWA definition of under-
ground injection "the underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels)
pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities");
see Sandra Zellmer, Treading Water While Congress Ignores the Nation's Environment, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2323, 2359-60 (2013).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(24) (2012) ("The term 'oil and gas exploration, production, processing,
or treatment operations or transmission facilities' means all field activities or operations . . . includ-
ing activities necessary to prepare a site for drilling and for the movement and placement of drilling
equipment, whether or not such field activities or operations may be considered to be construction
activities."); see Zellmer, supra note 61.
63. See Adam Kron, EPA's Role in Implementing and Maintaining the Oil and Gas Industry's
Environmental Exemptions: A Study in Three Statutes, 16 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 586, 596-97 (2015).
64. 526 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2008).
65. Id. at 593-94.
66. Kron, supra note 63, at 596-97.
67. Nat. Res. Def Council, 526 F.3d at 594.
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NPDES permit, as long as the well pad and access road are one acre or
larger in size.68 However, wastewater discharges containing other con-
taminants remain subject to the CWA permitting requirements.6 9
More recently in June 2016, EPA finalized a rule to set standards
for wastewater discharges produced by natural gas extraction and des-
tined for publically owned wastewater treatment plants.7 The agency
also announced that it would discontinue rulemaking for coalbed me-
thane extraction.7 Further limiting its regulation over fracking, EPA
issued its Preliminary 2016 Effluent Guidelines Program Plan in June
722016. This plan concluded that "no additional industries warrant[ed]
new or revised effluent guidelines" and so EPA is neither crafting new
effluent guidelines nor revising any existing effluent guidelines.73
Thus, while there have been several efforts in the last ten years to
erode the CWA power and authority, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council v. EPA has helped provide more au-
thority for EPA to regulate broader types of contamination in
wastewater. However, there is still an opportunity for EPA to more com-
prehensively protect waters of the United States by utilizing CWA au-
thority to regulate subsurface wastewater disposal that has a connection
to surface waters.74
68. Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic
Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 200 (2013);
see also Amendments to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Regulations
for Storm Water Discharges Associated With Oil and Gas Exploration, Production, Processing, or
Treatment Operations or Transmission Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,628, 33,639 (June 12, 2006) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122) (allowing an exemption for "small construction activities"); MICHAEL
LAUFFER, IMPACT OF NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL V. U.S. EPA (9 CIR. 2008) 526 F.3D
591 ON THE REGULATION OF STORM WATER DISCHARGES OF SEDIMENT FROM OIL AND GAS
CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES 1, 4 (2009),
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/water issues/programs/stormwater/docs/public oil gas memo021809.pdf.
69. See 40 C.F.R. § 435.32 (2017).
70. Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Oil and Gas Extraction Point
Source Category, 81 Fed. Reg. 41,845, 41,845 (Jun. 28, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 435).
71. Id. at 41,848.
72. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-821-R-16-001, PRELIMINARY 2016
EFFLUENT GUIDELINES PROGRAM PLAN 1-1 (2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-06/documents/prelim-2016-eg-planjune-2016.pdf.
73. Id.
74. One additional potential tool to regulate fracking through the Clean Water Act may be
through the portion of the Act that "authorizes permit writers to develop specific technology-based
limitations on pollutants in fracking wastewater based on 'best professional judgment' ('BPJ')."
Gaba, supra note 43, at 303.
These limitations allow the permit writer to exercise judgment in establishing permit limits appropri-
ate to the facility. Id. There are two circumstances in which permit writers may set best professional
judgment limitations on pollutants: First, BPJ may be invoked "if there are no promulgated national
standards applicable to the permittee." Id at 304. Second, BPJ may be used if pollutants are not
specifically regulated under the national standards, which "could form the basis for imposing addi-
tional technology-based limits on the discharge of fracking wastewater from private CTW [central-
ized wastewater treatment] facilities." Id.
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C. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act
CERCLA was created in 1980 to authorize cleanup of contaminated
properties and provide a cost recovery action for litigants. Any of the
following elements may establish a cost recovery action under CERCLA:
"(1) the defendant [is a] 'responsible party'; (2) [] hazardous substances
are disposed of at a 'facility'; (3) there is a 'release' or threatened release
of hazardous substances into the environment; or (4) the release causes
the incurrence of 'response costs."76 A CERCLA response action is thus
available where hazardous substances resulting from a federally permit-
ted release have contaminated the surface water, soil, or groundwater.77
Under CERCLA, the definition of "hazardous substance" includes
hazardous chemicals or substances included in TSCA, with the exception
of petroleum.7 8 This exception also includes crude oil, or "any fraction
thereof." 79 In Wiltshire Westwood Associates v. Atlantic Richfield
Corp., 80 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that constituent parts of gasoline
must also be excluded, or the exclusion would be meaningless.8 ' These
constituents have been interpreted to include any distillation of petrole-
um, including diesel fuel and the compounds (such as benzene, toluene,
ethylbenzene, and xylene) constituting diesel.82
The petroleum exemption also applies to "natural gas, natural gas
liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel."83 Adam
Kron reasons that, given the statute's language, it may be possible to
argue that the exclusion does not cover releases at modem natural gas
wells.8 4 This is because "the natural gas provision of the exclusion does
not include the 'any fraction thereof language in the petroleum provi-
sion, and it includes the modifier 'usable for fuel."' 8 5 Kron argues that,
since natural gas cannot be used for fuel until after a series of processing
steps to remove several "toxic constituents," "a release of unprocessed
natural gas or a release of the constituents removed by processing is not
75. Sean H. Joyner, Superfund to the Rescue? Seeking Potential CERCLA Response Authority
and Cost Recovery Liability for Releases of Hazardous Substances Resulting from Hydraulic Frac-
turing, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y, I11, 129 (2011).
76. U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258-59 (3d Cir. 1992); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(22) (2012) ("The term 'release' means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment.").
77. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d at 261; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10) (defining a "fed-
erally permitted release" as a discharge or emission that is allowed under a particular environmental
statute given that statute's permitted allowances or discharge limits).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
79. Id.
80. 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989).
81. Id. at 805.
82. Joyner, supra note 75, at 130.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
84. Kron, supra note 63, at 595.
85. Id. at 596.
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exempt and still should trigger CERCLA's liability and notification pro-
visions."
CERCLA allows "any injection of fluids or other materials author-
ized under applicable State law [] for the purpose of stimulating or treat-
ing wells for the production of crude oil, natural gas, or water, [] for the
purpose of . .. recovery of crude oil or natural gas."87 As a result, the
underground injection of fluids for fracking is a federally-permitted re-
lease under CERCLA § 101(10)(I), as long as the release is permitted at
the state level.88 Thus, fracking injection is exempt from CERCLA liabil-
ity.89
However, there remains a debate over the limits of fracking fluid
exemptions from cleanup liability. 90 Scholars note that EPA has used
CERCLA § 104(e) to investigate water that may be contaminated with
fracking fluids.91 Further, though petroleum and gas are excluded, courts
have held that liability attaches to an entire site if multiple hazardous
substances, such as diesel, are inextricably mixed together such that pe-
troleum cannot be separated from the other chemicals.92
To conclude, although the injection of fracking fluids into wells is
generally exempt under CERCLA,93 there is some ambiguity about
whether EPA has the authority to investigate water contaminated with
fracking fluid. However, spills are likely not as big of a concern for local
governments given their infrequency.94
D. Endangered Species Act
Fracking operations must comply with the ESA.95 If a species is
listed under the ESA, all federal agencies are prohibited from authoriz-
ing, funding, or carrying out actions (including issuing permits) that "re-
sult in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat."
96 In
2012, a United States Geological Survey (USGS) report documented that
shale gas and coalbed methane natural gas extraction practices between
86. Id.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10)(I).
88. Id.
89. Joyner, supra note 75, at 133-34 (noting that hazardous substances at the EPA study site
have been "so commingled with petroleum that they cannot be separated" and so CERCLA liability
should attach to the entire site).
90. Craven, supra note 57, at 410.
91. Id.
92. Joyner, supra note 75, at 133-34.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10) (2012).
94. EPA estimates that the number of spills related to hydraulic fracturing is less than one
hundred per year. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/601/R-
14/001, REVIEW OF STATE AND INDUSTRY SPILL DATA: CHARACTERIZATION OF HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING-RELATED SPILLS 9 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
05/documents/hf spillsreport final_5-12-15_508_kmsb.pdf (cataloguing 456 spills due to frack-
ing over six years).




2004 and 2010 in two Pennsylvania counties "create[d] potentially seri-
ous patterns of disturbance on the landscape."97 This finding is particu-
larly germane to the ESA because increases in habitat disturbances, such
as habitat fragmentation, can have negative impacts on the populations of
ESA-listed flora and fauna.98
The ESA applies to private and public property, and proscribes both
direct and indirect harms to listed species.99 As a result, the ESA has a
broad reach that can lead to extensive liability. Thus, the ESA can effec-
tively limit local impacts of hydraulic fracturing-but a species must be
listed to receive such protection.100
E. National Environmental Policy Act
While NEPA nominally applies to fracking, in practice fracking op-
erations are rarely subject to NEPA review for the reasons stated below.
Established in 1969, Congress envisioned NEPA as a regulatory program
that would require government agencies to consider environmental con-
cerns by identifying the environmental impacts of federal programs and
projects in an environmental impact statement (EIS).' 1 This intent was at
least thwarted in part by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which created a
"rebuttable presumption" that oil and gas operations fall under a "'cate-
gorical exception' to the normal procedural requirements."l02 To rebut
this presumption, a citizen bringing a suit must meet the high standard of
"extraordinary circumstances warranting a full NEPA review."I13 Fur-
ther, even if a particular project were subject to NEPA review, the opera-
tion would have to include federal actors or support in order to trigger
NEPA, and would have to be sufficiently "extraordinary" to rebut the
statutory exemption. Accordingly, only in rare circumstances does NEPA
apply to fracking operations. Ultimately, while NEPA review could pro-
vide substantial information on certain fracking activities, it provides
more in the way of transparency and review than in creating actual frack-
ing safeguards.
97. E.T. SLONECKER ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, OPEN FILE REPORT 2012-1154,
LANDSCAPE CONSEQUENCES OF NATURAL GAS EXTRACTION IN BRADFORD AND WASHINGTON
COUNTIES, PENNSYLVANIA, 2004-2010, at 1 (2012), http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2012/1154/of2012-
1154.pdf; see also Kalyani Robbins, Awakening the Slumbering Giant: How Horizontal Drilling
Technology Brought the Endangered Species Act to Bear on Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1143, 1154 (2013).
98. See Robbins, supra note 97, at 1154-55.
99. Id. at 1151.
100. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (delineating protections for species that have already
been listed as endangered).
101. Craven, supra note 57, at 410.
102. Id. at 410-11; see also 42 U.S.C. § 15942 (2012).
103. Craven, supra note 57, at 410-11 (quoting Daniel R. Cahoy et al., Fracking Patents: The
Emergence ofPatents as Information Containment Tools in Shale Drilling, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 279, 313 (2013)).
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F. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RCRA establishes a framework that "regulates hazardous waste
from cradle to grave" through a specific use, transport, and disposal
standards and procedures.104 When Congress passed RCRA in 1976, the
statute included regulation over oil and gas production and waste.05
However, in 1980, Congress granted a temporary exemption to "explora-
tion . .. [and] production" oil and gas wastes.io' At that time, Congress
directed EPA to study whether these wastes should be regulated under
RCRA.107 EPA's study found that the regulation of oil and gas wastes
was unwarranted due to relatively low risks and the costs that would be
imposed on oil and gas producers.108 EPA also asserted that state and
other federal regulation of oil and gas wastes was generally adequate.109
Since then, identifying the contents of "waste generated from oil and gas
operations is not subject to federal hazardous waste regulation" under
Subtitle C of RCRA.110
However, EPA has recognized that some oil and gas exploration
and production wastes were hazardous, and that some state regulations
were lacking. Instead of regulating the wastes itself, EPA provided fund-
ing to the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC) to re-
view state regulations."' In 2009, IOGCC hosted two congressional
briefings on Capitol Hill attesting to the adequacy of the states' fracking
regulation writ large. 12 These briefings did not result in any changes to
the oil and gas exemption under RCRA.113 Thus, RCRA continues to
exempt waste generated from oil and gas operations.
104. Id. at 409.
105. James R. Cox, Revisiting RCRA 's Oilfield Waste Exemption as to Certain Hazardous
Oilfield Exploration and Production Wastes, 14 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2003).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id. at 5-6.
109. Id. at 5.
110. Craven, supra note 57, at 409. EPA exempted oil and gas from oversight in 1980, after a
study concluded that oil and gas exploration and production wastes did not warrant regulation under
RCRA. Gaba, supra note 43, at 271-72. "This conclusion was not based on [the idea] that the wastes
did not contain hazardous constituents . . . , [but that] existing state and federal programs adequately
addressed management of these wastes and that classifying oil and gas wastes as hazardous would
result in increased administrative burdens." Id. at 272-73. "[I]n 1988, EPA acknowledged that [the]
exemption was 'unwarranted."' Cameron Jefferies, Unconventional Bridges over Troubled Water -
Lessons to Be Learned from the Canadian Oil Sands as the United States Moves to Develop the
Natural Gas of the Marcellus Shale Play, 33 ENERGY L.J. 75, 99 (2012) (quoting Hannah Wiseman,
Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 244 (2010)).
111. Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
229, 248 (2010).
112. Issues, INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM'N, http://iogcc.ok.gov/hydraulic-
fracturing (lasted visited Sept. 30, 2017).
113. Proper Management of Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Waste, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/hw/proper-management-oil-and-gas-exploration-and-production-waste (last
updated Apr. 10, 2017).
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G. Safe Drinking Water Act
The SDWA seeks to protect public health by regulating the nation's
drinking supply1 4 through "national health-based standards for drinking
water to protect against both naturally-occurring and man-made contain-
mants that may be found in drinking water."11 5
The SDWA, passed in 1974, requires EPA to create a national max-
imum contaminate level when a particular contaminate "may have an
adverse effect on the health of persons" and "there is a substantial likeli-
hood that [it] will occur in public water systems."' 16 However, it is in the
"sole judgment of the [EPA] Administrator [whether] regulation of such
contaminant presents a meaningful opportunity for health risk reduc-
tion."'"7 Such discretion suggests that there is flexibility for the types of
contaminants covered by the SDWA, but also a great deal of discretion
endowed to the Administrator.
In lieu of federal agencies implementing their regulations, states
may also apply to EPA for "primacy," defined by EPA as "the authority
to implement the EPA's standards within an individual jurisdiction."" if
a state elects this option, it must submit an Underground Injection Con-
trol (UIC) proposal to EPA meeting EPA's minimum requirements."9
The UIC program regulates both the initial injection of fracking fluid and
post-fracking injection of wastewater. EPA retains the right to take regu-
latory power back from a state if it determines that the state UIC program
violates the SDWA.12 As of 2015, EPA has delegated the authority to
administer UIC programs to thirty-nine states.121
Despite state programs' prevalence, a 2014 Government Accounta-
bility Office (GAO) report found significant deficiencies in EPA's over-
sight of states' regulatory schemes.122 First, GAO "found that EPA was
not consistently conducting annual on-site reviews of state programs, as
is required by EPA's own guidance." 2 3 Second, GAO found that EPA
114. Obold, supra note 40, at 482.
115. Abayev, supra note 59, at 297 (quoting OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
EPA 816-F-04-030, UNDERSTANDING THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT (2004),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-04/documents/epa816f04030.pdf).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2012).
117. Id. § 300g-1(b)(l)(A)(iii); Angela C. Cupas, The Not-So-Safe Drinking Water Act: Why
We Must Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing at the Federal Level, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 605, 609 (2009).
118. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-F-04-030, UNDERSTANDING
THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT (2004), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
04/documents/epa816f04030.pdf.
119. Obold, supra note 40, at 482.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(c).
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was not adequately updating its regulations to track state program re-
124
quirements.
Fundamentally, fracking may impact drinking water in two primary
ways. The first is when fracking fluid is injected to stimulate the well,
and the second is when flowback wastewater is disposed in underground
injection wells. The SDWA regulates neither.
First, the SDWA does not regulate the injection of materials into
wells. Between 2000 and 2005, EPA conducted a study into coalbed me-
thane and found that the "injection of certain extraction materials into
[such] wells posed 'little or no threat to underground sources of drinking
water."'l2 5 In the wake of EPA's study, Congress passed the Energy Pol-
icy Act of 2005, which excluded most fluids used in the initial fracking
injection from regulation under SDWA.126 These amendments effectively
"exempt[] fracking companies from compliance with UIC programs be-
cause their fracking fluids no longer require a permit."l27
The only aspect of fracking regulated under the SDWA is when die-
sel fuel is used as a fluid to initially inject water into a recovery well.1
28
In that instance, EPA does have authority to regulate the underground
injection of diesel fuel through the UIC program.129 This means that
"[a]ny service company that performs hydraulic fracturing using diesel
fuel must receive prior authorization from the UIC program.",30
Second, the SDWA does not cover wastewater. The SDWA and the
CWA establish minimal federal standards for management of
wastewater. In Part C of the SDWA, underground drinking water sources
are addressed, and the Act requires EPA to "establish and publish regula-
124. Id.
125. Cupas, supra note 117, at 606 (quoting OFFICE OF GROUND WATER AND DRINKING
WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO
UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED
METHANE RESERVOIRS ES-i (2004)). "The formal battle over whether the Safe Drinking Water Act
must regulate hydraulic fracturing began in 1997, when the Legal Environmental Assistance Foun-
dation, Inc. filed a petition asking the EPA to withdraw its approval of Alabama's underground
injection program." Id. "[T]he EPA's draft study noted that over ten chemicals associated with
hydraulic fracturing required SDWA regulation, nine of which exceeded the regulatory standard,
however, in the final draft of the study, the EPA either completely removed or favorably altered
calculations regarding most of these chemicals." Id. at 614.
126. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694; see also
Abrahm Lustgarten, Former Bush EPA Official Says Fracking Exemption Went Too Far; Congress
Should Revisit, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 9, 2011, 12:21 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/former-
bush-epa-official-says-fracking-exemption-went-too-far (describing the motivation behind the ex-
emption).
127. Craven, supra note 57, at 407; see also Spence, supra note 22, at 449-50.
128. L. Poe Leggette et al., Federal Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing: A Conversational
Introduction, in 33 ENERGY & MINERAL LAW INST., THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE, 795, 824
(2012); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Class II Oil and Gas Related Injection Wells, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/uic/class-ii-oil-and-gas-related-injection-wells (last updated Sept. 6, 2016).
129. Natural Gas Extraction - Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 49; see also Leggette et al.,
supra note 128, at 828-29.
130. Leggette et al., supra note 128, at 828-29.
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tions that set minimum requirements and restrictions for underground
injections nationwide."l3 1 These include standards "for inspection, moni-
,,132toring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements. Yet because Part
C of the SDWA was specifically amended to exempt any "underground
injection of' most fluids "related to oil, gas, or geothermal production,"
fracking wastewater is not regulated by SDWA either.1 33 However, EPA
maintains authority over its UIC Class II wells, which "accept injection
of oil and gas wastewater . . . [s]o long as fracking for oil and gas pro-
duction is not involved."1 34
In 2009, Congress directed EPA to commission a new study to de-
termine the comprehensive effects of fracking on the environment, in-
cluding effects on drinking water.135 In December 2016, EPA published
the results of that study, finding that fracking can impact drinking water
under certain circumstances-particularly during spills and improper
disposal. 136
A final source of regulatory authority in the SDWA rests with
EPA's emergency powers: under § 1431 of the SDWA, EPA has "the
power to issue emergency orders if a contaminant in an underground
source of drinking water may present an 'imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to the health of persons."'37 However, because this provi-
sion applies only if there is substantial endangerment of human health,
the SDWA would not protect drinking water supplies before there are
negative human-health effects.38
H. Toxic Substances Control Act and Emergency Planning and Commu-
nity Right-to-Know Act
TSCA gives EPA the authority to require private companies to re-
port the types and amounts of chemicals in their products.1 39 These re-
porting requirements apply to companies that manufacture and/or import
a chemical substance listed on the TSCA Inventory and are not otherwise
exempt.140 In 2014, EPA proposed a new rule mandating that companies
report their usage of inorganic chemical substances-substances often
131. Obold, supra note 40, at 482; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-300h-8 (2012).
132. Craven, supra note 57, at 407 (quoting Rebecca Jo Reser & David T. Ritter, State and
Federal Legislation and Regulation ofHydraulic Fracturing, 57 ADVOC. (TEX.) 31, 31 (2011)).
133. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694.
134. Kron, supra note 63, at 617.
135. Obold, supra note 40, at 487.
136. OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-600-R-16-236Fa,
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER
CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES (2016).
137. Craven, supra note 57, at 407-08 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (2012)).
138. Id. at 408.
139. Leggette et al., supra note 128, at 823; see also Hydraulic Fracturing Chemicals and
Mixtures, EPA, https://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/rulegate.nsf/byRIN/2070-AJ93 (last visited Sept. 30,
2017).
140. Leggette et al., supra note 128, at 823.
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used in fracking.141 The Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
closed in September 2014, and the final rule has not yet been promulgat-
ed.142
Moreover, EPA recently lowered the chemical volume that must be
included in reported records in one calendar year, from 100,000 pounds
to 25,000.143 Some chemicals used in natural gas extraction are still ex-
empt from reporting, including petroleum process streams and liquefied
petroleum gas.144
EPA also agreed to propose rules under §§ 8(a) and 8(d) of the Act
that would require regulated parties to disclose information on "chemical
substances and mixtures used in hydraulic fracturing."1 45 These rules
would also create new transparency and access to information by requir-
ing manufacturers, processors, commercial distributors, and other regu-
lated entities to disclose health and safety research addressing the regu-
lated substances.146 As a result, some observers expect that "the burden
of compliance would more likely fall on service companies, as opposed
to oil and gas well operators." 47 This would create a new degree of
transparency, but would not control on-the-ground operations.
Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA), operators must maintain material safety data sheets for certain
chemicals that are stored at the drilling site above threshold quantities.1
48
However, oil and gas operators are not required to prepare annual toxic
chemical release forms, because the oil and gas industry is not one of the
listed industries under the Act.149 Further, although the EPCRA requires
that operators provide the data sheets to local emergency planning com-
mittees upon request, it also allows operators to claim that certain chemi-
cal compositions are "trade secrets" and are thus exempt from disclo-
150
sure.
On March 20, 2015, the Secretary of the Interior released final
standards that would "improve safety and help protect groundwater by
updating requirements for well-bore integrity, wastewater disposal and
public disclosure of chemicals."15  These standards would also purport-
141. See Hydraulic Fracturing Chemicals and Mixtures, 79 Fed. Reg. 28,664, 28,665-66 (pro-
posed May 19, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
142. Id. at 28,664; see also Regulatory Development and Retrospective Review Tracker: Hy-
draulic Fracturing Chemicals and Mixtures, EPA,
https://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/RuleGate.nsf/byRIN/2070-AJ9
3 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
143. Leggette et al., supra note 128, at 823.
144. 40 C.F.R. § 711.6(b)(1) (2017).
145. Hydraulic Fracturing Chemicals and Mixtures, 79 Fed. Reg. at 28,664.
146. Leggette et al., supra note 128.
147. Id.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 11021 (2012).
149. Wiseman, supra note I11, at 250 n.125.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 11042 (2012).
151. Interior Department Releases Final Rule to Support Safe, Responsible Hydraulic Fractur-
ing Activities on Public and Tribal Lands, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. (Mar. 20, 2015),
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edly include "measures to target where oil and gas leasing occurs[,] and
protect" "special" areas where no drilling should be permitted.152 Specif-
ically, key provisions of the rule include improved protection of ground-
water supplies by requiring a certification of
well integrity and strong cement barriers between the wellbore and
water zones through which the wellbore passes; [i]ncreased transpar-
ency by requiring companies to publicly disclose chemicals used in
hydraulic fracturing to the Bureau of Land Management . . . within
30 days of completing fracturing operations; [h]igher standards for
interim storage of recovered waste fluids from hydraulic fracturing to
mitigate risks to air, water, and wildlife; [and] [m]easures to lower
the risk of cross-well contamination with chemicals and fluids used
in the fracturing operation by [increasing requirements for disclosure
to the Bureau].153
The rule, initially scheduled to come into effect in June 2015, ap-
plied only to land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
As a result, it was limited to development on public and tribal lands. Yet
this rule represented a significant step forward in federal regulation of
hydraulic fracturing. Then-Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell noted
that "[c]urrent federal well-drilling regulations are more than 30 years
old and they simply have not kept pace with the technical complexities of
today's hydraulic fracturing operations."'54
However, in June of 2016, a federal judge struck down the BLM
rule.5 5 Judge Scott Skavdahl found that BLM lacked the authority to
regulate energy extraction on public lands because Congress did not del-
egate such authority to regulate fracking to the Department of the Interi-
or.15 6 In looking at the text of the 2005 Energy Policy Act, Judge Skav-
dahl concluded that Congress had "explicitly removed the only source of
specific federal agency over fracking.",5 7 The case was appealed to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Tenth Circuit vacated the district
court's decision in September 2017.158
https://www.blm.gov/press-release/interior-department-releases-final-rule-support-safe-responsible-
hydraulic-fracturing; see also Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80
Fed. Reg. 16,128, 16,128 (Mar. 26, 2015) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
152. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 151.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, No. 2:15-CV-041-SWS, 2016 WL 3509415, at
*12 (D. Wyo. June 21, 2016).
156. Id.
157. Id.at*11.
158. E.g., Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Federal Judge Strikes Down Obama's Effort to Regulate Frack-
ing, BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2016, 8:20 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-
22/federal-judge-strikes-down-obama-s-effort-to-regulate-fracking; see also Wyoming v. Zinke, 871
F.3d 1133, 1146 (10th Cir. 2017) (vacating the district court's opinion and dismissing the case
without prejudice because the Trump Administration began the process to rescind the proposed
regulation in 2017).
210 [Vol. 95:1
2017] THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING GOVERNANCE GAP 211
L Gaps in Federal Regulations
The significant gap in federal fracking governance appears to be an
unprincipled, relatively arbitrary one.'59 In some ways, this is expected,
as "the regulation of oil and natural gas exploration and production in the
United States has always been primarily a state matter."'1
60 Because
"economic motives drove the earliest government interventions into oil
and gas production,"'61 the federal regime did not emerge from a com-
prehensive endeavor to protect the environment from oil and gas activi-
ties. The gaps that have emerged in the federal regulation regime stem
from the loopholes enacted throughout the past twenty-five years. These
include the exemptions for oil and gas exploration from CERCLA,
RCRA, and the SWDA. Such exemptions appear to have largely been
political calculations,162 and not the result of a reasoned policy decisions
to leave matters of primarily local concern to state and local govern-
ments.
The loopholes in federal fracking regulation might beg the question
of whether the federal government is the most appropriate regulator.
Some scholars argue that the federal government is not the appropriate
level of government to regulate fracking.'6 3 These scholars have noted
that not enough is currently known about the technology itself to institute
a comprehensive federal regime.16 Moreover, perhaps states are the best
level of government to make these decisions about their oil and gas regu-
lations, given the many intrastate effects of the technologyl65 and tradi-
tion of local oil and gas regulation. Other arguments for state regulation
include "the ability to tailor decisions to local environmental conditions;
regulatory and policy innovation; adaptive management or other experi-
mentalist or 'new governance' regimes; and interjurisdictional competi-
tion that can lead to economically efficient regulation."l
66
Others, however, have argued that the federal government is actual-
ly the better actor to regulate fracking given the widespread economic,
environmental, and energy-system impacts.16 7 With the rapid expansion
159. See Shalanda Helen Baker, Is Fracking the Next Financial Crisis? A Development Lens
for Understanding Systemic Risk and Governance, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 229, 268 (2015).
160. Spence, supra note 22, at 447.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Kron, supra note 63, at 612-13 (describing the "Halliburton Loophole" in the
SWDA and the purported role that Vice President Cheney played in brokering the deal).
163. See, e.g., David Spence, Energy Management Brief Is It Time for Federal Regulation of
Shale Gas Production?, ENERGY MGMT. & INNOVATION CTR.,
https://www.mccombs.utexas.edu/~/media/Files/MSB/Centers/EMIC/Briefs/Energy-Brief-Is-It-
Time-for-Federal-Regulation-of-Shale-Gas-Production.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).
164. Id.
165. Burger, supra note 9, at 153 (noting that "most individual contamination events occur
entirely within a single state or locality" but arguing that federal regulation is nonetheless prefera-
ble).
166. Id. at 158-59 (quoting Michael Burger, "It's Not Easy Being Green" Local Initiatives,
Preemption Problems, and the Market Participant Exception, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 835, 856 (2010)).
167. See, e.g., id. at 153.
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of fracking across the United States, there is a large risk of interstate pol-
lution.168 Federal regulation might also be favored in order to address
the interrelated problems of interstate externalities, the "race to the
bottom," and NIMBYism (not in my backyard); the economic effi-
ciencies gained through federal uniformity; the benefits of pooling
resources in order to gather technical and scientific expertise; creat-
ing durable rules, and providing for enforcement; the potential for
greater diversity of interest-group participation; and the mobilization
around national moral imperatives.169
In any event, local governance is rarely a part of this two-sided de-
bate.
II. STATE REGULATIONS
The gap in federal regulations is not unique to that level of govern-
ance. Fracking affects every layer of regulation, from local to national,
and yet there is no comprehensive regulatory framework at any level.170
At the state level, categorizing fracking regulations is difficult because of
the many steps and processes involved in fracking, and the variety of
policies that exist in different states.'7  Because fracking is a complex
process involving a range of stakeholders, effects, and procedures, most
states' regulations addressing fracking are fragmented across state stat-
utes and codes.172 Each state has its own regulations and statutory provi-
sions, and no comprehensive database has yet identified individual
states' statutes and regulations that apply to each stage of the process.173
Even if an organization were to attempt to catalogue these requirements,
state regulations are often being revised as science regarding fracking
develops and public opinion shifts.174
"Currently, only twenty-seven states have laws in place to address
hydraulic fracturing and related activities."'7 5 These laws employ a broad
range of regulatory techniques to manage fracking.176 For example, the
state of New York announced a ban on hydraulic fracturing in December
2014, after a state Department of Health report concluded that more re-
168. Id. at 161.
169. Id at 158 (quoting Michael Burger, "It's Not Easy Being Green" Local Initiatives,
Preemption Problems, and the Market Participant Exception, 78 U Cin. L. Rev. 835, 837- 38
(2010)).
170. See Baker, supra note 159, at 268.
171. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1695-97 (2014).
172. Id. at 1696-97.
173. Id. at 1697. However, Professor Wiseman notes that "some are getting close," including
the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission. Id.
174. Id. at 1698-99.
175. Blake Lara, Hydraulic Fracturing: Evaluating Fracking Regulations, 4 U. BALT. J. LAND
& DEV. 177, 181 (2015).
176. See Alexandra Dapolito Dunn & Chandos Culleen, Engines ofEnvironmental Innovation:
Reflections on the Role ofStates in the U.S. Regulatory System, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 462-
64(2015).
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search into the technology was necessary to determine whether fracking
is safe.177 In 2013, California passed Senate Bill 4, which allowed frack-
ing subject to a number of requirements including permitting, reporting
information about fluids used, and providing permit copies to all neigh-
boring property owners and tenants.178 Some states, such as Maryland,
have decided to propose regulations regarding fracking, "but with strict
control over the process." 79 Other states, such as Montana, have allowed
fracking with stringent, albeit less comprehensive regulation.'80
Such disparate fracking regulations across states may entice frack-
ing operators to "race to the bottom."'8 ' Shalanda Helen Baker, for ex-
ample, believes that this pattern is already occurring: she cites states with
more lax regulations, like West Virginia and Pennsylvania, as experienc-
ing the environmental and social effects of fracking in ways that states
that have banned fracking, like Vermont and New York, have not.182
Recognizing that there is a significant federal gap and a wide varie-
ty of regulations across the twenty-seven states that have regulated frack-
ing, we have singled out four states whose approaches to regulating
fracking differs significantly. Pennsylvania, North Dakota, Colorado, and
Texas all currently allow hydraulic fracturing and have seen large in-
creases in the amount of fracking occurring within their borders over the
past ten years. Investigating these states' policies demonstrates the array
of options available for states to regulate land use within their borders.
We believe that these four case studies illuminate the wide variety of
activity currently occurring in the fracking space. As discussed further in
Part V, local governments in these states are also exemplifying a third
dimension in the fracking debate: local governance.
A. Colorado
1. Overview
Colorado has an extensive history of oil and gas development. The
state's drilling has historically occurred on the Western Slope of the
state, and more recently in the more densely populated Front Range area
including Denver and Boulder.183 Colorado state law gives primary regu-
latory authority over oil and gas development to the state, though local
177. Id. at 463.
178. Id. at 462-63.
179. Id. at 463.
180. See NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, THE STATE OF STATE SHALE
GAS REGULATION 15 (2013), http://www.rff.org/research/publications/state-state-shale-gas-
regulation (comparing the categories and quantity of regulation in different states).
181. Baker, supra note 159, at 271.
182. Id.
183. CARY WEINER, COLO. STATE UNIV. EXTENSION, FACT SHEET NO. 10.639, OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT IN COLORADO (2014), http://extension.colostate.edu/docs/pubs/consumer/I0639.pdf.
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governments also have some explicit authority.'84 Colorado's principal
oil and gas law is the 1951 Oil and Gas Conservation Act (COGCA).1 5
The COGCA seeks to balance oil and gas development in a manner that
is "consistent with protection of public health, safety, and welfare, in-
cluding protection of the environment and wildlife resources."l8 6 It grants
authority to the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
(COGCC) to make and enforce regulations as reasonably required to
implement such power and authority; otherwise, the statute has very few
other specific guidelines for the Commission.'87 However, the COGCC's
implementing regulations are specific and cover a large number of sub-
jects. The governor appoints seven of these commissioners and two are
executive directors of state agencies.'8 8 The Commission's "mission is to
provide for the responsible development of the oil and gas resources
within the state," covering topics like operator registration, permits, no-
tice to the public and landowners, and enforcement.189 The Commission
also runs and maintains an online database cataloging the state's rules.190
Under the COGCA, local jurisdictions have authority to regulate lo-
cal affairs, including land use.19' Colorado has a strong tradition of home
rule, and as a result, local governments are authorized to address even
those aspects of oil and gas development that the Commission's regula-
tions cover, provided that "the local government regulations can be har-
monized with state regulations and do not 'materially impede' or 'de-
stroy' the state regulation."'92 Thus, the state's interest in uniform poli-
cies across its jurisdiction and local governments' interest in flexibility
and autonomy are sometimes at odds.193 Colorado's state courts have
held that state laws will only preempt local efforts if the local law causes
an operational conflict with state law.' 94 Further, two Colorado Supreme
Court cases have held that local governments can regulate oil and gas
operations, but "cannot completely prohibit state-sanctioned oil and gas
development within their jurisdictions."'95
184. Id.
185. John Jennings, Current Topics in Colorado's Regulatory Landscape, 92 DENv. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 183, 185-86 (2015).
186. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(1) (2017).
187. See id. § 34-60-105(1).
188. Jennings, supra note 185, at 186 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104 (2014)).
189. Id. (quotation omitted).
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. Joel Minor, Local Government Fracking Regulations: A Colorado Case Study, 33 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 61, 104-05 (2014) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d
1045, 1059 (Colo. 1992)).
193. See Jennings, supra note 185, at 186-87.
194. See id
195. Id; see also Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Colo. 1992); Bd. of Cty.
Comm'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P. 2d 1045, 1055-56 (Colo. 1992).
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Litigation has erupted in Colorado as a result of localities enacting
bans or other restrictions on fracking.196 In May 2016, the Colorado Su-
preme Court struck down local government fracking bans, affirming a
lower court's ruling that state law preempted a local fracking prohibi-
tion.197 In addition to litigation, both industry-backed and industry-
opposed groups proposed ballot initiatives to amend the state constitution
in 2014.198 Further, as the result of a politically-engineered compromise,
the groups backing all four ballot measures withdrew their petitions be-
fore the general election in 2014.199
2. Permitting & Reporting Requirements
Permitting and reporting requirements in Colorado are regulated by
the 1965 Ground Water Management Act, which requires "every well
intending to divert tributary, nontributary, designated, or Denver Basin
groundwater first secure a permit."200 These subcategories each require
slightly different permit processes.20 1 For example, in areas of Colorado
facing water shortages, additional water saving action (an "augmentation
20
plan") is required.202 These permits are usually distributed by the state
engineer and may differ slightly depending on the type of groundwater to
be removed.2 03
In 2011, the Colorado Legislature passed a law requiring "operators
to keep a chemical inventory on-site at each well and make that infor-
mation available to emergency responders and local governments within
[twenty-four] hours in the event of a spill." 204 The law also requires that
operators report the amount and type of chemical added to their fractur-
ing mixtures.205 Drilling operators are encouraged, but not required, to
create a Comprehensive Drilling Plan intended to identify foreseeable oil
206
and gas activities in a defined geographic area. All operators must file
196. Jennings, supra note 185, at 186.
197. Michael Wines, Colorado Court Strikes Down Local Bans on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES (May
2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/colorado-court-strikes-down-local-bans-on-
fracking.html.
198. Ballot Measures Withdrawn, supra note 2.
199. Id.
200. Yong Eoh, Yes, No, Maybe So: Uncertainty in Texas Groundwater Withdrawal for Hy-
draulic Fracturing, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1244 (2015) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-107,
-137 (2013)).
201. Id. at 1245.
202. Id. at 1244-45.
203. Id. at 1245.
204. Francis Gradijan, State Regulations, Litigation, and Hydraulic Fracturing, 7 ENVTL. &
ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 47, 68 (2012) (quoting David 0. Williams, Critics Claim Colorado Gas
Drillers Playing Both Sides of 'Fracking' Debate, COLO. INDEP. (July 22, 2010),
http://www.coloradoindependent.com/57895/critics-claim-colorado-gas-drillers-playing-both-sides-
of-fracking-debate).
205. Id. at 68-69.
206. See 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:216(a) (2017).
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detailed and truthful reports at times specified by the state regulations
and conduct ests to determine the presence of waste or pollution.207
Other aspects of hydraulic fracturing governed by the COGCC
health and safety requirements (600 Series) include fire prevention and
setback and mitigation requirements for various types of buildings.20 8
The 1200 Series establishes a comprehensive wildlife protection sys-
tem.209
3. Casing & Cementing Standards
Colorado's "300 Series" of regulations regulates drilling, develop-
ment, production, and abandonment of wells.210 Rule 326 governs the
mechanical integrity of wells. It specifies that there shall be a "test to
determine if there is a significant leak in the well's casing, tubing, or
mechanical isolation device."2 1 1 The Commission's regulations also cov-
212er well spacing requirements.
4. Air
Regulation 805 specifies that oil and gas facilities "shall be operated
in such a manner that odors and dust do not constitute a nuisance or haz-
ard to public welfare."213 Operators must control fugitive dust caused by
214their operations. The regulation controls emissions from production
equipment, such as crude oil, and from well completions.215
5. Water: Surface, Ground, and Wastewater
Colorado regulates groundwater, but no other type of water contam-
ination: in 2012, the COGCC promulgated a final rule that will apply to
oil and gas wells permitted on or after May 1, 2013.2 That rule requires
initial baseline samples of groundwater underlying the wells and subse-
quent monitoring from several locations on a proposed oil and gas
well .217
Well construction for oil and gas purposes is generally not allowed
in any of the designated basins, and the operator must formally apply to
change the water right.2 18 For operators entering into agreements with
207. Id. § 404-1:206.
208. See id. §§ 404-1.604, .606A, .609.
209. Id. §§ 404-1:1201 to :1205 (requiring operators to identify impacted wildlife and creating
area-specific restrictions).
210. Id. §§404-1:300 to:341.
211. Id. §404-1:326.
212. Minor, supra note 192, at 103.
213. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:805(a).
214. Id. § 404-1:805(c).
215. Id. § 404-1:805(b).
216. Id. § 404-1:609.
217. Id. § 404-1:609(b).
218. Eoh, supra note 200, at 1246.
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landowners to divert non-tributary groundwater from the aquifer underly-
ing the landowner's land, no more than one percent of the amount of
groundwater estimated to be in the aquifer may be withdrawn annual-
ly. 219
Operators seeking to withdraw groundwater outside of designated
groundwater basins must usually secure a court-approved augmentation
plan.22 0 According to Yong Eoh, "[t]his is because most wells exist in
parts where surface streams are over-appropriated, and because these
wells usually have junior water rights." 221
6. Recent Updates
222
A 2011 study by STRONGER, an independent nonprofit that
helps states develop hydraulic fracturing regulations, suggested several
improvements to Colorado's regulatory framework.223 First, the group
proposed that the COGCC set minimum and maximum surface casing
224
depths to demonstrate that those depths protect fresh groundwater.
Second, STRONGER recommended that the state COGCC and Colora-
do's Division of Water Resources "jointly evaluate available sources of
water for use in hydraulic fracturing."225
In 2014, Colorado approved regulations crafted by the state's most
productive oil and gas producers in conjunction with the Environmental
Defense Fund.226 The regulations seek to "fix persistent leaks from tanks
and pipes" by "require[ing] companies to install equipment to minimize
leakage of toxic gases and to control or capture 95 percent of emis-
sions."227 They also represent any state's first attempt to regulate me-
thane emissions caused by fracking.228
In February 2015, a task force of twenty-one governor-appointed
members229 unanimously recommended a series of action items "to har-
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1244-45.
221. Id. at 1246.
222. See generally STRONGER, STATE REVIEW OF OIL AND NATURAL GAS ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS (2016), http://www.strongerinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/STRONGER-
Presentation.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) (explaining the structure and purpose of the organiza-
tion).
223. STRONGER, COLORADO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 5-7 (2011),
http://cewc.colostate.edulwp-content/uploads/2012/02/ColoradoHFReview 2011 .pdf.
224. Id. at 5-6.
225. Id. at 7.
226. Jennifer Oldham, Colorado First State to Clamp Down on Fracking Methane Pollution,




229. These members included six representatives from the oil and gas industry, agricultural
industry, or homebuilding industry; six members from local government and conservation communi-
ties; and seven members from a variety of other interests. KEYSTONE CTR., COLORADO OIL AND GAS
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monize state and local regulatory structures" respecting the oil and gas
industry.230 One such recommendation advised each municipality to cre-
ate a Local Government Designee to work with the COGCC in an effort
to improve communication between the localities and state government,
and mitigate community-specific impacts.2 3 1 This report also recom-
mended that the Oil and Gas Commission focus on drafting rules that




In the last ten years, North Dakota has emerged as the third-largest
oil producing state in the United States.23 3 Fracking in North Dakota is
governed by the oil and gas regulations in the North Dakota Century and
Administrative Codes (NDAC) and enforced by the North Dakota Indus-
23trial Commission's Department of Mineral Resources.23 These regula-
tions cover several aspects of the hydraulic fracturing process, including
permitting requirements and rules regarding the disposition of fracturing
fluids, disclosure, and record keeping.2 35
The North Dakota Department of Health Environmental Health Sec-
tion administers provisions of the NDAC that protect the state's air, land,
and water resources. The North Dakota Department of Trust Lands regu-
lates oil and gas lease agreements, bonus payments and royalties, rights-
of-way applications and procedures, surface damage agreements, and
seismic surveys.2 36
2. Permitting & Reporting Requirements
In North Dakota, no entity or person may begin any operations for
drilling a well without first obtaining a permit from the North Dakota
237
Industrial Commission. Moreover, unless the Commission provides a
waiver, it will not issue a permit for an oil or gas well to be located with-
in 500 feet of a permanently occupied dwelling.2 3 8 If the Commission
TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT 4 (2015), http://www.cred.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/OilGasTaskForceFinalReport.pdf.
230. Id. at 3.
231. Id. at 9-ll.
232. Id. at 5-8.






237. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-05(1) (2017).
238. Id. § 38-08-05(2).
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issues a permit within 1,000 feet of an occupied dwelling, it reserves the
right to impose additional conditions on the permit operator.239
Within thirty days of ceasing operations, any open pit must be re-
claimed.240 North Dakota law requires that within sixty days of perform-
ing hydraulic fracturing, the owner, operator, or service company must
"post on the [F]rac[F]ocus chemical disclosure registry all elements
made viewable by the [F]rac[F]ocus website."241 However, there are no
express exceptions to reporting requirements for trade secrets or other-
wise confidential information.242
3. Casing & Cementing Standards
North Dakota regulations specify that all wells drilled for oil or nat-
ural gas must be "properly cemented at sufficient depths to adequately
protect and isolate all formations containing water, oil or gas or any
combination of these; protect the pipe . . . and isolate the uppermost sand
of the Dakota group."243 These regulations require operators to pressure
test casing strings after cementing and before beginning other operations,
like injecting fracking fluid, in the well.24 In addition, operators are re-
quired to keep a log describing the presence and quality of bonding of
cement before completing any well and must file these reports within
thirty days of completing the work.245 Further, North Dakota requires the
application of an appropriate cement evaluation tool to test well bore and
casing integrity before conducting hydraulic fracturing activity.246
Any exploration and production waste must be disposed of in a par-
ticular manner. This means that such waste must be stored in lined pits
removed within seventy-two hours after operations have ceased, and
disposed of at an authorized facility. 24 7 Lastly, the North Dakota Indus-
trial Commission may grant exceptions to these rules, "after due notice
and hearing, when such exceptions will result in the prevention of waste
and operate in a manner to protect correlative rights."
248
4. Air
North Dakota regulations do not establish any particular require-
ments for air pollution or emissions, but they do specify that "[t]he
commission may require surface air monitoring [] to detect movement of
[sequestered] carbon dioxide that could endanger an underground source
239. Id.
240. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-19.3 (2017).
241. Id. § 43-02-03-27.1.
242. See id
243. Id. § 43-02-03-21.
244. Id.
245. Id. § 43-02-03-21 to -25.
246. Id. § 43-02-03-27.1.
247. Id. § 43-02-03-19.3.
248. Id. § 43-02-03-02.
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of drinking water."24 9 Sequestered carbon dioxide might leak into under-
ground drinking water if, for example, it escapes "the drilled holes [] of
improperly constructed injection wells."250 Carbon dioxide might also
leach into the drinking water supply if plugged wells are not adequately
sealed, if there are faults or fractures in the surrounding rock formations,
or from "[1]ateral and upward movement into hydraulically connected
USDWs [underground sources of drinking water]."25 1 Should carbon
dioxide build up in any of these confined spaces, it could increase the
252pressure on the water source, potentially causing seismic events.
5. Water: Surface, Ground, and Wastewater
Much of North Dakota's fracking regulation regarding water relates
to carbon dioxide sequestration.253 Before issuing a permit, the Oil and
Gas Commission must find that the drilling operation's storage facility
for carbon dioxide will not adversely affect surface waters or any fresh-
254water source. North Dakota regulations specify that drilling pits "shall
be diked to prevent surface water from running into the pit," 255 and
treatment facilities "shall be constructed and operated so as not to endan-
ger surface or subsurface water supplies."2 56
For groundwater, all applications for permits to drill must provide
leak detection and monitoring plans for all wells and surface facilities,
and this plan must "[i]dentify potential degradation of groundwater re-
sources, with a particular emphasis on underground sources of drinking
water."257 Further, the operator must prepare a testing and monitoring
plan to ensure that any sequestration project does not endanger under-
ground sources of drinking water.258 This plan must include "periodic
monitoring of ground water quality and geochemical changes."259
North Dakota has no additional requirements for wastewater dis-
260posal.
6. Recent Updates
North Dakota has recently challenged the BLM's proposed rules for
fracking on BLM-managed land, arguing that federal law lets states regu-
249. Id. § 43-05-01-l1.4(1)(h).
250. Carbon Dioxide Capture and Sequestration: Storage Safety and Security, EPA,
https://19january2017 snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/carbon-dioxide-capture-and-sequestration-
storage-safety-and-security_.html (last updated Sept. 29, 2016).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-22-08 to -23 (2017).
254. Id. § 38-22-08(7).
255. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-19.4 (2017).
256. Id. § 43-02-03-51.3(13).
257. Id. § 4 3-05-01-05(1)(g)(2).
258. Id. § 43-05-01-11.4.
259. Id. § 43-05-01-1 1.4(l)(d).
260. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-01-01 to 38-22-23 (2017).
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late oil and gas operations, and thus these regulations impermissibly
override North Dakota's authority.261 Several other states, including Col-
orado, Wyoming, and Utah, have joined the suit. As described above in
Part II, Judge Skavdahl in Wyoming issued an injunction in September
2015 halting the implementation of these regulations.2 62
C. Pennsylvania
1. Overview
Fracking has been used as a method of gas extraction in Pennsylva-
nia since the 1950s, but the practice has grown exponentially since the
late 2000s.263 In response to this increased practice, Pennsylvania signifi-
cantly updated its Oil and Gas Act in 2012 and in 2016.264 This Act ex-
plicitly preempts local control over fracking.265 The Coal and Gas Re-
source Coordination Act, the Oil and Gas Conservation Law, and the
state's environmental protection laws also regulate fracking.266 Other
environmental protection laws include the "Clean Streams Law, the Dam
Safety and Encroachments Act, the Solid Waste Management Act, the
Water Resources Planning Act[,] and the Community Right to Know
Act." 267
The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
enacts and enforces fracking regulations in Pennsylvania. David Spence
argues that, consistent with his theory of "mission-orientation,"268 the
delegation of fracking regulation to the DEP demonstrates a commitment
261. Katherine Lymn, North Dakota Seeks to Join Suit Against Federal Fracking Rule, GRAND
FORKS HERALD (Mar. 31, 2015, 2:21 PM),
http://www.grandforksherald.com/news/business/3711856-north-dakota-seeks-join-suit-against-
federal-fracking-rule.
262. Coral Davenport, Judge Blocks Obama Administration Rules on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/1 0/01/us/politics/judge-blocks-obama-
administration-rules-on-fracking.html.
263. See PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE
REVIEW 10 (2010), http://www.strongerinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PA-HF-Review-Print-
Version.pdf.





OCh%2078%2ORegulation.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2017); Marie Cusick, DEP Finalizes New Oil
and Gas Drilling, STATEIMPACT (Jan. 6, 2016, 3:10 PM),
https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2016/01/06/dep-finalizes-new-oil-and-gas-drilling-
regulations.
265. See Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council, 964 A.2d 855, 858 (Pa. 2009).
266. Laws, Regulations and Guidelines, PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT.,
http://www.dep.pa.gov/Business/Energy/OilandGasPrograms/OilandGasMgmt/Pages/Laws,-
Regulations-and-Guidelines.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2017).
267. Id.
268. This theory suspects that people attracted to work for an agency will exhibit policy prefer-
ences consistent with its statutory mission. Spence, supra note 22, at 458.
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to minimizing the environmental impacts of fracking.269 DEP has more
270than doubled its drilling oversight staff since 2008. Spence's hypothe-
sis may well be reflected by this increase in attention to drilling. Howev-
er, some commentators argue that Pennsylvania regulators are still un-
derstaffed.2 71
2. Permitting & Reporting Requirements
Drilling a well in Pennsylvania requires a license.272 Revenue from
drill permit application fees funds the DEP staff as well as the DEP oil
and gas program more broadly.273 Pennsylvania is "not involved in regu-
lating lease agreements between mineral property owners and producers .
. . DEP does not audit payments, read or calibrate meters, or tanks, or
otherwise involve itself in disputes over lease issues."2 74 Instead, authori-
ty over leasing state land for fracking operations lies with the Common-
wealth's Department of Conservation and Natural Resources.275 For non-
state lands, there is no agency oversight of the private contracts between
landowners and lease-seekers.27 6
The Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act requires operators to notify the
DEP at least twenty-four hours before they begin drilling a well, but
there is no specific requirement that the operator notify the DEP before
beginning the fracking process by injecting fluid into the pre-drilled
well.277 The operator must then file a report within thirty days after com-
pleting drilling, and that report must include information about the well,
such as the type of propping agent that will be used, average injection
269. Id.
270. Sabrina Shankman, New Gas Drilling Rules, More Stafffor Pennsylvania's Environmen-
tal Agency, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 9, 2010, 12:44 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/new-gas-
drilling-rules-more-staff-for-pennsylvanias-environmental-agency.
271. Katie Colaneri, Well Inspectors Lured by Higher Pay to Industry Jobs, STATEIMPACT
(Oct. 7, 2013, 1:47 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2013/10/07/well-inspectors-lured-
by-higher-pay-to-industry-jobs.
272. Eoh, supra note 200, at 1240. This requirement exempts farmers, drilling for "farming
purposes," as well as landowners drilling on their own property, or lessees drilling on leased proper-
ty. 32 PA. CONS. STAT. § 645.4 (2017).
273. Laura Legere, Drilling Decline in Pennsylvania Hurts Funding for DEP Regulators,
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE: POWERSOURCE (May 19, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://powersource.post-
gazette.com/powersource/policy-powersource/2015/05/19/Oil-and-gas-drilling-decline-hurts-
funding-for-Pennsylvania-DEP-regulators.
274. Laws, Regulations and Guidelines, supra note 266.
275. See Laura Legere, Pennsylvania Legislature Wins in Court on Fracking Royalties,
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE: POWERSOURCE (Jan. 7, 2015, 1:05 PM), http://powersource.post-
gazette.com/powersource/policy-powersource/2015/01/07/Court-Pennsylvania-DCNR-not-govemor-
has-authority-to-OK-natural-gas-leases-on-state-lands; see also PA. DEP'T OF CONSERVATION AND
NAT. RES., M-O&G (11-09), OIL AND GAS LEASE FOR FOREST STATE LANDS 1,
http://www.docs.dcnr.pa.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/document/dcnr_008504.pdf (last visited
Aug. 31, 2017).
276. See Pennsylvania - Leasing Tips for Natural Gas Drilling, THE NETWORK FOR PUB.
HEALTH LAW https://www.networkforphl.org/_asset/6djnml/Pennsylvania-Leasing-Tips-FINAL.pdf
(last visited Aug. 31, 2017).
277. PA. DEP'T OF ENvTL. PROT., supra note 263, at 18.
222 [Vol. 95:1
2017] THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING GOVERNANCE GAP
rate, rock pressure, and well service company name.278 Pennsylvania's
chemical disclosure rules require that drilling companies disclose to the
DEP the names of chemicals (excluding trade secrets) that are used at a
drilling site within six days of the conclusion of fracking.279 Recently-
enacted regulatory changes require prospective drillers to identify public
resources like schools and playgrounds that would be affected by drill-
mg.280
3. Casing & Cementing Standards
Pennsylvania's standards for casing and cementing are expressed as
performance standards-for example, casing must be "of sufficient ce-
mented length and strength to attach proper well control equipment and
prevent blowouts, explosions, fires and casing failures."28 1 Such casing
standards were updated in 2011.282 "General provisions for well con-
struction and operation require the operator to 'construct and operate the
well' in a manner that will ensure the integrity of the well [and protect]
'health, safety, environment, and property."' 283 These plans must de-
scribe the casing that the operation is using, the proposed depths to
which they will set casing, the proposed placement of centralizers, and
detailed information about the type of cement they will use.284
4. Water: Surface, Ground, and Wastewater
Pennsylvania manages fracking wastewater in four ways: it is "(1)
[r]eused to fracture additional wells; (2) [t]reated and discharged to sur-
face water; (3) [i]njected into underground disposal wells; or (4)
[t]ransported to out-of-state facilities.285
For groundwater, the 2012 Oil and Gas Act dictates that water
withdrawals used for oil and gas drilling may not adversely affect the
quality or quantity of water in the watershed.286 This Act requires opera-
tors to restore or replace a water supply with an alternative source of
water of similar quantity and quality.2 87 Additionally, both the DEP and
278. Id.
279. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3222.1(b), (d) (2016); Gradijan, supra note 204, at 74-75; Spence,
supra note 22, at 456.
280. Cusick, supra note 264.
281. Spence, supra note 22, at 455 (quoting 25 PA. CODE § 78.7 1(a) (2011)).
282. Timothy James Furdyna, Strengthening State Regulation of Casing and Cementing in
High Volume Hydraulically Fractured Natural Gas Wells, 9 APPALAcHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 1,
24(2015).
283. Id. at 25 (quoting 25 PA. CODE § 78.73(a) (2015)).
284. See PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 263, at 11; see also Furdyna, supra note 282,
at 25-26.
285. PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 263, at 10. The Pennsylvania DEP is not author-
ized to administer its own UIC program due to the EPA's federal primacy. Id. at 11.
286. STRONGER, PENNSYLVANIA FOLLOW-UP STATE REVIEW 60 (2013),
http://www.strongerinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Final-Report-of-Pennsylvania-State-
Review-Approved-for-Publication.pdf.
287. Eoh, supra note 200, at 1240.
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the Oil and Gas Act require operators to submit water management plans
to identify where and how much water will be withdrawn during fracking
288
operations. Where water contamination occurs, there is a legal pre-
sumption that the oil and gas well operator is responsible for the pollu-
tion if the contamination "occurs within six months of drilling and is
within 1,000 feet of the well." 289
There are few other specific requirements for protecting surface or
wastewater.29 0 Both the landowner and operator must undertake baseline
water quality tests before operation.291 However, some regions facing
water scarcity must develop water plans that identify existing and future
uses of water available in these areas.2 92
5. Air
The General Permit for Air Pollution Control in Natural Gas Com-
pression and/or Processing Facilities (GP-5) regulates air emissions in
Pennsylvania.293 This general permit authorizes the construction, modifi-
cation, and operation of natural gas or gas processing facilities.2 94 It is
only applicable to non-major facilities (as defined by the CAA); 29 5 major
facilities need separate plan approval from the DEP before construc-
tion.296
6. Recent Updates
The nonprofit STRONGER recommended in 2013 that the DEP im-
prove its data standardization for tracking violations and enforcement
actions to facilitate accurate internal performance and transparency to the
public.297 The team also recommended that the DEP complete a study for
unconventional gas development to determine whether its program ap-
propriately assesses wastes to detect radiation.298 Further, the organiza-
tion recommended that DEP consider developing a process by which it
determines surface casing depths to protect fresh groundwater, as its
288. Id.
289. PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 263, at 5.
290. See id. at 38.
291. See id. at 5.
292. Eoh, supra note 200, at 1240.
293. STRONGER, supra note 286, at 113; see also GP-05, Natural Gas Compression Facili-
ties, PA. DEP'T ENVTL. PROTECTION ELIBRARY,
http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/View/Collection-9747 (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).
294. STRONGER, supra note 286, at 113.
295. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4006.6(b) (2016). "Major" is as defined in Title V of the CAA:
"[A]ny source that emits or has the potential to emit 100 tons per year or more of any criteria air
pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (2012).
296. BUREAU OF AIR QUALITY, PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., COMMENT/RESPONSE DOCUMENT
FOR MODIFICATIONS TO THE GENERAL PLAN APPROVAL AND/OR GENERAL OPERATING PERMIT FOR
NATURAL GAS COMPRESSION AND/OR PROCESSING FACILITIES (BAQ-GPA/GP-5) 4 (2015),
http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-105849/2700-PM-BAQ0205%20GP-
5% 20Comment/o20and%20%20Response%2ODocument%201-13-2015.pdf.
297. STRONGER, supra note 286, at 11.
298. Id. at 11-12.
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methodology has been inconsistent thus far.2 9 9 STRONGER also sug-
gested the state consider developing guidance for pre-drilling water sam-
pling.300 DEP's annual reports suggest that Pennsylvania has considered
some, but not all, of STRONGER's suggestions.3 0 1
Recent legislative activity suggests that fracking will continue in
Pennsylvania under regulation in the near future. Disagreeing with New
York State's fracking ban in December 2014, Pennsylvania Governor
Tom Wolf said he believes fracking can be done safely: "I want to do
what I think we can do here in Pennsylvania and that is have this indus-
try, but do it right from an environmental point of view, from a health
point of view." 302 However, Governor Wolf also stated that he would
support a moratorium on fracking in the Delaware River basin in the
303
eastern part of the state and on new leasing in state parks and forests.
On January 29, 2015, he signed a moratorium on drilling in Pennsylva-
nia's state parks and national forests, comprising over two million acres
of land.304
Later, in April 2015, Governor Wolf heard comments from the pub-
lic on proposed fracking regulations that would increase the mandatory
setbacks of oil and gas drilling operations to at least one mile from
schools.305 "The new rules would also ban temporary fracking waste
storage pits at well sites and increase requirements for ponds used as way
stations for drilling waste."306 These rules were finalized in October
2016, and "require additional measures if fracking is taking place near
public resources, and requires drillers to restore water supply that is de-
graded or damaged through fracking."
3 07
299. Id. at 12.
300. Id. at 12-13.
301. See generally OFFICE OF OIL & GAS MGMT., PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., 2016 OIL AND
GAS ANNUAL REPORT (2016), http://www.depgis.state.pa.us/oilgasannualreport/index.html (demon-
strating none of the 2013 STRONGER recommendations had been adopted in 2016); OFFICE OF OIL
& GAS MGMT., PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., 2015 OIL AND GAS ANNUAL REPORT 22-23, 25-26
(2015), http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-ll3887/8000-RE-DEP4621 (de-
scribing plans to study casing requirements and efforts to evaluate radiation levels in 2015); OFFICE
OF OIL & GAS MGMT., PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., 2014 OIL AND GAS ANNUAL REPORT (2014),
http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-
113130/2014_AnnualReport for web Julyl.pdf (describing future plans to study casing require-
ments in 2014).
302. Katie Colaneri, Wolf New York's Fracking Ban is "Unfortunate," STATEIMPACT (Dec.
18, 2014, 5:09 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2014/12/18/wolf-new-yorks-fracking-
ban-is-unfortunate.
303. Id.
304. Jon Delano, Gov. Wolf Signs Moratorium on Fracking on State Lands, CBS PITTSBURG
(Jan. 29, 2015, 12:07 PM), http://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2015/01/29/wolf-bans-new-gas-drilling-
leases-on-public-land-as-promised.
305. Reid R. Frazier, State Hears Comments on New Fracking Regulations, ALLEGHENY
FRONT (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.alleghenyfront.org/story/state-hears-comments-new-fracking-
regulations.
306. Id.
307. David DeKok, Pennsylvania Adopts New Fracking Regulations, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2016,
2:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pennsylvania-fracking-idUSKCNI272B3.
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In all, Pennsylvania has a fairly comprehensive set of fracking regu-
lations covering the major categories of environmental risks. Under the
leadership of Governor Wolf, the state appears to be taking a more pro-
tective approach to fracking that reflects some of the concerns that states
like New York have recognized. However, as averred by STRONGER,
there are some key areas in which Pennsylvania might strengthen its reg-
ulations, particularly with respect to pre-drilling water sampling and es-
tablishing a methodology to determine surface casing depths.
D. Texas
1. Overview
Texas's approach to fracking is highly decentralized; local jurisdic-
tions have significant leeway in defining how oil and gas development
occurs in the state.30 s The Texas Railroad Commission administers the
bulk of statewide regulatory authority, but the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality is responsible for administering air quality regu-
lations, "waste disposal[,] and other pollution-related aspects of gas pro-
duction."309 However, Texas has cut the Commission on Environmental
Quality's budget by about a third since 2008, implicating the organiza-
tion's ability to effectively enforce air pollution.3 10
Spence believes that in delegating power to the Railroad Commis-
sion, Texas has demonstrated its emphasis on natural gas development
without a corresponding emphasis on environmental values.311 In further
support of this argument, a 2012 University of Texas poll showed that
Texans are more likely to support fracking and believe it requires less
regulation compared to Pennsylvanians or New Yorkers.3 12
2. Permitting & Reporting Requirements
For oil and gas drilling, the Railroad Commission of Texas requires
permits for the following: new wellbores; working over an existing well-
bore to complete in a different reservoir; reentry of a plugged well; re-
308. See Ryan Hackney, Note, Don't Mess with Houston, Texas: The Clean Air Act and
State/Local Preemption, 88 TEX. L. REV. 639, 658 (2010) (noting that cities in Texas have a "great
deal of discretion in managing their affairs, and their ordinances will only be deemed invalid where
the legislature has limited their authority with unmistakable clarity.").
309. Spence, supra note 22, at 458. See also Hackney, supra note 308, at 639, 649-50 (ex-
plaining that the Texas Commission on Environment Quality administers an air quality regulatory
program).
310. Lisa Song et al., Fracking Boom Spews Toxic Air Emissions on Texas Residents, INSIDE
CLIMATE NEWS (Feb. 18, 2014), http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20140218/fracking-boom-
spews-toxic-air-emissions-texas-residents.
311. Spence, supra note 22, at 458.
312. Id. at 459.
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classification of a well from injection/disposal to an oil/gas producing
well; and transferring of the well location.3 13
Regarding water wells specifically, Texas groundwater conservation
districts "have broad authority under the Texas Water Code to determine
how and when a permit will be required" to be utilized in the district.
3 14
However, groundwater conservation districts are required to develop a
permit program for "drilling, equipping, operating, or completing . . .
wells[,]" except for wells that are statutorily exempt. 315 Drilling a well
solely to support a rig actively engaged in oil and gas exploration is ex-
empted from this permitting requirement.316 Thus, many groundwater
conservation districts have failed to issue permits for wells drilled for
fracking. Nevertheless, some districts have conversely construed this
exemption as inapplicable to water wells used for fracking.317 These dis-
tricts have argued that the exemption does not apply because the statute
only exempts "drilling," not "drilling and operating," as Texas's statute
regulating well drilling for livestock use does.
In 2012, the Railroad Commission of Texas implemented the Hy-
draulic Fracturing Disclosure Rule.3 19 This rule requires Texas oil and
gas operators to disclose the chemical ingredients and water volumes
used in hydraulic fracturing treatments on the website FracFocus.3 20
However, this rule does not apply to components considered "trade se-
crets," to chemicals that are not disclosed to the operators themselves by
manufacturers, or chemicals present in trace amounts.32 1
3. Casing & Cementing Standards
Compared to Pennsylvania's emphasis on performance standards,
Texas's substantive regulations focus on the attainment of specific tech-
nical goals.322 Administrative Code Rule § 3.13 provides specification
for well casing, cementing, drilling, well control, and completion re-
quirements.323 The Railroad Commission regulations include well con-
struction requirements and surface gauges used to measure contamina-
tion and protect groundwater.324 "Operators . . . must comply with gen-
313. INFO. TECH. SERVS. Div., R.R. COMM'N OF TEX., DRILLING PERMITS (W-1) ONLINE
FILING USER'S GUIDE 9, 54-57 (2017), http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/media/20067/dpmanual.pdf.
314. Trey Nesloney, Fracking Dry: Issues in Obtaining Water for Hydraulic Fracturing Oper-
ations in Texas, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 207-08 (2015).
315. Id. at 208 (quoting TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.113(a) (West 2017)).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 209 (quoting TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.117(b) (West 2017)).
319. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29 (2017).
320. Hydraulic Fracturing, R.R. COMM'N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-
us/resource-center/faqs/oil-gas-faqs/faq-hydraulic-fracturing (last visited Sept. 16, 2017).
321. Gradijan, supra note 204, at 79.
322. See Spence, supra note 22, at 458.
323. ADMIN. § 3.13.
324. R.R. COMM'N OF TEX., supra note 320 (follow "HOW DOES THE COMMISSION
PROTECT GROUND WATER?" hyperlink).
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eral proper wellhead practices for casing and well-waste disposal."325
However, these rules apply only to wells that will be "spudded" on or
after January 1, 2014.326
4. Air
Although the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality regu-
lates air quality, there are no regulations specifically related to air quality
and fracking in Texas. A 2014 study revealed that there were "[o]nly five
permanent air monitors . .. in [a] 20,000-square-mile region," and that
the monitors were all located "far from the . . . drilling areas where emis-
sions are highest."327 Further, the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality investigates only a small percentage of emissions complaints
filed.328
5. Water: Surface, Ground, and Wastewater
Water use in Texas is regulated by the Texas Commission on Envi-
ronmental Quality, which regulates the use of surface water, and local
groundwater conservation districts, with authority over the use of
groundwater in their regions.329
To protect groundwater, the Railroad Commission states that all
wells drilled in Texas must have the surface casing "in the well . . . set
below the depth of usable quality water."3 30 The Commission's rules also
"include strict well construction requirements that [specify that] several
layers of steel casings . . . [shall be utilized] to protect groundwater."3 3'
The rules also require that the production casing be "permanently ce-
mented in place."332
325. MILES HOGAN, LESSONS FROM THE WEST: FRACKING AND WATER RESOURCES 9 (2012),
https://law.uedavis.edu/centers/environmental/files/FrackingLessonsFromWest.pdf (citing ADMIN.
§ 3.13 (describing general well casing requirements)); see also ADMIN. § 3.14 (describing casing
requirements for plugging a well); ADMIN. § 3.95 (describing casing requirements for underground
storage of liquid or liquefied hydrocarbons in salt formations); R.R. COMM'N OF TEX., supra note
320 (follow "HOW IS HYDRAULIC FRACTURE FLOWBACK FLUID DISPOSED OF?" hyper-
link).
326. ADMIN. § 3.13(a).
327. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, In Denton, Texas, Voters Approve 'Unprecedented' Fracking Ban,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014, 7:19 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nationa/la-na-texas-fracking-
20141108-story.html.
328. See id.
329. R.R. COMM'N OF TEX., supra note 320 (follow "DOES THE RAILROAD
COMMISSION REGULATE WATER WITHDRAWALS BY THE NATURAL GAS DRILLING
COMPANIES FOR HYDRAULIC FRACTURING?" hyperlink).
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6. Recent Updates
While Texas's approach to regulating fracking provides a great deal
of freedom to municipalities,3 33 local jurisdictions can go beyond the
baselines state-level standards if they choose. For example, in November
2014, the town of Denton passed the first fracking ban in the state.
334 In
response to this, the Texas legislature passed a law stating that localities
may not ban fracking in May 2015.335 This law represents a major depar-
ture from Texas's long-held tradition of local home rule and giving mu-
nicipalities the "broad authority to manage the local impacts of indus-
tries., 336 The state's assumption of historically local power may signal
that localities' efforts to ban a technology actually backfire when they
attempt to contravene a state-supported technology.337 Tensions between
localities seeking to govern themselves and the state of Texas will likely
continue to build over this issue.
E. Gaps in State Regulation
The four states surveyed here have made promising steps in regulat-
ing fracking-particularly in terms of requiring disclosure of chemicals
used in fracking operations and specifying construction and maintenance
techniques for casing and well pipes. However, there are still many op-
portunities for states to create a comprehensive and responsibly-managed
fracking scheme. Specifically, there are gaps in terms of water and air
regulation, as evidenced by Texas's large number of air quality com-
plaints and low enforcement rate.
Further, even in states like Colorado that have a detailed and specif-
ic list of fracking regulations-and in fact, Colorado seems to also be a
leader in governing traditionally local issues such as dust and other nui-
sances-there are still gaps around many of the local impacts described
in Part IV below. In addition to some of the larger gaps noted above,
such as insufficient air and water regulation, less tangible aspects of
fracking have also been left unaddressed. For example, no state studied
here has addressed how hydraulic fracturing may affect communities'
social or economic welfare, such as impacts on property values or frack-
ing's effects on tax revenue.
Likewise, although the social tensions and financial risks arising
from fracking operations-including increased prices of the housing
stock, commodity prices, crime, and substance abuse-have been docu-
mented in the academic literature,338 the case studies in Part V show that
333. See Hackney, supra note 308, at 658.
334. Hennessey-Fiske, supra note 2.
335. Driver & Wade, supra note 2.
336. Josh Galperin, Fracking News: Texas Bans Bans, YALE CTR. FOR ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
(May 29, 2015), http://envirocenter.yale.edu/news/fracking-news-texas-bans-bans.
337. See id
338. Baker, supra note 159, at 266-67.
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the regulation of many of these non-environmental impacts have not yet
been widely implemented on the ground. The majority of these gaps are
areas of regulation with almost entirely local effects, and most are non-
environmental in nature. For example, there do not appear to be any or-
dinances addressing the environmental impacts from increased sand min-
ing and processing, or the adverse effects on farming and farmland
preservation. There are also no regulations targeting the effects of in-
creased fracking on the local housing market due to increased scarcity
and cost, or hedging against adverse effects on property values. We also
did not find any governance systems that address or capitalize on chari-
table contributions, local employment, the effect of increased tax reve-
nue, or revenue from leasing and royalties. Given the wide variety and
extent of impacts that address the environmental effects of fracking-
from regulating groundwater depletion to noise pollution-this lack of
regulation addressing non-environmental aspects of fracking provides an
opportunity for local governments to act.
III. LOCAL LAND USE AUTHORITY
The importance of local governance in hydraulic fracturing is now
receiving much-needed attention.339 And the timing is right, as 2016 was
340the hundredth anniversary of America's first zoning ordinance. Prior to
assessing how local governments should regulate hydrofracking and its
impacts, however, it is critical to understand what the sources of local
power are and from where they originate.
Most state constitutions vest in their legislatures all of the legisla-
tive authority for the state, which allows states to "enact laws [to] regu-
late, prohibit, or require certain conduct, provided that such laws have
some reasonable relation to the public health, safety, morals, or wel-
fare."3 41 This is commonly known as the "police power," under which
zoning regulations are enacted and enforced.342 Generally, state legisla-
tures have chosen to delegate these land use powers to local govern-
ments.34 3
339. See, e.g., Minor, supra note 192, at 62; John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking:
State Preemption, Local Power, and Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 995, 995,
998 (2013); Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Local Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 117 W. VA. L. REV.
593, 593-94, 596 (2014); Scott Martin, Note, What the Frack?! How Local Zoning Laws Keep
Dangerous Mining Techniques Off Our Property, 21 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 209, 218-19
(2015).
340. CITY OF N.Y. BD. OF ESTIMATE & APPORTIONMENT, BUILDING ZONE RESOLUTION (N.Y.
1916), http://biotech.1aw.1su.edu/cphl/history/laws/1916NYCcode.htm; Amanda Erickson, The Birth
of Zoning Codes, a History, CITYLAB (June 19, 2012),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2012/06/birth-zoning-codes-history/2275.
341. PATRICIA E. SALKIN, I AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.2 (5th ed. 2017); see, e.g., N.Y.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
342. SALKIN, supra note 341; see, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1.
343. SALKIN, supra note 341.
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Zoning as a form of regulatory power first began in the early twen-
tieth century.344 Before that time, governments had made very little use
of the police power to regulate land development and uses.345 In the be-
ginning, zoning was considered a "radical departure from the traditional
private property concepts, because it was perceived as prohibiting a citi-
zen from devoting his property to a purpose useful and entirely harmless,
in the ordinary sense, in certain districts within a community."346 Yet
courts upheld the exercise of such powers to promote orderly segregation
of industrial, commercial, and residential uses in bustling, growing
communities.347 In prohibiting uses from certain districts, localities (and
the courts which upheld their ordinances) relied on nuisance and "general
welfare" rationales.348 Zoning codes, in their earliest stages, sought to
regulate the kinds of nuisance and harms that could only be addressed
prior by use of restrictive covenants, building codes, or injunctions.349
Prohibiting certain uses or preferring "higher uses" for a district effec-
350
tively acted as injunctions against the nuisances of non-preferred uses.
Meanwhile, policy makers generally thought that zoning contributed to
the people's general welfare by assuring orderly development and in-
351
creased public services.
The first zoning ordinance in the United States was the 1916 Zoning
Resolution of the City of New York, which the New York Court of Ap-
peals upheld as constitutional.3 52 That resolution and court decision sub-
sequently sparked a widespread adoption of state zoning enabling stat-
utes and implementation of zoning codes.353 The Advisory Committee on
City Planning and Zoning, part of the U.S. Department of Commerce,
published a Model Standard State Zoning Enabling Act in 1922, which
served as a model that many state legislatures followed in delegating
zoning powers to their local governments.354 The Committee also pub-
lished a companion guide in 1928, known as A Standard City Planning
344. Id. § 7:1.
345. Id.
346. SARA C. BRONIN & DWIGHT H. MERRIAM, I RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 1:2 (4th ed. 2017).
347. See SALKIN, supra note 341, § 7:1.
348. BRONIN & MERRIAM, supra note 346.
349. Id.; see, e.g, Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404-05 (1915).
350. BRONIN & MERRIAM, supra note 346; see, e.g., Portage Twp. v. Full Salvation Union, 29
N.W.2d 297, 302 (Mich. 1947).
351. BRONIN & MERRIAM, supra note 346; see, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 387-89 (1926).
352. BRONIN & MERRIAM, supra note 346; see also Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp.,
128 N.E. 209, 209-10 (N.Y. 1920); CITY OF N.Y. BD. OF ESTIMATE & APPORTIONMENT, supra note
340.
353. BRONIN & MERRIAM, supra note 346.
354. See BRONIN & MERRIAM, supra note 346; see also ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES




Enabling Act. 35 5 In 1926, the U.S. Supreme Court definitively affirmed
the ability of localities to zone when the Court upheld the zoning ordi-
nance of the Village of Euclid, Ohio.35 6 Further, by 1931, every state had
authorized zoning and "over 1,000 municipalities had adopted zoning
codes."357
Today, it is well established that municipal governments have been
delegated legitimate zoning powers to assure orderly development and
regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of their residents. 35 The fol-
lowing Sections provide an overview of the most common types of dele-
gated powers and the source of those powers.
A. Home Rule Powers
Municipal home rule powers are one means by which local gov-
ernments may regulate the impacts of hydraulic fracturing. Municipal
home rule powers include grants of authority stemming from either state
constitutions or enabling legislation that allow localities to zone and reg-
ulate land uses.359 Local home rule systems are complex and are not easi-
ly sorted into distinct categories,360 but this Part provides an overview of
the most common systems.
The two broadest home rule categories are constitutional home rule
powers and statutory home rule powers; however, localities do not easily
fall into one category or the other.361 Constitutional home rule states
grant municipalities power directly from the state constitution, while
localities in legislative home rule states draw their power from legislative
362acts. In some states, municipalities possess a combination of constitu-
tional and legislative home rule powers, or are only permitted to exercise
certain constitutional home rule powers after adopting a municipal char-
ter.363 In each of the above cases, municipal power must be exercised in a
manner consistent with the general law of the state, and may be con-
strained by limits set by the general law of the state, the local charter, or
both.36
In New York, for example, it is the state enabling legislation-the
Municipal Home Rule Law-that grants localities their zoning power;
355. ADVISORY COMM. ON CITY PLANNING & ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A
STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (1928),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/BH/nbsbuildinghousingl l.pdf.
356. Village ofEuclid, 272 U.S. at 397.
357. BRONIN & MERRIAM, supra note 346.
358. See Michael Lewyn, New Urbanist Zoning for Dummies, 58 ALA. L. REV. 257, 263
(2006) (citing Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1091 (1996) (re-
marking that Euclidean zoning has become nearly universal in use throughout the United States)).
359. SALKIN, supra note 341, § 2:7.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See id.; BRONIN & MERRIAM, supra note 346, § 1:11.
363. SALKIN, supra note 341, § 2:7.
364. Id. § § 2:7 to :8; see also BRONIN & MERRIAM, supra note 346, § 1:11.
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courts have refused to hold that local governments can draw the power to
zone directly and solely from the state constitution.365 In Pennsylvania,
the Municipalities Planning Code delegates to localities the authority for
zoning, planning, enacting subdivision and land use controls, and creat-
ing planned developments.366 Moreover, a constitutional provision in
Texas gives home rule powers to cities with a population larger than
5,000, allowing them to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of
their citizens, while the state legislature delegates authority to municipal-
ities with populations below 5,000.367
Colorado, on the other hand, illustrates how complex the delegation
of authority to local governments can become:
There are five different types of local governments in Colorado:
home-rule municipalities [via a constitutional provision authorizing
localities to grant themselves home-rule powers by charter], statutory
municipalities [which have only those powers explicitly granted to
them by Titles 29 and 31 of Colorado's Revised Statutes, including




Zoning regulations that restrict development and use of land stem
from municipal police powers, which enable localities to regulate for the
general health, safety, and welfare of their residents.369 Granted by ena-
bling legislation or state constitution (depending on the legislatures' del-
egation of power), police powers address the regulation of uses that go
beyond merely dictating in which districts they may take place.3 70 The
police power is the basis for a wide variety of land use regulations, in-
365. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX; N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE L. § 10 (McKinney 2017); SALKIN,
supra note 341, § 2:6.
366. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10105 (2017); see also JOHN BOURDEAU, 22A SUMMARY OF
PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE MUNICIPAL AND LOCAL LAW § 14:47 (2d ed. 2017).
367. TEX. CONST. art. 11, § 5; see infra Section V.B.4. for more detail on Texas' delegation of
authority to municipalities.
368. Minor, supra note 192, at 90 (citing Robert M. Linz, Researching Colorado Local Gov-
ernment Law, 38 Colo. Law. 101, 101 (2009); see also COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6; COLO. REV.
STAT. § 31-15-401 (2017).
[The Colorado constitution] enumerates many broad powers, including eminent domain,
taxation, and election holding. But home rule powers are broader than those listed in the
Constitution. Section 6 also grants home rule municipalities 'all other powers necessary,
requisite or proper for the government and administration of its local and municipal mat-
ters,' and states that the enumeration of powers should not be construed to deny them
'any right or power essential or proper to the full exercise of [self-government] right[[s]."
Section 6 provides that state law is superseded by ordinances passed pursuant to home
rule charters.
Minor, supra note 192, at 90 (alteration in original) (quoting COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6).
369. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894); BRONtN & MERIAM, supra note 346, § 1:8;
see also City of Albany v. Anthony, 262 A.D. 401, 403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941) (distinguishing be-
tween zoning ordinance and nonzoning police power ordinances, zoning ordinances are traditionally
aimed at directly controlling where a use takes place as opposed to how it takes place).
370. BRONIN & MERRIAM, supra note 346, § 1:8.
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cluding, but not limited to: historic landmark district restrictions, envi-
ronmental controls, architectural and aesthetic regulations, affordable
housing mandates, and more.371 A zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to
a municipality's police power will only be held valid if it furthers an
objective that is expressly or impliedly authorized by the state enabling
statute.372
Some localities are currently using their police powers to regulate
fracking, as will be discussed in more depth in Part V. For example, Ar-
lington, Texas, has implemented a gas well permitting system that en-
sures developers will site wells in areas that minimize impacts on the
community and may impose additional conditions such as proper land-
scaping screening and the enforcement of basic safety standards.373
Though an updated ordinance has been crafted in Peters Township,
Pennsylvania, it will retain many features of the current regulations,
which include provisions limiting noise, odor, and dust disturbances, a
requirement for pre- and post-fracking water testing, and an emphasis on
roadway safety and maintenance.374
C. Preemption
1. Legal Nature
Municipalities may only exercise the authority granted to them by a
state statute or constitution, and may not exceed the limitations inherent
to this delegatory scheme. Otherwise, the ordinance is in direct conflict
with the constitution or statute that delegates the power.375 Additionally,
a number of states explicitly specify that "municipal legislation is valid
only to the extent that it does not conflict with the general law of the
state" (which includes the constitution as well as the general statutes of
the state).376 Express preemption exists when the state legislature, in spe-
cific and unambiguous terms, preempts local action in order to further
the interests of the state.377 For example, a state may expressly limit local
authorities' power to regulate the location of airports. 37 Implied preemp-
371. Id.
372. SALKIN, supra note 341, § 7:1.
373. ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE 11-068 (2011), http://www.arlington-
tx.gov/cityattorney/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2014/05/GasDrilling-Chapter.pdf; see also Brett
Shipp, Arlington Officials Report on Fracking Fluid Blowout, WFAA ( June 17, 2015, 1:32 PM),
http://www.wfaa.com/story/news/local/tarrant-county/2015/06/16/arlington-officials-report-on-
fracking-fluid-blowout/28844657 (explaining that despite these best efforts, however, Arlington was
the site of a well blowout that spilled over 42,000 gallons of fracking fluid into residential neighbor-
hoods).
374. PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE 737 (2011),
http://www.peterstownship.com/vertical/sites/%7B3BE5B086-2Al5-4083-A63D-16B3DD03C8DD
%7D/uploads/MineraExtraction Ordfinal version_737_8-2- l.pdf.
375. SALKIN, supra note 341, § 6:28.
376. Id.
377. Jessica A. Bacher & John R. Nolon, Mitigating the Adverse Impacts of Hydraulic Fractur-
ing: A Role for Local Zoning?, 37 No. 9 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Oct. 2014, at 1.
378. See, e.g., Petition of Detroit (Airport Site), 14 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Mich. 1944).
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tion, on the other hand, occurs when a state regulation does not explicitly
prohibit localities from regulating in a certain arena, but the local law
appears to conflict with the state interests at hand.379 In this case, it is up
to the judiciary to determine whether there is either an irreconcilable
conflict created by the local law with state regulation, or whether the
state law "occup[ies] the field" to the extent that local regulation is au-
tomatically preempted.380 When a conflict is found between a state law
and a local ordinance, the local ordinance must always give way to the
state regulation. For example, a locality is permitted to zone business
classes-liquor stores, for instance-into specific areas, but cannot total-
ly prohibit the sale of liquor within its jurisdiction when the state has
licensed liquor sales.382 This is because a complete prohibition contra-
dicts the implied interests of the state.
Many states have enacted comprehensive oil and gas legislation that
regulates how fracking operations are carried out, which preempt locali-
ties from adding additionally restrictive or contrary regulations.383 This is
a particularly contentious issue in the context of fracking, as local regula-
tions that severely restrict or prohibit drilling can frustrate state economic
objectives. For example, elements of the drilling process that are
preempted from local control might include the placement of boreholes
and well casing regulations.384 However, several states have upheld lo-
calities' use of zoning power to determine the locations where fracking
can take place. This can be accomplished by restricting drilling activities
to certain drilling districts (e.g. the industrial district),38 5 or by use of the
police power to implement a permitting scheme or passing ordinances
regulating nuisance effects such as road wear, noise, odor, and dust.
386
In Pennsylvania, local governments are expressly preempted from
mandating the thickness of well casings or the type of equipment that
drillers use.387 Yet despite these state-level limitations, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has upheld that Pennsylvania localities do have
the legal authority to regulate where fracking may take place within their
379. Bacher & Nolon, supra note 377.
380. Id.
381. SALKIN, supra note 341, § 6:28.
382. See id.; see also, e.g., Town of Fenton v. Tedino, 401 N.Y.S.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1974); Twp. of Spring v. Majestic Copper Corp., 256 A.2d 859, 859-60 (Pa. 1969).
383. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 34-60-102 to -130 (2017); 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3202-
74 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE. §§ 38-08-01 to -22-23 (2017); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 81.002
to 123.005 (2017).
384. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 34-61-102, -105.
385. See, e.g., Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 872 (Pa. 2009);
Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council, 964 A.2d 855, 858-59 (Pa. 2009).
386. See, e.g., PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCES no. 737, § 713(0) (2011),
http://www.peterstownship.com/vertical/sites/%7B3BE5BO86-2Al5-4083-A63D-
16B3DDO3C8DD%7D/uploads/MineraExtractionOrd final version_737_8-2-11 .pdf (discussed
in more detail infra Section V.B.3.).
387. See Range Res.-Appalachia, 964 A.2d at 875; Huntley, 964 A.2d at 861.
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jurisdiction.388 In Colorado, the state's Supreme Court has determined
that localities, such as Longmont and Fort Collins, do not possess the
authority to constitutionally ban fracking within their borders; such ac-
tion is preempted by the state oil and gas law, as bans arguably run coun-
ter to the state's interests in exploiting natural gas deposits.3 8 9
2. Politics and the Local Governance of Fracking
Preemption has become one of the central battlegrounds in the
fracking debate. State governments, for example, may seek to increase
oil and gas exploration, while local governments may remain sensitive to
residents' concerns regarding the lifestyle, environmental, health, and
economic risks of fracking. When states endeavor to overturn local regu-
lations related to fracking, a key question is whether the local fracking
rules are really different from other, well-established local regulations, or
whether they are simply addressing an issue that is currently a political
minefield.
D. Nonregulatory Governmental Approaches
In addition to traditional regulatory techniques, nonregulatory ap-
proaches can also be effective tools to address the impacts of hydraulic
fracturing, whether used alone or in conjunction with regulatory
measures. One of the most common nonregulatory approaches is crafting
a community benefits agreement (CBA)-a site-specific, legally en-
forceable agreement between local government, the community, and a
developer.39 0 A CBA lays out the project's benefits to the community and
ensures the community's support of the project.391 Allowing the commu-
nity and the developer to engage in a more collaborative negotiation pro-
cess than what is afforded under the usual land use application process,
the developer minimizes risk while community members enjoy an in-
creased degree of input to ensure the project is tailored to meet the
unique needs of their locale.392 Over the past two decades, CBAs have
gained a higher profile in the land use processes in several states, such as
New York and California, where they are employed to address a wide
range of environmental and social-justice concerns.393 Though the sce-
narios involved in drilling are not analogous to a CBA's usual applica-
388. See Range Res.-Appalachia, 964 A.2d at 872-73; Huntley, 964 A.2d at 864.
389. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 369 P.3d 573, 578 (Colo. 2016).
390. JULIAN GROSS ET AL., COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 9 (2005); Community Benefits 101, PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING
FAMILIES, http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/policy-tools-community-benefits-
agreements-and-policies (follow "The Basics" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 9, 2017).
391. GROSS ET AL., supra note 390, at 9-10.
392. Id.
393. Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Levine, Understanding Community Benefits Agreements: Equi-
table Development, Social Justice and Other Considerations for Developers, Municipalities and
Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 291, 300 (2008); Center for N.Y. Law,
The NYC Bar Ass'n Reports on CBAs In NYC's Land Use Practice, 16 CITY L. 49 (2010).
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tions (for example, to a single development site such as a stadium pro-
ject), modifications to the process could be made in order to enhance
negotiations between community members, local government, and indus-
try.394
Another nonregulatory approach is executing a memorandum of
understanding (MOU), also known as a "letter of intent. "39' An MOU
effectively memorializes in writing the signing parties' intentions to en-
ter into a formal contract, but does not legally bind the parties to adher-
ing to the terms of the MOU. 3 96 In terms of its applicability to hydraulic
fracturing, local governments may use an MOU to air concerns and ne-
gotiate with industry without the pressure of adopting or adhering to
formal regulatory measures.397 Finally, keeping open clear, direct, and
honest lines of communication can greatly enhance the relationship be-
tween local government officials and industry operators, which greatly
aids a locality's mission to effectively address impacts of concern.398
Given the scope and history of local land use and environmental au-
thority, governing fracking qua fracking is not the best tactic for control-
ling its impacts. Rather, local governments should govern fracking as
they do other local industries because, while fracking does present local
concerns and impacts that are distinct from other industries, at its core,
fracking is merely another industry. Thus, by addressing fracking
through those impacts that cause the most concern to local communities,
it is easier to highlight the ways in which local governments can address
those concerns using their familiar local powers. The following Part de-
scribes the ways in which these local powers overlap with the identified
impacts of fracking.
IV. IDENTIFYING THE LOCAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
The federal and state governance systems do address a range of im-
pacts from hydraulic fracturing, but a gap remains at the local level.
Communities must cope with a set of impacts that are uniquely local in
nature that federal and state regulations do not address, but local gov-
ernments can for the most part manage these impacts by using traditional
local governance tools. The authors of this Article, along with colleagues
at Yale University and Pace University School of Law, undertook a pro-
ject from 2013 to 2015 to catalogue and analyze the local impacts of
hydraulic fracturing. In this Article, we provide our list of local fracking
impacts as an illustration of major local concerns. The next Section de-
394. See William Yukstas, Note, Managing Fractions: The Role of Local Government in
Regulating Unconventional Natural Gas Resources - Recommendations For New York, 11
CARDOZO PuB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 563, 595-603 (2013).
395. Letter ofIntent, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
396. Id.
397. See infra Section V.B.1. (discussing Erie, Colo.).
398. See infra Section V.B.4. (discussing Arlington, Tex.).
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scribes the methods we used to catalogue local impacts, followed by a




This project began in 2013 in a joint effort between the Yale Center
for Environmental Law & Policy (YCELP), Yale Climate & Energy In-
stitute, and Pace Law School's Land Use Law Center. Our overarching
goals were to understand how local governments can fill fracking regula-
tory gaps at the federal and state levels, and to empower local govern-
ment decision making on a range of challenges that shale oil and gas
development pose. We hypothesized that outright fracking bans risk state
preemption and uncontrolled drilling risks negative environmental and
community impacts. Thus, our work has sought to support municipal
leaders in developing balanced and effective regulatory and nonregulato-
ry practices to address the effects of fracking. These practices would
ideally mitigate land use and environmental damage, while preserving
economic, social, and community benefits. We believe that, equipped
with the proper tools, local authorities can effectively govern most as-
pects of fracking.
2. Meeting with Stakeholders
Our process has involved two stages. First, we focused on research,
analysis, and stakeholder outreach to identify local impacts from frack-
ing. Second, we investigated local government strategies to manage
those impacts. Initially, we endeavored to synthesize fracking's local
effects and incorporate local communities' concerns. These concerns
include those founded on environmental impacts as well as social and
economic impacts. Some impacts are clear and well documented, while
others are speculative or largely unfounded. Nevertheless, we believe
that only with an understanding of community concerns can local leaders
address the tangible and intangible impacts of a significant new industry
such as fracking.
To begin this process, we identified a variety of local fracking im-
pacts based on data previously collected by the nonprofit organization
Food and Water Watch.3 9 9 The Food and Water Watch data aggregated
local resolutions, ordinances, and other legislative actions to ban hydrau-
lic fracturing. Our team then accessed these legislative actions and, by
reviewing the legislative findings of each, extracted details on the issues
about which local governments were expressing concern.
399. Mary Grant, Local Resolutions Against Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH (July 28, 2017),
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight/local-resolutions-against-fracking.
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These local actions ultimately included impacts that were well doc-
umented in the scientific literature as well as impacts that were less well
researched, speculative, or unfounded but still deeply worrisome to
community members. Our list does not seek to distinguish among these
categories of impacts. Instead, we seek to provide sufficient information
for local leaders to make informed decisions about how to manage hy-
draulic fracturing in their jurisdictions based on the concerns of their
constituents. At the same time, we provide access to scientific literature,
news reports, and other assessments of the science to help inform deci-
sion making with subjective and objective information.
After consolidating these initial impacts, we sought to verify and
understand firsthand the challenges that local governments might face.
To do this, we held an expert panel and roundtable workshop in Decem-
ber 2013 at the Pace Land Use Law Center's annual conference.400 This
session involved key participants from local governments, advocacy
groups, academia, and industry. At this meeting, the team presented the
preliminary impacts list and incorporated additional impacts based on
feedback from meeting participants. This session showed us that the im-
pacts highlighted in local bans presented a one-sided perspective. As a
result, we widened the project's focus to include beneficial aspects of
shale development, relying heavily on the work of Daniel Raimi and
Richard Newell at Duke University.401
Building on the momentum from the December 2013 conference,
we facilitated a second discussion at the Yale Law School in March
2014.402 This latter session focused on local strategies and best practices
for governing unconventional oil and gas development. The discussion
also centered on issues of state preemption of local authority, and includ-
ed examples of local land use efforts in various states addressing the im-
pacts of fracking. 403 With input from current or former local government
officials in Pennsylvania, Texas, and New Mexico, the workshop demon-
strated that local governments have a strong capacity to address the im-
pacts of hydraulic fracturing and vary widely in both approaches and
strategies.404
400. Antonio Soares, Hydro-Fracking LULC 12-05-13, PACE UNIV. MEDIASPACE (Dec. 6,
2013), https://mediaspace.pace.edu/media/Hydro-Fracking+LULC+12-05-
13/1_p2lysyb7/31792771.
401. Shale Public Finance: Local Government Fiscal Impacts of Oil and Gas Development,
DUKE ENERGY INITIATIVE, http://energy.duke.edu/shalepublicfinance (last visited Oct. 2, 2017).
402. See Workshop Materials and Further Resources: March 2014 Workshop Materials, LAND
USE COLLABORATIVE, http://sites.environment.yale.edu/collaborative/2015/08/1 1/hydraulic-






3. Building the Impacts List
Throughout 2014, we expanded the impact list to include two addi-
tional types of resources beyond positive and negative community im-
pacts. First, we explored the peer-reviewed and gray literature, as well as
news media to collate information on each of the impacts that our re-
search identified. Second, we scoured local hydraulic fracturing regula-
tions from across the country in order to find templates, models, and ex-
amples of the types of strategies local governments use to address im-
pacts of local concern.
The goal of including resources and regulatory strategies in the im-
pact list was ultimately to create an online database where local officials
could find thorough and varied fracking research to support their own
decision making and leadership.
To do this, we gathered resources on each of the impacts the re-
search team reviewed. We collected the available literature and consulted
with experts to identify potential resources that explain, document, con-
textualize, or substantiate the impact. Some potential impacts, such as
groundwater pollution from stray gas or fracking chemicals, have been
subject to scientific study and subsequently documented in peer-
reviewed literature.405 Other impacts, like the increase in demand for
local government services and a reduction in local government work-
force retention are not as well documented.406 Where possible, the
framework provides links to authoritative, peer-reviewed journal articles
with an objective perspective on the impact. Where peer-reviewed re-
sources were not available, the framework provides either non-peer-
reviewed studies or news reports with useful coverage of the impact.
Containing more than 150 resources and links documenting and contex-
tualizing potential local impacts, the framework represents a significant
step towards equipping local governments with foundational knowledge
to manage shale development.
To understand how the environmental, financial, and social conse-
quences of fracking are incorporated into local law and policy, we then
collected town resolutions and ordinances to augment those provided by
Food and Water Watch. We surveyed a wide range of local ordinances
and policy measures to procure a variety of regulatory and nonregulatory
governance options for local authorities to consider. Then, we paired
405. See infra Section IV.B. (discussing how the harms of groundwater pollution from stray
gas or fracking chemicals has been documented in the journal Environmental Earth Sciences, among
others); see also Birgit C. Gordalla, Ulrich Ewers & Fritz H. Frimmel, Hydraulic Fracturing. A
Toxicological Threat for Groundwater and Drinking-Water?, 70 ENVTL. EARTH SC. 3875, 3876
(2013).
406. See infra Section IV.B. Though many local municipalities have identified an increased
demand for local government services as an impact of fracking, no peer-reviewed journal has ad-
dressed this challenge. See infra Section IV.B., "Community and Government: Provision of Local
Government Services" and "Community and Government: Workforce Retention," among others.
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these local legal and policy strategies to corresponding impacts. While
the measures and impacts in the framework are not exhaustive, the data-
base provides a substantial resource and reference point for local gov-
ernments seeking to secure local economic advantages, while safeguard-
ing against potential negative effects from shale gas development.
At present, the impacts framework, summarized in Section V.B.,
and available in its entirety online in an interactive online format (see
Appendix 1) or a static document (see Appendix 2), contains nearly forty
unconventional oil and gas local impacts across the environmental, so-
cio-economic, and public health spectrum that correspond with local
measures that address these challenges. As stated above, while the cata-
logue of impacts is not an exclusive list of challenges a community may
face, nor a complete picture of the potential benefits, the compiled list
demonstrates the range of challenges a locality may face depending on
local context. We seek to provide a balanced resource for governments
seeking precedents of how other localities are addressing fracking, and
suggest how governments might incorporate concerns of the scientific
community, environmental advocates, industry, and local community
members into municipal policy.
B. The Local Impacts ofHydraulic Fracturing
As noted above, we have compiled nearly forty oil and gas impacts
of fracking across multiple areas of concern. The following list sets forth
the impacts that we have surveyed, with more information located in the
footnotes. For the online interactive database of these impacts, please see
Appendix 1. See Appendix 2 for a static database saved as a PDF.
Local Impacts
Agriculture: Farming and Farmland Preservation 
407
Agriculture: Farmland r an Preservation408
407. See ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VII, § 7.01B (2011),
http://www.arlington-tx.gov/cityattomey/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2014/05/GasDrilling-
Chapter.pdf (creating setback requirements); MCKENZIE COUNTY, N.D., ZONING ORDINANCE art. I.,
§ 1.2 (2016), http://county.mckenziecounty.net/usrfiles/ZoningOrdinance_9-20-2016.pdf; PETERS





%20August%202017.pdf (establishing compressor stations locations); MCKENZIE CTY., MCKENZIE
COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 1-1 (2016), [hereinafter MCKENZIE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE
PLAN], http://planmckenzie.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/McKenzieCountyComprehensivePlanFINAL-I.pdf (last visited Sept. 16,
2017) (creating a town-wide comprehensive plan and establishing economic development strate-
gies).
408. See Jon Hurdle, Fracking Under a Historic Farm, N.Y. TIMES: GREEN (Mar. 1, 2013 1:42
PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/fracking-to-unfold-under-a-historic-farm; Teri
Weaver, NY Farmers Reject Anti-Hydrofracking Position at Farm Bureau Meeting, SYRACUSE.COM
(Dec. 4, 2013),
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Community and Government: Civic Discourse, Community Character,
and Crime409
Community and Government: Provision of Local Government Ser-
-410vices
Community and Government: Workforce Retention411
Economy: Charitable ContributionS4 12
Economy: Local Economic Development413
Economy: Local Employment4 14
Economy: Property Values415
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2013/12/nyfarmers reject anti-hydrofracking position_at
farmbureau meeting.html.
409. See MCKENZIE COUNTY, N.D., ZONING ORDINANCE art. II, § 2.6, art, IV, § 4.8 (address-
ing the termination of non-conforming uses and addressing temporary workforce housing, respec-
tively); CECIL TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE no. 2-2010 § 3 (2010),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/aglaw/Ordinances/CecilTownship 2-2010 General.pdf (address-
ing resident notifications); MCKENZIE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 407, at 6-1 to 6-6
(creating a statement of housing strategies).
410. See ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE 11-068, art. V, § 5.03, art. VI, 6.01B (requiring bur-
den of proof to fall on the operator and requiring periodic reports); JEFFERSON HILLS, PA.,
ORDINANCE no. 833, § 5(1)(H)(1) (2014),
http://www.ecode360.com/documents/JE2362/source/LF834323.pdf (requiring use of a security
guard); MCKENZIE COUNTY, N.D., ZONING ORDINANCE art. IV, § 4.8 (providing standards for
temporary workforce housing); MIDLOTHIAN, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 2010-12, art. XIII (2010),
http://www.midlothian.tx.us/documenteenter/view/500 (establishing fire prevention measures);
NOTINGHAM TOWNSHIP, PA. ORDINANCE no. 91, art. II, § 3 (2010),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/ file/aglaw/Ordinances/Nottingham TownshipNo 91.pdf (ensuring
pedestrian safety); PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 440.602(55) (addressing spill
cleanup, site security, and accident preparedness); SOUTH FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP, PA. & GREEN
HILLS BOROUGH, PA., JOINT ZONING § 185.72(Q) (2014),
http://southfranklintwp.org/ZoningOrdinanceFinal.pdf (ensuring reimbursement for operator com-
pliance); MCKENZIE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 407 (requiring a statement of
government strategies).
411. See Katie Walters, Watford City's First-Ever Affordable Housing for Public-Service
Employees Dedicated, ROUNDUPWEB.COM (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://www.roundupweb.com/story/2013/08/14/news/watford-citys-first-ever-affordable-housing-
for-public-service-employees-dedicated/3160.html.
412. See TIMOTHY W. KELSEY ET AL., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MARCELLUS SHALE IN
BRADFORD COUNTY: EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME IN 2010, at 7 (2012),
http://aese.psu.edu/research/centers/cecd/publications/marcellus/economic-impacts-of-marcellus-
shale-in-bradford-county-employment-and-income-in-2010.
413. See, e.g., DANIEL RAIMI & RICHARD G. NEWELL, SHALE PUBLIC FINANCE: LOCAL
GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT I (2014);
ANDREW RUMBACH, NATURAL GAS DRILLING IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE: POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON
THE TOURISM ECONOMY OF THE SOUTHERN TIER I (n.d.),
http://catskillcitizens.org/leammore/MarcellusTourismFinal[ I ].pdf (describing the effect of fracking
on tourism).
414. See, e.g., MARCELLUS SHALE EDUC. & TRAINING CTR., PENNSYLVANIA STATEWIDE
MARCELLUS SHALE WORKFORCE NEEDS ASSESSMENT passim (2011),
http://pasbdc.org/uploads/media items/pennsylvania-statewide-marcellus-shale-workforce-needs-
assesment-june-201 .original.pdf (noting the increased need for local workforce); RAIMI & NEWELL,
supra note 413, passim (assessing the potential for an increase in the local tax base).
415. See ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VII, § 7.01(B)C) (setting bonding
and setback requirements, landscaping requirements, and fencing requirements, among other re-
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Economy: Revenue from Fee-for-Service PaymentS416
Economy: Revenue from Intergovernmental Transfers417




Health and Safety: Health Concerns for Workers421
Health and Safety: Local Health and Emergency Services422
Housing: Increased Scarcity and Cost23
Infrastructure: Improved Roads424
strictions); MCKENZIE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 407, at 1-2, 2-1, 2-5 to 2-6
(requiring a statement of land use strategies; building restrictions; and setback restrictions, among
other requirements).
416. See ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VII, § 5.07(A) (describing a provision
where an operator pays annual administrative fees for each permit); BEDFORD, TEX., CODE OF
ORDINANCES pt. 1, ch. 79, art. II § 79-22(b), art. V, § 79-72 (2017),
https://www.municode.com/library/tx/bedford/codes/codeofordinances?nodeld=PTIICOORCH7
9GADRPR (stating which fees must be paid prior to drilling/construction).
417. See, e.g., RAIMI & NEWELL, supra note 413, passim (describing that states collect taxes
and fees associated with fracking operations in localities).
418. See, e.g., id. (noting that oil and gas operators on public land pay royalties to the govern-
ment for use of the land); Jeffrey Jacquet, Energy Boomtowns & Natural Gas: Implications for
Marcellus Shale Local Governments & Rural Communities 40 (Ne. Reg'1 Ctr. for Rural Dev., Work-
ing Paper No. 43, 2009), http://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/publications/rdp/rdp43 (documenting increased
local government revenue in Wyoming).
419. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FACT SHEET: ECONOMICS OF
HIGH-VOLUME HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN NEW YORK STATE,
http://www.empireenergyforum.com/uploads/econimpact092011l.pdf; Charles Costanzo & Timothy
W. Kelsey, State Tax Implications of Marcellus Shale, PENNSTATE EXTENSION (Aug. 15, 2017),
http://extension.psu.edu/publications/ua468 (describing the increasing local tax revenue accompany-
ing fracking in Pennsylvania).
420. See ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VI, § 6.01 (2011),
http://www.arlington-tx.gov/cityattomey/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2014/05/GasDrilling-





%20August/o202017.pdf (public safety and permit compliance).
421. See ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. V, § 5.02 (requiring emergency re-
sponse plan, hazardous materials management, liability insurance, blowout prevention, fire preven-
tion, and storage tank regulations); CECIL TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE no. 2-2010, § 3(6) (Mar. 22,
2010), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/aglaw/Ordinances/CecilTownship_2-201 OGeneral.pdf
(requiring a first responders plan, and a preparedness, prevention, and contingency plans).
422. BURLESON, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 14, art. VII, div. 1, § 14-353 (2017),
https://library.municode.com/tx/burleson/codes/code of ordinances?nodeld=PTIICOORCHI4BU_
ARTVIIGADREX DIVIGESl4-353CIMA (describing the authority of the city manager's power);
CECIL TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE no. 2-2010, § 3(6); Cross Creek Township, Pa. Ordinance no.
1:11 (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.crosscreektwp.org/uploads/oil-and-gas-zoning-amendment-new-
draft-2.pdf (amending ¶ 7(g)(i)) (requiring a Preparedness, Prevention, and Contingency Plan to the
first responders and zoning officer); MCKENZIE COUNTY, N.D. ZONING ORDINANCES, art. IV, § 4.8
(2016), http://county.mckenziecounty.net/usrfiles/Zoning Ordinance 9-20-2016.pdf (providing
temporary workforce housing).
423. See Walters, supra note 411 (describing the provision of subsidized housing).
244 DENVER LAWREVIEW [Vol. 95:1
Infrastructure: Road Conditions and Safety425
Land Use: Future Growth and Development426
Land Use: Local Habitat and SpecieS4 2 7
Land Use: Recreational Space4 2 8
424. See CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP, PA. ZONING ORDINANCES ch. 27, § 27-705(57)(C) (2016),
http://www.ecode360.com/14180109 (requiring the permit applicant to enter into an agreement with
the township before, during, and after natural gas development).
425. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VII, § 7.0 1(A)(22) (requiring
that private roads must be approved before usage); BUFFALO TOWNSHIP, PA. ZONING ORDINANCE
art. 3, § 312(E) (2009), http:/Ibuffalotownship.com/pdf/zoningordinance0209.pdf (operator must
agree to deal with all necessary road degradation); CECIL TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE no. 2-2010,
§ 3(2)-(4) (operator must ensure safeguards to ensure road conditions and pedestrian safety); CROSS
CREEK TOWNSHIP, PA. ORDINANCE no. 1:11 , (requiring an impervious parking surface); JEFFERSON
HILLS, PA. ORDINANCE no. 833, §§ 1(2)(F), 4(l)(B) (2014),
http://www.ecode360.com/documents/JE2362/source/LF834323.pdf (requiring submission of a road
restoration plan); JACKSON TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE no. 141 § IV(A) (2006),
http://www.jacksontwppa.com/PDF%20Documents/Ordinances/Methane%20Gas%200rdinance%2
0141.pdf (stipulating access road requirements); MOUNT PLEASANT TOWNSHIP, PA., CODE ch. 200,
art. XII, § 200-103.](B)(9) (2017), http://ecode360.com/l1532552#15229488 (providing of inspec-
tion of proposed truck routes); MURRYSVILLE, PA., REVISED PENDING ORDINANCE no. 930-15
(2017), http://murrysville.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Murrysville-Oil-and-Gas-Ordinance-
Revised-for-County-Review-February-3-2017-Reduced-size.pdf requiring an operator to perform an
inspection of proposed truck routes); PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 440.602(55)(H)
(2017),
http://www.ecode360.com/attachment/PE3557/Peters%2OTownship%2OZoning%200rdinance%20-
%20August%202017.pdf (requiring a truck road use plan and requirement to fix property damage);
Bd. of Trs. of the Town of Erie, Res, no. 12-74 (Colo. 2012),
http://www.erieco.gov/documentcenter/view/4736 (describing the location of water supply and
providing a traffic management plan); MCKENZIE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 407,
at 3-19 (requiring a route for preferred heavy traffic network; MCKENZIE CTY., MCKENZIE COUNTY
APPROACH PERMIT (2014),
http://county.mckenziecounty.net/usrfiles/APPROACHPERMITAPPLICATION_FINAL.pdf
(holding contractor liable for damages).
426. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VI, § 6.01(B)(1) (requiring an
operator to hold a bond); BURLESON, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 14, art. VII, div. I, § 14-353
(noting the city manager's power).
427. See, e.g., AZTEC, N.M., CITY CODE ch. 15, art. II, § 15-12(l)(9) (2013),
http://www.aztecnm.gov/citycode/chapterl 5-oilgas.pdf (requiring a wildlife mitigation plan); CECIL
TOWNSHIP, PA. ORDINANCE no. 2-2010, § 3(5) (a ban on burning brush, trees, or stumps); FORT
WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 18449-02-2009 (2009),
http://publicdocuments.fortworthtexas.gov/CSODOCS/DocView.aspx?id=4092&searchid=a64088c9
-ea99-477b-a3ef-a675el8f855f&dbid=0 (landscaping requirement); JEFFERSON HILLS, PA.,
ORDINANCE no. 833 § 1(2) (requiring of overlay districts); MOUNTAIN LAKE PARK, MD.,
ORDINANCE no. 2011-01, art. IV, § 2 (2011),
http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/content/documents/2000rdinance-
Mountain%20Lake%2OPark--.pdf (noting rights of natural communities to exist); MOUNT PLEASANT
TOWNSHIP, PA., CODE ch. 200, art. XII, § 200-103.1(B)(4) (setback requirements); MURRYSVILLE,
PA., REVISED PENDING ORDINANCE no. 930-15 § 1(3) (defining a Best Management Practice as
mitigation measures used to ensure energy development proceeds in an environmentally responsible
manner); PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 440.602(55)(Z) (requiring compliance with
all federal, state, and local laws, ordinances and regulations protecting the environment or environ-
mental matters); Rio ARRIBA COUNTY, N.M. ORDINANCE no. 2009-01, art. 8, § 8.2 (2009),
http://www.rio-arriba.org/pdf/2009-01 rioarriba county oil and gasordinance.pdf (requiring
environmental report); Bd. of Trs. of the Town of Erie, Res. no. 12-74 (Colo. 2012)
http://www.erieco.gov/documentcenter/view/4736 (requiring a best management practices).
428. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. V, § 5.02(C)(14) (requiring a site
restoration plan); JEFFERSON HILLS, PA. ORDINANCE no. 833 § 1(2) (requiring overlay districts);






MOUNT PLEASANT TOWNSHIP, PA., CODE ch. 200, art. XII, § 200-103.1(B)(4) (setback require-
ments); MIDLOTHIAN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 4, art. 40.6, § 4.06.004 (2016),
http://z2codes.franklinlegal.net/franklin/Z2Browser2.html?showset-midlothianset note (noting
location criteria and specific use permits); NOTTINGHAM TOWNSHIP, PA. ORDINANCE no. 91, art. I,
§ 1 (2010), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/aglaw/Ordinances/Nottingham_TownshipNo_91.pdf
(ensuring pedestrian safety) (describing specific zoning districts); PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING
ORDINANCE § 440.602(55)(E) (permitted use zones); MCKENZIE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN,
supra note 407, at 4-2 (stating recreation and tourism strategies).
429. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VII, § 7.01(A)(15) (flaring
prohibitions, emissions restrictions); MIDLOTHIAN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 4, art. 4.06,
§ 4.06.013(a)(13), (17) (muffling exhaust standards and gas emissions); MURRYSVILLE, PA.,
REVISED PENDING ORDINANCE no. 930-15 § 1; PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE
§ 440.602(55)(0) (controlling dust and odor); Bd. of Trs. of the Town of Erie, Res. no. 12-74 (Colo.
2012), http://www.erieco.gov/documentcenter/view/4736 (describing best management practices for
the water supply).
430. See ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VII, § 7.01(A)(14)-(15), (A)(24), (1)
(insurance requirements, wastewater pond regulations, saltwater well prohibitions, and disposal lines
regulations).
431. See, e.g., id. § 7.01(F); BUFFALO TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE art. 6, § 603.5
(hiring an outside consultant); CECIL TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE no. 2-2010, § 3(16) (requiring a
seventy-two ambient noise level evaluation); JEFFERSON HILLS, PA., ORDINANCE no. 814 (July 12,
2010), https://www.pdffiller.com/en/project/130271573.htm?fhash=477fbc&reload-true (noise
curfew and limit) (pending ordinance never adopted, codified with differences in language at
JEFFERSON HILLS, PA. ORDINANCE no. 833, § 4(2)(I) (noise management plan)); NORTH STRABANE
TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE no. 368, § 14 (2016),
http://ecode360.com/documents/NO2412/source/LF931614.pdf (requiring engine mufflers); PETERS
TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 440.602(55)(P) (noise control); Bd. of Trs. of the Town of
Erie Res. no. 12-74 (Colo. 2012), http://www.erieco.gov/documentcenter/view/4736 (noting best
management practices, elaborated in Appendix A of attached Memorandum of Understanding).
432. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VII, § 7.01(A)(14), (A)(28),
(A)(31), (C)(1), (I) (describing pond design and landscaping features; storage tank regulations;
saltwater disposal lines); AZTEC, N.M., CITY CODE ch. 15, art III, § 15-30 (2013),
http://www.aztecnm.gov/citycode/chapterl5-oilgas.pdf (storage tank regulations); BUFFALO
TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE art. 3, § 331 (requiring heavy industry to provide a description
of disposal methods); MIDLOTHIAN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 4, art. 40.6, § 4.06.13 (specify-
ing discharge regulations); MOUNT PLEASANT TOWNSHIP, PA., CODE ch. 171, art. 1, § 171.10, ch.
200, art. XII, § 200-103.5(B)(13), http://ecode360.com/14960721 (noting a liability coverage re-
quirement); OTERO COUNTY, N.M., ORDINANCE no. 02-05 (2005),
https://web.archive.org/web/20110813193603/http://co.otero.nm.us/Oil%20&%2OGas%200rdinanc
e/O&GDocs/OrdO2-05_WORK.pdf (draft ordinance describing oil cleanup and disposal, accident
report and spills); PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 440.602(55)(E)(5) (requiring
water testing); SOUTH FAYETTE TOWNSHIP, PA., CODE ch. 240, art. XV § 240-95(A)(54), (A)(56)
(2016), http://ecode360.com/1 616851 (pond management); Bd. of Trs. of the Town of Erie Res. no.
12-74 (Colo. 2012), http://www.erieco.gov/documentcenter/view/4736 (attached Memorandum of
Understanding describes responsible products program and best management practices); MCKENZIE
COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 407, at 1-4, 2-48 (natural resources management plan).
433. See ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068 art. VII, § 7.01(A)-(C), (H), (L) (describ-
ing minimal interference initiatives; visual blight reduction; setbacks; landscaping; gates require-
ments); BEDFORD, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES pt. 1, ch. 79, art. I § 79-6 (2017),
https://www.municode.com/library/tx/bedford/codes/codeofordinancesnodeld=PTIICOORCH7
9GADRPR (seismic survey regulations); CECIL TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE no. 2-2010, § 3(3), (5),
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Soil and Geology: Earthquakes and Ground Vibration434
Soil and Geology: Erosion and Sedimentation4 3 5
Soil and Geology: Increased Sand Mining and Processing4 3 6
Soil and Geology: Soil Compaction43 7
Water Resources: Strain on Water Infrastructure and Public Utilities 438
V. OVERLAP BETWEEN LOCAL CONCERNS AND LOCAL AUTHORITY
Our ongoing research has sought to identify both the positive and
negative impacts of fracking. These impacts are local in nature, and their
regulation falls under the umbrella of traditional local zoning authori-
ty.
4 3 9
Positive impacts are generally economic in nature; drilling opera-
tions have been touted for creating jobs and providing desperately need-
ed income for hardscrabble farmers who choose to lease their land.44 0
Fracking can also improve conditions in poor, rural municipalities that
would otherwise not be able to afford to carry out functions such as fix-
(8)-(10) (minimal interference initiatives); MCKENZIE COUNTY, N.D., ZONING ORDINANCE art. III,
§ 3.8, art. IV, § 4.9, art. V, § 5.8 (2016),
http://county.mckenziecounty.net/usrfiles/ZoningOrdinance 9-20-2016.pdf (conditional use per-
mits; performance standards); MIDLOTHIAN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 4, art. 40.6,
§ 4.06.007(e) (landscaping requirements); SOUTH FAYETTE TOWNSHIP, PA., CODE ch. 240, art. XV
§ 240-95(A)(54)(K), (N)-(O), (T)-(U) (facility design); Bd. of Trs. of the Town of Erie Res. no.
12-74 (Colo. 2012), http://www.erieco.gov/documentcenter/view/4736 (best management practices
elaborated in Appendix A of attached MOU).
434. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VII, § 7.01(A)(6) (noting vibra-
tion control); BEDFORD, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES pt. 1, ch. 79, art. I, § 79-6 (seismic survey
regulations); MURRYSVILLE, PA., CODE ch. 220, art. V, §220-31(CC)(3)-(4) (2017)
http://ecode360.com/11539722 (geophysical exploration plan); PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING
ORDINANCE § 440.602(16), (42), (55)(0) (vibration and landslide control).
435. See, e.g., MCKENZIE COUNTY., N.D., ZONING ORDINANCE art. IV, § 4.9(l)(b), art. VI,
§§ 6.1.3(3), 6.10.14; MURRYSVILLE, PA., CODE ch. 220, art. V, § 220-31(P)(7), (T)(1)(b)(1)(e),
(T)(1)(c)(2), (T)(1)(d)(2), (T)(2)(g), (T)(2)(h)(2), (5) (erosion prevention and soil reclamation).
436. See, e.g., MCKENZIE COUNTY., N.D., ZONING ORDINANCE art. II, § 2.13.2, art. Ill,
§§ 3.4.3(13), (23), 3.8.1.2(7), (14), 3.8.2.2(2), (8) (specifying bond requirements for excavation and
reclamation).
437. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. V, § 5.02(C)(14) (describing a
site restoration plan); FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 18449-02-2009 § 15-45(D) (2009),
http://publicdocuments.fortworthtexas.gov/CSODOCS/PDF/i5 koge5c5rholnOsulvnile/47/Ordinanc
e%2018449-02-2009.pdf (describing a reclamation plan); MCKENZIE COUNTY, N.D., ZONING
ORDINANCE art. IV, § 4.9(1)(b), art. VI, § 6.7(2)(a) (requiring a runoff management plan).
438. See, e.g., BUFFALO TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE art. 3, §§ 307(G), 33 1(C)
http://buffalotownship.com/pdf/zoningordinance02O9.pdf (describing water withdrawal plan);
BURLESON, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 14, art. VII, div. I, § 14-357(e)(10) (2017),
https://library.municode.com/tx/burleson/codes/code ofordinances?nodeld=PTIICOORCH14BU
ARTVIIGADREX DIVIGE S14-353CIMA (water needs questionnaire); FORT. WORTH, TEX.,
ORDINANCE no. 18449-02-2009 § 15-42(A)(17) (requiring a fresh water fracture pond permit).
439. See supra Section IV.A.
440. RAIMI & NEWELL, supra note 413, at 2.
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ing their roads or buying new firefighting equipment."1 Further, local
governments can potentially advance these functions as conditions of
permitting fracking, or industry may provide for them via charitable do-
nations to the localities in which they operate.442 Such economic im-
provements may lead to increased population and property values, which
443
in turn increase tax revenues.
On the other hand, localities are concerned that fracking may also
negatively impact the environment, health and safety, and sense of char-
acter of a community. Environmental concerns include water444 and air
pollution," 5 water depletion (especially in drought-prone areas in the
West),446 nuisance effects (such as dust, odor, and noise),447 habitat
fragmentation,4 and increased erosion.44 Excessive truck traffic can





442. See KELSEY ET AL., supra note 412, at 5; RAIMI & NEWELL, supra note 413, at 4.
443. See ECOLOGY AND ENV'T, INC., N.Y. STATE. DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
002911_EGO4_03_B3371, ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON NEW YORK STATE'S OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING
REGULATORY PROGRAM 4-114 (Aug. 2011),
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals-pdfrdsgeisecon8 11.pdf;RAIMI & NEWELL, supra
note 413, at 4.





0141.pdf; SOUTH FAYETTE TOWNSHIP, PA., CODE ch. 240, art. XV § 240-95(A)(54)(f) (2016),
http://ecode360.com/l11616851.




MIDLOTHIAN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 4, art. 40.6, § 4.06.013 (2016),
http://z2codes.franklinlegal.net/franklin/Z2Browser2.html?showset-midlothianset note (noting
location criteria and specific use permits); TOWNSHIP OF UPPER BURRELL, PA., CODE ch. 350, art.
XVI, § 350-107(L)(7) (2016), http://ecode360.com/1 5010205#15010205.
446. See, e.g., MONIKA FREYMAN, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING & WATER STRESS: WATER




021014.pdf; Michael Dillon, Water Scarcity and Hydraulic Fracturing in Pennsylvania: Examining
Pennsylvania Water Law and Water Shortage Issues Presented by Natural Gas Operations in the
Marcellus Shale, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 210 (2011); Bobby Magill, Climate Change, Fracking,
Water Shortages in Northern Colorado Top Environmental Concerns in Coming Decades,
COLORADOAN (July 29, 2013, 8:45 AM), http://www.savethepoudre.org/news-articles/climate-
change-fracking-water-shortages-in-n-colorado-coloradoan-
2 013-07-29.pdf.
447. See, e.g, AZTEC, N.M., CITY CODE ch. 15, art. III, § 15-30 (2013),
http://www.aztecnm.gov/citycode/chapterl5-oilgas.pdf (minimizing odor); NORTH STRABANE
TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE no. 368, § 14 (2016),
http://ecode360.com/documents/NO2412/source/LF931614.pdf (minimizing noise and light pollu-
tion).
448. Erik Kiviat, Risks to Biodiversity from Hydraulic Fracturing for Natural Gas in the Mar-
cellus and Utica Shales, 1286 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI., May 23, 2013, at 1, 3-4; David
M. Marsh & Nicole G. Beckman, Effects of Forest Roads on the Abundance and Activity of Terres-
trial Salamanders, 14 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1882, 1882 (2004); Alexandre Racicot et al., A
Framework to Predict the Impacts of Shale Gas Infrastructures on the Forest Fragmentation of an
Agroforest Region, 53 ENVTL. MGMT. 1023, 1026-28 (2014).
449. Matthew McBroom et al., Soil Erosion and Surface Water Quality Impacts ofNatural Gas
Development in East Texas, USA, 4 WATER 944, 945 (2012); Mary Beth Adams, et al., Effects of
Natural Gas Development on Forest Ecosystems (2011) (Paper presented at the 17th Hardwood
Forest Conference), http://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/gtr/gtr-p-78papers/23adamsp78.pdf.
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quickly wear down local roads.450 These, as well as concerns about acci-
dents (such as spills), may actually negatively impact property values.451
Finally, the rapid population increase accompanying drilling activity-
associated with waste disposal, schools, courts, jails, and emergency
response services-may completely overwhelm a small locality.452
A. What Local Governments Can Do
Local governments may draw from their traditional zoning and po-
lice powers to regulate unwanted impacts of fracking in the same manner
as they have historically regulated industrial uses and activities within
their communities. Local governments may use zoning power to restrict
drilling activities to certain zones (e.g. the heavy industrial zone),453 or an
overlay zone where drilling is permitted to occur (albeit with heightened
restrictions above those that exist for the underlying zone).454 Local ju-
risdictions may make drilling a conditional use within a zone, requiring
industry to seek a special permit in order to establish an operation.455
Local governments may even ban fracking completely within a munici-
pality's borders as long as state law does not preempt doing so.456 Munic-
ipalities may also use their police power to pass local ordinances mitigat-
ing unwanted nuisances, such as noise, dust, odors, and safety con-
cerns.457 For example, a noise ordinance can limit the maximum decibel
level of fracking operations and the hours of the day in which they are
permitted to occur.T5
450. NOTTINGHAM TOWNSHIP, PA. ORDINANCE no. 91, art. I, § 3 (2010),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/aglaw/Ordinances/NottinghamTownshipNo 91.pdf; TOWNSHIP
OF UPPER BURRELL, PA., CODE ch. 350, art. XVI, § 350-107(K) (2016),
http://ecode360.com/15010205#15010205.
451. NOTTINGHAM TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE NO. 91, art. I, § 3; Jason Notte, Fracking
Leaves Property Values Tapped Out, DAMASCUS CITIZENS FOR SUSTAINABILITY (Aug. 23, 2013),
http://www.damascuscitizensforsustainability.org/2013/08/fracking-leaves-property-values-tapped-
out.
452. See infra Section V.B.2.
453. See text accompanying infra note 507.
454. Overlay zones are a generally accepted zoning mechanism that allow for a special zone,
with its own unique regulations, to lie overtop the existing zoning. See, e.g., Galveston Historical
Found. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 17 S.W.3d 414, 415 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (overlay zone used
to impose special restrictions on signs); Main St. Dev. Grp. v. Tinicum Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 19
A.3d 21, 27-28 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) ("[T]he MPC does not define overlay districts, but they
have become common tools of land use in Pennsylvania.").
455. See, e.g., NORTH STRABANE TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE no. 368, § 3 (2016),
http://ecode360.com/documents/NO2412/source/LF931614.pdf.
456. See, e.g., Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1191 (N.Y. 2014); Town of Dry-
den, N.Y. Ordinance Amending Prohibition on Gas Drilling (Aug. 2, 2011),
http://dryden.ny.us/Downloads/PROPOSEDAMENDMENTSZONING ORDINANCE.pdf
457. PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 440.602(55)(N), (0), (P) (2017),
http://www.ecode360.com/attachment/PE3557/Peters%2OTownship%2OZoning%200rdinance%20-
%20August/.202017.pdf (discussing noise, light, odor nuisances).
458. See, e.g., TOWNSHIP OF UPPER BURRELL, PA., CODE ch. 350, art. XVI, § 350-107(L)
(2016), http://ecode360.com/15010205#15010205 (requiring noise decibel limits during drilling
operations).
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Some local governments are even adopting novel nonregulatory
strategies, such as memoranda of understanding459 and road maintenance
agreements.460 These techniques, the efficacy of which have been debat-
ed,461 serve at the very least to foster better communication and relations
between the local government and industry, and can result in industry
being more sensitive to the concerns of the locality in which it is drill-
462
ing.
Compelling case studies from localities across the United States
demonstrate these strategies in practice. This Article specifically exam-
ines Erie, Colorado; McKenzie County, North Dakota; Peters Township,
Pennsylvania; and Arlington, Texas. Looking closely at the specific na-
ture of each government's strategy will show that fracking, and the tools
for governing it, are essentially the same in nature as any other land use,
despite difficult political circumstances and complicated technical and
environmental issues. These case studies also show that jurisdictions in
different political, legal, economic, social, and geologically technical
contexts can develop techniques that manage the most pressing impacts
of hydraulic fracturing. The following studies borrow from more detailed
case studies, which can be accessed from the link in Appendix 3.
B. What Local Governments Are Doing: Case Studies
1. Erie, Colorado: A Novel Nonregulatory Approach
In Colorado, there are four classes of localities, as determined by
the state legislature:463 cities, towns, territorial charter cities, and home
rule municipalities.464 "Home rule municipalities are those that have
adopted a home rule charter pursuant to Article XX of the Colorado Con-
stitution," which grants home rule power to those localities.4 65 Cities
have a population of over 2,000, while towns have a population of 2,000
or less.466 Territorial charter cities are those that incorporated prior to
1877 and never reorganized under the more modern statutes; only one
such city remains in the state.46 7 Only home rule municipalities possess
home rule powers; the others may exercise only the powers granted to
459. See infra Section V.B.1.
460. See infra Section V.B.3.
461. See infra Section V.B.1. on nonregulatory techniques in Erie, Colo.
462. See infra Section V.B.1. on Erie, Colo.
463. COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 13.
464. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-1-201 (2017); KATHLEEN M. KELLY, IC COLORADO PRACTICE
SERIES, METHODS OF PRACTICE § 54:1 (7th ed. West 2016).
465. KELLY, supra note 464.
466. Id.
467. Id. §§ 54:1, 54:1 n.6.
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them legislatively under Colorado Revised Statutes, section
31-15-101(2).468
In home rule municipalities, all state laws continue to apply until
superseded by the charters or local laws of the locality. Where a local
law is challenged under the doctrine of preemption, Colorado courts will
determine whether the issue the local law is seeking to regulate is of lo-
cal, state, or "mixed" local and state concern.469 If the matter is purely
local, the home rule municipality's ordinance will supersede the state
470law. On the other hand, if the matter is found to be of state concern,
state law will supersede the local regulation.4 7' If the matter is of mixed
state and local concern, then both the state and local governments can
adopt laws regulating it, 47 2 but in the case of a conflict, state law will
supersede the local law.473 Determining whether a matter is of local,
state, or mixed concern is an issue for the courts, who must balance fact
and policy in making their determination.4 74 The courts admit that often
these categories can even merge, and thus each determination is made on
an ad hoc basis using a multi-factor test.475 This makes for a rather liti-
gious area of the law, and provides the backdrop for the raging fracking
debate that has been ongoing for years within the state. In May 2016, the
Colorado Supreme Court finally resolved the fiercely contested issue of
whether local governments have the right to enact drilling moratoriums;
the court established that such moratoriums conflict with-and are there-
fore preempted by-state oil and gas law.476
The town of Erie, Colorado, is located in the northern part of the
state, nestled in the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains. It currently has
25,000 residents and expects its population to increase by forty percent
468. COLO. REv. STAT. § 31-15-101(2); KELLY, supra note 464, § 54:2; see also City of Sheri-
dan v. City of Englewood, 609 P.2d 108, 109 (Colo. 1980); City of Aurora v. Bogue, 489 P.2d 1295,
1296 (Colo. 1971); Svaldi v. City of Lakewood, 536 P.2d 331, 332 (Colo. App. 1975).
469. KELLY, supra note 464, § 54:2.
470. Id.; Vela v. People, 484 P.2d 1204, 1205 (Colo. 1971).
471. City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1279 (Colo. 2002).
472. John E. Hayes & Kristy M. Hart, Home Rule in Colorado. Evolution or Devolution, 33
COLO. LAW. 61, 62 (2004).
473. Id.; see City of Commerce City, 40 P.3d at 1279.
474. See City & Cty. of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.2d 748, 754-55 (Colo. 2001); Hayes &
Hartl, supra note 472, at 62 (quoting Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, LLC, 3 P.3d 30,
37 (Colo. 2000)).
475. City of Commerce City, 40 P.3d at 1278; City & Cty. of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764,
767-68 (Colo. 1990).
476. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 369 P.3d 573, 585 (Colo. 2016); see also
Cathy Proctor, Colorado Supreme Court Rules on Local Fracking Bans, DENV. BUS. J. (May 3,
2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.bizjoumals.com/denver/blog/earth topower/2016/05/colorado-
supreme-court-rules-on-local-fracking.html; Caitlin Hendee, Colorado Attorney General Threatens
Boulder County with Legal Action Over Oil and Gas Moratorium, DENv. BUS. J. (Jan. 27, 2017,
4:27 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2017/01/26/colorado-attorney-general-
threatens-boulder-county.html (demonstrating that some holdouts are still not in compliance with the
court's ruling; for example, Boulder County, Co. voted in December 2016 to extend its drilling
moratorium through May 1, 2017, and the state Attorney General threatened to bring suit against the
county to force compliance).
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by 2025.477 Erie's median age is thirty-seven and its median household
income is $112,000.478 The debate over hydraulic fracturing in Erie, Col-
orado, began in the summer of 2012 over a drill pad sited near Red Hawk
Elementary School; Erie residents were concerned by the proximity of
the well pad to the school and residential homes, as well as the noise that
emanated from the site.4 7 9 Though the site complies with all state setback
and operation requirements, the rig generated significant local resistance
against future drilling sites. The impacts of greatest concern to Colorado
residents include water consumption and pollution; waste; air pollution;
leaking wells and faulty containment equipment (a particular problem in
recent large flooding events); and insufficient siting and setback re-
quirements.480
In an attempt to address residents' concerns, Erie town administra-
tors decided to take a nonregulatory approach and entered into negotia-
tions with Encana and Anadarko, the two major companies running drill-
ing operations in northern Colorado.4 81 This approach is in stark contrast
to other Colorado towns, such as Longmont, whose residents instead
voted to outright ban fracking from its borders, but lost the fierce legal
battle to establish its right to impose a moratorium.482 The resulting
Memorandum of Agreements (MOA) between Erie, Encana, and Ana-
darko requires companies to use best practice techniques such as a wider
setback than the state requires; vapor recovery units; a noise, light, and
dust mitigation plan; and steel-rimmed berms around tanks at the well
site.483 When additional issues surfaced after drilling commenced (such
as noise and vibration problems), Erie's Town Board continued to en-
gage with the drilling companies and seek more mitigation measures
instead of banning the operations.484 Due to the collaborative approach
taken by town administrators and industry representatives-and especial-
ly in light of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision that local moratori-
ums are preempted by state law-Erie's MOU offers a potentially con-
structive pathway forward for other small towns confronted with the nat-
ural gas industry. At a minimum, the unique effort of crafting a MOU
has created a better relationship between the town and industry, in which
the town retains a significant amount of negotiating power.
477. See Quick Facts, TOWN OF ERIE, COLO., https://www.erieco.gov/240/Quick-Facts (lasted
visited Oct. 5, 2017).
478. Id.; Town of Erie 2017 Community Profile, TOWN OF ERIE, COLO.,
https://www.erieco.gov/DocumentCenter/Home/View/43 (last updated Jan. 27, 2017).
479. Interview by Avana Andrade with Fred Diehl, Assistant to the Town Administrator, Erie,
Colo. (Dec. 2, 2014).
480. Id.
481. Bd. of Trs. of the Town of Erie, Res. no. 12-74 (Colo. 2012),
http://www.erieco.gov/documentcenter/view/4736.
482. See City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 369 P.3d 573, 585 (Colo. 2016).
483. TOWN OF ERIE, COLO., ORDINANCE no. 21-2015 (2015),
http://www.erieco.gov/DocumentCenter/View/7078.
484. Mark Jaffe, Erie Rejects Fracking Freeze, DENV. POST (Apr. 26, 2016, 12:28 AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/2015/01/27/erie-rejects-fracking-freeze.
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2. McKenzie County, North Dakota: A Rural Hybrid Approach
In North Dakota, authority is statutorily granted to all municipalities
to regulate a wide variety of industries and uses, including passing ordi-
nances (though the power to zone is not a power explicitly granted).485
All municipalities hold the same powers as townships.486 For a proposed
municipal corporation to become a city, it must have a territory of under
487four square miles in area. Cities of under 500 inhabitants may incorpo-
rate "under the council or modem council forms of government," while
cities of 500 or more inhabitants may incorporate under either the coun-
cil, modem council, or commission forms of government.488
Home rule authority is statutorily granted to cities through the ena-
bling clause found in North Dakota Century Code § 40-05.1-01: "Any
city may frame, adopt, amend, or repeal home rule charters . . . .'489 The
powers of home rule cities are laid out in § 40-05.1-06 and notably in-
clude both the authority "[t]o provide for the adoption, amendment, and
repeal of ordinances, resolutions, and regulations to carry out its gov-
ernmental and proprietary powers and to provide for public health, safe-
ty, morals, and welfare,"490 and "[t]o provide for zoning, planning, and
subdivision of public or private property."4 91
In a similar vein, counties in North Dakota are statutorily estab-
lished entities492 that are also granted the power (if they choose to exer-
cise it) to become home rule entities.493 Their authority, much like cities,
494includes the ability to pass, amend, and repeal ordinances as well as
engage in planning and zoning for the health and welfare of their citi-
zens.495
With a pre-boom population of 6,360 people, McKenzie County has
been rapidly growing, recently landing the title of fastest growing non-
496metropolitan county in the country. Watford City's population more
than quintupled, growing from less than 1,500 residents in 2010 to over
10,000 residents in 2014.497 This phenomenal growth rate is one of the
485. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-01 (2017).
486. Id. § 40-05-10.
487. Id. § 40-02-01.
488. Id.
489. Id. § 40-05.1-01.
490. Id § 40-05.1-06(9).
491. Id. § 40-05.1-06(13).
492. Id. § 11-01-01.
493. Id. § 11-09.1-01.
494. Id. § 11-09.1-05(7).
495. Id. § 11-09.1-05(9).
496. Stephanie Norman, County Is No. I in Nation for Population Growth, MCKENZIE CTY.
FARMER (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.watfordcitynd.com/?id=10&nid=2665.
497. RICHARD G. NEWELL & DANIEL RAIMI, DUNN COUNTY AND WATFORD, CITY NORTH
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impacts that the county has been most focused on mitigating. The county
seeks to preserve its agrarian, "wholesome" community character, de-
spite this "instant sprawl.'A98 This "instant sprawl" describes the "man
camps," or miles of temporary housing units constructed for drill site
workers that have popped up within a twenty-mile radius of Watford
City in the few years since the shale boom has taken off. 499 County offi-
cials have utilized a hybrid approach to address these growth concerns;
the traditional zoning process was used to develop a Comprehensive Plan
and Zoning Ordinance, while nonregulatory collaborations between the
county, surrounding counties, and other stakeholders have assessed and
planned for infrastructure and service needs.
The Comprehensive Plan expresses the community's vision for fu-
ture development and features key priorities for guiding policy making.
The county used the Comprehensive Plan to articulate an overarching
goal of preserving the integrity of the rural communities while reaping
the benefits of development, focusing on broad categories of concern:
economic development; provision of government services; stewardship
of resources; land use and adequate transportation; recreation; and hous-
ing.500
The Zoning Ordinance creates zoning districts with district-specific
restrictions on development, though it allows all nonconforming uses at
the time of adoption to continue.5 0 The Ordinance focuses on allowed
and conditional uses in the county and includes general restrictions such
as requiring approved on-site sewage systems and road access for subdi-
visions.50 2 Importantly, temporary workforce housing is considered a
conditional use and is subject to significant regulation.o3 In contrast to
the other localities featured as case studies in this Article, the McKenzie
County Ordinance places minimal restrictions on oil and gas develop-
ment, avoiding regulations like sound restrictions that might be more
common in more urbanized areas.50 Yet an extensive portion of the or-
dinance is devoted to addressing wind energy siting, extensive permitting
fiscal%20effects%20of/o2OBakken%20shale%20development/o20FINAL.pdf; see U.S. Census
Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2015, AM. FACT
FINDER, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtmlsrc=bkmk
(last visited Oct. 5, 2017); see also Tom Haines, What If Your Small Town Suddenly Got Huge?,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/09/what-if-your-
small-town-suddenly-got-huge/379536.
498. Interview by Christopher Halfnight with Gene Veeder, Director, Economic Development,
McKenzie County, N.D. Job Development Authority and Tourism Bureau (Dec. 1, 2014).
499. Id.
500. See, e.g., McKENZIE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 407, at 1-4; Kate Rug-
gles, County Zone Plan Approved, MCKENZIE CTY. FARMER (Mar. 27, 2013),
http://www.watfordcitynd.com/?id=1 0&nid=2118.
501. McKENZIE COUNTY, N.D., ZONING ORDINANCE art. II, § 2.6 (2016),
http://county.mckenziecounty.net/usrfiles/ZoningOrdinance_9-20-2016.pdf.
502. See, e.g., id at art III, § 3.9.3, art. IV, § 4.1.
503. Id. at art. 4, § 4.8.
504. Id. at art. 1, § 1.3.
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requirements, public hearings, setbacks, and post-leasing restoration of
property-a contrast that mostly results from state authority over oil and
gas regulation but also reflects local priorities.50 5
McKenzie County's nonregulatory strategies to address the increas-
ing strains on local government infrastructure and services from the rapid
population boom have primarily focused on assessing and prioritizing
infrastructure and service needs, and then creating infrastructure and
expanding staff to meet those needs. The county joined with eighteen
other counties and entities to form Vision West ND, a consortium of
local interests seeking to improve the regional economy, and released an
Economic Development Strategic Plan, which included topics such as
business retention, health care, environmental restoration, and traffic
management.50 6
Although the oil boom in McKenzie County has dramatically
slowed over the past two years due to a sharp drop in oil prices,507 the
Trump Administration's focus on encouraging domestic energy produc-
tion may spur another uptick in fracking.sos Though the future for
McKenzie County is uncertain, their planning and zoning efforts (em-
phasizing controlled growth), diversification of the economy, and preser-
vation of community character will serve them well going forward, and
remain a prime example for local governments striving to achieve a bal-
anced and adaptive approach to the region's development.
3. Peters Township, Pennsylvania: A Regulatory Approach
Pennsylvania municipalities have general authority to regulate for
the wellbeing of their communities.5 09 However, the Pennsylvania Oil
and Gas Law explicitly preempts certain local control over fracking; ef-
fectively, the law prevents localities from regulating how fracking oc-
curs.5 0 For example, local governments cannot mandate the thickness of
well casings or the type of equipment that drillers use.51 Despite these
505. Id. at art. 1-6.
506. MCKENZIE CTY., N.D., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLAN (June 2013),
http://www.visionwestnd.com/pdf/strategicplans/McKenzie%20County%2OFinal.pdf
507. Ernest Scheyder, In North Datoka's Oil Patch, A Humbling Comedown, REUTERS
INVESTIGATES (May 18, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-
northdakota-bust.
508. An America First Energy Plan, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-
energy (last accessed Sept. 1, 2017) ("The Trump Administration is committed to energy policies
that lower costs for hardworking Americans and maximize the use of American resources, freeing us
from dependence on foreign oil."); see also Sharma, supra note 12.
509. Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code Act of 1968, Pub. L. 805, No. 247, art. VI,
§ 603 (2005), http://mpc.landuselawinpa.com/MPCode.pdf (enabling legislation that empowers local
governments to enact, amend, and repeal zoning ordinances in order to regulate for the health, safe-
ty, and welfare of their citizens).
510. See Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council, 964 A.2d 855, 868 (Pa. 2009); see also
Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 875, 877 (Pa. 2009); supra Section II.A.
511. Range Res.-Appalachia, 964 A.2d at 875.
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state-level limitations, Pennsylvania localities do have the legal authority
to regulate where fracking may take place.512
In 2012, the state government tried to limit this local authority over
fracking when it passed Act 13 . Peters Township was among a group
of townships and individuals that challenged the law, arguing that its
restrictions on local power were unconstitutional.5 14 The resulting 2013
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Robinson Township v. Com-
monwealth515 overturned § 3304 of Act 13 and affirmed local authority to
516
regulate the location of fracking operations, with certain limitations.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's
holding that § 3304 violates "substantive due process . . . because it al-
lows incompatible uses in zoning districts and does not protect the inter-
ests of neighboring property owners from harm, alters the character of
the neighborhood, and makes irrational classifications."s
1  Further, the
court held that § 3304 violates the environmental rights provision of the
Pennsylvania constitution because "a new regulatory regime permitting
industrial uses as a matter of right in every type of pre-existing zoning
district [including residential] is incapable of conserving or maintaining
the constitutionally-protected aspects of the public environment and of a
certain quality of life." 18
Peters Township, located in Western Pennsylvania, is heavily resi-
dential and relatively wealthy (especially compared to its neighboring
townships), with a population of 22,143 and median household income
of $108,500.59 While the majority of wealthy community members
would like to see Peters Township ban hydrofracking-as they harbor
strong concerns about negative environmental, road, and property value
impacts-the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code does not ap-
pear to permit local governments to completely ban a legitimate use.
Thus, the township has used the traditional zoning process to regulate the
location of drill sites, compressor stations, and processing stations, as
512. Huntley & Huntley, 964 A.2d at 864.
513. ActNo. 13 of Feb. 14, 2012, Pub. L. 87, No. 13 (codified at 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301-
3504 (2017)).
514. Jason Cato, Peters Residents Opposed to Fracking Turn Out for Public Hearing,
TRIBLIVE (Jan. 19, 2015, 9:21 PM), http://triblive.com/news/adminpage/7595230-74/drilling-peters-
ordinance.
515. 83 A.3d 901, aff'g 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2002).
516. Id. at 980-83 (Pa. 2013) (reaffirming the holdings in Huntley and Range Resources, which
Act 13 had directly contravened).
517. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 485 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012), affd, 83
A.3d at 901.
518. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979.




216 (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
520. Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code Act of 1968, Pub. L. 805, No. 247, art. VI,
§ 603(b), (i) (2005), http://mpc.landuselawinpa.com/MPCode.pdf
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well as mitigate impacts including visual blight, noise and odor pollution,
truck traffic and wear on local roads, and potential safety hazards.
The township, while regulating under the mandates of the now-
overturned provision of Act 13, originally crafted a Mineral Extraction
Ordinance, which regarded drilling as a "conditional use" that the Town-
ship's Planning Commission must approve prior to extraction. 521 The
ordinance modified the township's existing zoning code by creating a
"Mineral Extraction Overlay Zone," which the township can float over
the existing zoning to permit drilling in areas over forty acres that are
accessible via an existing road.522 All types of drilling activity and sta-
tions are considered industrial uses under the zoning code. The regula-
tions require setbacks; notification,5 23 signage, and fencing require-
ments;5 24 drilling noise decibel limits; 5 25 minimization of visual blight,52 6
lighting,52 7 and dust/vibrations/odor; 528 road maintenance and repair re
quirements;529 and pre- and post-drilling water testing,530 all with the
intent of mitigating to the fullest extent possible the negative impacts of
drilling on both community members and the environment.
To ensure compliance with the 2013 Robinson Township deci-
sion,53 1 the township reviewed and amended its ordinance in January
521. PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE No. 737 (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://www.peterstownship.com/vertical/sites/%7B3BE5BO86-2A 1 5-4083-A63D-
16B3DD03C8DD%7D/uploads/MineraExtractionOrd finalversion737_8-2-1 l.pdf (current
version at PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 440.602(55) (2017),
http://www.ecode360.com/attachment/PE3557/Peters%2OTownship%2OZoning%200rdinance%20-
%20August%202017.pdf).
522. PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 27, pt. 3, § 303(A)(1), pt. 5 § 504(A), pt.
7 § 713(C) (2016), http://www.peterstownship.com/vertical/sites/%7B3BE5BO86-2Al54083-
A63D-16B3DDO3C8DD%7D/uploads/Zoning(l).pdf, repealed by PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING
ORDINANCE §§ 400.00-.1200 (2017).
523. PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 440.602(55)(T) (2017),
http://www.ecode360.com/attachment/PE3557/Peters%2OTownship%2OZoning%200rdinance%20-
%20August/o202017.pdf.
524. Id. § 440.602(55)(T).
525. Id. § 440.602(55)(P)(1) (explaining that noise regulations are robust; after establishing a
pre-drilling noise level baseline, the drilling cannot exceed this ambient noise level by more than ten
decibels from the hours of 7:00am-9:00pm, and not by more than five decibels between 9:00pm and
7:00am); id. § 440.602(55)(P)(2) (stating that in order to accommodate the "fluctuations" in drilling
activities, the township also created a "sliding scale which provides adjustments in the permitted
level of noise generated during operations to create flexibility in the regulations and prevent repeated
violations."); see also id. § 440.602(16)(J) (explaining that the Township reserves the right to require
operators to use devices such as sound walls, acoustical blankets, and mufflers, to ensure compliance
with the permitted noise levels).
526. See PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 440.602(55)(U)(V) (requiring that the
operator paint machinery in "earth tones," and requiring.fencing and/or landscape buffering to min-
imize the visual impact of fracking at the streetscape).
527. Id. § 440.602(55)(N) (stating that lighting may not shine on adjacent public or private
property, and must point downward to illuminate only the drilling site).
528. Id. § 440.602(55)(0).
529. Id. § 440.602(55)(I).
530. Id. § 440.602(55)(E).
531. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, affg 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2002).
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2015.532 The township eliminated its mineral extraction overlay district,
and instead now permits fracking to occur in its Light Industrial Dis-
trict.5 33 The ordinance still retains all of its provisions relating to envi-
ronmental, health, and safety concerns. These specific requirements for
drilling are valuable best practices that other localities may consider in
order to regulate some of the impacts of fracking.53 4
4. Arlington, Texas: An Urban Hybrid Approach
Texas first enacted laws permitting the incorporation of cities in the
1850s.535 In the early 1900s, the Home Rule Enabling Act was created
and modified, permitting cities to designate zones and districts wherein
they could regulate size, height, bulk, and use of structures in furtherance
of the public welfare.53 6 In 1927, the basis of Texas's modern Local
Government Code was laid with the passage of the Zoning Act, a com-
prehensive piece of legislation outlining the mechanisms by which local
governments could exercise their authority.537 Today, the authority for
Texas localities' authority to zone is found in Chapter 211 of the Local
Government Code.3 8
There are three types of Texan municipalities: general law, munici-
pal home rule, and those chartered by special legislation.5 39 Each locali-
ty's governmental structure and powers are dependent on its classifica-
tion; thus, a general-law city is bound by the general laws of the state, a
home rule city is guided by its charter, and a special-law city regulates
pursuant to the special legislative act that created it.540 There are three
subtypes of general-law municipality: Types A, B, and C.54 1 Each has its
own distinct requirements for incorporation, such as population and terri-
532. PETERS TWP. PLANNING COMM'N, MEETING MINUTES FOR JAN. 15, 2015, at 3-5 (Pa.
2015), http://www.peterstownship.com/vertical/sites/%7B3BE5BO86-2A
1 5-4083-A63D-
16B3DDO3C8DD%7D/uploads/Planning_Minutes_2015-01-15.pdf (approving draft mineral extrac-
tion ordinance).
533. Id.
534. PETERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE no. 804 (Sept. 26, 2016),
http://www.ecode360.com/documents/PE3557/source/LF926970.pdf.
535. Act of Mar. 15, 1875, 1875 Tex. Gen. Laws 113 (granting authority to incorporate Type A
cities); Act of Jan. 27, 1858, 1858 Tex. Gen. Laws 69 (allowing the incorporation of Type B cities);
DAVID B. BROOKS, 23 TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: MUNICIPAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 21.01 (2d ed.
2016).
536. Act of Apr. 2, 1921, 1921 Tex. Gen. Laws 169; BROOKS, supra note 535.
537. Act effective of June 14, 1927, 1927 Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 424; BROOKS, supra note
535.
538. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 211.001 (West 2016); BROOKS, supra note 535, § 21.01.
539. BROOKS, supra note 535, § 3.03; see also LOC. GOv'T § 5.001 (Type A); LOC. GOV'T
§ 5.002 (Type B); LOc. GOV'T § 5.003 (Type C); LOC. GOV'T § 5.004 (home rule); LOc. GOV'T
§ 5.005 (special-law).
540. LOc. GOV'T § 1.005; BROOKS, supra note 535, § 3.03.
541. Loc. GOv'T § 6.001 (authority to incorporate as a Type A municipality); LOC. GOV'T
§ 7.001 (authority to incorporate as a Type B municipality); LOc. GOV'T § 8.001 (authority to Incor-
porate as a Type C municipality).
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542tory size requirements. Cities with a population of over 5,000 may
vote to adopt their own charter and become home rule cities.
543
Arlington, Texas, is a home rule city 54 4 of 392,772 people, with a
median household income of $53,6326, and is located inside of the na-
tion's fastest-growing metroplex.5 4 5 While local officials at first thought
fracking was a temporary phenomenon, it quickly became clear that
fracking would become a permanent industry.546 Local citizens and the
city are specifically concerned with avoiding state preemption (a con-
stantly-looming issue in Texas); mitigating noise pollution;547 and ensur-
ing the safe operation of heavy industry in a dense urban setting, such as
548through underground pipe management.
The city has utilized a hybrid approach of engaging in the tradition-
al zoning practice of passing a comprehensive ordinance-which re-
quires multiple layers of approval for fracking to occur and contains
clear guidelines for underground pipe laying, roads, and water use-as
well as the nonregulatory approach of developing close working relation-
ships through constant, symmetrical communication between enforce-
ment staff and operators. The city has also instituted a call system to co-
ordinate calls from operators and residents.549
Arlington's ordinance requires drillers to obtain a special use permit
(SUP); 550 approval of the permit is a multistep process with includes a
neighborhood meeting, a gas well permit application, and a public City
Council meeting.5 5' The system reduces the administrative burden by
allowing for entire "drill zones," which contain multiple well sites, to go
through the approval process. Before a zone is approved, it must comply
542. Loc. Gov'T § 6.001 (authority to incorporate as a Type A municipality); LOC. Gov'T
§ 7.001 (authority to incorporate as a Type B municipality); Loc. Gov'T § 8.001 (authority to incor-
porate as a Type C municipality ); LOC. GOv'T § 9.001 (adoption or amendment of Home Rule
charter).
543. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5; LOc. Gov'T § 5.004.
544. See CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEX., CITY CHARTER (2015), http://www.arlington-
tx.gov/cityattomey/wp-content/uploads/sites/1 5/2014/05/CHARTChapter.pdf.
545. QuickFacts: Arlington, Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/4804000 (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
546. Interview by Becky Gallagher, Yale Center for Law & Policy, with James Parajon, Depu-
ty City Manager for Economic Development and Capital Investment, City of Arlington, Tex. (May
19, 2014) [hereinafter Interview by Becky Gallagher with James Parajon].
547. ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VII, § 7.01(F) (2011),
http://www.arlington-tx.gov/cityattomey/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2014/05/GasDrilling-
Chapter.pdf.
548. Id. § 7.01(J).
549. Interview by Becky Gallagher, Yale Center for Law & Policy, with Collin Gregory, Gas
Well Coordinator, City of Arlington, Tex. (Nov. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Interview by Becky Gal-
lagher with Collin Gregory].
550. CMTY. DEV. & PLANNING, CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEX., APPLICATION FOR GAS DRILLING
AND PRODUCTION (2012), http://www.arlington-tx.gov/cdp-gaswells/wp-
content/uploads/sites/44/2014/12/Gas-Drilling-Production-Application.pdf.
551. Permitting Process, ARLINGTON GAS WELL DRILLING, http://www.arlington-tx.gov/cdp-
gaswells/applications-and-permits/permitting-process (last accessed Oct. 5, 2017).
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with setback restrictions, be approved at a public meeting, and be fully
licensed.552 If the drill zone is approved, then all of the well sites within it
are automatically approved.53 Once approved, the site is subject to front-
age and setback requirements, ambient noise mitigation measures, water
use and pollution regulations, road use restrictions, and charges for dam-
ages.554 Further, drillers must submit an underground pipe plan.5
Arlington's nonregulatory approach includes putting in place a
three-person full-time fracking team, which does on-site inspections,
processes and reviews documentation, and responds to complaints and
calls from drillers and neighbors on a daily basis.56 An assistant director
oversees the drilling program, and city administrative staff also supports
the team.57 These dedicated staff and resources are intended to help the
city maintain close working relationships with operators and ensure that
drilling is safely conducted in a manner compliant with the city's ordi-
nance.
The city hopes its hybrid approach-a comprehensive ordinance
combined with funding the resources necessary for enforcement staff to
cultivate close but professional relationships with both industry and
neighbors-will allow it to retain its authority over local drilling.5
5 8
Whether or not state authority ultimately preempts the ordinance, the
carefully worded provisions and dedication of the city to fund the execu-
tion of its regulations are certainly best practices for other local govern-
ments to emulate.
The above four case studies illustrate different paths forward that
localities across the country have taken in their quest to control the local
impacts of hydrofracking that most greatly impact their residents. Both
traditional regulatory practices-such as zoning and ordinances-as well
as nonregulatory approaches, like memoranda of understanding and open
channels of communication, have been effective in addressing impacts
from environmental, health, and safety concerns, to sprawl containment
and economic development. Localities across the United States likewise
facing the effects of hydraulic fracturing on their own communities can
552. Id.
553. Interview by Becky Gallagher with Collin Gregory, supra note 549.
554. ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE no. 11-068, art. VII, § 7.01(J).
555. Id.
556. Interview by Becky Gallagher with Collin Gregory, supra note 549. The town even main-
tains a website for each drill site with updated information. Gas Well Operators, ARLINGTON GAS
WELL DRILLING, http://www.arlington-tx.gov/cdp-gaswells/operators (last accessed Oct. 5, 2015).
557. Interview by Becky Gallagher with James Parajon, supra note 546; see also StaffInfor-
mation, ARLINGTON GAS WELL DRILLING, http://www.arlington-tx.gov/cdp-gaswells/staff (last
accessed Oct. 5, 2017).
558. See CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEX., FYI 5: CITY OF ARLINGTON 2015 PROPOSED BUDGET AND
BUSINESS PLAN 179, http://www.arlington-tx.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2014/08/FY-
2015-Proposed-Budget-Book-Final.pdf (last accessed Oct. 5, 2017) (budgeting for over $950,000
from gas well inspection fees).
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inform their own processes by drawing inspiration from the best practic-
es highlighted in these case studies.
CONCLUSION
Though many descriptive articles have been written about the
growth of fracking in the United States, this Article has sought to
demonstrate that local governments can regulate fracking in a manner
that does not pose a risk to their local authority. Because of significant
gaps in the state and federal regulatory apparatus that seem likely to con-
tinue with the Trump Administration, opportunity exists for local gov-
ernments to craft regulatory and nonregulatory structures that meet the
community's needs. Indeed, as our case studies and local impacts list
have shown, local governments are acting to balance environmental,
social, and economic risks of fracking with the benefits that this technol-
ogy can bring. However, because of the legal relationship between state
and local governments, local communities must beware of the risk of
preemption if localities enact outrights fracking bans. We believe that
with more comprehensive information about the impacts of fracking, as
well as regulatory and nonregulatory tools that local governments can
employ, municipalities will be better able to enact policies that withstand
legal scrutiny and reflect local interests.
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APPENDIX 3
A full investigation into the four case studies-Erie, Colorado; McKen-
zie, North Dakota; Peters Township, Pennsylvania; and Arlington, Tex-
as-is available at the following address:
landuse.yale.edu

















A NEW YORK APPELLATE COURT TAKES A FIRST SWING
AT CHIMPANZEE PERSONHOOD. AND MISSES.
STEVEN M. WISEt
ABSTRACT
Beginning in late 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project began filing
common law habeas corpus petitions with attached expert affidavits on
behalf of chimpanzees in New York State, alleging that, as autonomous
beings, chimpanzees must be recognized as legal "persons" with the fun-
damental common law right to bodily liberty. One such petition, on be-
half of a chimpanzee named Tommy in upstate New York, led to an in-
termediate appellate decision in 2014-the Lavery case-in which the
court denied relief to Tommy on the unprecedented grounds that "per-
sonhood" (the capacity to have any legal right) requires a correlative
ability to bear duties and responsibilities, and stated that chimpanzees
lacked that capacity. Recognizing that its decision would strip rights
from millions of humans who lacked the capacity for duties and respon-
sibilities (e.g., infants, the comatose, and the mentally ill), the Lavery
court opined that all humans would continue to be eligible for person-
hood because, as a species, they are "collectively" capable of bearing
legal responsibility and submitting to social duties. The mainstream
view, and the view of the New York Court of Appeals, has long held that
the question of who is a person must be answered by reference to public
policy, not biology. Lavery ignored this fundamental teaching and mis-
apprehended the nature of the rights sought, as well as the philosophical
and political foundations of those rights. Lavery merits scrutiny because
it represents a misunderstanding of the relationship between rights and
duties, constitutes a drastic and arbitrary departure from centuries of ha-
beas corpus precedent, and contradicts a correct decision of the New
York Court of Appeals.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (NhRP)
commenced three lawsuits on behalf of four chimpanzees that challenged
the chimpanzees' status as legal "things" that lack the capacity to possess
any legal rights.' The lawsuits petitioned for common law writs of habe-
as corpus and orders to show cause that demanded that each chimpanzee
be recognized as a "person" under the common law of habeas corpus and
within the meaning of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR)
Article 70.2 The NhRP filed one such petition in the New York State
1. Clients, Hercules and Leo (Chimpanzees): Two Former Lab Chimpanzees Exploited for
Scientific Research, Waiting to Be Released to Sanctuary, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT [hereinafter
Hercules and Leo], https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/hercules-leo (last visited Mar. 21,
2017); Client, Kiko (Chimpanzee): A Former TV Animal Actor, Partially Deaffrom Physical Abuse,
NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT [hereinafter Kiko], https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/client-kiko
(last visited Mar. 21, 2017); Client, Tommy (Chimpanzee): Our First Nonhuman Animal Client,
NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT [hereinafter Tommy], https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/client-
tommy (last visited Mar. 21, 2017).
2. Hercules and Leo, supra note 1; Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules v. Stan-
ley, No. 32098/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty. filed Dec. 5, 2013); Kiko, supra note 1; Nonhuman
Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Kiko v. Presti, No. 151725/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Niagara Cty. filed Dec. 3,
2013); Tommy, supra note 1; Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, No.
002051/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Fulton Cty. filed Dec. 2, 2013). Article 70 governs the procedure appli-
cable to all habeas corpus actions and requires the court to issue an order to show cause rather than a
writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner does not demand production of the detainee in court. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 7001, 7003(a) (McKinney 2017). As the NhRP was not demanding production of the
chimpanzees, it sought an order to show cause in all cases. See Verified Petition at 16, Nonhuman
Rights Project ex rel. Kiko v. Presti, N.Y. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 2, 2013),
https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/content/uploads/Niagara-Verified-Petition-E.Stein-and-
S.Wise_.pdf; Verified Petition at 16, Nonhuman Rights Project ex rel. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley,
N.Y. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/content/uploads/Suffolk-
Verified-Petition-of-E.Stein-and-S.Wise_.pdf; Verified Petition at 16, Nonhuman Rights Project ex
rel. Tommy v. Lavery, N.Y. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 2, 2013),
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Supreme Court, Fulton County on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living
alone in a cage in a warehouse on a used trailer lot (Tommy Petition).3
Attached to the Tommy Petition were approximately 100 pages of
expert affidavits from many of the most respected chimpanzee cognition
researchers in the world, which demonstrated that chimpanzees possess
numerous complex cognitive abilities that individually and together are
sufficient for legal personhood for the purpose of common law habeas
corpus.4 Their most significant cognitive ability was autonomy, which
subsumes many of their other cognitive abilities, including their posses-
sion of (1) an autobiographical self; (2) episodic memory; (3) self-
determination; (4) self-consciousness; (5) self-knowingness; (6) self-
agency; (7) referential and intentional communication; (8) empathy; (9) a
working memory; (10) language; (11) metacognition; (12) numerosity;
and (13) material, social, and symbolic culture; as well as their ability:
(14) to plan; engage in (15) mental time-travel; (16) intentional action;
(17) sequential learning; (18) mediational learning; (19) mental state
modeling; (20) visual perspective-taking; (21) cross-modal perception;
(22) to understand cause-and-effect and experiences of others; (23) to
imagine, (24) imitate, (25) engage in deferred imitation, (26) emulate,
and (27) innovate; and (28) to use and make tools.5
As habeas corpus "is deeply rooted in our cherished ideas of indi-
vidual autonomy and free choice,"6 the NhRP argued that, as a matter of
common law liberty and equality, a chimpanzee's capacity for autonomy
was sufficient to mandate his or her personhood for the purpose of a
common law writ of habeas corpus.7 After holding an ex parte hearing on
the Tommy Petition, the trial court found that the word "person" as used
in CPLR Article 70 did not include chimpanzees and refused to sign the
requested order to show cause.8 The NhRP appealed to the New York
State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department
(Third Department) which, in People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project,
Inc. v. Lavery,9 held that Tommy was not a person entitled to a common
https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/content/uploads/Petition-re-Tommy-Case-Fulton-Cty-
NY.pdf.
3. Verified Petition, Nonhuman Rights Project ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, supra note 2, at 3.
4. Id. at 5-6.
5. Id. at 6.
6. Nonhuman Rights Project ex rel. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898, 903 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2015).
7. Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Support of Order to Show Cause & Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Order Granting the Immediate Release of Tommy at 62-63, Nonhuman Rights Project,
Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, No. 002051/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Fulton Cty. filed Dec. 2, 2013),
https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/content/uploads/Memorandum-of-Law-Tommy-Case.pdf.
8. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (N.Y.




law writ of habeas corpus or any other legal right because chimpanzees
are unable to bear duties and responsibilities.'0
At first blush, the Lavery decision-a brief five-page opinion about
the novel issue of legal personhood for a chimpanzee-may appear a
minor coda to the rich and lengthy history of habeas corpus. The court,
however, for the first time in Anglo-American history, held that only an
entity capable of bearing duties and responsibilities may be a person for
any purpose, including habeas corpus. The decision further contradicted
the New York Court of Appeals decision in Byrn v. New York City
Health & Hospitals Corp.," which stated that personhood is not deter-
mined by reference to biology or taxonomy, but is a matter of public
policy.1 2 Lavery merits scrutiny as it represents a drastic departure from
centuries of habeas corpus precedent and contradicts the decision of New
York's highest court. 13
Part I of this Article will set out the salient parts of the Lavery deci-
sion. Part II will explain how Lavery rested in substantial part on the
court's failure to consider that the fundamental right to bodily liberty is
an immunity-right for which a capacity for bearing duties and responsi-
bilities is irrelevant. Part III will describe how the Lavery court's deci-
sion also rested in substantial part upon its misinterpretation of social
contract theory. Part IV will note that jurisprudential writers, legislatures,
and courts have long recognized entities that lack the capacity to bear
duties and responsibilities as "persons." Part V will explain how Lavery
improperly took judicial notice of the alleged scientific fact that chim-
panzees cannot bear duties and responsibilities. Part VI will discuss why
the Lavery court erred in finding that humans who are unable to bear
duties and responsibilities nevertheless are persons with the same habeas
corpus rights as humans who are able to bear duties and responsibilities
because humans "collectively" have that capacity.
I. THE LA VERY DECISION
After the Lavery court located no precedent in either state law or
English common law that a nonhuman animal could be a person "capable
of asserting rights for the purpose of state or federal law,"' 4 it acknowl-
10. Id.at251.
11. 286 N.E.2d 887 (N.Y. 1972).
12. Id. at 889. The Third Department did not analyze the NhRP's public policy arguments
that, both as a matter of liberty and equality, Tommy was entitled to be released pursuant to the
common law of habeas corpus. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
13. See Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 251; Bryn, 286 N.E.2d at 889.
14. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 249-50. None of the cases cited concerned either general com-
mon law or common law habeas corpus specifically. See id at 250; see also United States v. Mett,
65 F.3d 1531, 1533-34 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing whether a corporation has standing to raise a
Sixth Amendment claim); Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138, 139 (7th Cir. 1980)
(analyzing whether federal courts can hear a corporation's collateral attack under the Civil Rights
Act); Sisquoc Ranch Co. v. Roth, 153 F.2d 437, 440-41 (9th Cir. 1946) (holding that a corporate
employer could not rely on the fact that its employee was inducted into the military as support for a
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edged that this "does not, however end the inquiry as the writ has over
time gained increasing use given its 'great flexibility and scope.' 15
The court then opined that "the liberty rights protected by such writ,
the ascription of rights has historically been connected with the imposi-
tion of societal obligations and duties. Reciprocity between rights and
responsibilities stems from principles of social contract. . . ."i' Relying
almost exclusively upon a pair of law review articles by the same author,
the court stated that "[u]nder this view, society extends rights in ex-
change for an express or implied agreement from its members to submit
to social responsibilities. In other words, 'rights [are] connected to moral
agency and the ability to accept societal responsibility in exchange for
[those] rights.""7 The court further stated that "legal personhood has
consistently been defined in terms of both rights and duties."'8 Citing
Black's Law Dictionary's definition of person as "[a]n entity (such as a
corporation) that is recognized by law as having the rights and duties [of]
a human being,"'9 the court stated that "[c]ase law has always recognized
the correlative rights and duties that attach to legal personhood."2 0 It not-
ed that "[a]ssociations of human beings, such as corporations and munic-
ipal entities, may be considered legal persons, because they too bear le-
gal duties in exchange for their legal rights."21
Finally, the court took judicial notice, sua sponte, that
[n]eedless to say, unlike human beings, chimpanzees cannot bear any
legal duties, submit to societal responsibilities or be held legally ac-
countable for their actions. In our view, it is this incapability to bear
any legal responsibilities and societal duties that renders it inappro-
priate to confer upon chimpanzees the legal rights-such as the fun-
habeas petition on its own behalf); Graham v. State, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1009 (N.Y. App. Div.
1966) (holding that the writ of habeas corpus is not available as a method to secure the return of
property).
15. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (quoting People ex rel. Keitt v. Mcann, 220 N.E.2d 653, 655
(N.Y. 1966)).
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Children, Chimps, and Rights, Arguments from "Mar-
ginal" Cases, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 14 (2013)); Richard L. Cupp Jr., Moving BeyondAnimal Rights: A
Legal/Contractualist Critique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 69 (2009) [hereinafter Cupp, Moving
Beyond Animal Rights).
18. Id. at 250-51 (citing Person, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999)).
19. Id. (quoting Person, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999)).
20. Id. at 251 (citing Smith v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 431 S.W.3d 200, 203-04 (Ark. 2013)
(citing Calaway v. Practice Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2010 Ark 432, *4 (2010) (defining a "person" as "a
human being or an entity that is recognized by a law as having the rights and duties of a human
being")); Wartelle v. Women's & Children's Hosp., Inc., 704 So. 2d 778, 780 (La. 1997) (finding
that the classification of an entity as a "person" is made "solely for the purpose of facilitating deter-
minations about the attachment of legal rights and duties"); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1098
(1985) (Zappala, J., concurring) (noting that "'(p)ersonhood' as a legal concept arises not from the
humanity of the subject but from the ascription of rights and duties to the subject")).
21. Id. at 251 (citing Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181, 189 (1888); Western Sur. Co. v. ADCO Credit, Inc., 251 P.3d 714, 716 (Nev. 2011); State v.
A.M.R., 51 P.3d 790, 791 (Wash. 2002); State v. Zain, 528 S.E.2d 748, 755-59 (W. Va. 1999)).
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damental right to liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus-that
have been afforded to human beings.22
II. LA VERY RESTED IN SUBSTANTIAL PART ON A FAILURE TO CONSIDER
THAT THE RIGHT TO BODILY LIBERTY DEMANDED WAS AN IMMUNITY-
RIGHT AND NOT A CLAIM-RIGHT
The great Yale jurisprudence professor, Wesley N. Hohfeld's, con-
ception of the comparative structure of rights has for a century been em-
ployed as the overwhelming choice of courts, jurisprudential writers, and
moral philosophers when they discuss what rights are.23 Hohfeld began
his famous article by noting that "[o]ne of the greatest hindrances to the
clear understanding, the incisive statement, and the true solution of legal
problems frequently arises from the express or tacit assumption that all
legal relations may be reduced to 'rights' and 'duties"' 24 and that "the
term 'rights' tends to be used indiscriminately to cover what in a given
case may be a privilege, a power, or an immunity, rather than a right in
the strictest sense."25
Lavery apparently made this erroneous "express or tacit assump-
tion" and, as explained below, accordingly mistook the NhRP's demand
for Tommy's fundamental "immunity-right" to bodily liberty that is pro-
tected by a common law writ of habeas corpus for a "claim-right." This
mistake, combined with the improper linkage of personhood for the pur-
pose of a common law writ of habeas corpus to an ability to bear duties
and responsibilities, caused the Lavery court to commit a serious "cate-
gory of rights" error. Accordingly, the court's statement that "the ascrip-
tion of rights has historically been connected with the imposition of soci-
etal obligations and duties" was incorrect.26 The statement was particu-
larly inappropriate in the context of a common law writ of habeas corpus
to enforce the fundamental common law immunity-right to bodily liber-
ty, with the court implying that any entity unable to fulfill duties and
responsibilities could therefore be indefinitely deprived of her autonomy
and essentially enslaved for life.2 7 No case cited by the court supported
28this proposition or concerned bodily liberty or habeas corpus.
22. Id.
23. See generally Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913).
24. Id. at 28.
25. Id. at 30.
26. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), leave to appeal den., 38 N.E.3d 828
(N.Y. 2015).
27. The argument does not change because Hohfeld may have originally described his system
of rights with respect to "persons" and/or believed that "persons" meant human beings. Hohfeld, for
example, knew that human fetuses were both human and not "persons." See Dietrich v. Inhabitants
of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15-16 (1884). Moreover, who or what Hohfeld understood to be a
"person" a century ago is irrelevant to how his system of legal rights generally operates. It does not
require New York courts to apply Hohfeldian rights only to those "persons" Hohfeld may have
imagined. This is especially true in New York, where "person" is not synonymous with "human,"
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Hohfeld pointed out that John Chipman Gray, the distinguished ju-
risprudential writer, made the same mistake in his Nature and Sources of
the Law.29
In [Gray's] chapter on "Legal Rights and Duties," the distinguished
author takes the position that a right always has a duty as its correla-
tive; and he seems to define the former relation substantially accord-
ing to the more limited meaning of "claim." Legal privileges, powers,
and immunities are prima facie ignored, and the impression conveyed
that all legal relations can be comprehended under the conceptions,
"right" and "duty." 30
A claim-right such as breach of contract, which the NhRP did not
demand, does correlate with a duty.31 Even then, only a so-called "Will"
theorist, as opposed to an "Interest" theorist, would agree that the re-
quirement of being able to bear duties and responsibilities would apply to
Tommy's lawsuit to enforce a contractual right, while only the most re-
strictive Will theorist would limit a claim-right to entities that possess the
capacity to assert claims within a moral community.32 Yet this restrictive
Will Theory marks Lavery's personhood test for the immunity right to
bodily liberty, an immunity-right that the U.S. Supreme Court referred to
when it stated that "' [t]he right to one's person may be said to be a right
of complete immunity: to be let alone."'33
and where the determination of who and who is not a "person" turns not on biology, but on public
policy and moral principle. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 201
(N.Y. 1972). It is no better public policy or good moral principle to act irrationally and with bias in
determining who is a "person" than it is in determining what rights one should have as a "person."
28. See Lewis v. Burger King, 344 Fed. App'x 470, 472 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting plaintiff's
claim that her service dog had standing to sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990);
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that cetaceans lacked stand-
ing under the Endangered Species Act and were not within that statute's definition of "person");
Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entm't, 842
F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1263 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (explaining that the legislative history makes clear Thir-
teenth Amendment was only intended to apply to human beings); Citizens to End Animal Suffering
& Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993) (finding that a
dolphin is not a "person" within meaning of Administrative Procedure Act, section 702).
29. Hohfeld, supra note 23, at 34; see JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF
THE LAW 27-62 (Colum. Univ. Press 1909).
30. Hohfeld, supra note 23 at 34. Gray's error becomes obvious when one reads that, in the
same book, he agreed that both nonhuman animals and supernatural beings could be "persons." See
GRAY, supra note 29, at 27-28; see also Visa Kurki, Why Things Can Hold Rights: Reconceptualiz-
ing the Legal Person 3 (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper, No. 7/2015 (citing
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 19 (David Campbell & Philip
Thomas eds., 1997)), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstractid=2563683.
31. STEVEN M. WISE, RATELING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 56-57
(2000) [hereinafter WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE]; Steven M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution - The Eligi-
bility ofNonhuman Animals for Dignity-Rights in a Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L. REV. 793, 807-11
(1998) [hereinafter Wise, Hardly a Revolution].
32. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 31, at 57; Wise, Hardly a Revolution, supra note
31, at 808-10.
33. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (emphasis added) (quoting
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of
Contract 29 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1879).
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An immunity-right correlates not with a duty, but with a disability.34
Other examples of immunity-rights are the right not to be enslaved guar-
anteed by the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, in which
all others are disabled from enslaving those covered by that Amend-
ment,35 and the First Amendment right to free speech, which the gov-
36ernment is disabled from abridging. One need not be able to bear duties
and responsibilities to possess the fundamental right to bodily liberty any
more than the right to be free from enslavement or the right to free
speech.
The U.S. Supreme Court has illustrated the difference between a
claim-right and an immunity-right.37 Eight years before Harris, the Su-
preme Court in Roe v. Wade38 recognized a woman's immunity-right to
privacy and against interference by the state with her decision to have an
abortion in the earlier stages of her pregnancy.39 After the Harris plain-
tiff claimed she therefore had the right to a state-financed abortion she
was herself unable to afford, the Supreme Court recognized that the
woman's immunity-right to an abortion correlated with the state's disa-
bility to interfere in her decision to have the abortion but did not corre-
late with the state's duty to fund the abortion.40 Therefore, she had no
claim against the state for payment for her abortion.4'
The NhRP argued that Tommy's common law immunity-right to
bodily liberty protected by common law habeas corpus correlates solely
with the respondents' disability to imprison him. The existence or nonex-
istence of Tommy's ability to bear duties and responsibilities was irrele-
vant, as it is irrelevant to every immunity-right.42
III. LA VERY MISUNDERSTOOD THE MEANING OF SOCIAL CONTRACT
Lavery stated that
the liberty rights protected by such writ, the ascription of rights has
historically been connected with the imposition of societal obliga-
tions and duties. Reciprocity between rights and responsibilities
stems from principles of social contract, which inspired the ideals of
freedom and democracy at the core of our system of government ....
Under this view, society extends rights in exchange for an express or
34. WISE, RATrL[NG THE CAGE, supra note 31,. at 57-59; Wise, Hardly a Revolution, supra
note 31, at 810-15.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
37. Harris v. McRea, 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980).
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39. Id. at 154.
40. Harris, 448 U.S. at 301-02.
41. Id. at 314-15.
42. Petitioner's Oral Argument, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 998
N.Y.S.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), https://www.nonhumanrights.org/content/uploads/Tommy-
Appellate-Court-Transcript-100814.pdf.
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implied agreement of its members to submit to social responsibilities.
In other words, "Rights [are] connected to moral agency and the abil-
ity to accept societal responsibility for [those] rights."
43
Here, Lavery misunderstood social contract, which addresses the
authority of the state over the individual.4 At its most elementary, social
contract "is an agreement 'between the people and the government they
create [that] binds the agencies of government to respect the blueprint of
government and the rights retained by the people."'
45 Courts generally
invoke social contract in terms of the state's positive duty toward persons
in the "aid, care and support of the needy" and in consideration of fun-
damental procedural rights.46 Individuals surrender some freedoms to the
state in exchange for the state's protection of other freedoms.
47 The
Lavery court's position that social contract means "[s]ociety extends
rights in exchange for an express or implied agreement from its members
to submit to social responsibilities" is therefore incorrect.
48 It is the gov-
ernment that grants express or implied agreement to be responsible.
49
Lavery correctly notes that social contract emphasizes the accounta-
bility of the state to civil society.50 John Locke argued that individuals
would be bound morally by the law of nature not to harm each other, but
without government to defend them people would have no security in
their rights.5 ' Under the social contract, "the State has an interest in pro-
tecting its citizens . . . . [T]his surely is at the core of the Lockean 'social
contract' idea."52 To this end, fundamental rights impede and temper the
exercise of state power. Thus, rights cases invoke a breach of state re-
sponsibilities, not social responsibilities of the individual.
5 3
43. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014), leave to appeal den., 38 N.E.3d 828 (N.Y. 2015).
44. J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 2-3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1936).
45. State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 210 (Conn. 2015).
46. Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. 1977); Khrapunskiy v. Doar, 909 N.E.2d 70,
75 (N.Y. 2009) (citing Tucker, 371 N.E.2d at 451).
47. State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147, 161 (Conn. 1996); William Uzgalis, John Locke, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2017), https://plato.stanford.edulentrieslocke.
48. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
49. See generally Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 602-04 (1860).
50. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
51. See e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 12, 17 (Putnam ed., 1906)
("It is a vain and contradictory agreement to stipulate absolute authority on one side and obedience
without limit on the other. Is it not clear that there is no obligation towards one from whom you have
the right to demand everything? And does not this one condition, without equivalent or exchange,
involve the nullity of the act?").
52. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1977) (discussing criminal law).
53. In re Foster Care Status of Shakiba P., 587 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
("Recognizing that 'it is the unique mandate of our courts to enforce the obligations we owe to
children under our social contract[.].'); People v. Wynn, 424 N.Y.S.2d 664, 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980) (holding criminal rights to be from "a system of justice evolved over centuries from origins
rooted in a fundamental philosophy processed from experience in our political and social ascent
from historical tyrannies. It is a corporal part of our social contract covenanted by the
[C]onstitution"); 500 W. 174 St. v. Vasquez, 325 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971) ("Perhaps
chief among the assurances which together make up the social contract is the judiciary's promise
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What social contract does not require is that the rights-holder be
subject to correlative responsibilities. The individual holds the rights; but
the government bears the responsibilities.54 Lavery's requirement that a
legal person must be capable of reciprocal duties and responsibilities in
order to have the right to habeas relief conflicts with social contract's
actual focus on the responsibilities of the government.
Lavery's confusion can be traced in part to its reliance upon the idi-
osyncratic theories of Professor Richard Cupp, who conflates social con-
tract with the philosophical theory of contractualism that denies all rights
to nonhuman animals and human beings alike because of their failure to
qualify as rational agents. In Cupp's view, and therefore Lavery's, con-
tractualism necessarily connects rights to moral agency and the ability to
accept societal responsibilities.56 But Cupp fails to substantiate his singu-
lar notion that social contract requires that rights correlate with responsi-
bilities, in support of which he cites no relevant case law, and fails to
address the problem that the immunity-right to bodily liberty does not
correlate with any duties.57 Cupp's errors became Lavery's.
Had the Lavery court not misunderstood social contract, it still
would have erred in applying it for, as the U.S. Supreme Court has rec-
ognized, social contract lies "among the great juristic myths of histo-
ry .... As a practical concept, from which practical conclusions can be
drawn, it is valueless."58 In contrast to Lavery, social contract theorists
generally recognize that the foundation upon which contractualist argu-
ments rests does not support the "express or implied agreement [of
never to close the courthouse doors. Through them should walk unhindered every citizen with a
dispute to settle or a grievance to air.").
54. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967) (holding that the social compact "defines the rights of
the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise"); id. at 18-22 (discussing due
process).
55. Thus, in State v. Lyon, a New Jersey habeas corpus action brought by a slave, the court
stated that "[i]n cases of this kind the state is bound to protect the rights of all who are within its
dominion, and fulfill the duties which are imposed by the social contract." I N.J.L. 462, 464 (N.J.
1789).
56. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 250-51 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014), leave to appeal den., 38 N.E.3d 828 (N.Y. 2015); Cupp, Moving Beyond Animal
Rights, supra note 17, at 68-71.
57. Even contractualist philosophers may argue it embraces nonhuman animals. E.g.,
THOMAS M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE EACH OTHER 179, 183-84 (1998).
58. FPC v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 605 n.6 (1942) (citing Gerard C. Henderson,
Railway Valuation and the Courts, 33 HARV. L. REv. 1031, 1051 (1920)); see also Kentucky v.
Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 92 (1861) (discussing the imperfect obligation within the social compact
"which binds every organized political community to avenge all injuries aimed at the being or wel-
fare of its society. Certainly, this is the first and highest of all governmental duties; but nevertheless
it is, in juridical language, a 'duty of imperfect obligation,' incapable in its essence of precise expo-
sition or admeasurement, and its fulfillment depends on moral and social considerations, accosting
the community at large, which a judicial tribunal can neither weigh, define, nor enforce"); Watson v.
Employ. Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 79 n.2 (1954) ("Phrases like . . . 'the principles of the
social compact' were in fashion . . . for stating intrinsic limitations on the exercise of all political
power. More recently, the power of this Court to strike down legislation has been more acutely
analyzed and less loosely expressed. Rhetorical generalizations have not been deemed sufficient
justification for invalidating legislation").
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rights-bearers] to submit to social responsibilities" because there is no
such agreement.59 Contractualism consists of hypotheticals, not legal
fact.
Moreover, habeas corpus has always been available to those who
are not part of the fictitious American "social contract." In Rasul v.
60
Bush, the Supreme Court stated, "Application of the habeas statute to
persons detained at the base [in Guantanamo] is consistent with the his-
torical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. At common law, courts exer-
cised habeas jurisdiction over the claims of aliens detained within sover-
eign territory of the realm .... 61
These Guantanamo petitioners were not part of any social contract.
In fact, the U.S. government alleged they desired to destroy any social
contract that existed. Still they were eligible for habeas corpus. American
courts followed a similar practice in the early years of the Republic.6 2 In
Jackson v. Bulloch,63 for example, a black slave was freed pursuant to
habeas corpus despite being doubly excluded from the social compact
both because he was black and because he was a slave.64
IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL WRITERS, LEGISLATURES, AND COURTS
RECOGNIZE ENTITIES WHO LACK THE CAPACITY FOR DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES AS PERSONS
Lavery not only contradicts Byrn, but also sister common law and
civil law countries that have declared that an entity may be a person
without having the capacity to bear any duties and responsibilities. For
instance, in 2012, an agreement between the indigenous peoples of New
Zealand and the Crown granted New Zealand's Whanganui River "legal
personality" so that the river owns its riverbed and is itself incapable of
being owned.6 5 In July of 2014, the Te Urewara park in New Zealand
was designated a "legal entity, and has all the rights, powers, duties, and
liabilities of a person."6 6 In 2000, the Indian Supreme Court designated
59. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 250; see e.g., Jean Hampton, Contract and Consent, in A
COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 179, 379-83 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip
Pettit eds., 1993); Charles W. Mills, Race and the Social Contract Tradition, in READINGS IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 144, 144-47 (Diane Jeske & Richard Fumer-
ton eds., 2012).
60. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
61. Id. at 481-82, 481 n.l I (citing inter alia Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499
(K.B.1772); Case of the Hottentot Venus, 13 East 195, 104 Eng. Rep. 344 (K.B.1810)).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Villato, 2 U.S. 370, 372 (1797) (granting habeas relief to a
Spanish-born prisoner charged with treason on the ground that he had never become a citizen of the
United States).
63. 12 Conn. 38 (1837).
64. Id. at 38-39.
65. Tutohu Whakatupua Agreement Between the Whanganui and the Crown of New Zealand
[2012] NZTS 10 (signed 30 August 2012),
http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/content/documents/193Wanganui%2ORiver-Agreement--.pdf.




the Sikh's sacred text as a legal person. Pre-Independence Indian courts
designated mosques as legal persons to the same end.6 8 A pre-
Independence Indian court designated a Hindu idol as a person with the
capacity to sue.69
More to the exact point, on November 3, 2016, a Mendoza, Argen-
tina court granted a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a chimpanzee
named Cecelia. The court declared Cecelia a "non-human legal person,"
and ordered her transferred to a Brazilian sanctuary.70 Rejecting the
claim that Cecelia could not avail herself of habeas corpus because she
was not human, the court stated that
societies evolve in their moral conducts, thoughts, and values, and al-
so in their legislations. More than a century ago most of the individu-
al rights that are expressly recognized today in the constitutions of
the different countries and by the Human Rights International Trea-
ties were ignored and in some cases they were even overlooked, or
worse, insulted like the rights related to gender perspective ....
... At present, we can see an awareness of situations and realities
that, although they have persisted since time immemorial, have not
been recognized before by social actors. That is the case of gender
violence, marriage equality, equal voting rights, etc. There is an iden-
tical situation with the awareness of animal rights.72
The Mendoza court stated that classifying
animals as things is not a correct standard [that] . . . chimpanzees
have the capacity to reason, they are intelligent, are conscientious of
themselves, they have culture diversity, expressions of mental games,
they manifest grief, use and construction of tools to access food or to
solve simple problems of daily life, abstraction capacity, skills to
handle symbols in communication, conscience to express emotions
such as happiness, frustration, desires or deceit, planned organization
for intraspecific battles and ambush for hunting, they have metacog-
nitive capabilities, they have a moral, psychic, and physical status,
they have their own culture, they have affectionate feelings (they ca-
67. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Comm., Amritsar v. Som Nath Dass, AIR 2000 SC 421
(India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1478973.
68. Masjid Shahid Ganj Mosque v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Comm., AIR 1938
(Lahore) 369, ¶15 (full bench) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1035515.
69. Pramath Nath Mullick v. Pradyunna Nath Mullick, 52 IA 245, 264 (India 1925),
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/290902.
70. Terecer Juzgado de Garantias [Third Court of Guarantees], 3/11/2016, "Presented by
A.F.A.D.A About the Chimpanzee "Cecilia" - Non Human Individual," (Arg.), 22-24, 32,
https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/content/uploads/Chimpanzee-Cecilia-translation-FINAL-
for-website-2.pdf.
71. Id. at 19.
72. Id. at 19-20.
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ress and groom each other), they are capable of lying, they have
symbols for human language and use tools.7 3
The court concluded it was "undeniable that great apes, like the
chimpanzee .. . have non-human rights."7 4
Moreover, several states, including Connecticut, New York, and
Massachusetts, expressly allow nonhuman animals to be trust "benefi-
ciaries ." In so legislating, these states recognize nonhuman animals as
"persons" with the capacity for legal rights, as only persons may be trust
beneficiaries.76 Before these statutes, "trusts for animals were void, be-
cause a private express trust cannot exist without a beneficiary capable of
enforcing it, and because non-human lives cannot be used to measure the
perpetuities period."7 7
For example, in 1996, the New York Legislature enacted Estates
Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) 7-6 (now EPTL 7-8) (a), which permit-
ted "domestic or pet animals" to be designated as trust beneficiaries. The
Sponsor's Memorandum stated the statute's purpose was "to allow ani-
mals to be made the beneficiary of a trust."
78 This section thereby
acknowledged these nonhuman animals as persons capable of possessing
legal rights. In In re Fouts,79 the court recognized that five chimpanzees
were "income and principal beneficiaries of the trust" and referred to its
chimpanzees as beneficiaries throughout.
80 In 2010, the legislature re-
moved "Honorary" from the title and the twenty-one year limitation on
73. Id. at 23-24.
74. Id. at 24.
75. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-489a (West 2009); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
§ 7-8.1 (McKinney 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 203E, § 408(h) (West 2012) ("The measur-
ing lives shall be those of the beneficiary animals, not human lives.")
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 43 (2003) ("A person who would have capacity
to take and hold legal title to the intended trust property has capacity to be a beneficiary of a trust of
that property; ordinarily, a person who lacks capacity to hold legal title to property may not be a trust
beneficiary."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 (1959); KATE MCEVOY, 20 CONN. PRAC., CONN. ELDER
LAW § 2:16 (2016 ed.); Gilman v. McArdle, 65 How. Pr. 330, 338 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1883) ("Benefi-
ciaries may be natural or artificial persons, but they must be persons ... In general, any person who
is capable in law of taking an interest in property, may, to the extent of his legal capacity, and no
further, become entitled to the benefits of the trust."), rev'd on other grounds, 99 N.Y. 451 (1885);
see also Beneficiary, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) ("A person for whose benefit prop-
erty is held in trust; esp., one designated to benefit from an appointment, disposition, or assignment
(as in a will, insurance policy, etc.), or to receive something as a result of a legal arrangement or
instrument. 2. A person to whom another is in a fiduciary relation, whether the relation is one of
agency, guardianship, or trust. 3. A person who is initially entitled to enforce a promise, whether that
person is the promisee or a third party.") (emphases added).
77. Margaret Turano, Commentary, Practice Commentaries, MCKINNEY'S N.Y. EST. POWERS
& TR. L. § 7-8.1 (2010).
78. Bill Jacket, S.B. 5207, Ch. 159, Leg. 219th, 1996 Sess. (N.Y. 1996) (including Memoran-
dum of Support from bill sponsors Norman Levy and Richard Gottfried).
79. 677 N.Y.S.2d 699 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1998).
80. Id. at 699; Feger v. Warwick Animal Shelter, 870 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008) ("[T]he law now recognizes the creation of trusts for the care of designated domestic or pet
animals upon the death or incapacitation of their owner.").
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trust duration, and amended section (a) to read: "Such trust shall termi-
nate when the living animal beneficiary or beneficiaries of such trust are
no longer alive" thereby dispelling any doubt that animals are capable of
being beneficiaries in New York.
The NhRP argued that a person is any entity with the capacity to
bear rights or duties. But Lavery rejected this argument and relied upon
two sources to support its claim that a person is any entity with the ca-
pacity to bear rights or duties.82 However, both sources actually support
the NhRP's position. The first source was the tenth edition of Black's
Law Dictionary, which stated that "a person is any being whom the law
regards as capable of rights and duties," quoting the seventh edition.83 In
turn the sole support for this statement in the seventh edition of Black's
Law Dictionary was the tenth edition of John Salmond's Jurispru-
dence.84 But every edition of Salmond, including the tenth edition, actu-
ally provides that "a person is any being whom the law regards as capa-
ble of rights or duties," just as the NhRP argued.85 When the NhRP
pointed out its error, Black's Law Dictionary promptly promised to cor-
rect it in its next edition.86
The second source that the tenth edition of Black's Law Dictionary
relied upon was John Chipman Gray's The Nature and Sources of the
Law,8 7 which the Third Department quoted as stating that "the legal
meaning of a 'person' is 'a subject of rights and duties."'88 But Gray
makes clear that "[o]ne who has rights but not duties, or has duties but no
rights is . . . a person."89 In his discussion of legal personhood, Gray
notes that "supernatural beings have been recognized as legal persons" in
81. N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-8.1(a) (McKinney 2010).
82. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 250-51 (N.Y.
2014) (emphasis added).
83. Person, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (quoting Person, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999)).
84. Person, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (quoting JOHN SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE 318 (10th ed. 1947)).
85. JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE OR THE THEORY OF THE LAW 334 (1st ed. 1902) (em-
phasis added); JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE OR THE THEORY OF THE LAW 277 (2d ed. 1907)
(emphasis added); JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 272 (4th ed. 1913) (emphasis added); JOHN
SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 272 (5th ed. 1916) (emphasis added); JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE
272 (Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 6th ed. 1920) (emphasis added); JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 329
(Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 7th ed. 1924) (emphasis added); JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 329
(C.A.W. Manning ed., Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 8th ed. 1930) (emphasis added); JOHN SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE 318 (Glanville L. Williams ed., Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 10th ed. 1947) (emphasis
added); JOHN SALMOND, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 350 (Glanville Williams ed., Sweet &
Maxwell, Ltd., l1th ed. 1957) (emphasis added); JOHN SALMOND,SALMOND ON
JURISPRUDENCE 299 (P.J. Fitzgerald ed., Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 12th ed. 1966) (emphasis added).
86. James Trimarco, Chimps Could Soon Win Legal Personhood, YES! MAG. (Apr. 27, 2017),
http://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/chimps-could-soon-win-legal-personhood-20170428.
87. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27 (2d ed. 1921).
88. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S 2d, at 251.
89. GRAY, supra note 87, at 27.
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several legal systems, such as in ancient Rome9 0 and the Middle Ages of
Germany,9' and that
animals may conceivably be legal persons . . . . [There may be] sys-
tems of Law in which animals have legal rights . . . . When, if ever,
this is the case, the wills of human beings must be attributed to the
animals. There seems no essential difference between the fiction in
such cases and in those where, to a human being wanting in legal
will, the will of another is attributed.92
The Lavery court also failed to recognize that whether a chimpanzee
is a person for the purpose of demanding a common law writ of habeas
corpus is a matter of policy, not biology. The court avoided the issue by
sua sponte creating the novel and unsupported personhood requirement
for any purpose of reciprocal rights and duties.9 3
V. LAVERYIMPROPERLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED
SCIENTIFIC FACT THAT CHIMPANZEES CANNOT BEAR DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
The capacity of chimpanzees to bear duties and responsibilities is
not an adjudicative fact, but a scientific fact that requires proof through
expert testimony and therefore is not appropriate for judicial notice. In
the absence of expert testimony, a court may only take judicial notice of
facts "which everyone knows,"94 that is facts that are indisputable.
95 To
be appropriate for judicial notice, the source of the underlying infor-
mation must be of "indisputable accuracy,"96 and so "patently trustwor-
thy as to be self-authenticating."97 "The test is whether sufficient notorie-
ty attaches to the fact to make it proper to assume its existence without
proof."98 Judicial notice is particularly inappropriate in "scientifically
90. Id. at 40.
91. Id. at 41-42.
92. Id. at 42-43.
93. See Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 250-51.
94. States v. Lourdes Hosp., 100 N.Y.2d 208, 212-13 (N.Y. 2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. d (1965)).
95. See TOA Constr. Co. v. Tsitsires, 861 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); see also
People v. Darby, 701 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d
156, 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
96. Crater Club, Inc. v. Adirondack Park Agency, 446 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982).
97. People v. Kennedy, 503 N.E.2d 501, 507 n.4 (N.Y. 1986).
98. Dollas v. W.R. Grace & Co., 639 N.Y.S.2d 323, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (quoting Ecco
High Frequency Corp. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 81 N.Y.S.2d 610, 617 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948)). Judi-
cial notice of a fact is only proper when adjudicative facts are commonly known to exist. Id "Adju-
dicative facts" are "propositions of general knowledge which are capable of immediate and accurate
determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy." JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
HAROLD KORN & ARTHUR R. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, § 4511.02 (2d ed. 2005). See
People v. Jones, 539 N.E.2d 96, 98 (N.Y. 1989) (explaining that "a court may take judicial notice of
facts 'which are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible
sources of indisputable accuracy.').
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complex cases."99 The only scientific facts appropriate for judicial notice
are "notorious facts" that cannot be disputed and are supported by refer-
ence to "sources of indisputable reliability." 0 0 Judicial notice was further
inappropriate "because of the novelty of the issue"'0' that the Tommy
Petition raised.
The Lavery court improperly took judicial notice of the complex
scientific fact that chimpanzees cannot bear duties and responsibilities
despite the fact that the issue had not been noted, briefed, or argued by
either party before either the lower or appellate court.102 The Lavery
court further failed to refer to any scientific authority supporting this fact
and gave no notice to the NhRP that it intended to take judicial notice
thereof. Had the NhRP been so apprised by the court, it could have pre-
sented expert evidence on the issue.103
In December 2015, the NhRP filed its second petition for a common
law writ of habeas corpus and order to show cause in the New York State
Supreme Court, New York County on behalf of Tommy and attached
about sixty pages of expert affidavits directed solely to demonstrating
that chimpanzees have the capacity to bear duties and responsibilities
both in chimpanzee societies and in human/chimpanzee societies.104 The-
se make clear that the Third Department's decision to take judicial notice
was both inappropriate and incorrect.
VI. THE LAVERY COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT HUMANS WHO
ARE UNABLE TO BEAR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE "PERSONS"
BECAUSE HUMANS "COLLECTIVELY" HAVE THAT CAPACITY
An obvious problem with the Lavery court's holding that a person
must have the capacity to bear duties and responsibilities is that millions
of New Yorkers lack that capacity. In an attempt to avoid condemning
them to thinghood, the court stated the following in footnote three:
To be sure, some humans are less able to bear legal duties or respon-
sibilities than others. These differences do not alter our analysis, as it
is undeniable that, collectively, human beings possess the unique
ability to bear legal responsibility. Accordingly, nothing in this deci-
99. Hamilton v. Miller, 15 N.E.3d 1199, 1204 (N.Y. 2014).
100. In re Perra, 827 N.Y.S.2d 587, 592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (citing PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON
EVIDENCE, § 2-204 et seq. (Farrell 1Ith ed.)) (court took judicial notice that smoking was harmful to
the fetus based upon the much-discussed and much-respected "2006 Surgeon General's Report On
The Health Consequences ofInvoluntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke . . , [a] document created by
the Office of the Surgeon General and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.").
101. Brown v. Muniz, 878 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
102. See People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014), leave to appeal den., 38 N.E.3d 828 (N.Y. 2015); see generally Tommy, supra note
I.
103. See Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 249-51.
104. All affidavits are available on Tommy's Litigation page:
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/client-tommy.
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sion should be read as limiting the rights of human beings in the con-
text of habeas corpus proceedings or otherwise.
105
The Lavery court cited nothing in support of this remarkable state-
ment nor did it hint at what it intended "collectively" to mean. To be
sure, millions of human beings can bear duties and responsibilities at a
high level. Millions of human beings can bear duties and responsibilities
at some level. And millions of human beings cannot bear duties and re-
sponsibilities at any level. Yet the court concluded that all human beings
are legal persons not because they are human beings, which is indefensi-
ble, but because some human beings can bear duties and responsibilities.
The court's choice of species as the relevant touchstone was arbi-
trary and likely meant merely to reinforce the status quo. Other touch-
stones it could have chosen also contain all the human beings the court
claimed are able to bear duties and responsibilities, but these are broader
than the category of human being, such as vertebrates, primates, and
mammals. Still other categories contain all human beings able to bear
duties and responsibilities that are narrower than human being, such as
sane humans and humans with an IQ above 60.
The philosopher, James Rachels, pointed out that any choice of cat-
egory-as opposed to individual characteristics-as a condition for
rights "assumes that we should determine how an individual should be
treated, not on the basis of its own qualities but on the basis of other in-
dividual's qualities."l06 Something like Lavery's unusual notion of group
benefits has been occasionally employed to correct the effects of prior
discrimination, such as affirmative action, not to invent new ways to
discriminate.107 But this does not mean that racial or gender affirmative
action is, or should be, illegal. Harvard Law School Professor Laurence
H. Tribe, who supports racial and sexual affirmative action, acknowl-
edged the "tenaciously-held principle . .. with undeniable constitutional
roots ... that each person should be treated as an individual rather than
as a statistic or as a member of a group-particularly of a group the indi-
vidual did not knowingly choose to join."10 8 Yet even those judges may
exhibit what Professor Tribe called "considerable unease" in their dis-
cussions and rulings.109
That unease has not quieted. The Supreme Court has long required
race-based admissions to meet strict scrutiny.
1 10 In 2003, the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Gratz v. Bollinger,'11 struck down a system of under-
105. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 251 n.3 (emphasis added).
106. JAMES RACHELS, CREATED FROM ANIMALS 157 (1990).
107. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 328 (2003).
108. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1589 (2d ed. 1988); see id. at
1526-29.
109. See id. at 1523.
110. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504-06 (1989).
Ill. 539 U.S. 244, 244 (2003).
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graduate admissions that allocated predetermined points to racial minori-
ty candidates.112 That day, the Supreme Court also upheld a system of
preferences that treated race as a relevant feature in a law school admis-
sion process with a holistic review.'13 Thirteen years later, the Supreme
Court in Fisher v. University of Texas,1 14 would note "the enduring chal-
lenge ... to reconcile the pursuit of diversity with the constitutional
promise of equal treatment and dignity."'15
There exists a common law promise of equality, as well, that belies
the argument that persons must be able to bear duties and responsibili-
ties. Equality has always been a vital New York value, embraced by con-
stitutional law, statutes, and common law.1 16 Article 1, § 11 of the New
York Constitution contains both an Equal Protection Clause, modeled on
the Fourteenth Amendment, and an anti-discrimination clause."' New
York equality values are embedded into New York common law. There
has long been a "two-way street between common law decision-making
and constitutional decision-making" that had resulted in a "common law
decisionmaking infused with constitutional values."' 8 At common law,
such private entities as common carriers, victuallers, and innkeepers may
not discriminate unreasonably or unjustly." 9
In harmony with common law equality principles that forbid private
discrimination, the common law of equality embraces, at a minimum, its
sister fundamental constitutional equality value-embedded within the
112. Id. at 244, 246-47.
113. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306-10 (2003).
114. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
115. Id.at2214.
116. Equality is an important value throughout Western jurisprudence. See Vriend v. Alberta,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, 536 (S.C.C.) ("The concept and principle of equality is almost intuitively
understood and cherished by all."); HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defence 49(4) PD 94, 16
(1995) (Isr.) ("It is difficult to exaggerate the importance and stature of the principle of equality in
any free, democratic and enlightened society."); HCJ 453/94 Israel Women's Network v. Govern-
ment 48(5) PD 501, 1 22 (1994) (Isr.) ("The principle of equality, which . . . 'is merely the opposite
of discrimination' . . . has long been recognized in our law as one of the principles of justice and
fairness which every public authority is commanded to uphold."); Mabo v Queensland (No. 2)
(1992) 175 CLR 1, ¶ 29 (Austl.) ("equality before the law ... [is an] aspiration[] of the contempo-
rary Australian legal system"); see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Book
II, 65 (Henry Reeve trans., 2007) ("Democratic nations are at all times fond of equality ... for
equality their passion is ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible; they call for equality in freedom;
and if they cannot obtain that, they still call for equality in slavery."); THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[A]ll men are created equal").
117. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be
subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corpora-
tion, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.").
118. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 38, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Presti, 124 A.D.3d
1334 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (No. 14-00357); Judith S. Kaye, Forward. The Common Law and State
Constitutional Law as Full Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 727,
746-47 (1992).
119. See, e.g., Hewitt v. New York, 29 N.E.2d 641, 643-44 (N.Y. 1940); New York Tel. Co. v.
Siegel-Cooper Co., 96 N.E. 109, 111 (N.Y. 1911); Lough v. Outerbridge, 38 N.E. 292, 294-95 (N.Y.
1894); People v. King, 18 N.E. 245, 248-49 (N.Y. 1888).
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constitutions of New York, most other states, and the Constitution of the
United States-that prohibits discrimination based on irrational means or
illegitimate ends.120
A chimpanzee's common law classification as a "thing," unable to
possess any legal rights, rests upon the illegitimate end of enslaving an
autonomous being.12 1
Without such a requirement of legitimate public purpose it would
seem useless to demand even the most perfect congruence between
means and ends, for each law would supply its own indisputable-and
indeed tautological-fit: if the means chosen burdens one group and
benefits another, then the means perfectly fits the end of burdening just
those whom the law disadvantages and benefitting just those whom it
*122
assists.
In Romer, the Supreme Court struck down "Amendment 2" because
its purpose of repealing all existing anti-discrimination positive law
based upon sexual orientation was illegitimate.123 It violated equal pro-
tection because "[i]t is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies
persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the
board." 24
The test is whether persons are similarly situated for purposes of the
law challenged.125 "' S]imilarly situated' cannot mean simply 'similar in
the possession of the classifying trait.' All members of any class are sim-
ilarly situated in this respect and consequently, any classification what-
soever would be reasonable by this test." 26 "The equal protection guar-
antee requires that laws treat all those who are similarly situated with
respect to the purposes of law alike." 27 In Goodridge, the court swept
aside the argument that the legislature could refuse same-sex couples the
right to marry because the purpose of marriage is procreation, which they
could not accomplish.12 8 This argument "singles out the one unbridgeable
120. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1996) ("Equal protection of the laws is not
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.").
121. See Affronti v. Crosson, 746 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (N.Y. 2001) (discussing the permissibil-
ity of suspect purposes for creating classifications); see, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 959-60 (Mass. 2003); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
451-52 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
122. TRIBE, supra note 108, at 1440.
123. 517 U.S. at 623-26.
124. Id. at 633; see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962 (noting that same-sex marriage ban
impermissibly "identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the
board").
125. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 421-22 (Conn. 2008).
126. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009).
127. Id. at 883.
128. 798 N.E.2d at 961-62.
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difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms
that difference into the essence of legal marriage." 2 9
Tommy is imprisoned for one reason: he is a chimpanzee. Pos-
sessing that "single trait," he was "denie[d] . . . protection across the
board,"13 0 to which his autonomy and ability to self-determine entitle
him. Denying him his common law right to bodily liberty solely because
he is a chimpanzee is therefore a tautology.
Even those who will never be competent, who have always lacked
the ability and always will lack the ability, to choose, understand, or
make a reasoned decision about medical treatment possess common law
autonomy and dignity equal to the competent.'31 But if humans bereft
even of sentience are entitled to personhood, courts must either recognize
a chimpanzee's just equality claim to bodily liberty or reject the principle
of equality. The court in Lavery opted, mistakenly, for the latter.132
Nor is there any rational connection between the right to bodily lib-
erty sought and the Lavery court's novel "duties and responsibilities"
requirement. The NhRP claimed that chimpanzees have a common law
right to bodily liberty protected by the common law of habeas corpus.133
To satisfy equality, the classification (viz., the ability to bear duties and
responsibilities) must be rationally related to the goal or purpose of the
classification.'34 If, for instance, the right sought was a right to vote, right
to drive, or a right to bear arms, then perhaps a logical connection would
exist for Lavery's classification. By way of example, the Supreme Court
held that imposing a mandatory retirement age for judges was rationally
connected to the state's interest in "maintaining a judiciary fully capable
of performing the demanding tasks that judges must perform," because it
is "an unfortunate fact of life that physical and mental capacity some-
times diminish with age." 3 5
But no such connection exists between the ability to bear duties and
responsibilities and the denial of an autonomous being's right to bodily
liberty. The "object of the writ of habeas corpus is to set at large those
129. Id. at 962.
130. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
131. See, e.g., In re M.B., 6 N.Y.2d 394, 440, 443-44 (N.Y. 2006); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d
337, 341 (N.Y. 1986) (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 425 (Mass. 1977)); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73 (N.Y. 1981). See discussion supra Parts
II, IV.
132. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249-50 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014), leave to appeal den., 38 N.E.3d 828 (N.Y. 2015). Abraham Lincoln understood
that the act of extending equality protects everyone: "[i]n giving freedom to the slave, we assure
freedom to thefree-honorable alike in what we give, and what we preserve." ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1862, in 5 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
133. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 249-50; Brief for Petitioner at 46, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc.
ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (No. 2013-02051).
134. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 462-63 (1981).
135. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 471-72 (1991).
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who are illegally restrained of their liberty, and this applies equally
whether the person restrained be an infant or of full age."'36 Even the
never-competent-the severely mentally retarded, the severely mentally
ill, and the permanently comatose-who will never be competent, lack
the ability, have always lacked the ability, and always will lack the abil-
ity, to choose, understand, or make a reasoned decision about medical
treatment possess the right to bodily liberty equal to that of the compe-
tent.137 Such mentally incapable adults are entitled to habeas corpus de-
spite lacking the ability to bear duties and responsibilities, not because
they are human but because equality so demands.1 38
CONCLUSION
The determination of who is a person, for any reason, has never
been predicated upon an entity's ability to bear duties and responsibili-
ties. The New York Court of Appeals correctly held forty years ago that.
the question of who may be a person must be answered by reference to
public policy, not biology.139
Recognizing that its decision would strip millions of humans who
lack this capacity from having legal rights, the Lavery court erroneously
opined at footnote three that all humans would continue to be eligible for
personhood because they are "collectively" human, without relying upon
anything.140 The court further erred by taking judicial notice of the al-
leged scientific fact that chimpanzees do not have the capacity to bear
duties and responsibilities. 141 In subsequent habeas corpus cases involv-
ing the Lavery chimpanzee, Tommy, the NhRP attached numerous affi-
davits that demonstrated that chimpanzees actually possess this capaci-
ty.
14 2
136. In re Kottman, 2 Hill Eq. 363, 364 (S.C. Eq. 1834).
137. E.g., In re M.B., 846 N.E.2d 794, 795 (N.Y. 2006); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341
(N.Y. 1986) (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423
(Mass. 1977)); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981), superseded by statute, SURR. CT. PROC.
ACT § 1750 (2016), as recognized in In re MB., 846 N.E.2d at 796-97; Delio v. Westchester Cty.
Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 685-86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419,
426 n.25 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010) (quoting Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 428); In re New York Presbyterian
Hosp., 693 N.Y.S.2d 405, 411 n.5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (quoting In re Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 519
N.Y.S.2d 511, 513-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987)); In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 65, 67
(Wis. 1992) (An "individual's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment emanates from the com-
mon law right of self-determination and informed consent," as well as "the personal liberties pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
138. See, e.g., People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 174 N.E.2d 725, 725-26 (N.Y. 1961); People
ex rel. Jesse F. v. Bennett, 661 N.Y.S.2d 657, 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Brevorka ex rel. Wittle v.
Schuse, 643 N.Y.S.2d 861, 862 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); In re Cindy R., 970 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2012).
139. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. 1972).
140. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 n.3 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014), leave to appeal den., 38 N.E.3d 828 (N.Y. 2015).
141. See id. at 251.
142. Brief for Petitioner at 5, 60, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, No.
162358/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 2, 2015).
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The NhRP recently challenged the Lavery decision in the New York
Supreme Court's First Judicial Department. But when the NhRP asked
the First Department, by motion, to consider Black's Law Dictionary's
concession that it had erred in stating that a "person" was required to
have the capacity for rights and duties, rather than rights or duties, an
error the Lavery court had adopted, the First Department denied the
NhRP's motion, then perpetuated Lavery's and Black's Law Dictionary's
error, as if Black's Law Dictionary had never recanted.143
Appearing to recognize the frailty of Lavery's personhood reason-
ing in footnote three, the First Department noted that "Petitioner argues
that the ability to acknowledge a legal duty or legal responsibility should
not be determinative of entitlement to habeas relief, since, for example,
infants cannot comprehend that they owe duties or responsibilities and a
comatose person lacks sentience, yet both have legal rights."'" The First
Department's entire response was that the NhRP "ignores the fact that
these are still human beings, members of the human community."4 5
That very young humans and comatose humans are "persons" with
the capacity to possess legal rights, despite their inability to bear duties
and responsibilities, explodes the claim that the capacity to bear duties
and responsibilities has any relevance to personhood and the capacity for
legal rights.
Instead of entering into the required mature weighing of public pol-
icy and moral principle that determines, and ought to determine, person-
hood in New York and elsewhere,146 the First Department merely an-
nounced that only humans can have legal rights, without providing any
justification. We have seen such naked biases in other contexts.
Before the Supreme Court in 1857, Dred Scott's lawyers "ignored
the fact" that he was not white.147 The lawyers for the Native American,
Chief Standing Bear, "ignored the fact" that Standing Bear was not white
when, in 1879, the U.S. Attorney, in the Circuit Court for the District of
Nebraska, argued that a Native American could not be a "person" for the
purpose of habeas corpus after Standing Bear was jailed for returning to
his ancestral lands.148 The California Attorney General "ignored the fact"
that a Chinese person was not white when he insisted in 1854, without
success before the California Supreme Court, that a Chinese witness
could testify against a white man charged with murder in a California
143. Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 152 A.3d 73, 76 (N.Y. App. Div.
2017).
144. Id. at 78.
145. Id.
146. Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. 1972).
147. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
148. See generally United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb.
1879) (No. 14891).
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court.1 4 9 The lawyer for Ms. Lavinia Goodell "ignored the fact" that she
was not a man before the Wisconsin Supreme Court that, in 1876, denied
her the right to practice law solely because she was a woman. so
Chimpanzees are autonomous beings who can choose how to live
their rich lives. Habeas corpus protects autonomy. Rational arguments
are required to support the proposition that an autonomous being's spe-
cies should be relevant in determining whether she possesses the funda-
mental right to the bodily liberty-the autonomy-that habeas corpus
protects. None have been provided.
149. See generally People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854).
150. See generally In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (Wis. 1875).
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